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Theological Seminary, 


Case, "■^^.^r"^^. D.i.visj.o n , 

Shelf, JL<^^1 Section , 

Booh, .::..:.:: No,.,. 






A N 

S S A Y 

O N T H E 


By Dr. William King, late Lord 
Archbifhop oi DUBLIN. 

Tranilated from the Latiny with large Notes, 

To which are added two Sermons by the fame Au-' 
thor, the former concerning Divine Prefciencey 
the latter on the Fall of Man. 

The Third Edition corrected. 

By EDMVND LAW. M. A. Fellow of Chrifi College. 


i.KS^f5i.;^>«ri : 



And Sold by J. and P. Knapton, W. Innys and R. Mavhy, S. Birt znd. 
C. RivtJigtoTi, Booicfellers in London. Mdccxxxix, 


Dr. Waterland 

Mailer of Magdalen CoIIese in 
Camhridie^ &€, &c. 


IT is a common obfervation that the ge- 
nerality of fuch Freethinkers as are feri- 
rious and have reafon'd them.lelves out of 
the Chriftian RelisT^ion, have at the fame 
time rejected the beKef of a Deity. This 
muft arife either from their entertaining 
fome Principles that lead equally to both 
thefe abfurdities; or, which is more proba- 
ble,' from their having no Principles at all : 
from mere Sceptic! fm and a habit of rai- 
iing Objedions without ever attending to 
the anfwers ; without proceeding on any 
fettled grounds of enquiry, or endeavour- 

A ing 


ing to eftablifli any thing: a temper of 
mind which may eafily bring a Man to 
disbeHeve any thing. But whatever be the 
Caufe of this, the Obferv^ation is remarkably 
verify'd in the prelent Age. Moft of our 
modern Unbehevers have fo far perplex'd 
themfelves with Difficulties about the Law 
of Nature and right Reafon, Liberty Divine 
and Human, Prefcience, Providence, and 
the like, that they feem to be in univerlal 
Confufion The chief defign of the follow- 
ing Book is to clear up fome of thefe Diffi- 
culties, to eftablifli true and proper Notions, 
as well as to refute falfc and unworthy ones, 
concerning the Exiftence and Attributes of 
God, and his Government of the World ; 
concerning the Nature and Condition of 
Man, the Obligations he Hes under, the 
Rule and End of his actions; and to build 
the whole upon fuch Principles of Pvcafon 
as are perfectly confiftcnt with Revelation. 
This, 'tis hoped, will not be without its ufc 
at prefent, in flopping the growth of Ltc- 
ligion by ftriking at the Root of it ; it may 
have fome influence toward fettling the 
minds of the unlearned and unflablc^ and be 



fufflcient tlio' not to reduce them to a hearty 
profeiiion of the true Faith, yet at leaft to 
hinder them from falling into downright In • 
fidelity; efpecially if coiintenanc'd by a 
Perfon eminent fjr a tlioroiigh knov/ledge 
of thefe Subjedlsj confefledlyan able Judge, 
an upright Defender, a bright Example of 
Religion both reveafd and natural ; v/ho is 
zealous to aflert the truth and enforce the 
neceffity of the Principal Dodrines and In- 
ftitutions of the one, as v/ell as to eftaWifh 
the true ground and fundamental Principle, 
and fix the proper Limits of the other : and 
above all, who has always the Courage to 
maintain thefe great Truths, howfoever un- 
fafiiionable or unpopular they may be fome- 
times made. 

Thefe, Sir, are very obvious reafons for 
my being ambitious to prefix your Name to 
the foUcwino; ¥/ork, and endeavouring to 
recommend it to the favour of one to whom 
its Author wou'd liave been defirous to ap- 
prove himfelf 

'Tis with pleafure alfo that I take this op- 
portunity of declaring as well my fenfe of 
the great benefits that attend the perufal of 

A 2 your 


your Writings, which muft giv^e equal 
warmth and convidlion to all who have the 
leaft concern for Religion ; as my experience 
of that candid condefcention and commu- 
nicative temper, which is ready to encou- 
rage and inftrud: every young enquirer after 

To thefe more general Motives to an Ad- 
drels of this kind give me leave to add the 
many private Obligations which in a parti- 
cular manner demand an acknowledgment 

S I Ry 

Tour tnojl obliged 
humble Servanty 

Edmund L a w^ 


Tranflator's PREFACE. 

IH A V E always look'd upon an Enquiry into 
the Caufe and Origin of Evil, as one of the 
nobleil: and mod important Subje(fts in Natural 
Religion. It leads us into the moft exalted Spe- 
culations concerning the Exillence and Attributes of 
God, and the Original of Things. ^It firft endea- 
vours to difcover the true intent of the Deity in 
creating Beings at all, and then purfues that Intent 
thro' the feveral Works of his Creation : it (hews 
how this is fully anfwer'd at prefent by the Inani- 
mate and Brute Part, and how it might and fliould 
be, and why, and in what refped, it is not by the 
Rational. It contemplates the Oeconomy in the 
Government of the Univerfe, fearches into the va- 
rious Schemes of Providence, and takes in the whole 
Compafs of Nature. 

Neither is its Ufefubiefs inferior to its Extent. It 
concerns every Man who pretends to adt upon any 
ferious Views here, or to entertain any folid Hopes 
of Futurity. The Knowledge of it, in fome degree, 
is abfolutely neceffary in order to the fettling in our 
Minds right Notions of the Nature and Will of God, 
and the Duties we owe him ; in order to the due 
Apprehenfion of his Defign in creating, preferving, 
and directing us ; and to the regular Coadud: of our 

A3 Live^ 

vlii P R E FA C E. 

Lives, and Enjoyment of ourfelves in that State and 
Condition wherein he has placed us. Nay, while 
we are ignorant of this one Point, what rational Plea- 
fure can we take in knowino; any other? When I 
enquire how I got into this World, and came to be 
what I am, I'm told that an ablblutely perfed Being 
produced me out of Nothing, and placed me here 
on purpofe to communicate fome Part of his Hap- 
pinefs to me, and to make me, in fome meafure, 

like himfelf ^ This End is not obtain'd ; • 

the diredt contrary appears ;■ I find myfelf fur- 
rounded with nothing but Perplexity, Want and 

Miferys By whofe fault I know not, How 

to better myfelf I cannot tell What Notions of 

God and Goodnefs can this afford nie ? What 

Ideas of Religion ? What Hopes of a future 

State ? For, if God's Aim in producing me be 

entirely unknown ; if it be neither his Glory, (as 
fome will have it) wdiich my prefent State is far from 

advancing; nor mine own Good^ which the 

fame is equally inconfiilent with ; how know I v/hat 
T am to do here, and in what m.anner I mufl: endea- 
vour to pleafe him ? Or why fliould I endeavour it 

at all ? For, if I mull be miferable in this 

World, what Security have I that I fliall not be fo 
in another too; (if there be one) fince, if it were 
the Will of my Almighty Creator, I might (for 
ought I fee) have been happy in both ? 

Such Thoughts as thefe muff needs difturb a Per- 


fon that has any real Concern for his Maker's PIo- 
nour or his own Happinefs ; that delires to pay him 
a reafonable Service, and anfwer the End of his 
Creation : in fliort, that happens to think at all upon 
thefe things, and to think for himfelf. And there- 


fore an Endeavour to rid the Mind of fome of thefe 
Perplexities, cannot fnre be unacceptable, and a So- 
lution of any one of thefe Doubts, is doing a piece 
of Service to Mankind which can never be un- 
feafonable. But the Ufefulnefs, as well as Anti- 
quity, of the prefent Debate ; and the Abfurdity of 
the Manichcan Scheme of accounting for Evil, have 
been often explain'd, and need not here to be infifted 
on : all that ever feern'd wanting to an entire Con- 
quefl over thefe Heretics, and their abfurd Hypo- 
thefis, was only a tolerable Solution of the many 
Difficulties which drove them into it: and this our 
Author has etFeded, as I hope to make appear in the 

There are two general ways of Reafoning, called 
Arguments a Priori^ and a Pojleriori^ or according 
to what Logicians commonly flile the Synthetic and 
Analytic Method : The former lays down fome evi- 
dent Principles, and then deduces the feveral Conje^ 
q^ences neceilarily refulting from them : The latter 
begins with the Pkenomena themfelves, and traces 
'em up to their Original^ and from the known Pro- 
perties of thefe Phenomena arrives at the Nature of 
their Caufe. Now the former of thefe is evidently 
preferable, where it can be had, fince the latter mufl 
depend upon a large Indudion of Particulars, any of 
which failing invalidates the whole Argument and 
fpoils a Demonftration. 

An Attempt therefore to flxew that the Subjed be- 
fore us is capable of the former Method, mull be ve- 
ry delirablej and this our Author feems to have 
done, without any precarious Syftem, or illgrounded 
Hypothefis. His fuperior Excellence confills in ha- 
ving laid down, and previoufly eftablifh'd fuch folid, 

A 4 fubftantial 


fubftanr'ial Principles as may be drawn out /;/ infiui- 
turn. ?r>d eafily apply'd to all the Difficulties that at- 
tend t^e prefent Qticflion. 

He firil of all enquires into the Nature and Per- 
fe<5lions of the Deity, and his Delign in the Creati- 
on j fettles the true Notion of a Creature, and exa- 
mines whether any could be perfecfl ; and if not, 
whether all fliould have been made equally imper- 
fect; or feveral in very different ClafTes and Degrees. 
Having proved the laft of thefe Opinions to be the 
true o\\^^ he proceeds to the lowed Clafs of Beings, 
mx. Material ones: He enquires into the Nature 
and effential Properties of Matter^ and the Laws of 
its Motio?!^ and thereby eftabliflies fuch Rules as di- 
rect us to the Solution of all the Difficulties attend- 
ing it as diftributed into various Maffes^ Syftems, 
and Animated Bodies He fliews the unavoidable- 
nefs, and abfolute neceffity oi contrary Motions in 
Matter, for the fame Reafons that it had any Motion 
at all and confequcntly ol Attrition^ Corruption and 
T)i[[olution, nnd all the Natural Evils that attend 
themx. In the next place, from the Nature of a 
SelfrJno'vi7ig Principle, and the manner of its Opera- 
tion, he deduces all the Irregularities incident to Vo- 
lition, and the Actions confequent thereupon. He 
flates at large the true Notion of Frcc-lVill^ and 
.demonftrates the abfolute Neceffity for ic in every 
Rational Being, in order to if^ Happinefs. Then 
accounts for the feveral Abufes of it, and the Moral 
Evils arifing from thence, and examines all the pof- 
fible Ways of preventing them ; and upon the whole 
makes it appear^that none or thefe could have been ori- 
ginally avoided, or can now be removed, without in- 
troducing greater 5 and confequently that the very Per-r 



nilffion of thefe Evils, and the Production and Pre- 
fervation of thefe Beings, in the prefent State, is the 
higheft Inftance of infinite Wifdom, Power and 

Now thefe arc not mere Arguments ad Ignoraiiti- 
am : This is not telling us that we muft believe fuch 
and fuch things to be the Effeds of an infinitely wife 
and good God, tho' no Marks of either Wifdom or 
Goodnefs appear in them j which tho' it may be true, 
and all that perhaps can be faid in feme particular 
Cafes, yet has, 1 think, but very little Tendency 
towards either the Convidlion of an Infidel, or the 
Satisfaction of a true Believer. When a Ferfon is 
ferioully contemplating any Parts of Nature, and fo- 
Hcitoufly enquiring into their feveral Ends and Ufes, 
no Pleafure furely can arife to himfelf, nor Devoti- 
on toward the Author of it, merely from the Per- 
plexity and Unaccountablenefs of thofe Parts. Nay 
every fuch Inftance, one would think, muft caft a 
damp upon his Spirits and prove an ungrateful Re- 
flediion on his Weaknefs, a mortifying Argument of 
his Imperfedion. Whereas one fingle Perplexity 
clear'd up, or Objed:ion anfwer'd, is a piece of real 
Knowledge gain'd, upon which he can congratulate 
himfelf, and glorify his Maker. 

Our Author therefore was not content with mere 
lS[cgative Arguments, and barely avoiding Difficul- 
ties, by removing all Defeds from external things 
to ourfelves, and multiplying Inftances of the Nar- 
rownefs and Weaknefs of Human Underftandino-: 
(which any one that thinks at all will foon be con- 
vinced of, and heartily defirous of having it fome- 
what enlarged and improved, to which this manner 
of Argumentation, I fear, contributes very little.) 



Bat he attacks his Adverfaries in their flrongeft 
Holds, and plucks up the Manichean Herefy by the 
Roots : he ihews by certain pre-eflabliih'd Rules, 
and necellary Confeqnence, that we can eahly reduce 
all to one fupreme Head, and clearly comprehend 
how the prelcnt ftate of things is the very bell in all 
refpedts, and worthy of a mod wife, powerful, and 
beneficent Author : And why, taking the whole Sy- 
flem of Beings together, and every Clafs of them in 
its own Order, none could poilihiy have been made 
more perfed', or placed in a better. He proves, in 
the firft place (as we obferv'd) that no created Be- 
ings could be abfolutely periedt, and in the next, 
that no manner of Evil, or Imperfedion was tole- 
rated in them, but what was, either in their Clafs 
and manner of Exillence, abfolutely unavoidable, 
or elfe productive of feme Good more than equi- 
valent: In both which Cafes there will be the fame 
Reafons for the Creation of fuch Beings in fuch 
Circumftances, together with their concomitant E- 
vils, as there was for any Creation at all j For which 
the fole Reafon will appear to be an Intention in the 
Creator of communicating Happinefs to as many Be- 
ings as could be made capable of it, on the very beft 
Terms ; or a Refolution not to omit the leaft Degree 
Q^ pure Good on account of fuch Evils, as did not 
counterballance it : Or (which is the very fame, fince 
'twill be evident that the Prevention of all the prefent 
Evils, in any conceivable Manner, would have been 
of worfe Confeqnence than the Permiliion of them) 
an Intention always to choofc the leaft of two Evils^ 
when both cannot be avoided. 


PREFACE. :xiii 

This muft be granted to come up to the Point ; 
and when it is once made apparent, will be a full 
and fufficient Anfwer to that old triumphant Quef- 
tion, rio gv tI Ka;cov; 'twill be an ample Vindication 
of the Divine Providence ; a Demonflration of the 
Power, andWildom, and Goodnefs of God in the 
Produd:ion, Prefervation, and Government of the 
Univerfe; and as much as a reafonable Man can ex- 
ped or defire. And I heartily wifli this Method had 
been taken by more of thole Authors that have wrote 
on the prefent Subjed, and the Argument purfued a' 
little farther by Natural Light ^ in order to give fome 
Light and Confirmation even to Re--cclation itfelf, in 
thefe inquifitive Days, wherein a great many feera 
unwilling to be determined by its fole Authority-; 
wherein Men are not a little inclined to call every- 
thing into queftion^ and a weak Argument, is fur e 
to be exploded. Even the moil: learned and in- 
genious Writer on this Subject often flies to Scrip- 
ture when a Difficulty begins to prefs him: which^ 
in my Opinion, is deferting the Argument, and 
owning, with Mr. Bayle (in his Explanation touch- 
ing the Manichees at the End of his Didf ionary) " that 
the Queftion cannot be defended on any other foot, " 

Whereas, if the Difficulty be really unanfwerable 

by Reafon, ora plain Contradidion to our natural No- 
tions of God; if (as the fore-mentioned Author often 
urges) '' we perceive by our clear and diftind: Ideas, 
" that fuch a thing is intirely repugnant to his Nature 
" and Attributes, "—referring us to Scripture, which 
declares that an infinitely perfed Being did conflitute 
it thus, will be no manner of Satisfadion, fince(upon 


xiv P R E FA C E. 

this Suppoiltionj we cannot have greater AfTurance 
that this Scripture comes from him, than we have 
that the Doctrine therein contain'd is abfurd and im- 
poflible. And what that ingenious Perfon's intent 
might be in reprefcnting the matter thus, and then re- 
ferring us to Scripture for an Anfvver, I cannot deter- 
mine. But lure I am, that his Account of it ferves 
rather to betray the Caufe, and undermine the Autho- 
rity of bodiReafon and Revelation and is enough (if 
no better could be gi/en) ro make a Perfon that argues 
confequentially reject all kinds of Religion. 

Farther, every one muft have obfcrv'd, that mofl 
Authors upon this Subjc6t treat of Gods Dilpenfa- 
tions toward Man, as if they were fpeaking of one 
Man's Behaviour toward another. They think it 
fjfiicient to make the Almighty cboofe the moft pru- 
dent, likely Means of bringing Man to Happinefs ; 
and aCt upon the highell P?'obabilit\\ tho' (upon what 
account foevcr it matters not) he fail of his End. Now 
this may indeed be the bell manner of acting in all 
finite, ifnperfert Beings, and fufficient to acquit the 
Goodnt^is and Jiiltice of God, but 'tis very far from 
latisfying his IVifdom. To a perfect Being who fore- 
fees tjie Ette6ls of all poiTible Caufes and Means, as 
the fame Authors allow God to do, thefe only ap- 
pear fit and eligible for the effects and End> which 
they will certain^ produce. Nor is it any reafon 
why I fhould purfue a Method which is apt and wont 
to fucceed in moll Cafes, if I Jzno'-J) it will fail in this. 
To a Perfon therefore that takes all the Attributes 
of God toeether and confiders the whole Scheme of 
Providence from end to end, it will not appear a 
complete and facisfac^tory Vindication of them, to 
.aiierc that God either now makes Men, or fulfers 



them to make themlelves miferable, for rejeding 
that Happinefs which he at fir ft made them capable 
of, and endow 'd them with fuch Powers, and placed 
them in fuch Circum.ftances as render'd it naturally 
poffible and even eafy to be attain d by them : tho' 
this may indeed clear his Juftice and lay the Blame 
upon ourfelves: And yet thefe Writers generally con- 
tent themfelves with going thus far : They bring all 
our Sin and Mifery from the abufe of Free- Will, 
(/. e. a Power whereby a Man might poflibly have 
acted otherwife, and prevented it;) without ever ex- 
plaining the Nature of this Principle, or fhewing the 
Worth'and excellence of it, and proving that, asfar 
as we can apprehend, more Good in general arifes 
from the donation of fuch a Self-moving Power, 
together with all thefe forcfeen Abufes of it, than 
could poffibly have been produced without it. To 
demonftrate this was an Actempt worthy of our Au- 
thor, who has at leafl laid a noble Foundation for 
it, and feems to be the firft that has propofed the 
true Notion of Human Liberty^ and explained it con- 
fiftently : All the Doubts and Difficulties attending 
which intricate Queftion will, I hope, be tolerably 
cleared up ; or at leaft fuch Principles eftabliihed as 
may be fufficient for that Purpofe, by this Treatife 
of his, and the Notes upon it. 

So much for the Subjed: and our Author's way of 
treating it. As for the T^ranjlatlon^ 'tis barely Lite- 
ral. 1 endeavoured to keep clofe to the Author's 
Senfe, and generally to his very Words. I once in- 
tended to have cut off every thing that I could not 
defend, efpecially about the Beginning (which ufed 
to difcourage mod Readers from perufmg the reft of 
his valuable Book, and might perhaps as well have 



omitted -,) but confidering that he had involv'd it (o 
clofely ill the reil: of his Scheme, that the whole 
would feem confufed without it, and that others 
might perhaps have a different Opinion of it, I con- 
tented myfelf with omitting part of his Notes, and 
obviarino; the rell all alono-. both from other Authors, 
and fuch Obfervations of my own as occurr'd upon 
the Subjed. » 

Some perhaps may thin^ the frequent and long 
Rotations tedious, and introduced only to ftuff up. 
. 1 can only anfwer that the Notes, and Refe- 
rences together, were intended to point out a fort of 
Compendium of Mctaphyjics or Speculative Divinity, 
bv direfting; the Reader to a Set of true Notions on 
the various Subjeds which our Author touch'd upon, 
and which could not be found in any one particular 
Book, nor' collected from feveral, without much 
Trouble, and Confufion, and unneceffary Reading. 
I chofe rather to quote the very Words of the Au- 
thors than either to uie worfe of my own, or pretend 
to difcover what had been often difcover'd before; 
or to repeat the fame things over and over again, 
which is endlefs. 'Tis hop'd the Reader will find 
that a citation of two or more Authors on the fame 
Point is not always Tautology: and I believe it will 
appear in the multitude of References no more 
than one is ever made to the fame Place, except up- 
on a very different Occafion, or in feme different 
Lig;ht. A Writer often does more good by fhewing 
the Ufe of fome of thofe many Volumes which we 
have already, than by offcrmg new ones; tho' this 
be of much lefs Advantage to his own Charader. I ' 
determin'd therefore not to fay any thing myfelf where 
I could bring another conveniently to fay it for me ; 


• P R E FA C E. xvli 

and tranfcrlbed only fo much from others as was 
judg'd abfolutely neceiTary to give the Reader a fliort 
View of the Subjecin:, and by that Sketch to induce 
thofe who have leifure, opportunity and inclination, 
to go farther and confult the Originals ; and to afford 
fome prefent Satisfa<fi;ion to thofe who have not. 

Since the publication of the former Edition, Arch- 
bhhop Kifigs Relations have obliged me with a large 
Colledion of his Papers on the fame Subjed: both in 
Lati?! and EfigUJh. They contain an Explication and 
Defence of the principal parts of his Scheme, and 
afford very good hints for improving it in feveral 
points; efpecially with regard to x\\^Union of the 
Soul and Body, and their mutual hifaience ; to Hu- 
man Liberty ; to the State of Adam in ParadiJ'e, and 
the Confequences of his Fall. The lafl of thefe is 
alfo fully difcufs'd in the Setmon annex'd, which 
the Author had order'd to be printed after his deceafe, 
and which cannot but be acceptable to the Public. 
Thefe advantaged' encourag'd me to review the whole 
and endeavour to complete the Author's defign. To 
make room for the neceffary Additions, I omitted all 
his Notes to the firft Chapter, as well as fome of 
my own which had no immediate relation to the 
main Subjedi. I have compared the Latin and Eng- 
liili Papers together on each head, and give the Ar- 
gument made up from them both. What is extradl- 
ed from them I have fet down by way of Note un- 
der thofe parts of the Book which treat on the fame 
things, with Capital Letters prefix'd to diftinguifh 
them from all the reft, which I am anfwerable for. 

The great Value which the Author fet upon this 
Work appears from the pains he has taken to vindi- 
cate it from <ivery the leaft cavil j in which view tU 



Xviii PRE FA C E. * 

that he has v.'roie would make a much larger Volume 
than his firfl. It was my intention to reduce it to as 
fmall a compaTs as poilible by infer ting no more than 
what feem'd to give light to his main Scope and was 
>^fufficiently clear. -/-He begins with an account of the 
prefenc liate of the Controverfy about the Origin of 
Evil, and offers many Arguments againil the fuppo- 
iition of an abfolutely Evil Principle, mofi: of which 
are omitted, fmce few, if any, thinking Perfons 
now-a-days can be imagin'd to embrace fo extrava- 
gant an Hypothefis, and therefore it requires but 
little confutation. In the next place he lays down a 
fummary of the chief Principles on which his Book 
is built, and then proceeds to rank his Adverfaries 
into their feveral Clailes, and confider the various 
Arguments which they have urg'd againft him. The 
fubftance of his Anfwers, efpecially to fuch Obje(5tions 
as have been either omitted, or but flightly touch'd 
upon in the former Edition, will be given in their 
proper Places. The general view bf his Scheme as 
laid down by himfelf, may perhaps be not difagree- 
able to the Reader before he enters on the Book, and 
is as follows, 

I . Ali Creatures are necejfarily imperfeSi a?jd af 

infinite dijhince from the Eerfe^ion of the Deity, and 

if a negative Principle were to he admitted, fuch as 

tlje P R i V A r I O N oftJje P E R I P AT E T I C S, 

it might be fciid that every created Being confifts of 

Exigence and Non-Exiflence j for it is nothing in re- 

fpcFc' both of tJjofe perfections which it wants, and of 

-t^thoje which ot/jers have. -^Ind tins D^feSt, or as we 

may fay. Mixture of INJON-ENTITY in the 

Confftution of created Beings is the necefjary Priij-^ 



cipk of all Natural Evils, a?id of a pojjlbility of Mo- 
ral ones ; as, will appear in the fequel. 

2. An Equality of PerfeBion in the Creatures is 
impofibky [as our AdverJ'aries alloiv) I add, neither 
ivou d it he fo convenient to place all in the fame fate 
of PerfeSfion. 

3 . It is agreeable to Divine Wifdom and Goodiiefs 
to have created not only the more perfeB Beings, but 
alfo the moft imperfedt, fuch as Matter, fo long as 
they are better than nothings and no impediment to 
the more perfeSl ones. 

4. Admitting Matter and Motion there necejfarily 
follows Compofition and Difolution of Bodies, that is 

Generation and Corruption-, which fome may look up- 
on as defeBs in the Divine work ; and yet it is no 
ObjeBion to his Goodfiefs or Wifdom to create fuch 
thi?igs as are neceffarily attended with thefe Evils, 
blowing therefore God to be infinitely powerjul, good 
and wife, yet it is manifefi that fome Evils, vix. Ge~ 
ration and Corruption, and the necejfary Confluences 
of thefe, might have place in his Works ; a}id if even 
one Evil coud arife without the ill Principle, why 
not many ? And if we knew the nature and circmji- 
fiances of all things as well as we do thofe of Matter 
ftnd Motion, it may be prefunid that we coud account 
for them without any i?nputation of the Divine Attri- 
butes. For there' s the fame reafon for them all, and 
one Inftance to the contrary deflroys an univerfal Pro- 

5. // is not inconfijlent with the Divine Attributes 
to have created fome Spirits or thinking Subfiances, 
which are dependant on Matter and Motio?i in their 
Operations, and being united to Matter may both move 
their Bodies and be affcBed with certain Pajjions and 

b Senfations 



Sen fat ion 5 by their Mot ion ^ and jl and in need of a 
certain dijpofition of Organs for the proper exercife of 
their thinking faculty j fuppofing the number of thofe 
that are quite fepar ate from Matter to be as comp/eat 
as the Syftejn of the whole Vniverfe laou'd admits and 
that the lower order is tw incowoenience to the higher. 

6. It cannot be co?icei'v'd but that fome fe?ij'ations 
thus excited by Matter and Motion Jhoud be dif agree- 
able and tend to difohe the union between Soul and 
Body, as well as others agreeable. For 'tis impojjible 
as well as inconvenient that the Soul jlmid feel 
itfelf to be lofing its faculty of thinking, which alone 
can make it happy, and not be afeBed with it. Now 
di [agree able fenfation is to be reckon d atnong natural 
Evils, which yet cannot be avoided without removing 
fuch kind of Atiimals out of nature. If ajiy one ask 
why fuch a Law of Union was ejlablifjd ? Let this be 
his anfwer -, Becaufe there cotid be no better. For fuch 
a necejjity as this flows from the very nature of the uni- 
en of things, and confidering the circumftanccs and 
conditions imder which, and which only they coiid 
have exifence, they coiid neither be placed in a better 
State, nor govertid by more commodious Laws. Thefe 
Evils therefore are not inconfijient with the Divine 
Attributes, provided that the Creatures which are 
fubjeSl to them enjoy juch benefits ds over-ballance them, 
'T^is to be obfervd alfo that thefe Evils do not properly 
arife from the Exiftence which God gave to the Crea- 
tures, but jrom hence that they had not more of Exif- 
tence given them, which neverthelefs their State and 
the place they fill in the great Machine of the World 
CQU d not ad?nit . This Mixture therefore of Non-ex- 
ijlencefupplies the place of an ill Frinciple in the Ori^ 
gin of Evil, as was f aid before^ 

y, The 


7. ^be Happinefs and Perfetlion of every thing or 
Agent ar'ifes from the due Excrcfe of thofe Faculties 
which God has given it, and the more Faculties and 
PerfeBions any thing has, 'tis capable of the greater 
and more perfect Happinefs. 

8. T'he lej's dependent on external things, the more 
felffuficient any Agent is, and the more it has the 
principle of its Anions in itfelf, 'tis fo fnuch the more 
perfect j Since therefore we may conceive two Sorts of 
Agents, one which do not ail, unlefs impell'd and 
det er mill d by external force the other which have the 
Principle of their Anions within themfelves and can 
determine themfelves to aBion by their own natural 
Power : 'tis plain that the latter are much more per- 

feB than the former. Nor can it be denyd but that 
God may create an Agent with fuch a power as this, 
which can exert itfelf itito aBion, without either the 
concourfe of God or the determination oj external Cau- 

fes, fo long as God by a general Concourfe preferves the 
Extflence, Powers and Faculties of that Agent, 

9. Such an Agent may prejcribe to itfelf an End, 
and profectite it by proper Means and take delight in 
the profecution of it, thd that end might be perfeBly 
indifferent to it before it was propofed, and be no more 
agreeable than any other of the fame or a different kind 
woud be, if the Age?7t had once refolvd to profecute 
it, Forfince all the pleafure or happinefs which we 
receive, arifcs from the due exercife of our Faculties^ 
every thing which is equally commodious for the exer^ 
cife of our faculties, will give us the fame delight. 'The 
reafon therefore why one thing pleafes above another is 

founded in the AB of the Agent himfelf, viz. his Elec* 
tion. This is largely explain d in the Book itfelf, to- 

b 2 gether 

xxii PREFACE. 

gether with the limits within which it is conjinedy and 
Jhall be illiiflrated more fully her e aft e?-. 

10. It is impojjible that all things Jljoii d agree to 
ally that is be good; for fine e the things are limited ^ 
diflincl and different one from another ^ and are en- 
dow d with finite y dijlinB and different appetites ^ it 
neceffarily follows that the relations of cont'efiieftt and 
inconvetiient mufi arife from this di've?fity. Since 
therefore every created being isjrom the imperfeBion 
of its nature neceffarily limit ed^ and from that limi- 
tation there neccfjarily follows diftin^ion and diver- 

fity, 2t follows that a pojjibility at leafl of Evil is a ne- 
cejfary attendant on all Creatures, and cannot he fe- 
parated from them by any Power, JVifdom or Good- 
nefs whatfoever. For when a thing is applied to afi 
Appetite or Being to which it is not appropriated, as 
it is not agreeable to it, it necejfarily affeSis it with 
iineafinefs \ nor was it pofible that all things foud be 
appropriated to every Being, where the things them- 
felves and the appetites are various and different ^ as 
they 7nujl neceffarily be, if created, evefi in the mofl 
perfeB ?nanner. 

1 1 . Si?ice fome Agents have a power over their Ac- 
tions, as above, and can pleafe the?nfelves in the choice 
offuch thi?igs as may exercife their faculties j and fine e 
there are fome ways of exercifing them which may be 
prejudicial to themf elves or others -, 'tis plain that front 
this power there arifes a poff.bility of choofuig amifsy 
and they ma\ exercife thcmfelves to their own preju-^ 
dice or that of others. 

12. And fine e infuch a variety of things thofe that 
are beneficial or hurtful cannot be known by an intel- 
ligent Joeing which is in its own nature limited and 
imperjediy it was agreeable to the Divine JVifdom and 


PREFACE. xxlii 

Goodnefs to prefcribe fome Rides and DireBiofis toftich 
aoents^ in order to inform them of what woii'd bene^ 
fit or incommode them and their Fellow Creatures^ 
i. e. what woud be good or evil ; that they might choofe 
the one and avoid the other. 

13. Since therefore, as was faid before^ an Equa- 
lity of PerfeBions in the Creatures is impoffible^ nei- 
ther woud it be convenient for them to be placed in 
the fame State of PerfeSlion, it follows that there are ■ 
various Orders and Degrees even among intelligent 
Creatures ; and fine e fome of the inferior Orders and 
Degrees are capable ofthofe benefits which the fuperior 
ones enjov, and fine e there are as many placed in. thofe 
fuperior Orders as the Syjtem of the Univerfe allowed, 
itjollows that the inferior ones, as a more convenient 
place coud not be left for them, ought to be content 
with a lower portion of Happinefs, which their nature 
makes them capable of, and to a higher than which 
they coud not afpire without detriment to the fuperior 
which poffeffes that Station. For he mujl quit his place 
before another can afcendto it; and it jeems hard and 
^ery inconfiftent with the nature of God to degrade a 
Superior as long as he has done nothing to deferve it. 
But if one of a fuperior Order fo all by his own aB, 
without any violence or compulfion, voluntarily quit 
his place, or freely choofe fuch things as deferve a De- 
gradation, God wou'd feem unjuft to thofe who are in 
an inferior Degree and by a good ufe of their Liberty 
become fit and qualify d for a fuperior State, if he 
jlmid refufe them the free ufe of their Choice. It 
feems unjuft for God to condemn or degrade any one ar- 
bitrarily, but he is not to be blamed for fuffering one to 
degrade himfelf by his own a£l and choice, ejpecially 
when the ufe of that eleBive power belongs to the na^ 

b 3 t^T^^ 

xxiv PREFACE. 

titre of an intelligent Beings and coiid not in the prefent 
fiate be prohibited ivitkout detriment to fome ether. 

Here the IViJdom ond Gccdnefs of God feem to haTe 
exerted thc?}ifelves in a mo ft glorious manner^ the contri- 
'vance appears to be the effcdl of the highefl Policy and 
Pmidence. For by this means God has jl^ewn himfelj- 
mofi equitable to his Creatures ; fo that no one can com^ 
plain oj or glory in his lot. He that is in a lefs conve- 
nient Situation has no room for complaint , fince he is en- 
dow d with faculties and has power to ufe them in fuch 
a manner as to acquire a more commodious one ; and he 
mufi be forced to own himfelf only in the fault if he con- 
tinues deprived of it : and he that is now in a fuperior 
kit ate may learn to fear left he fall from it by an unlaw- 
ful ife of his faculties. 'The Superior therefore has a 
Dread that may in fome meafure dlminiftj his happinefsy 
and the inferior Hope that may increafe it-, by which 
means they are both brought nearer to an equality^ and 
in the mean time have the utmoft provocation and incite- 
ment to choofe the beft, and make the mo ft beneficial ufe 
of their faculties. This Cont eft ^ if I mi ft a ke not , makes 
for the good of the Univerf\ and much more than if 
all things were fixd by Fate and Ncceftit\\ and abjo- 
lutely confined to their prefent State. Either God muft 
have created no free Agents to be governed by the hope 
of rewards and fear of puiiifijments, or this will be the 
fit t eft means to that end, and worthy of a God. For what 
ground is there to complain of the Deity in this whole 
affair ; except that when an equal ftoare of happinefs 
coud not befal every one^ he beftows the beft on fuch as 
ife their faculties aright^ and takes away what he had 
given from thofe that ab ufe them": But more of this 
hereafter » 


14. If what is laid down above be true^ from thence 
^tismanifeji that all kinds of Evil ^ viz. that 0/" IM- 
PERFECTION, PAIN ana SIN may enter 
into a world made by the mojl wife good and powerful 
Author^ and that its Origin ?nay be accounted for with- 
out {falling in the ajjiftance of an Evil Principle . 

15, ^'i is plain that we are tied down to this Earth 
and cojifined in it^ as in a Pj'ifon, and that our Know- 
ledge does not extend beyond the Ideas which we receive 

from the Senfes ; and who knows not how fmall a part 
we underfland even of thofe Elements about which we are 
converfant ? But fince the whole Mafs of Elements is as 
a Point in regard to the whole Univerfe, is it any wonder 
if we mijiake when %ve are forming a judgment^ or rather 
a conjeBure^ concerning the beauty^ order and Goodnefs 
of the Whole fro?n this contemptible Particle f T^his 
Earth of ours may be the Du7igcon of the XJniverfe^ an 
Hofpital of Madmen or a Work-houfe of reprobates^ and 
yet fuch as it is, there is much ?nore both of natural 
and Moral Good than Evil to be found in it. 

T'hus far has the Controverfy about the Origin of 
Evil proceed in the Author s Book. For all that has 
been faid above is either exprejly contaiiid in ity or 
may very eafly be deduced from the Principles there laid 

P. S. The Perfons to whom I am more particu- 
larly obliged for the Papers abovemention'd, are the 
Reverend Mr Spence Redlor of Donnaghmore^ and the 
Reverend Mr. King Prebendary of St. Pat}'ick\ and 
Minifter of St. Brides Dublin : who are defired to 
accept of this Acknowledgement, and to excufe the 
Freedom I here take of informing the Public, to 
whom I eileem it as well a? myfelf indebted. 

b 4 The 

xxvi PREFACE, 

The Author of the following DilTertatlon is well 
known, but I cannot have leave to mention him. 

N, B In this third Edition the Errors of the 
Prefs, (which were very numerous) are carefully cor- 
redted, fome fmall alterations made in the Tranfla- 
tion and Notes, and a few additions in the Referen- 
ces to Authors, fuch more efpecially as have ap- 
pear'd fmce the former Edition, 




Concerning the 

Fundamental Principle 

o F 

VJR7VE or MORAllfr. 

THO' all Writers of Morality have in the main 
agreed what particular Aaions are virtuous 
and what otherwife yet they have, or at lealt 
feem to have differ'd very much, both concerning the 
Criterion oi Virtue, viz. what it is which denonii- 
nates any Adion virtuous i or, to Ipeak more pro- 
perly, what it is by which we mull try any Adtion 
\Qknow whether it be virtuous or no ; and alio con- 
cerning the Principle or Motive by which Men are 
induced to purfue Virtue. . 

As to the former, fome have placed it in aoting 
agreeably to Nature, or Reajon j others in the titnejs 
of things; others in a Conformity with ^^^^^-^^ ^^.^ 
in promoting the Conijnon Good; others in the ^ViU 
of God, &c. This Difagreement of Moralifts con- 
cernino; the Rule or Criterion of Virtue in general, 
and at the fame time their almoft perfect Agreement 
concerning the particular Branches of it, would be 

xxvii Preliminary Dijferfahon, 

jipt to make one fufped, either that they had a dif- 
ferent Criterion (the' they did not know or attend to 
it) from what they profefs'd ; or (which perhaps is 
the true as well as the more favourable Opinion) that 
they only talk a different Language, and that all of 
them have the fame Criterion in reality, only they 
have exprcfs'd it in different Words. 

And there will appear the more room for this 
Conjediure, if we confider the Ideas themfelves about 
which Morality is chiefly convcrfant, viz. that they 
are all mixed Modes^ or compound Ideas arbitrarily 
put together, having at firft no Archetype or Origi- 
nal exifting, and afterwards no other than that which 
exifts in other Men's Minds. Now fince Men, un- 
lefs they have thefe their compound Ideas, which 
are fignify'd by the fame Name, made up precifely 
of the lame fimple ones, muft neceffarily talk a dif- 
ferent Language; and fince this difference is fo dif- 
ficult, and in fome Cafes impoffible to be avoided, 
it follows that greater Allowance and Indulgence 
ought to be given to thefe Writers than any other : 
and that (if we have a mind to underfland them) 
we fhould not always take their Words in the com- 
mon Acceptation, but in the Senfe in which we find 
that particular Author which we are reading ufed 
^them. f And if a Man interpret the Writers of Mo- 
rality with this due Candor, I believe their feeming* 
Inconfiftcncies and Difagreements about the Crite- 
rion of Virtue, would in a great meafure vanifli ; 
^and he would find that aBing agreeably to Nature, 
or ReaJo?7, (when rightly underllood) would perfectly 
coincide with the Fititefs of things -, the Fitnefs of 
things (as far as thefe Words have any meaning) with 

Tirutb \ 

Treliminary Dijfertation, xxix 

^ruth ; Truth with the Common Good-, and the Com- 
mon Good with the Will of God, 

But whether this Difference be real, or only ver- 
bal, a Man can fcarce avoid obferving from it, that 
Mankind have the Ideas of moll particular Virtues, 
and alfo a confufed Notion of Virtue in general, be- 
fore they have any Notion of the Criterion of it, or 
ever did, neither perhaps can they, deduce all or any 
of thofe Virtues from their Idea of Virtue in general, 
or upon any rational Grounds ihew how thofe Actions 
(which the World call Moral, and moft, if not all 
Men evidently have Ideas of) are diftinguifh'd from 
other A(5tions, or why they approve of thofe Adtions 
call'd Moral ones, more than others. 

But fince the Idea of Virtue among all Men (how- 
ever they differ in other refpedts) includes either ta- 
citly or exprefly, not only the Idea of Approbation 
as the Confeqi;ence of it ; but alfo that it is to every 
one, and in all Circumftances, an Objed: oi Choice ', 
it is incumbent on all Writers of Morality, to fhew 
that that in which they place Virtue, whatever it 
be, not only always will or ought to meet with Ap- 
probation, but alfo that it is always an Object of 
Choice ; which is the other great Difpute among Mo- 
ralifls, 'vix. What is the Principle or Motive by 
which Men are induced to purfue Virtue. 

For fome have imagin'd that that is the only Ob- 
jedt of Choice to a rational Creature, which upon 
the whole will produce more Happinefs than Mifery 
to the Choofer ; and that Men are and ought to be 
guided wholly by this Principle ; and farther, that 
Virtue will produce more Happinefs than Mifery and 
therefore is always an Objed; of Choice: and what- 
ever is an Objed: of Choice, That we approve of. 


XXX Preliminary DiJJeriation. 

But this, however true in Theory, is Infufficient 
to account for Matter of Fa(5l, /". e. that the genera- 
lity of Mankind do approve of Virtue, or rather 
virtuous Actions, without being able to give any 
Reafon for their Approbation j and alfo, that fome 
purfue it without knowing that it tends to their own 
private Happinefs ; nay even when it appears to be 
inconfiftent with and def}:ru(5tive of their Happinefs. 

And that this is matter of Facl, the ingenious 
Author of the Enquiry into the Original of our Idea 
of Virtue has fo evidently made appear by a great 
Variety of Inftances, that a Man mull be either very 
little acquainted with the World, or a mere Hobhifi 
in his Temper to deny it. 

And therefore to folve thefe two Difficulties, this 
excellent Author has fuppofed (without proving^ 
unlefs by ihewing the infufficiency of all other 
Schemes) a Moral Senfe to account for the, 
and a puhlick or bene"Jole}2t Affeciion for the latter : 
And thefe, viz. the Moral Senfe and Public AfFedi- 
on, he fuppofes to be implanted in us like Infti?i£ls^ 
independent of Reafon, and previous to any Inftruc- 
tion ; and therefore his Opinion is. that no account 
can be given, or ought to be expe<fted of them, any 
more than we pretend to account for the Pleafure or 
Pain which arifes from Senfation ; i. e. Why any 
particular Motion produced in our Bodies fhould be' 
accompany'd with Pain rather than Pleafure, and 
"uice ver/a. ^ 

But this Account feems ftill infufficient, rather 
cutting the Knot than untying it, and if it is not a- 
kin to the Dodrine of Innate Ideas, yet I think it 
reliffies too much of that of Occult ^lalities. This 
ingenious Author is certainly in the right in his Obr 


Preliminary Dijfertation. xxxi 

fervations upon the Infufficiency of the commoii 
Methods of accounting for both our Ekaion and 
Apprvbation of Moral Adions and rightly inters the 
Neceffity of fuppofing a Moral Senfe {i, e. a Power 
or Faculty whereby we may perceive any Adion to 
b- an Objed of Approbation, and the Agent of Love) 
and public Affedions, to account for the principal 
Anions of human Life. But then by calling thefe 
Inftinas, I think he ftops too foon, imagining him- 
felf at the Fountain-head, when he might have tra- 
ced them much higher, even to the true Principle 
of all our Anions, our own Happinejs, 

And this will appear by fliewing that our Ap- 
probation of Morality, and all AfFedions whatlo- 
ever are finally refolvable into Reajon pointing out 
pri^^te Happitiefs, and are converiant only about 
things apprehended to be means tending to this end; 
and that whenever this end is not perceived, they 
are to be accounted for from the Affociation of Ideas, 
and may properly enough be call'd Habits. 

For if this be clearly made out, the neceffity of 
fuppofing a Moral Senfe or public AfFedions to be 
implanted in us, fmce it arifeth only from the Infuf- 
ficiency of all other Schemes to account for human 
Aaions will immediately vanilh. But whether it 
he made out or no, we may obferve in general, that 
all Arguments ad Ig72orantiam, or that proceed a 
Remotione only (as this, by which the Moral Senfe 
and public Affedions are eftablifh'd to be Inilinds, 
evidently does) are fcarce ever perfedly fatisfadory, 
being for the moft part fubjed to this Doubt, 'viz. 
Whether there is a full Enumeration of all the Parts; 
and liable alfo to this Objedion, viz. That tho' I 


xxxii Pf'eliminary Dijj'ertatiou. 

cannot account for Phenomena other wile, yet pofii- 

bly they may be otherwife accounted for. 

But before we can determine this Point, it will 
be neceffary to fettle all the Terms : We fliall in the 
firft place therefore enquire what is meant by the 
Criterion of Virtue. 


Co?icer7ting the Criterion of Virtue. 

TH E Criterion of any thing is a Rule or Mea- 
fure by a Conformity with which any thing 
is known to be of this or that fort, or of this or that 
desree. And in order to determine the Criterion of 
any thing, we mufl firft know the thing whofe Cri- 
terion we are feeking after. For a Meafure prefup- 
pofes the Idea of the thing to be meafured, otherwife 
it could not be known (fince what is the proper Mea- 
fure of one thing is not fo of another) whether it was 
fit to meafure it or no. Liquids, Cloth, and Flefh, 
have all different Meafuresj Gold and Silver different 
Touchfi:ones. This is very intelligible, and the Me- 
thod of doing it generally clear, when either the 
Quantity or Kind of any particular Subftance is thus 
to be afcertain'd. 

But when we extend our Enquiries after a Criteri- 
on for abftra6t, mix'd Modes, which have no Exif- 
tence but in our Minds, and are fo very different in 
different Men j we are apt to be confounded, and 


Prekminary Dijjerfation. xxxiii 

fearch after a Meafiire for we know not what. For 
unlefs we are firft agreed concerning the thing to be 
meafur'd, we fliall in vain expert to agree in our 
Criterion of it, or even to underfland one another. 

But it may be faid, if we are exadly agreed in any 
mix'd Mode, what need of any Criteriouy or what 
can we want farther ? What we want farther, and 
what we mean by the Criterion of it is thisj ^iz. to 
know whether any inferior or particular thing do be- 
long to this mix'd Mode or no. And this is a very 
proper Enquiry. For let a Man learn the Idea of 
Intemperance from you never fo clearly, and if you 
pleafe let this be the Idea, viz. the Eating or Drink- 
ing to that degree as to injure his Underftanding or 
Health ; and let him alfo be never fo much convinc'd 
of the Obligation to avoid it ; yet it is a very perti- 
nent Queflion in him to afk you, How fl:all I know 
when I am guilty of Intemperance ? 

And if we examine this thoroughly, we fhall find 
that every little difterence in the Definition of a mix'd 
Mode will require a different Criterion, e.g. If Mur- 
der is defined the wilful taking away the Life of ano- 
ther, it is evident, that to enquire after the Criterion 
of Murder, is to enquire how we fliall know when 
the Life of another is taken away wilfully j i. e. when 
one who takes away the Life of another does it with 
that malicious Defign which is implied by Wilful- 
nefs. But if Murder be defined the Guilty taking 
away the Life of another, then to enquire after the 
Criterion of Murder, is to enquire how it fhall be 
known when Guilt is con traded in the taking away 
the Life of another. So that the Criterion of Mur- 
der, according to one or other of thefe Definitions, 
will be different. For Wilfulnefs perhaps will be 


XXX iv Frcliminary Differtation. 

made the Criterion of Guilt, but Wilfulnefs itfelf, 

if it want any, mud have fome farther Criterion, it 

being evident tliat nothing can be the Meafure of 


If the Criterion is contain'd in the Idea itfelf, then 
it is merely nominal^ e. g. If Virtue is defined. The 
ai^ting agreeably to the Will of God: To fay the 
Will of God is the Criterion of Virtue, is only to 
lay, what is agreeable to the W^ill of God is called 
Virtue. But the real Criterion, which is of fome 
life, is this. How (hall I know what the Will of 
God is in this refpedl ? 

From hence it is evident, that the Criterion of a 
mix'd Mode is neither the Definition of it, nor con- 
tain'd in it, For, as has been ihewn, the general 
Idea is neceflarily to be fix'd; and if the Particulars 
comprehended under it are fix'd or known alfo, there 
remains nothing to be meafured, becaufe we meafure 
only things unknown. The general Idea then being 
fix'd, the Criterion which is to meafure or determine 
Inferiors, rnuft be found out and proved to be a 
proper Rule or Meafure, by comparing it with the 
general Idea only, independent of the inferior things 
to which it is to be apply d. For the truth of the 
Meafure mufl be proved independently of the Parti- 
cular to be meafured, otherwife we Ihall prove in a 

To apply what has been faid in general to the Cafe 
in liand. Great Enquiry is made after the Criterion 
oi Virtue J but it is to be fear'd that few know dif- 
tindly what it is they are enquiring after j and there- 
fore this mud be clearly ftattd. And in order to 
this, we mull (as lias been ihewn) firll fix our Idea 
of Virtue, and that exa(5tly,; and then our Enquiry 


Prelifhinary "Differfailon, xxxv. 

will be, how we (liall know this or that lefs general 
or particular Action to be comprehended under Vir- 
tue. For unlets our Idea of \'irtue is fix'd, we en- 
quire after the Criterion of we know not what. And 
this our Idea of Virtue, to give any Satisfadion, 
ought to be fo general as to be conformable to that 
which all or mod Men are fuppoled to have. And 
this general Idea, I think, may be thus exprefs'd. 

Virtue is the Conformity to a Ride of Lije^ diredl- 
ing the ABions of all rational Creatures with refpeSi 
to each other s Happinejs \ to which Conformity every 
one in all Cafes is obliged : and every one that does fo 
conform^ is or ought to be approved of, efteem'd and 
loved for fo doing. V/hat is here exprefs'd, I be- 
lieve every one, or moft, put into their Idea of 

For Virtue generally does imply fome relation to 
ethers: where Self is only concern'd, a Man is call'd 
prudent, (not virtuous) and an A6tion w^hich relates 
immediately to God, is ilil'd Religious. 

I think alfo that all Men, whatever they make 
Virtue to confiflin, yet always make it to imply 
Obligation and Approbation. 

The Idea of Virtue being thus fix'd, to enquire 
after the Criterion of it, is to enquire what that Rule 
of Life is to which we are ohlizd to conform, or how 


that Rule is to be found out which is co diredl me 
in my Behaviour towards others, which ought aU 
ways to be purfued, and w^hich, if purfued, will or 
ought to procure me Approbation, Ejleem, and Love, 
But before I can anfwer this Enquiry: I mull: firil 
fee what I mean by Obligation. 

c SECT. 

XXXV i Preliminary Dijfertation. 


Coitceritino; Oblisfation. 

f\ BUgation is the necejfity ef doing or omitting any 
^^ Adiion in order to be happy : i. e. when there is 
fuch a relation between an Agent and an Adtion 
that the Agent cannot be happy without doing or 
omitting that Adion, then the Agent is faid to be 
obliged to do or omit that A6lion. So that Obliga- 
tion is evidently founded upon the Profpe(ft of Hap- 
pinefSy and arifes from that'neceffary Influence which 
any AcJ^ion has upon prefcnt or future Happinefs or 
Mifery. And no greater Obligation can befuppofed 
to be laid upon a.ny Jree Agent without an exprefs 

This Obligation may be confider'd four ways, 
according to the four different manners in which it 
is induced : Firft, that Obligation which arifeth from 
perceiving the natural Confequences of things, /. e. 
the Confequences of things ading according to the 
fix'd Laws of Nature, may be call'd Natural. Se- 
condly, that ariiing from Merit or Demerit, as pro- 
ducing the Efteem and Favour of our Fellow Crea- 
tures, or the contrary is ufually failed Virtuous. 
Thirdly, that arifing from the Authority of the 
Civil Magillrate, Civil. Fourthly, that from the 
Authority of God Religious. 

Now from the Confideration of thefe four forts of 
Obligation (which are the only ones) ic is evident that 

a full 

Prelminariy Dijfertation. xxxvii 

a full and complete Obligation which will extend to 
all Cafes, can only be that ariling from the Autho- 
rity oiGod', becaufe God only can in all Cafes make 
a Man happy or miferable: and therefore, fince we 
are ahvays obliged to that conformity call'd Virtue, 
it is evident that the immediate Rule or Criterion 
of it is the Will of God. But is the whole Will 
of God the Criterion of Virtue ? No. For tho' the 
whole Will of God is equally obligatory; yet, iince 
Virtue was defined to be the conformity to a Rule 
dired:ing m.y Behaviour with refpec^i to my Fellow- 
Creatures^ the Will of God can be no more farther 
concern'd about Virtue, than as it direds me in that 

The next Enquiry therefore is, v/hat that Will 
of God in this particular is, or what it direds me 
to do ? 

Now it is evident from the Nature of God, "oiz, 
his being infinitely happy in himfelf from all Eter- 
nity, and from his Goodnefs manifeiled in his Works, 
that he could have no other Defign in creating Man- 
kind than their Happinefs ; and therefore he wills 
their Happinefs ; therefore the means of their Hap- 
pinefs : therefore that my Behaviour, as far as it may 
be a means of the Happinefs of Mankind, fliould be 
fuch. Here then we are got one Step farther, or to 
a new Criterion : not to a new Criterion of Virtue 
immediately^ but to a Criterion of the Will of God, 
For it is an Anfwer to the Enquiry, How ihall I 
know what the W~ill of God in this particular is ? 
Thus the Will of God is the immediate Criterion of 
Virtue, and the FLippinefs of Mankind the Criteri- 
on of the Will of God -, and therefore the Happinefs 

c 2 of 

XXXV iii Preliminary Dijferfation. 

of Mankind may be laid to be the Criterion of Vir- 
tue, but once remcoed. 

And fmce I am to do whatever lies in my Powe-r 
towards promoting the Happinefs of Mankind, the 
next Enquiry is, what is the Criterion of this Hap- 
pinefs: 1. e. How fliall I know what in my Power is, 
or is not, for the Happioefs of Mankind ? 

Now this is to be known only from the Relations 
of things, (which Relations, with Refpeft to our 
prefent Enquiry, fome have call'd their Fitncfs and 
Unfitnefs.) For fome Things and Adions are apt 
to produce Pleafure, others Pain j fome are conve- 
nient, others inconvenient for a Society ; fome are 
for the good of Mankind ; the others to be avoided. 

Thus then we are got one flep farther, viz. to 
the Criterion of the Happinefs of Mankind. And 
from this Criterion we deduce all particular Virtues 
and Vices. 

The next Enquiry is, How fliall I know that 
there is this Fitnefs and Unfitnefs in things ? or if 
there be, how fliall I difcover it in particular Cafes ? 
And the Anfwer is, either from Experience or 
Reafon. You either perceive the Inconveniencies of 
fome Things and Adions when they happen ; or 
you forefee them by contemplating the Nature of the 
Things and Ad:ions. 

Thus the Criterion of the Fitnefs or Unfitnefs of 
things may in general be faid to be Reafon : which 
Reafon, when exadly conformable to the things ex- 
ifling, i. e. when it judges of things as they are, is 
called Right Reafon. And hence alfo we fometimes 
talk of ihe Reajb^t of thi'gs^ i. e properly fpeaking, 
that Relation which we fliould find out by our Rea- 
fon, if our Reafon was right. 


preliminary Dijfertation. xxxlx 

The expreffing by outward Signs the Relations of 
things as they really are, is called ^ruth, and hence 
by the fame kind of Metaphor, we are apt to talk of 
the T'ruth, as well as Reafin of things Both bx- 
preffions mean the fame : which has often made me 
wonder why fome Men who cry up Rea/hn as the 
Criterion of Virtue, fl.ould yet diflike Mr. WoUa^ 
lions Notion of rruth being its Criterion _ 

The Truth is, all thefe juft mentioned, ^oiz. the 
Happinefs of Mankinds the Relations, or titnels 
and Unfitnefs of things; Reafon and 1 ruth ; naay 
in fome fenfe be faid to be Criterions of \ irtue ; but 
it mult always be remember'd that they are only re^ 
mote Criterions of it, being gradually fubordinate to 
it's immediate Criterion, the Will of God, 

And from hence we may perceive the Kealon ot 
what I fuggeiled in the beginning of this Treatile, 
^iz That theDifpute between Moralifts about the 
Criterion of Virtue, is more in Words than Meaning ; 
and that this Diiference between them has been occa- 
fion'd by their dropping the immediate Criterion, 
and choofing fome a more remote, fome a leis re- 
mote one. And from hence we may fee alio the In- 
convenience of defining any mix'd Mode by its Cri- 
terion. For that in a great meafure has occafion d 
all this Confufion, as may eafily be made appear m 
all the pretended Criterions of Virtue above men- 
tioned. J , 
Thus thofe who either exprelly exclude, or don t 
mention the Will of God, making the immediate 
Criterion of Virtue to be the Good of Mankind ; 
muft either allow that Virtue is not in all Cafes obit- 
^atorv (contrary to the Idea which all or molt Men 
^ ^ ^ '' have 

xl Treliminary Dijfertation. 

have of it) or they muft fay that the Good of Man- 
kind is a lufficicnt Obligation. But how can the 
Good of Mankind be any Obligation to ?}it\ when 
perhaps in particular Cafes, fuch as laying down my 
Life, or the like, it is contrary to my Happinefs, 

Thofe who drop the Flappinefs of Mankind, and 
talk of the Relations, the Fitnefs and Unfitnefs of 
Things, are ftill more remote from the true Crite- 
rion. For Fitnefs without relation to fomc Etid^ is 
fcarce intelligible. 

Reafon and Truth come pretty near the Relations 
of things, becaufe they manifeflly prefuppofe them j 
but are ftill one flcp farther from the immediate 
Criterion of Virtue. 

What has been faid concerning the Criterion of 
Virtue as including our Oblioation to it, may per- 
haps be allow'd to be true, but flill it will be urg'd, 
that 'tis infufficient to account for matter of Fad:, 
*viz. that moft Perfons, who are either ignorant of, 
or never confider'd thefe Deductions, do however 
purfue Virtue themfelves and approve of it in others. 
I fliall in the next place therefore give fome account 
of our Approbations and Affedions. 


Concerinnp' Anprobation a'/id Afteclion. 


MAN is not only ^fcnfihlc Creature, not only 
capable of Pleafure and Pain, but capable al- 
fo Qi forcj'ecing this Pleafure and Pain in the future 


Preliminary Dijferfafion. xli 

confequences of Things and Actions; and as he is 
capable of knowing, fo alfo of governing or dire(5t- 
ing the Caufes of them, and thereby in a great mea- 
fure enabled to avoid the one and procure the other : 
whence the Principle of all Acflion. And therefore, 
as Pleafure and Pain are not indifferent to him, nor 
out of his Power, he purfues the former and avoids 
the latter ; and therefore alfo thofe things which are 
Caufes of them are not indifferent, but he purfues 
or avoids them alfo, according to their diffent Ten- 
dency. That which he purfues for his own fake, 
which is only Pleafure, is called an End; that which 
he apprehends to be apt to produce Pleafure, he calls 
Good, and approves of, i e. judges a proper means 
to attain his end, and therefore looks upon it as an 
Objedt of choice ; and that v/hich is pregnant with 
Mifery he difapproves of and fliles Evil. And this 
Good and Evil are not only barely approved of, or 
the contrary, but whenever view'd in Imagination 
(fmce Man confiders himfelf as exiding hereafter, 
and is concern'd for his Welfare then as well as now) 
they have 2iprejent Pleafure or Pain annex'd to them, 
proportionable to what is apprehended to follow them 
m real Exiftence ; v/hich Pleafure or Pain arifmg 
from the profpedl of future Pleafure or Pain is pro- 
perly call'd Paffion^ and the Defire confequent there- 
upon, ^ffeciion. 

And as by refleding upon Pleafure there arifes in 
our minds a Defre of it ; and on Pain, an Averfon 
from it (which neceffarily follows from fuppoiing us 
to be fenfible Creatures, and is no more than faying, 
that all things are not indifferent to us) fo alfo by re- 
£c<^ing upon Good or Evil, the fame Defires and 

c 4 Averlions 

xlii Prelim'uiary Differtation. 

Averlions are excited, and are didinguifhd into 
Lo've and Hatred. And from Love and Hatred va- 
rioufly modify'd, arife all thofe other Defires and 
Aversions which are promifcuouily fliled Paffions 
or Affections ; and are generally thought to he im- 
planted in our Nature originally^ like the Power of 
receiving Pleafure or Pain. And when placed on 
inanimate Objeds, are thefe following, Hope, Fear, 
Defpair and its oppofite, for which we want a 


Approbation and JifeBion co7ifiderd with regard to 
Merit, or the Law of Efteem. 

IF a Man in the purfuit of Pleafure or Hnppinefb 
(by which is meant the Sum total of Pleafure) 
had to do only with inanimate Creatures, his Appro- 
bation and Affe<5lions would he as defcribed in the 
foregoing Section. But, fmce he is dependent with 
refped: to his Happinefs, not only in thefe but alfo 
on rational Agents, Creatures like himfclf, which 
have the Power of governing or directing Good and 
Evil, and of ad:ing for an End ; there will arife dif- 
ferent means of Happinefs, and confequently diffe- 
rent Purfuits, tho' tending to the fame End, Hap- 
pinefs ; and therefore different Approbations and Ai- 
fedions, and the contrary \ which deferve particu- 
larly to be confider'd. 


Prdimijiary T)iJfertation. xliii 

That there will arife diiferent means of Happinefs, 
is evident from hence, ^iz. that Rational Agents, in 
being fubfervient to our Happinefs, are not pailive 
but voluntary. And therefore fince we are in pur- 
fuit of that to obtain which we apprehend the con- 
currence of their Wills neceflary, v/e cannot but 
approve of whatever is apt to procure this Concur- 
rence. And that can be only the Pleafure or Pain 
expedled from it by them. And therefore, as I per- 
ceive that my Happinefs is dependent on others, I 
cannot but judge whatever I apprehend to be proper 
to excite them to endeavour to promote my Happi- 
nefs, to be a means of Happinefs, i. e. I cannot but 
approve it. And fince the annexing Pleafure to their 
Endeavours to promote my Happinefs is the only 
thing in my Power to this end, I cannot but approve 
of the annexing Pleafure to fuch Adions of theirs 
as are undertaken upon my account. Hence to ap- 
prove of a Rational Agent as a means of Happinefs 
is different from the Approbation of any other means, 
becaufe it implies an Approbation alfo of an Endea- 
vour to promote the Happinefs of that Agent, in or- 
der to excite him and others to the fame concern for 
my Happinefs for the future. 

And becaufe what we approve of we alfo defire 
(as has been fliewn above) hence alfo we the 
Happinefs of any Agent that has done us good. And 
therefore hove or Hatred, when plac'd on a rational 
Objed, has this difference from the Love or Hatred 
of other things, that it implies a defire of, and con- 
fequently a pleafure in the Happinefs of the Objed 
beloved 3 or if hated, the contrary. 


xliv Preliminary Dijfertation. 

The Foundation of this Approbation and Love 
(which, as we have feen, confifts in his voluntary 
contributing to our Happinefs) is called the Merit of 
the Agent fo contributing, /. e. that whereby he is 
entitled (upon fuppofition that we ad: like rational, 
fociable Creatures, like Creatures, whoTe Happinefs 
is dependent on each other's Behaviour) to our Ap- 
probation and Love : Demerit the contrary. 

And this AfFedion or Qu_aliry of any Adion v/hich 
we call Merit is very confident with a Man's a6ling 
ultimately for his own private Happinefs. For any 
particular Action that is undertaken for the fake of 
another^ is meritorious, i. e. deferves Efteem, Favour, 
and Approbation from him for whofe fake it was 
undertaken, towards the Doer of it. For the Pre- 
fumption of fuch Efteem, ^c. was the only Motive 
to that Action j and if fuch Efteem, ^c. does not 
follow, or is prefum'd not to follow it, fuch a Per- 
fon is reckon'd unworthy of any favour, becaufe he 
fhews by his Actions that he is incapable of being 
obliged by Favours. 

The Miftake which fome have run into, 'viz, 
that Merit is inconfiftent with a(fting upon private 
Happinefs, as an ultimate End, feems to have arifen 
from hence, viz. that they have not carefully enough 
diftinguifli'd between an inferior and ultimate End; 
the end of a particular A(5lion, and the end of Adlion 
in general: which m.ay be explained thus. Tho' 
Happinefs, private Happinefs, is the proper or ulti- 
inate End of all our Adions whatever, yet that par- 
ticular means of Happinefs which any particular 
Adlion is chiefly adapted to procure, or the thing 
chiefly aim'd at by that Aiftion ; the thing which, if 


Preliminary Differ tation, xlv 

poflefs'd, we would not undertake that Adlion, may 
and generally is call'd the End of that Adion. As 
therefore Happinefs is the general End of all Ani- 
ons, fo each particular Adion may be faid to have its 
proper and peculiar End : Thus the End of a Beau is 
to pleafe by his Drefs ; the End of Study, Know- 
ledge. But neither pleafing by Drefs, nor Know- 
ledge, are ultimate Ends, they ftill tend or ought to 
tend to fomething farther as is evident from hence, 
mz. that a Man may ask and exped: a Reafon why 
either of them are purfued : Now to afk the Reafon 
of any Adion or Purfuit, is only to enquire into 
the End of it : But to exped a Reafon, /. e. an End, 
to be afi^ign'd for an ultimate End, is abfur'd. To 
alTc why I purfue Happinefs, will admit of no other 
Anfwer than an Explanation of the Terms. 

Why inferior E?2ds, which in reality are only 
Means, are too often look'd upon and acquiefc'd in 
as ultimate^ fliall be accounted for hereafter. 

Whenever therefore the particular End of any 
Adion in the Happinefs of another (tho' the Agent 
defign'd thereby to procure to himfelf Efteem and 
Favour, and look'd upon that Efteem and Favour as 
a means of private Happinefs) that Adion is merito- 
rious. And the fame may be faid, tho' we defign to 
pleafe God by endeavouring to promote the Happi- 
nefs of others. But when an Agent has a view in 
any particular Adion diflind from my Happinefs, 
and that view is his only Motive to that Adion, tho* 
that Adion promote my Happinefs to never fo great 
a Degree, yet that Agent acquires no Merit ; /. e. 
he is not thereby entitled to any Favour and Efteem: 
Becaufe Favour and Efteem are due from me for any 


xlvi Preliminary Dijjertation. 

no farther than that Adion was undertaken upon my 
account. If therefore my Happinefs is only the pre- 
tended End of that Adion, I am impofcd on if I 
believe it real, and thereby think myfelf indebted to 
the Agent; and I am difcharg'd from any Obligation 
as foon as I find out the Cheat. 

But it is far othervvife when my Happinefs is the 
fole End of that particular Action, /. e. (as I have 
explain'd mylelf above) wlien the Agent endeavours 
to promote my Happinefs as a Means to procure my 
Favour, /. e. to make me fubfervient to his Happi- 
nefs as his ultimate End : Tho' I know he amis at 
my Happinefs only as a means of his own, yet this 
leifens not the Obligation. 

There is one thing, I confefs, which makes a 
great alteration in this Cafe, and that is, whether 
he aims at my Favour in general, or only for fome 
particular End. Becaufe, if he aim at my Happi- 
nefs only to ferve himfelf in fome particular thing, 
the Value of my Favour will perhaps end with his 
obtaining that particular thing : And therefore I am 
under lefs Obligation {c ceteris paribus) the more/>^r- 
tiadar\\\^ Expectations from me are; but under 
Obligation I am. 

!N'o\v from the various Combinations of this which 
"we call Merit, and its contrary, arife all thofe vari- 
ous Approbarions and Averfions ; all thofe Likings 
and Dillikings which we call Moral. 

As therefore, from confidering thofe Beings which 
are iht ini:o!u?itary means of our Happinefs or Mife- 
ry, there were produced in us the Paflions or Aflec- 
tions of Love, Hatred, Hope, Fear, Defpalr, and 
its contrary : So from confidering thofe Beings v/hich 


P?'elimt72ary Dijj'^rtation. idvii 

"voluntarily contribute to our Happinefs or Mifery, 
there arife the following. Love and Hatred, (which 
are different from that Love or Hatred placed on in- 
voluntary Beings ; that placed on involuntary Beings 
being only a Denre to poiTefs or avoid the thing be- 
loved or hated 5 but this on voluntary Agents being 
a Defire to give Pleafure or Pain to the Agent be- 
loved or hated) Gratitude, Anger, 'fometimes cali'd 
by one common Name, Refentment) Generofity, 
Ambition, Honour, Shame, Envy, Benevolence: 
and if there be any other they're only as thefe are, 
different Modifications of Love and Hatred. 

Love and Hatred^ and the Foundation of them 
{^iz. the Agent beloved or hated being apprehended 
to be inflrumental to our Happinefs) I have expbin'd 
above. Gratitude is that Defire of promoting the 
Happinefs of another upon account of fome former 
Kindnefs received. Anger ^ that Deiire of thwarting 
the Happinefs of another, on account of fome for- 
mer Difkindnefs or Injury received. And both thefe 
take place, tho' we hope for, or fear nothing farther 
from the Objeds of either of them, and this is flill 
confident with adling upon a Principle of a private 

P^or tho' we neither hope for, nor fear any thing 
farther from thefe particular Beings j yet the Difpo- 
lition fnewn upon thefe Occafions is apprehended to 
influence the Behaviour of other Beings towards us ; 
/. e. other Beings will be mov'd to promote our Hap- 
pinefs or otherwife, as they obferve how we refenc 
Favours or Injuries. 

Ambition is a Defire of being efteem'd. Hence 
2 Defire of B^nng thought an Objed: of Efteem ; hence 


xlviii Preliminary Difjerfatiort. 

of being an Object of Eileem, hence of doing lau- 
dabky i. e. ufeful Adions. Generofity^ and Benevo- 
lence are Species of it. Ambition in too great a De- 
gree is called Pride, of which there are feveral Spe- 
cies. The Title to the Efteem of others, which ari- 
feth from any meritorious Adion, is called Honour, 
ThePleafure arifmg from Honour being paid to us, 
/. e. from others acknov/ledging that we are entitled 
to their Efteem, is without a Name. Modefty is the 
fear of lofing Eileem. The Unealinefs or Paffion 
which arifeth from a Senfe that we have loll: it, is 
called Sha?ne. So that Ambition^ and all thofe other 
Paffions and Affedtions belonging to it. together with 
Shame^ arife from the Efteem of others: which is 
the Reafon why this Tribe of affedions operate more 
ftrongly on us than any other, 'viz. becaufe we per- 
ceive that as our Happinefs is dependent on the Beha- 
viour of others, fo we perceive alfo that that Beha-*- 
viour is dependent on the Efteem which others have 
conceived of US; and confequently that our acquir- 
ing or lofing Efteem, is in effect acquiring or lofing 
Happinefs, and in the higheft Degree. And the 
fame may be faid concerning all our other Aftedi- 
ons and Paffions, to enumerate which, what for 
want of Names to theni, and what by the confu- 
fion of Language about them, is almoft impof- 

Envy will be accounted for hereafter, for a Rea- 
fon which will then be obvious. 

Thus having explain'd what I mean by Obligation 
and Approbation ; and fliewn that they are founded 
on and determinate in Happinefs : having alfo point- 
ed out the Difference between our Approbations and 


Frehminary Differ tat ion. xlix 

Affedlons as placed on involuntary and voluntary 
Means of Happinefs; and farther, that thefe Appro- 
bations and Affedlions are not innate or implanted in 
us by way of Injlindl, but are all acquired^ being 
fairly deducible from fuppoiing only fenlible and ra- 
tional Creatures dependent on each other for their 
Happinefsj as explain'd above: I fhall in the nexc 
place endeavour to anfwer a grand Objection to what 
has here been faid concerning Approbations and Af- 
fedions arifing from a profped: of private Happi- 

T^he ObjeBion is this^ 

The Reafon or End of every Adion is always 
known to the Agent ; for nothing can move a Man 
but v/hat is perceived: but the generality of Man- 
kind love and hate, approve and difapprove, imme- 
diately, as foon as any moral Charader either occurs 
in Life, or is propofed to them, v>fithouc conlidering 
whether their private Happinefs is affeded with it, 
or no : or if they do confider any Moral Charader 
in relation to their own Happinefs, and find them- 
felves, as to their private Happinefs, unconcern'd in 
it, or even find their private Happinefs lefTen'd by it 
in fome particular Inftance, yet they ftill approve 
the Moral Charader, and love the Agent : nay they 
cannot do otherwife. "Whatever Reafon may be af- 
fign'd by fpeculative Men why we fliould be grateful 
to a Benefador, or pitty the Diflreffed; yet if the 
grateful or compaffionate Mind never thought of that 
Reafon, it is no Reafon to him. The Enquiry is 
not why he ought to be grateful, but why he is fo. 


I Treliminary D/jJl-rtafion, 

Thefe after- reafons therefore rather fhew the Wif- 
dom and Providence of our Maker in implanting the 
immediate Powers of thefe Approbations (/. e, in Mr, 
Hiitchiiifou^ Language, a Moral Sefife) and thefe Pub- 
lic AfFeiftions in us, than give any fatisfacftory Ac- 
count of their Oriorin. And therefore thefe Public 
Affedions, and this Moral Senfe, are quite indepen- 
dent on private Happinefs, and in reality ad: upon us 
as mere Inflinds. 


The Matter of Fadl contain'd in this Argument, 
in my Opinion, is not to be contefted ; and therefore 
it remains either that we make the Matter of Fad: 
confident with what we have before laid down, or 
give up the Caufe. 

Now, in oi-der to fiiew tliis Confiflency, I beg leave 
to obferve, that as in the purfuit of Truth we don't 
always trace every Propofition whofe Truth we are 
examining, to a firft Principle or Axiom, but acqui- 
efce, as foon as we perceive it deducible from fome 
known or prefumed Truth j fo in our Condud we 
do not always travel to the ultimate End of our Adi- 
eus, Ilappinejs : but reft contented, as foon as we 
perceive any Adion fubfervient to a known or pre- 
fumed Means of Happinefs. And thefe prefumed 
Truths and Means of Happinefs whether real or o- 
therwife, always influence us after the fame manner 
as if they were real. The undeniable Confequences 
of Prejudices are as firmly adhered \6 as the Confe- 
quences of real truths or arguments ; and what is fub- 
fervient to a falfe (but imagined) meails of Happinefs, 


preliminary Differtation. li 

is as induflriouily purfued as what is fubfervlent to 
a true one. 

Now every Man, both in his Purfuic after Truth, 
and in his Condud has fettled and fixed a great ma- 
ny of thefe in his Mind, which he always ads upon, 
as upon Pr/;/a/>/^^, without examining. And this is 
occafion'd by the Narrownefs of our Underllandings : 
We can confider but a few things at once ; and there- 
fore, to run every thing to the Fountain-head would 
be tedious, thro' a long Series of Confequences ; to 
avoid this we choofe out certain Truths and Means 
of Happinefs, which we look upon as RESTING 
PLACES, which we may fafely acquiefce in in 
the Condud: both of our Underftanding and Pradice, 
in relation to the one, regarding them as Axio?ns ; in 
the other, as Ends. And we are more eafily inclined 
to this by imagining that we may fafely rely upon 
what we call Habitual Knowledge, thinking it need- 
lefs to examine what we are already fatisfy'd in. And 
hence it is that Prejudices, both Speculative and 
Pradical, are difficult to be rooted out, -viz. few will 
examine them. 

And thefe RESTING PLACES are fo 
often ufed as Principles, that at laft, letting that flip 
out of our Minds which firft inclined us to embrace 
them, we are apt to imagine them not as they really 
are, the Siibftitiites of Principles, but Principles 

And from hence, as fome Men have imagin'd In- 
nate Ideas, becaufe forgetting how they came by 
them ; fo others have fet up almoft as many diftind 
InJiinBs as there are acqiiird Trinciples of ading. 
And I cannot but wonder why the Pecuniary Senfe, a 

d Senfe 

lii Freliminary Diff'erfafion. 

Senfe of Power and Party, &c. were not mentlon'd, 
as well as the Moral, that of Honour, Order, and 
fome others. 

The Cafe is really this. We firft perceive or ima- 
gine fome real Good, /. e. fitnefs to promote our 
Happinefs, in thofe things which we love and ap- 
prove of. Hence (as was above explain'd) we annex 
Pleafure to thofe things. Hence thofe things and Plea- 
fure are fo ty'd together and afTociated in our Minds, 
that one cannot prefent itfelf but the other will alfo 
occur. And the Ajfociation remains even after that 
which at firft gave them the Connexion is quite for- 
got, or perhaps does not exift, but the contrary. An 
Inflance or two may perhaps make this clear. How 
many Men are there in the World who have as flrong 
a talle for Money as others have for Virtue ; who 
count fo much Money, fo much Happinefs ; nay, 
even fell their Happinefs for Money j or to fpcak 
more properly, make the having Money, without 
any Deiign or Thought of ufing it, their ultimate 
End ? But was this Propenfity to Money born with 
them ? or rather, did not they at iirft perceive a great 
many Advantages from being poffefs'd of Money, 
and from thence conceive a Pleafure in having it, 
thence defire it, thence endeavour to obtain it, thence 
receive an acftual Pleafure in obtaining it, thence de- 
fire to prcferve the Poflellion of it ? Hence by drop- 
ping the intermediate Steps between Money and Hap- 
pinefs, they join Money and Happinefs immediately 
together, and content themfelves with the phantafli- 
cal Pleafure of having it, and make that which was- 
at firft purfued only as a Means, be to them a real 
Etidy and what their real Happinefs or Mifery con- 


Freliminary Dijjerfatiojt, lili 

iifts in. Thus the Connexion between Money and 
Happinefs remains in the Mind ; tho' it has long fince 
ceas'd between the things themfelves. 

The fame might beobferv'd concerning the Thirfl 
after Knowledge, Fame, ^r. the delight in Reading, 
Building, Planting, and mod of the various Exerci- 
fcs and Entertainments of Life. Thefe were at firft 
*enter'd on with a view to fome farther End, but at 
length become habitual Amufements j the Idea of 
Pleafure is alTociated with them, and leads us on flill 
in the fame eager Purfuit of them, when the firll 
Reafon is quite vanifh'd, or at leaft out of our Minds. 
Nay, we find this Power of Affociation fo great as 
not only to tranfport our Paffions and Affecflions be- 
yond their proper bounds, both as to Intenfenefs and 
Duration ; as is evident from daily Inftances of Ava- 
rice, Ambition, Love, Revenge, ^c, but alfo, that 
it is able to transfer them to improper Objecfts, and 
fuch as are of a quite different Natufe from thofe to 
which our Reafon had at firfl diredled them. Thus 
being accuftom'd to refent an Injury done to our Bo- 
dy by a Retaliation of the like to him that oifer'd ir, 
we are apt to conceive the fame kind of Refentment, 
and often exprefs it in the fame manner, upon re- 
ceiving hurt from a Stock or a Stone, whereby the 
hatred which we are ufed to place on voluntary Be- 
ings, is fubftituted in the Room of that Averfion 
which belongs to involuntary ones. The like may 
be obferv'd in moft of the other Paffions above-men- 

From hence alfo, 'viz. from the continuance of 
xk\\% Ajfociation of Ideas in our Minds, we may be en- 
abled to account for that (almoft Diabolical) Paffion 
called Rnv)\ which we promifed to confider. 

d a Mr. 

liv Preliminary Dijfertation. 

Mr. Locke obferves, and I believe very juftly, that 
there are fome Men entirely unacquainted with this 
PafTion. For moil: Men that are ufed to Refledion, 
may remember the very time when they were firft 
under the dominion of it. 

Envy is generally defined to be that Pain which 
arifes in the Mind from obferving the Profperity of 
others : not of all others indefinitely, but only of 
fome particular Perfons. Now the examining who 
thofe particular Perfons whom we are apt to envy 
are, will lead us to the true Origin of this Paffion. 
And if a Man will be at the Pains to confult his Mind, 
or to look into the World, he'll find that thefe par- 
ticular Perfons are always fuch as upon fome account 
or other he has had a Rival fiip with. For when two 
or more are Competitors for the fame thing, the Suc- 
cefs of the one miifl neceffarily tend to the Detriment 
of the other, or others : hence the Succefs of my Ri- 
val and Mifery or Pain are join'd together in my 
Mind ; and thiskonnediion or alfociation remaining 
in my Mind, even after the Rivalfhip ceafes, makes 
me alv^ays affecfled with Pain whenever I hear of his 
Succels, tho' in Affairs which have no manner of 
Relation to the Rivalfhip, much more in thofe that 
bring that to my Remembrance, and put me in mind 
of what I might have enjoy'd had it not been for 
him. This may poflibly caft fome Light upon the 
black Defigns and envious Purpofesof the fallen An- 
gels. For why might not they have formerly had 
fome Competition with their Fellows ? and why may 
not fuch Aifociations be as ilrong in them as us ? 

Thus alfo we are apt to envy thofe Perfons that 
rcfufe to be guided by our Judgments and perfuaded 
by us. For thi§ is nothing elie than a Rivalihip about 


Preliminary Dijferfation! Iv* 

the Superiority of Judgment; and we take a fecret 
Pride both to let the World fee, and in imagining 
ourfelves, that we are in the right. 

There is one thing more to be obferved in anfwer 
to this Objedion, and that is, that we do not always 
(and perhaps not for the moll: part) make this AlTo- 
ciation ourfelves, but learn it from others : i. e, that 
we annex Pleafure or Pain to certain Things or 
Adions becaufe we fee others do it, and acquire Prin- 
ciples of A(^ion by imitating thofe whom we admire, 
or whofe efteem we would procure : Hence the Son 
too often inherits both the Vices and the Party of his 
Father, as well as his Eftate : Hence National Vir- 
tues and Vices, Difpofitions and Opinions: And 
from hence we may obferve how eafy it is to account 
for what is generally call'd the Prejudice ofEduca- 
tion ; how foon we catch the Temper and Affedlions 
of thofe whom we daily converfe with ; how almoft 
infenfibly we are taught to love, admire or hate; to 
be grateful, generous, companionate or cruel, ^c. 

What I fay then in anf jver to the Objection is this : 
" That it is neceflary in order to folve the principal 
" Adions of human Life to fuppofe a Moral Senfe 
" or what is fignify'd by that Name) and alfo/'wMc/^ 
" AffeBions ; but I deny that this Moral Senfe, or 
" thefe public Affeftiqns, are innate, or implanted 
" in us. They are acquired either from our own 
" Obfervation or the Imitation of others." 


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Chap. 1= 

Co7icerning the Origin of Evil. 


Containing fomt Prificiptes prevtoujly necejj'a-^ 
ry to the Vnderjlanding and Solution of the 
difficulty about the Origin o/Evil. 


Of the Knowled<^e of External ObjeEisi 


I. "^f T is allowed that external obje<S:s are made That fen- 
known to. us from without by the Senfes j Nations re- 
but we have entirely forgot how Lights Co- P^'^^ent 
lours, and other external Things at firfl af- thines^o, 
fefted our Senfes and enter'd the Mind j nor ys, or at 
can we eafily recoiled the rife and progrefs of our ^eait diT- 
Knowledge concerning thefe Things. cover tht 

However it is. agreed that the Conceptions which of^j^",'^^ 
tve have of thefe either repiefent to us the Things 
themfelves, or at leaO: difcover the prcfcnce and cpc- 
rations of them : That the fenfation of Light, for 
inftance, arifes from its being prfclented to the Eye j 
and fo in all other Objeds of the Senfe-. 

II. But rt is to be obferv'd that the reprcfenta- Thatrhefe 
tioiis of Things which we have from the Senfes, ^/J ^^^^'^■^ 
ar« bv no means fimple, but very much confufgd ^^ ^\ ' 
and complicated; lor Example? ths Eye reprefents ed, .but af- 

B to tsm'ards 

a Concerning the Ongm of "EvA. Chap. I. 

fepanted to the Mind burning Wax^ i. e. a thing that is hard, 

by the un- round, capable of being melted in the Fire, red, and 

derftand- \y}^gj^ foftentd by heat changeable into any Figure^ 

ftanceof fufceptiblc alfo of various Colours ; and laftly, re* 

this in Solvable into Smoke. The Eye exhibits all thefe 

burning Properties in the burning Wax alftioft at one glance^ 

Wax, jjj^jf ^|-j£ Vnderflanding fcperates thofe things by 

Refledion, which the Sight had convey'd to the 

mind colledively. For it percieves that the Wax 

preferves its ElTence and Denomination, though 

from round it be turn'd into fquare, from hard and 

red, into foft and black. Fiom whence it appears 

that all thefe Properties are extrinjtcal to ifj- but that 

which continues under all thefe Changes is call'd its 

Nature and Subfliince. 

Thefirfl HI. By SubfiaNce I here urrderftand a thing 

dillindi- -^vhich the Mind can conceive by itfelf 23 dijlinll 

^" ° J;'^ and feparate from all others : For that Thine, the 

onsinto Conception of which does not ^f^w« upon another, 

fenliblc nor incIudc or fuppofe any othe , is to us ^ Sub' 

^<alitics fiance I and accordingly we diftinguifli it by that 

MdSub- ]vT^j,^^. gyj jI^^j. v/^liich implies dependence in its 

nance. . ,, ~ . r Vt • r r 

■* conception we call a Aiode-i or Accident. For 

inftance, we can conceive a certain portion of 
matter^ fuch as Wax, fetting afide all others, and 
alfo v/irhout any particular Figure: But we arc 
not in like manner able to conceive any parti- 
cular Figure without matter* Wax therefore is a 
Subjlance, for our conception rcprelents it as di- 
fiinth divided from, and independent of all other 
things: Nor is it neccflary to the knowledge 
thereof that we join the conceptions of other 
things when we think of it : for the conceptions of 
that and thefe contribute nothing (to, nor iland in 
need of each other in order to their being under- 
iiood. But Coiotir^ Ti'iiire-^ Softnefs and H-.^'dnefs are 
wodei or ^xcidcnts, fince thev cannot be conceiv'd ; 
Wiihout fomething that is colour d, fgur'd, fofr, or; 

hiird; i 

Bed. I . Concerning the Orig mofEvW, .% 

hard; but they enter not into the Suhflance or na- 
tftre of Wax, for that remains, whatever may be- 
come of thefc, 

IV* But when this is refolv'd into fmoke^ or How ue 
fiame, it has no longer the name of Wax given to '^"O"' that 
it. We call the thing Wax which is applicable to ^^^""^^s 
a certain peculiar ufe; but when it is once I'e^lv- thing^as 
€d into fmoke or flame, it becomes unfit for that matter. 
life to which Wax is fubfervient; and therefore 
changes its Ejfenccy and u^ppellation. What then 
does it carry along with it under all mutations? 
It is always extended, and capable of wo?;'£?« or rf/?j 
and has always parts which are feparable, and ex- 
clude orie another oiit of the fame place.; the Sub-. 
fiance therefore which is attended with thefe Qua- 
lities or I*roperties we call Matter. ( i . ) 

B 2 V. What 


(i .) Our Author's Notion of SuhJIance, as including al! the 
conllituent Properties of any thing, fccms to be more plain and 
agreeable to nature, and therefore of greater ufc in Philo- 
fophy than that which is commonly received. We find by 
experience that a thing will always exhibit the fame appear- 
ances in fomc refpe£ts though it admit of Change in others ; 
or in Mr. Locke\ Language, tliat certain numbers of fimple 
Ideas go conftantly together, whereas feme others do not: 
The former of thefe we call the SubJJance, Thing or Being 
itfelf, tlie latter are term'd its Modes or Accidenti. Thus the 
fubftance o^ Body, as far as we know of it, confiib in Solidity 
and Extcnfion ; which being ncceflarily finite, it alfo be- 
comes capable of Divifion, Figure and Motion. Thefe are its 
original, infeparable Qualities which conflitute the thing, and 
feem not to depend on any thing clfc as a Suhjcil. But a 
particular Figure, Motion, i3c. are only Accidents or Modes 
of its Exiftcnce, which do not nccellarily attend it, though 
they themfelves cannot be fuppofed to exift wlthour it. The 
fubltance of Spirit confifts in the Powers of thinking and 
acting, which likewife admit of various Modifications. , This 
feems to be all that v/e can learn concerning the nature of 
things from obfervation and experience. . To enquire into the 
Mannc*- how thefe, which we call Properties,, exift together. 

4 Concernittg the Origin ofEvW. Chap. I. 

What it is. V. What is obfervable in Wax, niay alfo be 
obferv'd in any other Subftancej which we know 


or to attempt to explain the Caufe, Ground or Reafon of their 
Union is in vain ; to aflig;n the word Suhjlance for a rcpre- 
fentation of it is faying nothing; it is fetting a mere word 
for what v/e have neither any Idea of nor occafion for. In- 
deed if we confidcr thefc primary Quahtics as needing fome- 
thing to inhere in, we are obliged to feck for fomething to 
fupport them ; and bv the fame way of reafoning we may 
feek for fomething clfe to fupport that other fomething, and 
fo on; and at lad fliall find no other fupport for the whole 
but the Caufe which produced it. Mr, Locke though he gave 
into this way of talking yet he has fufficiently flicwn his 
diflike of it in B. i. C 4. §. iS. B. 2. C. 13 . §. 18, 19, 
20. and C. 23. §. 23. andelfewhere*. Dr. M'atts is of opinion, 

• that it is introducing a needlefs Scbolajlic Notion into the 

• real nature of things and then fancying it to have a real 
' Exillcncc'. Logic p. 14. The Author of the Procedure, Ex- 
tent ^'c- affirms, ' that as far qs we direftlv knov.- the effcntial 

• Properties of any Subftance, fo far we have a direft know- 
' Icd^e of the Subilancc it/e/f; and if \%e had a dircft Knoir- 

• ledge of aU the elTential Properties of any Subftance, we 
' fiioiild have an adeqnc.te knowledge of that Subihnce ; for 

• iurely, if there be any meaning in words, the kniowing any 
' of the effcntial Properties of a thing is knowing Jo Jtmch of 
'its very Subilancc or Eflence ; f meaning the fame by 
thefc two laft words, though Mr. Locke ufcs them in a very 
difierent Signification ; the former being only that which 
iuakes any thing an Ens or Being ; the latter that which 
makes it a Being of this or that Sort : Of which belo\v. 

In fliort, whatever is underftood by this word fubjiancc ; 
it cannot as Mr. Locke obferves ;{; be applied to God, Spirits 
and Body in the fame fenfe ; and therefore the application of 
this and the like doubtful Terms to Subjefls of a very dif- 
ferent nature (cfpccially that of S-.thjlraiutn, wliich more ap- 
parently confines our thoughts to Body) muft needs occafion 
Error and Coniiifion. 

But though our Author's notion of Subftance be very de- 
fenfilile,. he has applied the word Matter to the Idea of Body, 


* Comp. Mr. CoUihfr''?, Enquiry into the Exiftcnce and Na- 
ture of God. p. 227, 228. and Dr. S/:er/o:k^s Yiiidic. of the 
Trin. p. 69. &-c. and Dr. //W//s Philofophical EfHiys. Elf. 2. 
■ t B. 1, C. iii. p. So, 81. X B. II. C. xiii. §; ^^^ 

S.edl. I. Concerning the Origin e/* Evil. 

by the Senfcs. For all thing> that are perceived 
by the Senfes admit of the like changes, and the 

N OT E S. 

whereof Matter is only a partial Conception containing no- 
thing more than the Idea of a folid fubllance whicli is every- 
where the fame. Thefc two terms therefore cannot be put 
one for the other, as Mr. Locke obferves * though indeed they 
are often ufed promifcuoufly. 

Upon this occafion it may not be improper to obferve tliat 
the various figniiications of thefe general Terms Matter, Sub- 
Jiance, Effence, &c. will ferve to convince U3 in the iirlt place, 
that thefe words don't denote the manner how things really 
exilt, but only our manner of conceiving them, and lecondly, 
that there are no real Exiftencies ftridlly conformable to this 
our manner of conceiving them, i.e. \i\ Generals. For if ei- 
ther thefe general Terms ilood for things really cxilting under 
fuch a Precifion, or this our way of conceiving things were 
fix'd by Nature, neither of them would be fo various and un- 
certain as we find they are. The End of making tnefe Gene- 
ral Conceptions is to range things into Sorts for the convenience 
of Language. The manner of acquiring them is as follows. 

We arc at firft only acquainted with particular Subilanccs ; 
but obferving that as thefe particular Subllances differ in fome 
relpetts, fo they agree in others, [i.e. though this particular 
excites in the mind fome fimple Idea or Ideas, which another 
does not, yet there arc fome Ideas excited equally from both) 
we take no notice of thole Ideas in which two or more parti- 
cular fabllances differ, but feleft thofe only in which they 
tigree, and conned them into one complex Idea by giving 
them one Name. Which cornplex Idea becomes General, 
;. e. it may be affirm'd of, or belongs to, or is found in more 
than one particular Subilance; and the fevera! Subftanccs of 
which it is aflirm'd, ^c. are faid to be contain'd under that 
General Idea. General Ideas of Subllances therefore ars not 
made by adding all or any of the particular Ideas found in each 
Subfunce, or by that retin'd method, which the Author of 
x\iZ Procedure imagines, of adding and omitting them at the 
fame time ; but only by leafing out all thofe Ideas in which 
two or more particular Subilauccs differ, and ret.uning thole 
in which they agree. And from general Ideas thus made we 
proceed to more general ones in the fame way, 'viz. by al- 
ways dropping the particulars wherein they differ. Thus ob- 
' B 3 ferving 

* B, in. C. X, §. i;.. 

Concerning the Origin (j/Evil. Chap. I. 

abovemention'd properties continue both undert 
and after all the(e motions and mutations. Any 


feiving a certain agreement among Individuals and omitting 
the rcll, wc forni an Idea of the feveral Species. In like man- 
ner leaving out the diltinguifliing marks of each Species, we 
get an Idea of the Genus, fuch as Ma>t, Beaji, or of a higher 
Genus, fuch as Animal : and again by dropping that by which 
Animals are dillinguifhed from all other things we acquire 
the ftill more general or partial, Idea qI Behg or Suhjiance. 
When any one of thefe general Ideas is found in a particular 
thing it is call'd the Effence of that thing : EJJ'ence therefore 
is only that general abllra6l Idea in the Mind by which we 
determine any thing to be of this or that fort, which fort we 
■fignify by fuch a general name as Animal, or Matter. So that 
the fame Quality may be eflential or not effential to any thing 
jiccording as that thing is ranked under a diiTerent_^r^*. 

In the fa-me wa}^ that we make General Ideas ofSubftances 
we alfo c.>.Jider fingle Propeyties, Monies and Relations, -viz. 
by feparating them from a)i other Properties, i3'c. with 
which they are found in Nature, or from all particular 
Subjeds in which they inhere, and leaving only fo much as 
remains in common, and includes, or may be aflirm'd of eve- 
ry Property, ^V. of that kind; Thus obferving that all Bo- 
dies agree in being extended, as w'cU as folid, though they 
differ never fo much in magnitude and figure, we take the 
former of thefe Properties apart from the latter, as alfo from 
ajiy particular Magnitude or Shape, and call it Extevjlon in 
the abftradt ; which being thus made general it will compre- 
hend all particular Extenfions, and may be enlarged every 
way and amplified in infinitum: We can conceive it as exilling 
beyond the limits of Body, and by adding the coniufed Idea 
of a Subjiratum to it, it will become independent and ferve 
both as a common meafure and a common Receptacle for all 
Bodies, which probably conftitutes our Idea oi Space. See Notes 
3 and 9. In the fame manner we form an Univerlal Mode^ 
I'.g. Obferving a train of Ideas fucceeding one another in our 
mijids at certain diitances, and being confcious that we our 
felves exift while we receive them, or that our own ^xiftenc* 
is commenfurate to this fucceffion, wc get the Idea of con- 
tinuing. Obferving alfo that leveral other things continue as 
well as ourfelves, we find that the fame affedtion belongs to 

them ; 

• See Loch ?. III. C. vi. §. 4, 5, ^c. 

Std. I. Cone erni Jig the Origin o/'Evil. 

ienfible Objeft, however chang'd, is always ex- 
tended^ movecible^ conjifting o£ Jolid, dijlin^ and di- 
yifibk parts, 


them ; but it being an endlcfs work to form as many diftinft 
Ideas of this kind as there are things that thus continue, we 
abftraft from particular Exiilences and make one general Idea 
of Continuance, which ferves for all, and this is Duration. 

The Parts or Periods of this common Duration we call 
7ime; and every thing which is commenfurate to them is mea- 
fured by it, and faid to exift in it, after the fame manner as 
was obferv'd before of Space. 

Mix' J Moc^es und Relations are Combinations of Ideas of dif- 
ferent kinds voluntarily put together and conne<fled by their 
names. Such as G(7(7^;;(?/}, Gratitude; Identity, NeceJJjty, i3c, 
Thefe are apparently the work of the Mind, and though many 
of them have a real foundation in Nature, and may be found 
by obfervation in the concrete, yet they arc generally got be- 
fore from information or invention, abftrafted from particu- 
lar Sabje61s, and lodg'd in the mind with general names anr 
nex'd to them, according as the circumllances of perfons an4 
conveniencies of Life require.. See Locke, B. III. C. iii. 

I have been the longer on this fubjedl o^ AbjIraSl Ideas, iince 
notwithllanding what Mr. Locke has hinted, the nature of 'em 
feems to be but little underftood, otherwife we fhould never 
hear of our Ideas of Infinity, oi Space, Duration, "Nutnber, Sec. 
requiring an external Ideatum or objeSli-ve reality; — of their 
beiijg real Attributes and neceflarily inferring the Exiftence of 
ofiome immenfe and eternal Being ; — whereas all univerfals, 
or abftrad Ideas, fuch as thefe evidently are, (See Dr. Clarke''^ 
Anfvv'er to the 4th letter) exill under i\\3.l formality no where but 
in the Mind, neither have th^ any other foundation, nor can 
they be a proof of any thing, befidc that power which the 
mind has to form them. 

If the nature of M;xV Modes and Relations were fufficiently 
attended to, I believe it would not be aflerted that our Ideas 
of perfeft Goodncfs, Wifdom, Power, ifjc. are all inadequate 
and only negative. — th,at all our knowledge of thefe Pei- 
fedtions is improper, indireft, and only analogical, — and 
that the whole kind, nature, Effence and Idea of them is (^n- 
tirely different v/hen applied to God from what it is when pre- 
dicated of his Creatures. Whereas thefe being arbitrary com- 
binations of Ideas made without regard to any patticular Sub- 
ject in which they may inhere, they are evidciuly their own 

B'4 ' Arc he- 

8 Concerning the Origin of EvIL Chap. I. 

That this VI. Not that this is a Definition, or Idea (z.) 
Definition ^f Matter, any more than the former was of Suh^ 
*^°"hThe i^^»<^^> ^^^ ^^^^ hereby we arc acquainted with its 
7dea of prefence, and diftinguilli it from every other thing; 
inatter,but as we know a Man by his Countenance, and other 
onlylhews circumftanccs ; Nor is it necelTary that thefe flioiUd 
^^the ^g applicable to all SubjUnce^ at all times, and x6 
flin^uifti^" that alone: For it is enough if for this particular 
jt hy. Time jind occafion we know tlie particular Sttbfiance 

•' : ■ ■'. WQ 

N OT E S^ 

Archetypes and therefore cannot but be adequate nnd pofiti've : 
Thev are what they are immutably and univerfally ; their A'a- 
iur es :ind EJ/ences niuft be the fame wherever they are found, 
or to whatfoever fubjec^ we apply them, fo long as the fame 
number of Ideas are included under the lame word ; and no- 
thing more is requifite than that the Ideas thus put together 
be confiftent to make all our knowledge concerning them, real, 
proper, direil, adequate and miinjerfal. See Locke, B. \Y. C. iv. 

I fhall trouble the Reader no farther on this Head than only 
to obferve that the method of forming general Ideas (which 
our Author had advanced ill his firlt Note, and which is fincc 
ufed by the Author of Procedure, Sec ) by making the Idea of 
one Ir^dividual ftand for the whole Species, muft be wrong on 
this very account, f/s:. that according to the foremention'd 
fchemc Umver/ah, fuch as Animal or Matter would have a real 
Kxiltcnce in the fame prccife manner in which we confider 
them ; whereas under fuch Prccifions they are confefledly the 
creatures of our o^n Minds and exiftno where elle. Wc have 
nothing at all to do therefore with Analogy in forming Ahjlra^ 
Ideas, we can never come at them by fubitituting one particu- 
lar for the roll; hut on the contrary muft conceive them by re- 
moving all particularities of Exiftcncc and leaving only what 
lemams in com"mon, as explain'd above. See Locke, B. ill- 
C iii. ^. 7, 8, 9. or N'a^/s's Logic, Part. I. C. iii. §, 3. or 
ihe words Aijlra^ion :n\d Genera/ in Chambers's Dictionary. 
[z) Our Author confines this word Idea to the fenfc in 
\\ hich it was firft ufed by Plato, kj'tx. as an Image or Reprefen- 
tation of the fuppofed TJfence of things; in which \iih.iii. It 
was attributed peculiarly to God, A\ ho was faid to perceive 
things immediately by their EJ/ences, whereas we only know 
them by certain Marks cr Chara^ers, or by Anciloij;, 

■* 'Our 

Se(a. I. Concerning the Origin o/'Evil. | 

we are talking of by them ; ^nd fiifficiently di- 
ftinguirh it from othei things. 

" VII. It is to be obferved farther, that when a How we 
part of this matter is removed another fucceeds in- come to 
to its Place, but is not in the fame Place con- fj^^ know- 
fiftent with it. Vlace therefore feems to be fome- ^'^^^ ° 
thing beyofid, befidc and diftind: from the Mat^ 
ter which it receives. For as from hence that 
Wax was fuccedively capable of different forms, fi- 
gures, colours and chaiiges, it appears that fomething 
is init'befide, and difl^rent from all thefe, which 
we call the Matter of the Wax : So in like manner 
from hence that the fame Place or Space receives 
more and different Bodies and Particles of matter 
fucceffively, but cannot admit more than one ac 
the fame time, it will appear that Place or Space^ 
is as diflinft from Matter or Body as Wax is froni 
the Colours fucceffively receiv'd, and does not 
depend on them any more than Wax does on any 
particular Form, 

VIII. If therefore we fet afide, or annihilate What it is. 
Matter i whatfoever flill remains will all belong to 
the nature of Spacer as in the former cafe when 
we had fet afide the Properties of IVax, that which 
belonged to the A4atter or fubflance of it remain- 
ed. If you ask what that is ? I anfwer, firfl Lo- 
cal Mobility is to be fet afide, for that feems pe- 
culiar to Matter. Secondly, an a(ftual feparation 
of Parts, for what is immov^eable cannot be divid- 

^ or E s, 

Our Autlior Tiad endeavoured to explain this in his Note 
upon the place; which is omitted as ^vc apprehend it to be 
much better explain'd and more conveniently applied by 
Mr. Locke, who makes the word Idea Hand for every thing 
about which the Mind is converfant, or which can be the ob- 
jeft of Perception, Thought or Underftanding; In which 
large fenfe we have an Idea of Matter ox Bod^, as well as of 
Suljia/ice, or of Space. 

(3 ) Though 

iqf\ Concerning the Origin ^Evil. Chap. I. 

cd. Thirdly, JmpeyietrAbility, or Solidity ; for 
that fuppofes Motion and is neceflaiy to the Pro- 
dudion of it. It remains therefore that (as 
we conceive it) be fomething extended immovea- 
ble, capable of receiving or containing Matter, and 
penetrable by it. Though therefore we have not 
a Definition or Idea of Space, properly fo call'dj 
yet we can hereby fufiiciently diftinguifli it from 
every other thing, and may reafon about it as much 
as we have occafion. 
Thefe IX. Thefe three conception*?, namely, of fenfi- 

threeCon- bie Quahties {viz.. Motion, dec.) of Matter and 
Sx.'of*' ^P^^^^ ^^^^ fo be the chief of thole which we 
fenfible hW^ from Without, and fo natural to us that there 
Qualities is uo reafonable Man but perceives them in him- 
(v. g. Mo- feif. There are fome who deny that Space is any 
ci^^Mat^ter ^^^^S difl:in6l from Matter, nor is it much to our 
and space, purpofe whether it be or no: Yet we csnnot with- 
feem to be out offering Violence to our Underftandings, deny 
the chief but that the Conception of Spacf is diftind from the 
ofthofe conception of -^^jir^f/-, (3.) 

external. atv^l. 


(3.) Though fo much noife has been made about Space, 
(which Leibnitz juftly calls an Idol of fome modern Englijh 
Men: ] and fo great ufe made of it in demonltrating the divine 
Attributes, in a way which fome ftile a Priori ; yet f am forc'd 
to confefs that I cannot poffibly frame any other Notion of it, 
than|cither, firft, as the mere jiegation or ahfcnce oi Matter, or 
fecondiy, as the extenlion o^ Body, confider'd abilradlly or fepa- 
fate from any particular Body ; or thirdly, as a SubjcSl or Suljlra- 
ium of that iivnc general extenjion, for which lall Notion fee N 9. 

Now according to the firft Suppofition we may indeed have 
J pojiti've Idea of it, as well as oi Silence, Darknefs, and many 
other Privations ; as Mr, Locke has fully proved that wchave, 
andlhewnthe Reafon of it B III. C viii. §. 4. But to argue 
from fuch an Idea of Space, that Space itfelf is fomething ex- 
ternal, and has a real cxiftence, feems altogether as good Scnfe 
as to fay, that becaufe we have a different Idea of Darknefs 
from that of Light ; oi jilence from that oi found; of the abfence 
gfany thmg, from th«t of its Prefence ; therefore Darknefs, i^c. 


jSect. 2. Concerning the Ongm of Evi\, I.I 

S E C T. II. 

Of the Enquiry after the Tirf Caufe^ 
I. Suppoiinc thefe three, viz. Aiotion, Matter, An enqu'H 

^ cerning 

NOTE S. Motion, 

jnufl befomething pofitive and different from Light, l^c. and Matter, 
have as real an Exitlence as Light has ; And to deny that we and Space | 
have any pofitive Idea, or, which is the very fame, any Idea whether 
at all, of the Privations above-mentionM (For every Idea, as ^''^^7 ^^"'" 
it is a perception of the Mind, mult neceffarily be pofitive, orthen^' 
though it arife from what Mr, Locke calls a privative Caufe ) felves. 
to deny, I lay, that we have thefe Ideas, will be to deny Ex- 
perience and contradift common Scnfe. There are therefore 
Ideas, andy?/;;/i/e ones too, which have nothing ad extra cor- 
refpondent to them, no proper Ideatum, Archetype, or ob- 
jeftive Reality, and I don't fee why that oi Space may not be 
reckon'd one of them. To fay that Space mull have exiflence, 
bccaufe it has fome Properties, for inllance. Penetrability, or a 
ffl/i^aVy of receiving Body, feems to me the fame as to urge 
that darknefs rriufl: ht fomething becaufe it has the power or pro- 
perty o'ireceiiitng Light ', Silence the property o^ admitting Sound i 
and Ahfence the property of being fupply'd by Prefence, i. e. 
to aifign abfolute Negations, and fuch as by the fame way ot 
realoning may be apply 'd to Nothing, and then call them po- 
fitive properties; and io infer that the Chimera thus cloathed 
with them mull needs be fomething. Setting afide the names 
of its other pretended properties (which names alfo are ab 
merely negative as the fuppofed properties to which they be- 
long) thofe that attribute extenfion to fpace feem not to attend 
to the true notion of that Property, which, as the Schoolmen 
define it (and let them who like not this definition try to give 
us a better) is to have partes extra partes, and as fuch, /. e. as 
including Parts (which parts, as they differ in fituation front 
each other, may have things piedicated of fome of them dif- 
ferent from thofe which can be predicated of others) it ap- 
pears plainly inconfiilcnt with their own Idea of whaC they 
call fimple, uniform, indivifible fpace, and is applicable to 
Body only. And to attribute Extenfion or Parts to fpace, ac- 
cording to the firll notion of it laid down by ns* will be the 
lame as to talk of the cxtenfipn or parts of Ahfence, q[ Pri'va' 
tion, or of mc7-e Noihing. L^ftly, to ask jf Space under the 


"jl^ Concerning the Origin ^'Evii. Chap. I. 

and Space, wc arc in the next phccto examine whc- 
thcf they be of themrclves, or of fomething elfc? 


fccond Notion of that word, (/. e. as Extenfion in the Abftracl) 
be extended or have parts, is apparently abfurd ; it is the lame 
with that noted Qtiellion of the Man, who being told that to 
have Riches, was to be rich, ask'd if Riches then thcmfclves 
were Rich ? 

Well then, according to the firft Suppofition, Space will 
be mere uon entity, or nothing, i. e. nothing can be aflirm'd, 
but every thing denied of it : According to the iecond, it will 
be only znabjiraS} Idea form'd in the mind from a property 
peculiar to matter, which property abflrafled in Idea cannot 
rtfelf admit of any other properties, nor be applicable to the 
Divine Nature, nor capable of pofitive Infinity jn any refped. 
As to the laft, ' If Space, fays Dr. Cud^vorth, be concluded 

* to be nothing elfe but the extenfion and difiance oi Body, or 

* ?natter con^x^cx'd. m general (without refpeft to this or that 

* particular body) and abfiraBly in order tQ the Coi^ccption of 

* Motion and the menfuration of things, then do we lay that 

* there appeareth nQ fufficicnt grounds for this pofitive Infinity} 

* of Space, we being certain of no more than this, that be the 

* World, or any figuratt^ Body, never fo great, it is not im- 
« poflible but that it might rtill be greater and greater without 

* end. Which iiidefinite increafahlenefs of Body and Sp.icc 
\ feems to be miltaken for a pofitive infinity thereof. Whcre- 

* as for this very Reafon, becaufe it can never be fo great, but 

* that more magnitude may ftill be added to it, therefore it can 

* never be pofitively Infinite. 

< To conclude therefore, by Spice without the finite World, 
*: is to be underilood nothing but the polfibility of Body farther 
f and farther without end, yet ib as never to reach to Infinity.* 

Hence appears tlie weaknefs of that common Argumcnc 
nrg'd by Gajfendus, Dr. Clarke, and Raphfion, for the ahfiohite. 
infinity' ofi Space, viz. From the impoflibility of fetting bounds 
or limits to it : fincc that, {vj they, would be to fuppofe Sp^cs 
bounded bv yS/;/f/A/\^ which ///«■// occupies Space, or elfc by 
nothing, both which are contradidlions. 

Which Argument either firft of all fuppofes that Space h 
really Ibme thing, Qr fome pofitive Quality ; which wants to 
be proved. Or elfe improperly applies bounds and bounders 
to mere non-entity, or bare poifibility ; which has nothing to 
4o with the Idea of Bounds. 

* True Intel! , Syft. P. 644 & 766. 

Sed:. 2. C^ncenii fig t/jeOtigm of Ev'ih ^3' 

If they eyifl: of themfelves, the Enquiry is at an 
End. For thofe things that Exift by Nature are 


If therefore we take Space in the ficfl: Notion laid down, 
thi5u its unboundednefs will (as Dr. Cudvjorth fays) fignify 
nothing but the poffibility Of Body farther and farther without 
end ; according to which Senfe, let «s ftatc their ufual Quef- 
tion in other Words, and the great fallacy and impropriety of 
it will appear. What is there, fiy they, beyond this Space ? 
You muft imagine more fuch Space, or nothing. What is there 
fay we, beyond this pojjibiltty of Exijience? You muft either 
imagine more i'dc\). foJJibilUx o't Exijlende or mere notbing, i. e. 
Mn Exifience. What Coniequence can pofTibly be drawn from 
fuch an odd kind of Argumentfttion ?, 

But if Space be taken in tfee fecond Senfe, /. e, as Exter>» 
fion in ^abJlra3o, then the meaning of o«r not being able to fet 
bonnds to it will only be, that wc have a power of enlarging 
our abftraft Idea in htfinittim, or that we always find in our 
felves the fame ability to add to, or repeat it; and if we always 
find that we can add, we Ihall never find that we canuot add, 
which (as a very eminent Writer on the Subjedl obierves) is 
all the Myftery of the Matter, and all that can be underftood 
by infinite Space. 

But it is farther urg'd that there muft be fomething more in 
the prefcnt Gafc ; for luc _^7id not otily a Povjer of enlarging ihe 
Idea, but fi lid it i?npcijfib/e to fet bounds to the thing ; ivbcreait 
<ue can enlarge tht Idea of Matter to Infinity, and can alfo fet 
hounds to the thing itfclf. In anfwcr to the firft part of this 
Objection it is afk'd. What thing, I pnayyoii, but the thing in 
your own mind, that is, the Idea ? Prove it to be a thing 
and then we'll enquire whether it has bounds or not; but to fay 
the thing is infinite or boundlefs, before you have prov'dit to 
exift, orto be a Thing, is too large a ftcp to take. The abovc- 
mention'd excellent Writer folves the Difficulty arifmg from 
the fecond part o'i the Objedion by another parallel Cafe, 

< Whenlconfider the number of the Stars, I can go numbering 

* on in my thoughts ftill more and more Star^ in Infinitum, but 

* I can fet bounds to them, can fuppofe their number finite, 

* but to number itfelf I can fet no bounds. Yet what is Num- 

* ber.? Nothing but an abftract Idea, nothing ^i ^A7r«, and to 
' fay that number is infinite, comes only to this, that we can 

< fet no bounds to our Faculty of Numbering, it being always 
' as eafy to add to a thoufand, or a Million, one more, bV. as 

* to One. Well then, to fet bounds to numl-^r in the atftrai^, 

« i^ 

$4 Concerning tls Origin t^Evil. Chap. 1 

t^aufes oi Exijlence to themfelves, i.e. do not ftand 
in need of any external caufe ; if they depend on 


' is to Tet bounds to the Faculty itfelf, and to deny that it is 

* in my Power to add, when I plainly perceive that I can ; and 
' fo is a direft Contradiftion. Eut as to the number of Stars, 

* or Hairs, or Alen, or any thing, I can fet bounds to that, 

* without any contradi6l;ion, becaufe it iHll leaves me in pofT- 

* cflion of the power of numbering, which I find I have; and 

* which does not require any fub'iedt ad extra, but may goon 

* independent of any, and indifferent to all. Now to apply 

* this to other cafes: The Mind finds in itfelf the faculty of en- 

* larging and extending its Idea of cxtenfion. It can apply 

* it to Matter, or can let it alone: Can fuppoie Matter infi- 

* nitely expanded, or can fet bounds to it. But to fct bound? 

* to all Extenfion, as well imaginary as real, is cramping the 

* Faculty, is denying it the power of enlarging, which is al- 

* Ways prefent to the mind, and which flie can never lofe; 

* and, in a word, is a contradidlion. Any, either imagina- 

* ry, or real Subject is fufficicnt for the mind to exercife its 

* Faculties upon; and fo if you cither JuppolcGod or Matter, 

* or Space to be infinitely extended, it is equally latiffied 

* with any. All that fhe requires, is, that fhe may be able to- 

* enlarge the Idea of Extenfion. But if you take from her Ex- 

* tenfion itfelf, that is the Idea of it, and the Power of adding 

* to it, you deprive her of her Faculty, and deny her a power 

* which fhe finds fhe has. In a word, we can fet bounds to 

* any thing that ftill leaves us the power of enlarging or ex- 

* tending infinitely, as we find we always can: and if we 
' \vould fpeak ftridtly, it is not jmmher that is infinite, nor cx- 

* ttnfion infinite, which are nothing but iiotions abllrailcd from 

* things: But the mind ofMan is able to proceed numbering 

* or extending infinitely, that is, without ever coming to any 

* Stop or Bounds. For to fet Bounds is to deny and dellroy the 

* Faculty itfelf: If it could not always do it, it could not 
' do it at all. He that can add one to one, as often as he will 

* can never find an end of numbering, nor he that can double 
' an Inch as often as he will, find an end of enlarging; it is 

* all nothing more than repeating one of the caficll operations 

* or exercifes of the Mind, and it will always be a contradic- 

* tion for any rational Mind to v/ant it. The Cafe being 
' plainly thus, 1 think it fliould not be afk'd, v;hy a Mancan- 

* nor fet bounds to Number or F.xtcnfion, but how he comes 
' to have the Faculty of counting and repeating, which is rcil' 

Sedt. 2. Concerning the Origin of Evil. 15 

fomething eUe, there will be a queflion about that 
alfo, what it is, and what are its properties. 

II. Wt 

* \y tantamount to the other, and what it ultimately refolves 

* into. And then, I fuppofe, the Anfvver is very eafy, and 

* we need not go to the utmoft Limits of the World to enable 

* us to rcfolve the Riddle. 

' I cannot but fmile to oblerve how grofly we are often im- 

* pofed upon by Words Handing for abllraft Ideas, for want 
' of confidering how, and upon what Occafions, thefe abftrafl 

* Ideas were invented for the help of weak and narrow Con- 

* ceptions, and have been ufcd fo long till they are thought to 

* ftand for real Things. 

This, I think, is a folid and ample confutation of the Ar- 
gument drawn from the Idea of Space and its imaginary Infini- 
/)'. We fhall only add a Word or two to fhew that Duration., 
(as well as Space,) Number, and all ^avtity ; any thing which 
can be confidercd only by way of parts, or in Succeffion ; is 
abfolutely repugnant to, or incapable of true pofitive infini- 
ty in any refpeft. Now by a pofitive, or Metaphyfual Infi- 
nite we always mean that which is abfolutely PerfeB in its 
kind, which cannot admit of ^rt'<////ea, or Increafe. It is an 
Idea of a certain Quality in the Abjiraii, which has no jnix- 
iure of the contrary Quality in it, no failure or defied ; and 
which therefore is our Standard to which we always refer, and 
by which we try all imperfeftions, all mix'd or finite Quali* 
tics, which arc for this reafon calTd imperfeft, becaufe they 
fall fliortof our original Standard, and are properly negations 
iofit: Confequcntly our Idea oi Peifedion muft be a pofitive 
one, and prior to that of ImperfeiiiovL ; as will appear from 
Cudivorth cited in Remark 1. where the Reader may find a full, 
account of this pofitive Infinity, and how we get the Idea of it 
and arc able to diltinguifh it from that negative one explained by 
Mr Locke, which is frequently confounded with it. To return. 

If then a Metaphyfical Infinite means perfect, or that ta 
luhich nothing can be added, it is plain that Diiraiion, Number, 
and all Quantity, the very Nature aud Idea of which includes 
perpetual Increafablenefs or Addibility muft be effentially inca- 
pable of this abfolute or pofitive Infinity, in like manner as 
Cudnxorth has Ihewn of Space and Body in the Paffage 
referr'd to above. Farther, if we attend to the Notion of an 
Infinite Series, and take a view of the manifold Abfurdities 
which accompany it in any manner of conception, (from 
which abfurditici vva draw our ©nlv proof of a /ry? Canfe, or 


l6 Conc'srning the Origin o/'EviL Chap. 1. 

We arc \\, We muft prefumc that all our conceptions 

to form of fimple Objeds without us are true, i. e. reprefent 

'':Jif ^^ 'he 

things NOTES. 

they exill ^°^^ ^^^ ^'^^^ ^'^ neccflarily led to exclude from Infinity all 

of them- ("-i^^h things as exifl Seriatim, or nuill be conceiv''d as confifl- 

lelves Or "^^ iri and compofed ofyJ/(r<rf|/^w parts, i. e., fuch as Duration, 

require a ^'^"^^^*'y Space, Motion, Mag7iitude, l£c. all which, when faid 

Caufe ^*^ ^^ infinite, arc nothing but fo many infinite Series, and 

from our ^^^''^^'^'^'^I'^ble to the fame abfurdities ; as the abovemention'd 

fimple •Author has demonftrated of them all together, Intell. Syjl. p. 

Conc-Dti- ^^^' ^'^'^^^^^ ^^''^'"'>' in particular, /». 843. The fame is 

^^^^^ * fliewn cf Duration or Time, by Dr. Bently, Boyle's Lea. 

. Serm. 7. or Ha/e, Primitive Origination ofMan^ 

there IS no l- J r-* •' ^-n o ■;.. n ^ ■ • o r» TTr 

, ' J- '• ^- *^- orBiniopiS/J^;«^;?ff/. Origines Sacrae, B. HI. 

f r A> ^' '• prop- 7> 8. See alfo the confutation of an Infinite Series of 
p H r^ fucceflive Beings in the beginning of Note 10. and Rem. b. *" 
a a }. 'fj^g jj].^ j^ Ihewn of Number and all ^lantitv, by, the Au- 
thor of the Impartial Enquit'y into the nature ami exifience 
of God, p. z\,lf^c. 

* If any Number be abfolutely or infinitely great, it can be 

* for no other realon than becaule it is abfolutqly or in its very 
nature incapable ofincrcafe without an abfolute contradic- 
tion. But the very nature of all Quantity infers on the 

* contrary a ncceflity of the encrcafe of its Greatnefs on the 
fuppofition of the leaft addition: For fmcc no Quantity is 
more or Xciz fuch, or poIlclTes more or lefs of the nature of 
Quantity, than another, it follows that all Quantities be- 
ing of the fime general Nature mull feverally bear a propor- 
tion to each other. For example, that can be no Unit which 

.* by the addition of an Unit will not become two: and by 

* parity of reafon, that is bo Alillion which by the addition of 

* a fingle Unit will not incrc-afe to the greatnefs of a Million 

* and an Unit. For if it b» but a Million after the Addition 

* of an Unit, it is plain, it mull before that Addition have 
' been Icfs than a Million by an Unit.— ———•The like may 

* be faid of all other Quantities, p. 25. 

The learned Dr. Clarke endeavours to evadelhefe Arguments 
about Parts, Sec. by denying that any Number of Years, Days, 
and Hours : or of Miles, Yards, or Feet, ' can be confidered 
' as any aliquot, or (onfiitucnt parts of infinite 'lime or Space, or 

* be 

* How this is confillent with the Eternity of God, and 
what the true meaning of that Attribute is, See Note 10. Rem. 
c. or Dr. Bcntleys Bcj/c's Lect. Scrm. 3x1. 

S^dt. 2. Cofkermng the Origin of E^W. 

the things as God would have them known to 
us, except we elfewhere difcovcr lome Fallacy or 



^ be compsred at all with it, or bear any kind ofpropc'rtioR to 

< it, or be the foundation ofany Argument in any Queftion 
*. concerning it ' Dcmonftr. ofDiv. Attr. p, 37, 38. Jth-Edit. 
But does not this look ibniething like avoiding one great 
difliculty by admitting a greater? For how do we come 
^t out- confufid Idea of inf5nite Quantity but by firll: hav- 
ing a clear Idea of fome certain part of that Quantity ; in. 
Space, for inftance, of fuch a ftated Length as a Foot', 
in Time, of an Hour, and then by doubling, trebling, or any 
way multiplying chat fame Idea as long as we pleafe, and 
ftill finding as much room for or poflibility of multiplying it 
as we did when we began? See Lfjike B.II. c. xvii. ^..3. But 
does this Idea of Infinite (which fcems to be the only one the 
X)o£lor ever thought, of) n'hen applied to Time ov Space, al- 
ter the very nature, ejjence, and idea of that Time and Space? 
Do not we ftill confider it as an infinity of th.<i fame Time and 
Space ; or as confiiling in a continual addihility oi fuch por- 
tions of Time and Space; or as a Whole made upof numberleia- 
fuch parts of time and fpace as are of tiic fame kind wlththefe 
hours and feet ? To fay that infinite Space has no parts, is 
(as Leibnitz urges in his fourth Letter to Dr. Clarke, No. Xi. 
p. 99.) * to fay that it does not confift of finite Spaces; and, 

* that infinite Space might fabfili:, though all finite fpaces fliould 

* be reduced to nothing. It is as if one fnould fay, in the 
' Cartefian fuppofition of a material, extended, unlimited 
' World, that fuch a World might fubfift, though all the Bo- 

< dies of] which it confills, fliould be reduced to nothing *'. Is 
is therefore impoffible to conceive that hours and feet, ^c, 
{hould not be aliquot parts of infinite 1'ime and Space, and. 
that thefe parts fhould not bear fome kii7d of Proportion to 
this Infinity. Thefe parts indeed will never reach o\xx po,:tii:e,, 
sbfolute Infinite (i. e, that to which nothing can poliibly be 
added) becai:fe they include a perpetual addibility, as we ob- 
fcrved, which is called their Infinity, and which is a direil 
contradidlion to what we call a pofitive Infinite: And there-, 
fore poiitive Infinity applied to them is filf.y .applied, and 2 

C pofitive 

* See th?s plea fully confuted by Mr. Co/Z/^fr,, Lpparcial 
Enquiry into the Exiikuce and Nature of God. B. II. C ii. 
$>. i57,«fc. 

Concerning the Ox\gm of 'EwW, Chap. I. 

Prejudice adhering to them. For we can judge of 
things no otherwife than from our Conceptions. 
Nor arc we to feck for any other Criterion of 
Trnth than that a Conception of any thing offer- 
ed to the Mind forcibly extorts A (lent; as there 
is no other Criterion of Objeds perceived by the 
Senfe?, than that an Objed, by its Prefence forces 
us to perceive it even againfl our Will?. If there- 
fore the Conceptions, which we have of thcfe three 
before mentioned, reprefent them to us as exit- 
ing tiecejfarilj, fo that they cannot be feparatcd 



pofitive infinity of Matter, Number, Time, Sparc, or any 
quantity that confifts of parts, or muft be confidered in 
fiicceflion. i. e. to uhich this negative infinite, and this on- 
ly, is and muft be apply'd, are all contradidtions. Now 
inllead of anfvvering this Argument againft the abfolute In- 
finity of Time and Space, Dr. Clarke firft of z\\ ftifpofcs 
that 7im£ and Space are abfolutcly infinite, and then becaufe, 
according to this our way of conceiving Infinity (which yet 
is the only v/ay we have of concci\ing it in thefe things) they 
could not polTibiy be infinite, he argues that we mull not con- 
fider them in this way, namely as if their farts had any re- 
lation at all to their Infinity. But fliould not the Argument 
rather be rcvers'd, and the confequence of it ftand thus ? This 
is our only way of conceiving any infinite applicable to.thele 
Things, but this way we cannot conceive thefe to be pofitive- 
ly infinite (or pofitive Infinity cannot be apply'd to thek) 
without a contradiiltion ; therefore we cannot at all conceive 
thefe to bepofitivcly infinite without a contradiction, or there- 
fore thcfe are not politively infinite. 

There is indeed a certain ufc of the term infitiite among Ma- 
thematicians, where this reafoning of Dr. Clarke^ might bo 
admitted, but that is only they confider Quantities re- 
latively, and not abfolutely, and therefore that can have no 
place where we arc confidering real Exillences. Thus when 
Geometricians fay that one Quantity is infinitely lels than a- 
noiher, they mean that their infinitely fmall Quantity is no 
a!i<^.uot part of, bears no proportion to, or cannot be compared 
V, ith the other ; but proportion 'is'(not]iing real but) purely 
relative, and therefore the term infinite apply'd here mull be lb 


Se6t. 2 Concerning the Origin <?f E v iL 
from Exiftence even in Thought, we muft affirm 
that thefe exift of themfdves, and reqiure no C^«^ 
of their txtiienu. But if we can conceive thefe 
once not to have been, to have begtin to be, or 
to be capable of Annihilation, 'tis plain that ^^■" 
ce(^an Exificr^ce belongs not to them, nor are they 
of thcmfelves; they muft therefore have their Be- 
ing from fomething elfe. For, h nee they may 
eitlier exift or not exift, Exiftence is not of their 
Nature, and if it be not of their Nature, they mult 
have it from without; and there wants a Caufe by 
which this Indift^rence to or Poffibility of either 
Exiftence or Non-exiftcnee, may be dctermm d. 
Nor do we judge a Caufe in th.ngs to be other^. 
wife neceffary than as they are in their own Nature 
iKdiferersty that is, pajjivc in regard to Exiitence, 
for, if our Conceptions reprefent fomethmg to us 
as neceflary in its own Nature, we enquire no far-- 
ther about the Caufe whereby it exifts (4) , 

C 2, 11^' 


too. Thus for mftance, the Angle of Contaa made by a Curve 
md its Tangent is inftnitely Icfs than any ledihnear Angle, 
"bears no Proportion to it, is no Meafure of it, or cannot 
any ways be compared with it. But this is nothing to Infi- 
nity in^he Senie in which Dr. Clarke has ufed it; fuice by 
that he muft mean fomc determinate thing fomethmg ot 
which real Exiftence may be predicated which is very difte- 
rcn from Infinity in a relative Senfe, as it is fometimes con^ 
MeredTy Mathematicians ; or in a progreiTive and ludefimtc 
one which is the Senfe in which it is app bed to Quant tie? 
inci'eafmg or decreafing without End; and therefore what re- 
lates to thefe Infinites cannot be the foundation of any Argu^ 
ment concerning the other. The equivocal Ufe of the Word 
Ste in thel different Senfes by P-bhng Ivlathe-a.atics 
and Metaphvfics together has, I believ^e, occafion d muft ot the 
Confufion attending Subjefts of this Kind. ^^ ^ , 

(4.) The Sum of what our Author is here endeavou ng to 
pviJe'is that neither Matter nor Motio. (and he will ftiew 
The lame by and by oi Space) cm be inde,pend.nt or feU-«c, 


20 Concerning the Origin c/Evil. Chap. I. 

^Tis pro- in. If we apply this to our Conceptions of the 

ved that xhings in Qiieftion, it will appear whether they ht 

qidres'a fclf-exiftcnf, or require a Caule. In the firft Place 

Caufe, let us examin Aiotion^ whicJi is really ^tiion, but in 

tho' it be all Action it is neceffary, if we may truft our 

fuppofcd Thoughts, that there be an Jlgent and a Patient, 

„„j 1 \ without thefe we have no Notion of Acflion. In 

anci that , . ^ . 

Matter is A'lotion therefore, lince that is Action, there is re- 
rot the ciuircd an ^geyjt and a Patient, We have indeed 
Caufe of x\\Q Patient, namely Aiattcr i We muft in the next 
Place (ee what is the Agent : viz,. Whether Mat- 
ter produces IVIotion in itfelf ; or (to fpeak proper- 
ly) Whether Motion be coeval with it, natural, 
and nccelTarily adhering to its EfTencc, as Figure 



iftent, and confequently that they require feme caufe of their 
Exiftencc dillind from and antecedent to themfelves. And tho' 
lie fi-equenty makes ufe of that confufed equivocal Term, twcef- 
fary Exijunce, yet he feems to apply it only in a negative 
fenfe for Silf-Exijhnce or Exi[le7ice ivithout Caufe, wliich is as 
much as his Argument requires. For where any thing ap- 
pears to be an efieil, as Matter and Motion do, we muft re- 
quire a Caufe ; where no luch Caufednejs can be difcovered, 
we call the Thing Self-exijlent, tho' perhaps it really be not 
fo, but might proceed from foracthing elfe; and where an 
abfurdity would follow from fuppofing any Being not to have 
cxified once, or not to exift for the future, we fay there's a 
fieccffity for fuppofing that it did and will always exift ; or wc 
flilc that Being recejfarily Exijietit : which is perhaps as far as 
we can go. But as thefe Words, Neceffhry Exijience feem to 
have been taken to denote fome pofii've, extrinjic Principle of 
Exiftencc ; and which accordingly is often ftiled antecedent, 
ahfoh.te, original ISeceJJlty, a ISeccJJity ftinple, and uniform, and 
abfolutely fuch in its onxin nature, in itfelf, &c. It may be ot 
fome ule to confider the fevcral Things to which thefe Terms 
are apply'd, and what Ideas wc fix to them ; which will per- 
haps convince us that thcv are all merely relati've. 

Ncccfiity is chiefly ana primarily apply'd to Means ; and 
when it is thus apply'd, it evidently has Relation to fome End 
t& be attaia'd by thole Means gf which its aihrm'd. Thus, 


Sed. 2.^ Concerning tbe Ongm of Evil, 2 1 

is to Body. But if we remember what was kid 
down above, and carefully examine the Sentiments 
and Conceptions of our Minds, it wiil appear that 
the Nature of Matter (as far as we know of it) is 
indifferent to Motion, or Refl, and moves not ex- 
cept it be moved. Motion therefore does not fol- 
low from its Nature, nor is it contained in its Ef- 

C 3 fcence 


when we fay fuch a thing is necefTary, we mean that fome Emf 
cannot be attained without the Exiftence of that thing. Thus 
Religion is, tiecejfar'^ to a Rational Creature, or more properly. 
to the Happinefs of a Rational Creature ; /, e, a Rational Crea- 
ture cannot attain Happinefs, its ultimate End, without Reli- 
gion. Farther, Means being a Relative Idei, whatever is afr 
iirm'd of Means as Means, muft be Relative alfo ; or which is 
much the fame, muft be an AfFe<9:ion of a Relative Idea, v g. 
When we fay, any Aflion is Good, Fit, Right, Reafonahle, &c. 
all thefe Ter^is are or fliould be apply'd to it, as it is con- 
ceiv'd to be a Means to fome End, and confequently are re« 
lative ; therefore to call any Adtionyf/, hz. in itfclf, will be 
the fame as to affirm any thing to be rdatlve in itfelf, which 
is nonfenfe. 

Neceihty is alfo applied to Truth, and then it has relation 
10 fome other Truths, either antecedent or confequential, ac- 
cording to the different manner in which that Truth is proved 
to be necejfaril)^ true, i.e. according as the Proof is dire<fl or 
indireft. When the Proof is diredl, /. e. when the truth of 
any Propofition is llaewn to follow by unavoidable Confequence 
from fome other truth before known; then the A^^r^^/jofthaE 
Truth arifes from the Relation which it has to fome antecedent 
■Truth: When the Pfoof is indireft, /. e. when the Truth of 
any Propofition is flicwn, by {hewing that the Suppofition of 
the con;:rary to that Truth, /. e. the denying that, would 
imply the Negation of, or be incontillent with fome other 
known Truth; then the Neceflity of that Truth arifes from, 
the Relation which it has to fome confequential Truth- iV^ 
tejjity is alfo applied to Axioms; and then it has Relation to 
the Terms themfelves, /. e. ic arifes from the Relation which 
is between the terms, and means that fuppofing or laying 
down thofe Term?, that Relation or Connexion between thcnj 
cannot but be. Farther, the faniie may be fa^ oiTrnth, as of 

^2i. Concerning the Ongin of Y^vW. Chap. I.' 

fence, nor do we conceive it to arife from thence : 
Matter is therefore merely palTive in Regard to 
Motion, and an Agent muft be fought elfewhere. 
If you fay it has been in Motion from Eternity, 
you'll be never the nearer ; for Duration alters not 
the Nature of Things. If it has moved from E- 
ternity, it has had an eternal Caufe; and fince 
Matter is only paffive with refpect to the Motion 
which is in it, if it was from Eternity, it was ftill 
pajjlve onlj, and there wanted an eternal Agenf 



Means, Truth being relative alfo ; confequently fuch Phrafes 
as thefe, true ox falfe in itfelf, a Contradi^ion in iifelf; ox abfo- 
lutel'yfuch, &c. are very abfurd ones, 

Neceflity is alfo applied to Exigence, and then it arifes ei- 
ther from the relation which the Exiftence of" that thing of 
\vhich it is aflirmed has to the Exiifence of o/^^r things', or 
from the Relation which the Exiffence of that thing has to the 
Manner of its oivn Exiftence. In the former Signification, 
when Neccffity of Exiftence has Relation to the Exiftence of 
other things, it denotes that the Suppofition of the Non-exift- 
cnce of that thing of which Neceflity is afKrmed, implies the 
Non-exiftcnce of things which we know to exift. Thus fome 
independenc Being does necejjarily exiji. Becaufe to fuppofe 
no independent Being implies that there are no Dependent Be- 
ings, the contrary of which we knov/ to be true; lb that Ne- 
ceflity of Exiftence in this Senfe, is nothing elfe but Neceflity 
of Truth as related to Confequential Truth. And this fort of 
Froof is called Dctnonjlratio a Fojleriori. 

When the NecefHty of Exiftence arifes from the Rekition 
which rhc Exiftence of any thing has to the Manner of its own 
Exiftence, then Neceflity means that that thing of which it 
is afiirm'd exifts after fuch a Manner that it never could have 
not exifted. ' Thus every Independent Being, or every Being ex- 
ifting without a Caufe, is neceffarily exifting. Becaufe fuch a 
Being from the <z'ery manner of its exifting, could not begin to 
cxift, therefore muft always have exifted, /. e. does ncccfl^arily 
exift. For to fuppofe a Being to begin to exift, is to fuppofe 
a Mutation, i>iz. from Non-entity to Entity; and to fuppofe a 
Mutation is to fuppofe a Caufe', For if there's no Caufe, every 
.hing muft continue as it was. Therefore every Being which 


Secfl. 2^ Concermttg the OnginofEvW. 2j 

xo produce eternal Motion (5) in it: For eter- 
nal Adion cannot be more eafily conceived, with- 
out an eternal Agent, than temporary, without 2 
temporal one. But you'll fay, what is eternal, lince 
it was never made, requires no Caufe. Why fo? 
Suppofe the Sun to have fhined from Eternity, 

C 4 and 

N O T E S» 

had no Caufe of Exiftence, /. e. wKich is independent, cannot 
begin to exift, confequently cannot be fuppofed not to exift, 
z. e. is necejfarily exiftent. This fome call Demonjiratio a 

Neceffity as applied to Exiftence in thcfe two Ways, mull 
carefully be diftinguifhed. For tho' an independent Being can- 
not be neceflarily exiftent in the former Senfe, without being 
fo in the latter alfo ; yet it may be neceffarily exiftent in the 
latter Senfe without being fo in the former. There may be 
two or more neceflarily exiftent Beings in the latter Senfe, 
i. e. with regard to Independence, though in the former i. e. 
in Relation to this Svjiem, there can be but one neceflarily ex- 
iftent Being ; which may ferve to fliew us the inconclufivenefs 
of Dr. darkens feventh Propofition. And upon the whole, I 
think we may be convinced that no Ideas can poffibly be fixe4 
£0 thefe terms, Neceffity abjblute in itfelj. See alfo the latter 
Part of N. 10. and R. e. 

(5.) Eternal Motion feems to be a Contradi6tion, [See in- 
finite Series in N. 3. and Collibers Impartial Enquiry, c. 7. and 
Rem. b.j unlefs we could conceive two Eternals, one before 
the other ; as every mover muft, in the order of our Ideas, 
neceiTarily operate before they moved ; Thefe things there- 
fore which imply Beginning, Change, Sacceflion, or Increafe, 
are finite as well in Duration, as in any other refpecl, 
and confequently the Siippoiitions here and below are all 
impoflible ones. 

Of how little Importance that old Controverfy is, whe- 
ther Matter be eternal, may .be gathered from Note i* 
which fliews that there is properly no fuch thing as Mat- 
ter, diftindl from Body, /. e. a folld Subjiance enjery ivhere 
the fame, whicli that Word denotes, and which is not to 
to be found in that prccife manner of Exiftence. But if 
with our Author we take Matter for Body only, this as 
it undergoes perpetual Changes is in its very Nature in- 
capable of Eternity by Remarks c and d. 

(6.) Thefe 

24- Concerning the Origin ofEsW, Chap. I, 

and the Earth, nouriflied by its Hear, to have un-. 
dergone eternal Viciffitudes of Seafon^ ; had thofe 
VicifTitudes therefore no caufe? Would they be e- 
ver the kfs dependent on the Sun as their Source 
and Original? Hence it appears that Eternity of 
Aftion docs not exclude an aftive Caufe, and it is 
fo far from Truth that i'uch Adion was never pro- 
duced, bccaufe it is conceived to have been from 
Eternity, that we mull: rather fay it has always 
been produced. Tor in the Inftance given it ap- 
pears that the Sun did always, and from Eternity^ 
iCaufe the cjiangeof Seafons : Not that I think the 
Sun really was, or could be eternal ; but if Motion 
jfhould be fuppof^d eternal (which is the only Sub- 
terfuge left to them that deny the Neceffity of an 
Agent, in order to the Exiftence of Motion) the 
Sun might equally be eternal with its Light and 
their Effeds. And if this be granted, it will 
plainly appear, that Etermty of lAElion does not 
exclude an AcHve Caufe. If then we follow the 
i^uidance of our Thoughts, we muft acknowledge 
that there is fomerhing befide Matter and Motion., 
which muft be the Caufe of Motion. 
Tl1at^7^^ IV. Secondly, as to Matter itfelf, if we may 
/^; requires fuppofe it lo have had a Beginning, or to be anni- 
a Caufe of biiated, tjecejfary Exiftence will manifeftly not be 
jts Exift- jnipijj.j \^ its Nature, for that may be taken from 
^ ''"' it, atlcaft in Thought; but a thing cannot be fe- 
paratcd from its Nature or Jiftence even by the. 
Mind: If therefore Exiftence v/eve ejjemial to Mat- 
ter, it could not be divided from it even in 
thought, that is, we could not conceive Matter 
not to exift'. But who doubts whether he can do 
that ? Is it not as eafy to conceive that Spiice which 
the Marerial World occupies to be empty^ that is 
Void of Matter, z% fulll Cannot the Underftand- 
ing aflign to the Material World a Beginning ahd 
In End? They who admit of S^ace, or a F^^ 


Sed. 2.' Concerning the Ong\n ofEvWo 11^. 

CHum (6) cannot deny but Matter is at Icafl: 
mentally feparapl? from Exiftence, For Space 



(6.) Thefe two Words Space and Vacuum, tho' they ouglil- 
perhaps to have both the lame meaning, i. e. neither of them 
to mean any real thing or Quality exifting in Nature, but on- 
ly a ISegation of Matter and its Qualities; yet as the former is 
more evidently a pofitive Term, it is apt to convey an Idea of 
fomething pofitive, and thereby lead us to frame fome imagina- 
tion of that lomething, and fo at length draw us into a Notion 
quite different from that, which the latter Word more natural- 
ly offers, and which comes nearer to the truth of the Cafe ; 
and therefore it feems not quite fo convenient to ufe tl\efe two 
Words promifcuoufly. It may be doubted whether our fubfti- 
tuting the former of thefe terms for the latter, when the Ideas 
ufu^Uy fixt to them have in reality little to do with one ano- 
ther, may not have given rife to moft of the Difputes againft a 
Vacuum, which have been carried on by many able Writers- 
Vacuum, in Natural Philofophy, is (according to the true irrr 
port of the Word) only Emptinefs, or abfence of Matter, /. e. 
a Term that implies mere Negation ; tho' when we come to 
prove that Matter exifts not every where, or that there is rgai- 
ly any fuch emptinefs or abfence of Matter, we are obliged^ 
thro' the Defecl of Language, to make ufe of pofitive Terms 
about it, -viz,, that there is a Vacuum in this or that Place, or 
that there is a real Foundation in ^]'ature for fuppofing it. 
Hence, probably, Metaphyficians, when they come to confider 
it, being ufed to the Contemplation of abftract EfTences, arc 
led to undcrfland it as fomething pofitive, which mighr 
properly be faid to be here and there. Sec. Their next Step 
IS to bring it under the Imaginatio)2, and fo finding the Iden 
ef Space or Extenfipn in fome Mcafure connefted with this 
Emptinefs, they eafily fubftitute one for the other, and often 
change the negative Idea into a pofitive one, and define Vacu- 
um to be Extcjijion 'void of Solidity, or Space ivithout Body *» 
whereas the Ideas of Vacuity and Extenfion have no real 
Conneclion with each other, as was faid before, tho' they be 
very apt to go together. Thefe two diftin£t Ideas then being 
both included under the Word Vacuum, it becomes equivocal, 
and confequently that may be affirm'd or d«;ny'd of it accord- 
mg to the one Idea, which cwnot according to the other, and 


f IfOcke^ B. 2, C. 13. f. 2^j 

2h' Concerning the Origin ^Evil. Chap. IJ 

may be conceived either full or empty ; that is, 
with Matter, or without it. The Notion there- 

N O 'f E S. 

here is room for endlefs Juggle, i;. o-. It may be faid that 
there is a rca! Foundation in Nature for fuppofing a Vacuum in 
the negative Senfe of the Word, i. e. as fignifying mere Emp- 
tinefs ; but the fame Thing may be denied of it in the pofitive 
i. e. as {landing for pure Extension, which is an ahjlraB Idea 
form'd by the Mind itlelf, and as fuch has no Foundation 
any where elfe. Again, Philofophers, who take a Vacuum for 
Space or Extenfion in the Abftradt, flifRy deny that there is a 
Vacuu?n in Nature, which is true indeed of ablolute Space, 
which exifts only in the Mind, but is not fo of Vacuity or 
ab fence of Matter, which has as real a Foundation in Nature 
as Matter itfelf has ; except we'll argue that 'it cannot be faid 
to be or to have Exiftevce predicated of it, becaufe it is only a 
Negation; which is playing upon and puzling one another 
with Words. To illuflrate what has been faid of the Difputes 
about a Vacuum, I fhall prefent the Reader with fome Argu- 
ments brought againft it by Mr. Green and Boyle ; which may 
be of ufe to us fo far as they overthrow the Reality of abfo- 
lute, fimple Space, which they do effedlually, tho' I take 
them to be mere Quibbles with regard to the End for which 
thefe Authors feem to have quoted them. They may ferve al- 
fo for another Inftance of the great Confufion caufed by a jum- 
ble of Mathematics and Metaph)Tics together : An Example 
of which was given before in the Word hjinite, N. 3. 

<f Extenfion into Length, Breadth and Thicknefs, or what 
" is called mere Space, or Diltance, is a Quantity abftratlcd 
,* by the Mind, as all other Mathematical f^H-'^iti'^i'-s are ; as 
" a Line, or Superficies; and can be no more imagin'd to 
<' exift in Nature alone, than Length or Breadth can. A 
" Line is produced from the flowing of a Point; a Surface 
" from the flowing of a Line; and a Space or Mathematical 
"' Solid from the flowing of a Surfice : But it is owned 
*' that there is no fuch real Point, and confequcntly no fucli, 
«' Line in being, therefore no fuch Surface. And what Rea- 
<' fon can there be afligned why we may not go on one Step 
<' farther, and from the flune Principles conclude thare is no 
*' fuch Solid. For how is it poflible for a Superficies which 
'< has not a Being, and is imaginary and abftradred, to produce 
S' an Effedi: which is not equally fo. 
js ^< We have faid, that Length, Breadth, and Thicknefs is 
I ■ t " the 

Sed. 2. Coficer?img the Ongm of EwW, zf^ 

fore of the Creation of Matter, is no more repug- 
nant to our Conceptions, than the Creation of 



«« the Definition of imaginary Space ; and it is likcwife the 
*« Notion we have of Vacuum, as to the Nature and Eflence 
" of it; for the foreign Properties of Light, or Heat, or 
«' Sound, ^c. are not inchided in the Conceptions our Minds 
" have formed of Room to move in, or fimple Space. If 
" therefore the Delinition of imaginary Space and a Vacuunty 
*' are the fame, and a Vacuum is real Space, it follows, that 
*' real Space and imaginary are the lame, which is a Contra- 
*' didlion. Since to abftraft any thing in the Mind from Be- 
*' ings as they really exift, is not to confider Beings as they 
« reallv exift. 

" Fl-om this Idea o? Space, being only an abftraded one, it 
*' is eafy to give an Account of what Place is, namely, that it 
*' is only a Portion of this abftrafted Space, we have menti- 
*' oned, feparated from the reft, and applied to that Body 
*^' which it confiders as a Meafure of its Capacity. Therefore 
" primary or abfolute Place alfo, as well as Space is a Crea- 
•' tureofthe Mind, and nothing really exilling, as fome Phi- 
•' lofopher's imagine. Mr. Gr:e.(iXii Principles of Natural Phi- 
" lofophy, B. I.e. 4, 8, 18. 

'"■ Let us rummage as much as we pleafe into all the Re- 
" cefles of our Mind, we fhall never find there an Idea of an 
" unmqveable, indivifible, and penetrable Extenfion. And 
«' yet if there is a Vacuum, there mull exift an Extenfion cf- 
*' fentially endued with thefe three Attributes. It is no fmall 
" Difficulty to be forced to admit the Exiiicnce of a Nature, 
" of which we have no Idea, and is befides repugnant to the 
«* clearejl Ideas of our Mind. But there arc a great many o- 
" ther Inconveniences which attend this. Is this Vacuum, or 
♦' immoveable, indivifible, an4 penetrable Extenfion, a Sub- 
*' ftance or a Mode; Itmuft be one of the two, for the ade- 
** quate Divifion of Being comprehends but thele two Mem- 
" bers. If it be a Mode, they muft then define its Subftance j 
" but that is what they can never do. If it be a Subftance, I 
" aflc whether it be created or uncreated ? If created, it may 
*' perifti without the Matter, from which it is diftinft, cea- 
" fing to be. But it is abfurd and contradidorv that a Va- 
y cuum> that is, a Space diftin£t from Bodies, ftiould be de- 

" ftroycd 

2S^ Concerning the Origin ofEvW. Chap. L' 

That is is V. But whether there be any fuch Thing as 

not necef- Spa^e or no, we are certain that we have an Idea of 

farily exi- ^ 

ftent, as **• 

appears • ^ ^ p 

from the ISJ U I t. ^. 


of thofe " ftroyed, and yet that Bodies fliould be diflant from each o- 
Perfons " ther, as they maybe after the Deftruftion of the Vacuinn. 3ut 
who fup- " 5t"this Space diiiinft from Bodies is an uncreated Subftance, 
pofc Space " i^ will follow either that it is God, or that God is not the 
to be the " only Subftance which necefTarily exifts. Which Part fo- 
Image of " ever we take of this Alternarive, we fhall find our felves conr 
Bod^. " founded. The laft is a formal, and the other at leaft a 

" material Impiety : For all Extenfion is compofed of di- 
" ftinft Parts, and confequently feparable from each other; 
" whence it refults, that if God was extended he would not 
" be a fimple, immutable, and properly infinite Being, but a 
" W^{=,Q'i^t\Xi%%, Ens per aggregationem, each of which would 
•' be finite, tho' all of them together would be unlimited. 
" He would be like the Material World, which in the Car- 
*' _/?^z« Hypothefis, is an infinite Extenfion. And as to thofe 
*' who fhould pretend that God may be extended without be- 
" ing material or corporeal, and alledge as an Argument, his 
<* Simplicity, you will find them folidly refuted in one of Mr. 
** Arnatild's Books, from which I fhall cite only thel'e Words: 
" So far is the Simplicity of God frojn allon.ving lis Room to think 
*' that he mav be extended, that all Divines hanie acknoavledged, 
" after St. Thomas, that it is a neceffary Confequence of the 
" Simplicity of God, not to be extended. Will they fay, with 
<' the Schoolmen, that Space is no more than a Privation of 
«' of Body; that it hath no Reality, and that, properly fpeak- 
«' ing, a Vacuufh is nothing? But this is fuch an unreafon- 
•' able AfTertion, that all the modern Philofophcrs who de- 
" clare for a Vaanvn, have laid it afide, tho' never fo conve- 
*' nient in other Rcfpects. Gaffcndus carefully avoided any 
** Reliance on fuch an abfurd Hypothefis ; but chofe rather 
«* to plunge himlelf into the moit hideous Abyfs ofconjeftur- 
»' ing, that all Beings are not either Subil;ances or Accidents, 
f and that all Subftances are not cither Spirits or Bodies, and 
" of placing the Extenfion of Space amongft the Beings, 
" which are neither Corporeal nor Spiritual, neither Sub- 
*' ftance nor Accidents. 

" Mr. Locke, believing that he could not define \vhat a Va- 
*' citum is hath yet given us clearly to underlland, that he 
" took it for a pofitive Being. He had too clear a Head no: 
«• to difcerii, that nothingnflfs cannot h% extended in Lengthy 

' ■ ^< Breadth, 

Sed. ^. Cmcerning the Origin o/'Evil. 2^ 

it rho* whence we had it, Philofophers are not a- 
crreed. Thofe that deny any Diflindion between 



'' Breadth, and Depth. Mr. Hartfcshr hath very clearly ap- 
" prehended this Truth. There is no Vacuity in 'Nature faith 
*' he, this OHght to be acknoivledged ivithout Difficulty., becaufe, 
'* it is utterly contradiSlory to concei've a mere l\lon-entity, ivith 
" all the Properties lubich can onl-j agree to a real Being. But if" 
** it is contradidlory thatNothingncfs fhould be endued with 
" Extenfion or any other Quality, it is no lefs contradiiStory 
*' that Extenfion fhould be a Jimple Being, fmce it contains 
*' fome things of which we may truly deny what we may truly 
*' affirm of fome others, which it includes. The Space filTd 
*< up by the Sun is not the fame Space that is taken up by the 
" Moon; for if the Sun and the Moon filled the fame Space, 
** thefe two Luminaries would be in the fame Place, and pe- 
*' netrated one with another, fince two Things cannot be pe- 
** netrated with a third, without being penetrated betwixt 
*' themfclves. It is moll evident that the Sun and Moon are 
" not in the fame Place. It may then be faid truly of the 
*' Space of the Sun, that it is penetrated by the Sun; and it 
" may as truly be deny'd of the Space penetrated by the 
" Moon. There are then two Portions of Space, really di- 
^' Ilinfl from one another, by reafon that they receive two 
*' contrary Denominations of being penetrated and not being 
^' penetrated by the Sun. Which fully confutes thofe who 
" venture to alfert that Space is nothing but the Immenfity of 
" God ; And it is certain that the divine Immenfity could not 
*• be the Place of Bodies, v/ithout giving room to conclude 
" that it is compofed of as many real dillindt Parts as there 
*• are Bodies in the World. 

" It will be in vain for you to alledge, that Infinity hath no 
«* Parts; this mull necefTarily be falfe in all infinite Number i^ 
*' fince Number ellentially includes feveral Units. Nor will 
" you have any more Reafon to tell us that incorporeal Ex* 
*' tendon* is wholly contain'd in its Space, and alfo wholly 
■ " contained in each Part of its Space : For it is not only 
*' what we have no Idea of, and befides, thwarts our Ideas of 
*' Extenfion ; but alfo what will prove that all Bodies take 

" up 

* Tofa in toto, ^3° tota in ftngulis par tibia : that is what the 
Schoolmen fay of the Prefence of the Soul in a hu^r^'ah Body, 
and of the Prefence of An^el* in certain Place?, 

2^ Concermng the Origin of Ewi\. Chap. T, 

it and Body, bid us imagine Matter or the World 
to be annihilated ; and then, if we remember the 
Things that did exift, without confidering of what 
Kind they were, but only that they were withouu 
the Mind, we have what we call Space, If this be 
true, then it will be certain that Matter is not 
Self-cxiftent : For we may conhder it as annihi- 
lated, neither can we attribute any other Nature 
to it, than fuch as anfwers to our Conceptions of 
it. If Space therefore, according to them, be a 
Phantafm of Body, that is, an Idea of Body re- 
called to mind which formerly was, but now is 
nor, or is it not fuppofed tobe, 'tis certain that Bo- 
dy or Matter, fo far as we know any thing of its 
nature, is indifferent as to exiftence or non-exiflence. 
It has not therefore Exiftence of itfelf; for that 
which exifts by Neceffity of Nature, Exiftence 


'• NOTES. 

^^ up the fame PIacc, fince each could not take up its owa," 
" if the Divine Extenfion was entirely penetrated by each 
" Body numerically the fame with the Sun and with the 
" Earth. You will find in Mr. ArnaiiW^, a folid Refutation 
*' of thofe who attribute to God the difFufmg 'himfelf through- 
" out infinite Space. Crtt. DiSf. p. 3083, 3084. He con- 
cludes p. 308:; " If the Nature of penetrable or impenetrable 
" Extenfion draws along with it fuch a large Train of Incon- 
*' veniencies, the fliortelt Way is to affcrt that it hath no other 
" Exillence than in our Mind." If any Perfon want any- 
more Arguments againft the Exiflencc of fimple Extenfionj 
or the Application of it to a Spirit, he may find enow ia 
Bayle, p. 2790, 3077,^5'^. See alfo Efifcopitis. Inji, 7heol. 
p. 294. 

* Arnauld, Letter 8 and 9 to Father Malebranchc See al- 
fo a Book of Peter Petit., de cxtenfione Anims. i^ reruni incorpo- 
rearum natura. Aud M. de la Chamhrih Aufwer to it, which' 
he publifhed at Paris, Anno 1666. \to with this Title, Defe?tce 
de r Extenj'.on 13 de partes libres de Vajne. 

All the Rcafons he alledges to fltew that Extenfion ancJ 
Spirituality may be together are {o weak, that they arc only 
good to fiiew the F.vlfity of his A'ficrtion. 

Se£t. 2. Concerning the Origin of Evil. gl 

enters into its Uea, nor can it be conceived other- 
wife than as exifting. 

VI. Others deny that Space is diftinguifhable And of 
from Matter, any other way thart as a genericd thofc wha 
Oumtity is from a particular one ; For as when In- f^^jj^^^?^* 
divldftals are changed^ the Nature of Man or Animal fti,-,gu;f}i, 
remains unchanged: So when Body is changed or able from 
iranjlated into another Place, the Extenjion of the Matter, 
Place 7vhich it occupied remains unchanged, namely ^'V o'^er- 
/-,» ; . r ; -n / T iJ - Wife then 

entpty, or filled with another Bodj. JL would not -^sExtenfi- 

fpend a Cenfure on this reafoning ; but granting it on in gc- 
To be true, it would follow that Body or Matter neral is 
contains nothing in the idea of it, which might in- f''°^^ ^ 
duce us to believe that it is of itfelf, or cxifts by ^f^Son. 
the NeceOTity of its Nature: but on the contrary, 
that it may be annihilated at leaft in Conception. 
If therefore we confult our Ideas, we mull con- 
fefs that Matter does not exift neceffarily, but is as 
indifferent to Exiftence or Ncn-exiftence, as to 
Motion or Reji':, i. c. is in that rcfped merely paffivc. 
It requires a Caufe then which may determine it to 
Exifience no lefs than to Motion, For that whicli 
is not of itfelf mull: necellarily be of another, nor 
can we know that any thing is of itfelf, otheiwife 
tl¥in from the Ideas whfch.we have of its nature ; if 
thefe r:prefent the nature of any thing as necejfarily 
exifting, fo that we cannot conceive it not to be, 
we enquire no farther about its caufe; if not, we fly 
to a Caufe ; nor is the Underftanding farisfied till 
it has found one. Why are we inquifitive about 
the Original of Man, or any thing elfe? but only 
becaufe our Conceptions reprefent thefe as indiffer- 
ent in themfelves to Being, and therefore a; requi" 
ring fome Caufe of their Exifience diflind from 
themfelves. From the nature then of Matter as 
well as Alotiony we are forc'd to admit of mother 
Principle to be the Caufe of both. 



ieems at 
ftrft Sight 
ble from 

that this 
may a rife 
from Pre- 

S/>Jtfe i 
we con- 
ceive fome 
thing to 
ex ill vvi th- 
ou t us, 
\vc cannot 
Space in 

Concerning the Origin of Evil, Chap. f. 

VII. Thirdly. As to Space^ many doubt whe- 
ther its nature be diilinguilliable from exiftence. 
Whether it can be annihilated even in thought, or 
conceived not to have been. For when the whol6 
material World is annihilated in the Mind, the Idea 
of Space remains, as of a thing yetexifting; it ob- 
trudes itfelf upon the Underftanding, and lufFers us 
not to aflign any beginning or end of its Bxiftence, 
It forces us therefore to confefs, whether we will or 
no, that it exifts ; nor doesitfeem to require a Caufe 
whyitexifts fince it is of fuch a Nature as being 
felt fufficient, muft have exiftence of itfelf. For 
what v.'ill be felf-e:^i(knr, if that be nor, which 
cannot even be conceived not to exifl: ? 

Villi This feems to argue flrongly for the Self- 
exijience of Space. Yet a Doubt may arife v/he- 
th'er this Inability of our Underftanding to fepa- 
rate the Nature of Space from Exiftence, proceed 
from that fame Nature of Space, or rather from 
the ImperfeElion of our Rcafon. For tho' all our 
fimple Conceptions mufi: for the mo ft part be 
look'd upon as true, as we faid before ^, yet thefe 
are to be excepted from this Rule in which we find 
any Grounds of Fallacy or Prejudice. And in this 
reafoning about Space, it is to be fufpeQed that we 
conned Exiftence with ics Nature merely out of 

IX We may underftand how this comes to paf?, 
if we confider ifi- That our Conceptions come 
for the moft part from 7i'ithouty when therefore 
fomething is prefented to our Mind>, we always 
conceive it as without us : This Notion therefore 
of external and internal adheres to all our Concep- 
tions, and we continually alhgn a P/ace to every 
thing which we happen lo think of; but that there 
Ihould be any thing externa), or which ha? a Place 


* § II. Parag. 11.' 

Stdi 2 . Colic ti 'nhig the Orig i n ^ E v il, 

and no SpAce^ is inconceivable. As long then as 
we think of any thing external, we cannot but at 
the fame time believe that Space exifls, in which 
Space we conceive that thing to exift. For while 
we fuppofe any thing exifling b:fide ourfelves, that 
Jieceflarily feerns to be without us; but imagine all- 
Externals removed, and turn the Mind upon it/'elf, 
and that without will be taken away, and together with 
it the neceffity o^ Space or Place. For while we con* 
ceive nothing to exifl befide ourfelves, i.e. our Minds, 
we don't think of this u-ithout, that is, of Space ) nor 
fee any necefliry for its Exigence, (j.) 


AT T E S, 

. (7.) From hence, I think, it appears fufficiently that Space. 
Were itr granted to have any real Exiltcnce at all, I mean to be 
any thing more than an Idea in our Minds, (which fome per- 
haps will not be very ready to grant, from an attentive Confi- 
cjeration o^ the Notes 3. and 6.) yet it cannot be fuppoied 
to exift ncceflarily, in Dr, C/arh's lenlc o^ necejary Exijrence,. 
For according to him, ' * Whatever is nccefliirily exiiling, 

* there is need of its Exigence, in order to the Suppofal of the 

* Exigence of any other Thing; fo that nothing can pofTibly 

* be fuppofed to exift, without prefuppofing and including' 
« antecedently the Exiftence of that which is ncccfiary, , There-^ 

* fore, the fuppofing of any thing poffibly to exiil alone, fo 33- 

* not neceffarily to include the prefuppoial of fome other 

* thing, proves demonftrably that that oth?r thing is not ne- 

* cellarily exifting ; becaufe, whatfoever has necelTary Exi- 

* ftence cannot pojhbly, in any Conception whatfoever, be. 

* flippofed away. There cannot poffibly be any Notion of th«, 

* Exiftence of any thing, there cannot poffibly beany Notion 
"* of Exiftence at all, but what fliall neceffiirily prcinclude the 
' Notion of that which is necefiarily exiilent. 

Now if we can confidc.r our own Souls as exifting alone 
and without this iS/rtc^?, without confidering it as a caufa Jitu 
qua non, or in any other refpeft; \w\x\\o\xt prefuppojing, or unv 
Vfs.y5 inciudingii: This (according to the Dr. himfelfj vvijl 
-prove demonftrably that Space is not necefTariiy exiftent. But 
let any one flicw us what neceffi.ty there is fur the Exiftence of 

D' Space. 

* JiifiK-er to the ftrji tetter p 10, 

34 Co7iccrni?ig the Ox\gmof'Ev\\. Chap. I. 

That X. It is to be obfervcd farther, that when we 

things Q^nihilatc any thine in our Mind, we confider it as 

conceived jo 

to be an- lOme-' 

nihilated a7 n -r r c 

by fubRi- N U I h b. 


fomething Space, in order to the fuppofal of the Exiftence of a Spirit . 
elfe in the Let him try whether he cannot conceive an imjuaterial think- 
Room of ing Subftance, without the Idea of Space or Exte7ij,on; nay, 
them J but whether he can poffibly conceive it with them; whether thefe 
we have Ideas are at all applicable to an immaterial Being, and not ra- 
nothirg ther repugnant and contr.:diclory to the very Notion of it ; 
to fublli- whether they belong not iolcly to Matter, and if that were an- 
tutc for nihilated, might not eafily be fuppofed away. Few, I believe. 
Space. befide Dr. Clarke, can apprehend liow Space is (as he calls it 

in his 4th Reply to Leibnitz*) the Place of all Ideas. Vm. 
fure Space and Spirit, and the diftincT: Properties of each, 
appear to me as diftant and incompatible, as the moll remote 
and incondilent things in nature; and an extended Soul icems 
juii: fucli another Phrafc as tl green Sound, an Ell of Coiifciouf- 
nefs or Cube of Virtue. Dr. Clarke grants \ that Extenjwn does 
not beloiig to "Thought, (as our Author has indeed proved in 
many of its Modes, in Pnrag. XIV. and XV.) and at the 
fame time endeavours to fliift off the Confequencc by anfwer- 
ing, that Thought is not a Being. But where's the Diffe- 
rence in this Rei'pect ? Don't we frame our Idea of the Bei7ig 
from its conftituent Properties ? And if thefe have no manner 
of relation to Extenfion, why fliould the fuppofed Being to 
which they belong have any ? \ Wliich Being is indeed no- 
thing but the Aggregate of thele Properties. See Note i. 
I'm apt to think that our conceiving Subjiance by way oi Suh- 
f.ratum, lias led us into the Notion that all kind of Subftances 
mull be extended; and 'tis perhaps impoffible for us to imagine 
any fuch thing as an U next ended Suljiance ; but yet Reafon con- 
vinces us that there are many veal things of which we can 
form no Imagination. And that there are Beings in Nature 
to which no manner of Extenfion can poflibly be apply'd, wc 
find fufficiently prov'd by Cied--u'orth |(. Among the various 
Arguments there produced this is the Subilance of one. ' If 
' the Soul be an extended Suhjiance, then it mufl of neceffity 
* be either a Phyjical Point (for a Mathematical Poi-nt has no 

' ExtenJiOTi) 

* N. 29. p. 144. 

f Anf^Mcr to the fecond Letter, p. 1 6. 
% See R. h. at the end of this Chapter, 
i Imcll. Syil- p. 82} — 832. 

Sedt. 2 Co?icernirigtIjeOx\^\nof)^\'\\. 3^ 

fomething evanefcenr, and removed out of Sight; 
but yet \ve look upon fome other thing as fublh- 

D 2 tuted 

N T E S> 

* Exten/ion) or minimiiin, the leaft Extcnfion that can pofiiblf 

* be ; — or ehe it nuift confift of more inch. P hyfecal Points. 
"■ joined together. As for the former of thcfe, it is impoflibl^ 
« that one fmgle Atom, or fmallcjl Point of extcnfion ihould 

* be able to perceive diitindly all the ijaricty of things, /. e. 

* take notice of all the diJlinSl and different Parts of an extend- 

* cd Objed, and have a Defcription ov Deiifuafirjn oi thcwholc 
' of them at once upon itfclf: (for that would be to make ic 

* di-viftbie and indi'vifible at the ilime time) As for the l?.trer, if 
*. the Soul be an extended Subftance conlilHng o^ tr.ore Points,. 

* one without another, all concurring in every Seufatioiu therjf 

* mull every one of thefe Points cither perceive a Poijit and 
' Part of the Object only, or elfe the au/'o/V Objed : Now if 

* every Point of the extended Soul perceives only a Point of 

* the Objed, then is there no one thing in us that perceives the 

* ^vhole ; or which can compare one Part with another. But 

* if every Point of the extended Soul perceives the ivho/e Oh- 
' jedl at once confifting of many Parts , then will the former 

* Abfurdity return. And alfo there would be innumerable P^rr- 
'. cipients of the fame Obje£i in every Senfation, as many as 

* tliere are Points in the extended Soul : And from both thefe 
' Suppofitions it would alike foUov/ that no Alan is one fingle 
*. Percipie?it, or Perfon, but that there are innumerable diftindt 
^ Percipients, or Perfons in every Man. Neither can there be 
' any other Suppofuion made befides thofe three foremea- 

* tion'd: As that the whole ^•.Y/fWfr/5'5«/fliould perceive both 
' the nvhole fenjible object, and all its fcveral Parts, no part of 

* this Soul in the mean tinje having any Perception at all by 
' itfelf; becaufe the whole of an extended Being is nothing but 
' all the Parts taken together; and if none of thofe P^v;/j hxvz. 

* any Life, Senfe, or Perception in them, it is impofhble there 
' fhould be any in the nvhole. But in very truth, to iay that 
^ the whole Soul percciveth all, and no Part of it any thing, 
' is to acknowledge ic not to be extended, but to be indivifeble, 

* which is the thing we contend for. 

From hence alfo, that an indi'vifible Being or Subftance is not 
capable of receiving a Di'uijible <^iality, nor a Di-vijillc Sub-, 
llance an itidi-i.>ifibie one, he makes it tally appear that neither 
Matter can pofliblv think, nor Spirit be extended, ibid. p. 
827, 828, 829. ' , 

D 3' Where 

36 Concernifig the Origin ofEw'il. Chap. I. 

tilted in the room of that which difappeared; thus 
when jiccidcnts are removed, we conceive the Sub- 


Where Mr. Collihcr might have found a fufficient Anfvvef 
to his Argument for the Soul's Extenfion from its recei'ving 
Ideas of extended Things*. And to his Maxim, that like is 
kvov.-n bv like, and by Confcquencc a Subjeft abfolutely void 
of extenfion could have no Ideas of extended things -f. 

' Nay the Soul (fays Cud-Tvorth) conceives extended things 
' themfclves /iWA7f;;^;'i?(7'/y and ifidi^jijihly, for as the difierenci 

* of the whole Hetnifphere is contrac^ted into a narrow Compafs 

* in the Pupil of the Eye, fo are all diftances yet more con- 

* tra6tcd in the Soul itfelf, and there underilood indijlantly : 

* for t.}\Q thought of a Mile difiance, or 10,000 Miles, or femi- 

* diameters of the Earth, takes up no more room in the 

* Soul nor Jirctches it any more than does the thought of a 
' foot or i}2ch, or indeed of a Mathematical Point X-''^ 

The foregoing Arguments againft the fimplicity of exten' 
fion, as well as thofc in Notes tj. and 6. conclude equally a- 
gainfc Vix. ColUbers Amplitude or Expanfton j| . Since, if it hz 
any thing real, it mufl: have parts reallv diilinft from one ano- 
ther ; which diftinct parts can never be the fubjeftof an undi- 
vided Quality, nor any addition of them ever reach a pofitive 
Infinity. But in truth, thcfc V.''ords Expanfion, Amplitude, &c. 
don't feem to imply any f ofitive thing or quality diftindt from 
material Extenfion, or indeed to have any determinate mean- 
ing at all; like the Vii cf the School-men, which was not 
place but fomething elfe, they did not know, and mull 
belong to Spirits, tho' how or why they could not tell. 

The lalt mention'd Writer has a lecond Argnment for the 
Amplitude or Expavfton of the Dii'ive Natttre, grounded on a- 
nother Maxim, viz. Nothing can hejlo^v nvhat is has tiot in it- 
felf: but God has created material expanfion, therefore he mull 
be expanded himfelf, p. 223. Which Argument is anlwefd 
by our Author in the 1 8 th Paragr who_fliews that fuch Expaii- 
fion is a mere imperfedion, as well as materiality, and confe- 
qucntly is equally inconfillent with the perfcdion of the Di- 
vine Being. See alfo Rem. h. 


* Impartial Enquiry p. 222. 
-j- Ibid. p. 223. 

X hitell. Syfi. p 827, 829. ^c. 
11 Impartial Enquiry 

SevSt. 2. Concerning the Origin ofEvW, 37 

fiance remaining; fetting afide Matter, we fubfti- 
ture Space ; but when Space is removed, we have 
nothing to fubftitute in its (lead, except material 
or external Things j but all thcfe fuppofe Space, 
and cannot be conceiv'd without it; no wonder 
then that we cannot annihilate Space, while we 
conceive thefe as exifting. If therefore we would 
come at a. right Underihnding of the Nature of 
Space, we muft not apply our Minds to any thing 
material or external, but attend to our own 
Thoughts and Senfations, which have no rcla'^ion 
to external Things or to Qiiantity : And when our 
Minds are thus employed, there will appear to be 
no more Neceffity for the Exiftence of Space than 
of Matter. 

Xr. It proceeds therefore (vomPrejudiccy and an We at 
unwary way of thinking, that we couple nccefTity of ^"^\P ^,^ 

r -a • L r • L J \ f \ \. annihilate 

txijtence with Space; neither do we obferve that ^^,}^j|g 

for this very Reafon we cannot conceive Space not thofe 
to exif}, becaufe we imagine thofe things ftill exi- things 
iting, which cannot exift without Space; which is continue 
no greater a Wonder than if any one intent upon l"" \ ■ 
the Mobility of the Heavenly Bodies, fhould cona- and there- 
plain that he could not annihilate the Matter of foreitcan- 
thera, while the -^or/o'? continued; for material "pt be an- 
and extern?.! things have no lefs Dependance on nihilated. 
and Conneiflion with Space, than Mobility has 
with Matter; if then we con:eive God only to 
ejfift, -vyhile he contemplates himfelf as exifting 

D 5 alon^ 


That no CoUcfljon or Combination of Atoms can think^ 
(and the fame reafon holds againft any thing which can be con- 
ceiv'd by way oi parts) fee proved at large in Bayle's Dift. 
p. 1924. under the Aricle Leucippia, Remark E. See alfo 
Dr. Ciarke''& Letters to Z)ui/--zw/ Concerning the Immortality of 
the Soul, if^c. or Religio)! of Nature Deli?:, p. i86, ^c. or 
H. Ditionh Appendix to his Djfcouxft contcrni;ig the R.efL|r- 

38 Concerning the Origin o/'Evil. Chap. I, 

alone, he cnn no more be judged to ftand in need 
of Space, or be confcious of it as aclually exiting, 
than we are while we contemplate only the reflex 
Ad-s of the Mind. But when he willed external 
Things, he made Flace or Space for them to 
exifl- in. 
God can- XII. It may be objecled that we can 
'not be Extfteme from God after the fame manner as we 
conceived endeavour to nmo/e it fiom Space. For the 
?xiV° Mind being reflected on itfelf, and folely intent 
v.V upon contemphting i^s Operations, may deny 

God to exift as well as Space. If therefore we de- 
ny Space to be felf-exittent, becauf? we can confi- 
der our Mind as exifling alone in Nature, and 
confequently Space as not cxifling; why may not 
we, by the fame way of reafoning, deny that God 
h Jclf-exifientt I anlwer, we are confcious that we 
do not exift of ourf'elves, while therefore we con- 
template ourfelves and our intelledual Operations, 
we are ncceflarily carried to fome Caufe ; being 
certain that we have Exiflence from another, and 
not of (burfelves; we cannot therefore exert even 
one ad of the Underfl:anding but it mufl: have a 
neceflary Connexion with fome Cmfc diflind 
from u«. 
Bccaufe XIII. We cannot therefore conceive ourfelves 

Weave as the only Beings in nature, for v/e mufl: admit, 
confcious along with us, the Caufe from which we derive 
that we £xiftence, which is a confufcd Conception of God. 
exift°of ^^^ ^^'^ ^^^^^ cannot be faid of Space; for the Ope- 
curfclvEs. rations of our Mind aie fo intimately perceived by 
' us as to have no neceffary Connexion with Space, 

and we underfland clearly eaough that thefe may 
be, tho' there were no Space, and do not fland in 
need of it for their Exiftence. If we conceive our- 
felves as confifting of both Body and Adind^ 'tis 
certain we fland in need of Space for our Exiftence, 
and during that Conception, 'tis impoflible for us 
' ■ ■ . '■■ '■ ■ ■ ■ to 

Sed. 2. Concerning the Origin of RwW, 39 

to conceive Space to be annihilated; viz,. h<^- 
caufe fuch a Conception has a necelTary Conneftion 
with Space. After the fame manner, if we con- 
ceive ourfelves to be Mind only, yet we muft own 
the Exigence of God. For a finite Mind requires 
a Caufe from which it may receive Exigence, no lefs 
than a Body does a Place tn which it may exift; 
and from hence, in reality, it is that we attribute 
Self-exijience to Space, becaufe whenever we think 
of ourfelves, we imagine ourfelves to confift of 
both Body and Mind. While therefore we are con- 
fcious of our own Exigence, we form our Belief 
of Space alfo as neceffarily exifling, fince it is 
conneiSed with the Conception of Bodp i. e. of 

XIV. Secondly, It is remarkable that the Con- Smell, 
ceptions which we have from hearings fmclUngt or Talk, 
tafting, tho' they be produced in us by external Hearing, 
Objects, yet they have no Connexion with the aive us 
Conceptions o^ Space -^ for who can imagine the any notice 
Longitude, Latitude, orProfundity of 5'i??i«i, Smelly of the 
ovTaJie^ If then we had only thefe three Senfes, we ^^ift^''''^^ 
fhould not fo much as imagine that there was any ^ 
Space. Our Conceptions therefore abftraft from 
all Extenfion, nor do the Notion-; of external and 
internal adhere fo clo'ely to our Thoughts bnt we 
may lay them allde ', and if we fet thefe afide, the 
Sclf-exiftence of Space doe? not neceffaily ohiruds 
itfelf upom u% Now as the common People at- 
tribute Smells, Tajles, Colours, and other fenjib'e 
Qualities to the Objeds themfelves, and believe 
that they exift in them; while they who attend 
better to their Thoughts, know that they exift on- 
ly in the Mind, and are nothing in the things by 
which they are produced, befide the peculiar Mo- 
tion and Texture of their Parts; after the fame 
manner, 'tis probable, we are impofed upon in 
attributing necelTary Exiftcnce to Space, becaufe 

P 4 we 

40 Concerning tbe Origin ofEvW. Chap. I. 

we obfcrve that alinofl; all our Thoughts are pro- 
cluced in us from withour, and thereby accuftom- 
ing ourfclves to join Space with them, while we 
arc confcious that we think, we conceive alfo that 
Space exirts; Whereas, if \vt remember that aH 
our Senfation?, even thofe produced by exfernal 
Things;, fuch as Smells, c^c, do not bring along 
with them the Notion of Space, we may eafily 
lay alide this Prejudice , and withdrawing our 
Thoughts fiom the Contemplation of Space, ma^ 
conceive it not ro^f. 

The XV. And this will appear Thirdly, if by a 

il^'-ic/^ reflex A(5b we view the Aiind itfelf and its Opem-. 
u nor it- '^''^^'O'^^s \ for nothing of Extenfion or Space offer's 
felt has no itfelf in thefe ; nor does the Mind, when employ- 
relation to ed about them, think at all of Space, nor is it 
Space, nor confcious tliat it occupies Space: It withdraws 
'.(.y ^^j.|^' therefore from the Conceptions of internal and 
i* " externd, and may conceive nothing to be in the 

World befides hfc]j\ and its Cauje ; i. e. can imia- 
gine Space to be non-exiflent. Thinking Beings 
then may exift without Space ; It proceeds there- 
fore from Prejudice that we join Necejfary Exijlenc^ 
with it. 

We may XVI. Fourthly, It is to be remarked that 

conceive Space, fo far as appears to our Conceptions, is 

Space to ^jf fm-h a Nature as cannot be annihilated by 

L-fteTall ^' ^^^^^i Toi' ^hey are in (uch a manner united t6 

together, ^nd dependent upon one another, that if we fup- 

butnotbypofe one Part, it will imply a Contradidion 

5*arts. for the others not to exifl. We can in Thought 

* ' remove all W-ater put of -a VefTel, or Chamber, 

and the Space interjacent between the Walls 

remains extended in Length, Breadth, and Depth': 

put the Space caniioc be removedj lince it is of its 

Sedt. 2. Cojic erni rig the Ongm of 'EvW. 41 

own Nature immmovable, (8.) nor can it be an- 
vihilatcd; for Diftance would ftill remain between 
the Bounds, which cannot be without Extenlion, 
nor Extenlion without a Subjed ; but Space, as 
fa}' as we can conceive itj is the primary Suhjd^ (c?.) 

■ ■■ pf 


(8.) That is, as I have often hinted, if we fuppofe it tq 
have any real Nature or to exijl at all, it mufi:, as our Author 
fays, exill: every where, and cannot be removed by parts. And 
in this Senfe fli'ould the Words of Sir I/aec NeivtoJi be under- 
ftood *. " The order of the parts of Space is immutable > re- 
** mo've thefe from their places^ and you nvill remo-ve them, as / 
*' may fay, from themfel'ves." For to fuppofe it all at once a- 
v/ay, feems fo far from amounting to that ahfw-d Suppofition 
xnerLtion'd by Dr. Clarke f , that it is i)o more than what mufi: 
be conceiv'd in every Annihilation of any thing, which is the 
total deftrutlion or taking a^vay of Exiflcnce, the removal oF 
it, as we may {^j, from itfclf, or from Being: Which is ^ 
Suppofition that is generally thought to carry no abfurdity 
along with it. 

(9 ) Dr. Clarke affirms;]: that ^pace is not a Suhfance ; and 
yet declares that it has real ^alities Ij. Is not this either to 
fuppofe ^/alities or Properties inherent in one another? Or 
clfe, with Gnffendus, to imagine fome middle thing betwecii 
Subfance and Accident, which is neither ofthem^ but partakes 
of both ? 

The learned Writer referred to in Note 3. is of the fame 
Opinion \vith our Author in this Place, viz. that we are apt 
to conceive Space to be a fort of Subllancc or Subfratum 0/ 
Exteitfon, and fo are ufed to attribute that and other imagi- 
nary Qualities to it. * The Idea of Space is not the Idea qF 
' Extenfion, but of fomething extended, it is the Subfratum of 

* Extenfion, and not Extenfion itfelf. But when I fay it is 

* the Subjlratum, do not imagine I make it to be any thing 
' nvithout; it is an Ideal St,ifratum, and nothing more. When 

* the Mind has been confidering the Idea of Extenfion at)- 
< ftraded from the extended Bodies, from ^vhcnce it firft re- 

* ceived 

* Princ. Schol. ad dcf 8. 

■|- Anfn.ver to the 6th Letter, p. 39, 

X Anfwer to the ^d Lett. p. 2"?.. and to the ^th p. zS, 

L An^iAjer to the 6th Letter, p- 30, 

42 Concerning the Origin of Evil. Chap. I. 

of Extenfion ; therefore it neceflarily continues 
with Diftance, nor can it be annihilated, unlefs 



* ccived the Idea, (whether as they were Caufes or Occafions 
« of it I confider not now) it is a very eafy Step for the Mind 

* to make farther, to frame an imaginary Subjiralum to fupport 

* an imaginary Extenfion. And this is the more eafy becaufe the 

* Idea we have of a real Suhjlratum or Subflance, the Support 
' of real Qualities is dark and confufed, an Idea o'i fomenjjhat, 
' and that's all. Now it is but joyning the Idea o^fomen.vhat 
' with the Idea of one Quality only, namely Extenfion, and 

* we have an imaginary Subjiratum prefently formed, that is, 
' an Idea o^ Space, or an /^t'a/ extended fomething. Whether 

* this be not the very Cafe, I mail leave to any Man to judgq 

* by reflefting on his own Ideas. 

Again ; To this Quellion, Why may jiot Space he rather de- 
fined Extenfon in the AbJlraSl, or imaginary Extenfion rather 
than the imagijiary Subjiratum of imaginary Extenfion ? He an- 
fwers, ' Extenfion in the general or in the abftraft, is an Idea 

* of pure hitelle^ly i.e. is to be underftood, but cannot be 

* imagind, any more than Whitenefs in the general, or a 
« thoufand other the like abftrafl Ideas. But as foon as Ima- 

* gination comes to deal with this general abllrad Idea (or 
« Ideas) it fupplies it with an imaginary Subflratum, and fo 

* makes the general which was invifble, be conceived as a 

* particular, for the help of the Underftanding. So if the 

* Imagination comes to conceive any certain Degree of White- 

* nefs, it fupplies the Mind with fome imaginary white Sur- 
« face, and brings down the general Idea to a particular Ob- 

* jedh In like manner, when it comes to conceive a Lengthy 

< a Breadth, a Thicknefs, it fapplies the Mind with a Sabftra- 

* turn pro hac 'vice, fuch as may ferve the Purpofe, otherwife 
« the Mind mull reil in pure intcllcd only, as in Numbers ; 

< and there is nothing more tedious or uneafy to the Mind 

* generally than to be wholly abjlrafted; which is the Reafon, 
' by the way, that Arithmetical Demonftrations, tho' as clear 

* and certain as any, are lefs delightful than Geometrical, and 
' nothing more irkfome than abftraft Numbers. Now Space. 
« being the Obje£t of the Imagination, and not of pure Intcl- 

* leSi, as are all general, abllra£t Ideas, it is properly the 

* imaginary Subjiratum of an imaginary Extenfion, or the gene- 
'■ ral Idea of Extenfion particularized in an imaginary SubjeSii 
« and hence it is that Space is faid to bo extended, which 

« would 

Sea. 2. Concerfiiftg the Ongm of Evil. 4J 

we would have Extenfion without a Subjefl, 
|:hat is imo Length, Breadth, md Depth ^'nhom^ny 
Thing Lo-ag, Broad and Deep. Hence it appears 
that Space cannot be partially annihilated, and from 
hence the Opinion of its Jelf-exijieuce might mk. 

XVIT. For fince it is of fuch a Nature as muft jJ^^^^J^^' 
be annihilated either alltogetherj or not at all, they Prejudice 
that attempted to annihilare it only by Parts, faw for its felt 
that it was impoflible to de done, the Nature of the cxiftencc^ 
Thing remonftratedagainft a partial Annihilation, and 
if one Part be fuppofed, all others might be demonftrat- 
cd to exifl: by neceffary Connexion, But if any one 
ihould fuppofe all extended things to be removed to- 
gether at iOnce, he would find nothing impoffiblein 
that Suppofition: For one may imagine nothing to 
exift in Nature befidehis own Soul, and the Caufe on 
which it depends ; v/hich, as a thinking Being, includes 
nothing of Extenfion in it: Every thing that is ex- 
tended may therefore be feparated from Exiftence. 
But they that attempted this by Parts, when they 
found it impoflfible, did not fcruple to refol ve the Caufe 
into the Self-exiftence of Space j tho' in reality it did 



' would be Nonfenfe to (ay of Extenfion Itfelf : And Bodici; 
« are faid to be in Space, which would likewife be Nonfenfe 

* to fay of Extenfion. And fo it is conceived as immoveable^ 

* indivifible, infinite. Immoveable, ^c. all Properties ofSiib 

* fiances ; which makes it plain that it is conceived after the 

* manner of Sabftance, and therefore is, becaufe it can be no- 

* thing elfe, an imaginary Subfiratum, which the Mind takes; 

* to particularize, and thereby render conceivable its general 

* Idea of Extenfion ; which could not otherwife fall within 

* the Imagination, nor be ellimated any way but by abftraft 

* numbers, fo many Yards, or fo many Miles, lo, 20, 30 j 

* without attending to any thing but the numbers, and the 

* meaning of the Words, Yards, Miles, ^c. as it is when we 

* reckon Ounces, Pounds, Iffc. of Weight. — Thus then you 

* fee how we come by the Notion otSpace^ ^nd wh^t it i\»\ 
§ee alfo Note 3. .:...« 

4,4- Concerning the Ongm of ¥^\i\. Chap. I, 

not arife from thence, but from this, that they at- 
tempted to fepaiMte things naturally infeperable, name- 
ly, the Parts of Space one from another. 
We are XVIII. But whether there be any fuch Thing 

rifwi""^ as Space, or no; whether its Extenfion be diftin- 
^laufe in g^i'^i^d from the Extenfion of Body, or not : Be 
Whatman- it nothing at ail; Be it mere privation of ComaFty 
Tier focver as fome are pleafed to term it ; be it mere PoJJibi' 
tl^e Dif- lity or Capacity of exiRin?, as others; be it, laftly, 

pute about -li r /■ J^ r ■ r,r j rr"^ 

Space be ^^^"^r lometliing credited, or or itfelf and necejjar- 

determin- ^^ cxijJing ; yet ftill, as far as we know any thing of 
cd. the Nature of it, 'tis an indolent thing, it neither 

ii^Sy nor is in the leail: aBcd upon', it cannot there- 
fore, as mere Extenfion, under which Notion only 
n appears to us, be the Caufe o^ Matter, or imprels 
Amotion on it. There muft then neceflarily be a- 
mother Canfe o£ Alatter and Motion, that is a5iive, 
Jelf-exifient, and the Caufe of all Things and Atiions, 
which, fince they are not of themfelves, require a 


Of the Tirjl Caufe, 

Our Rea- \'\7'^'^^'^ '■^^'^ active Principle is we cannot 
fpniiv^s a- ' ' apprclund otherwife than by Reafon, for ;c 
bout the occurs not to the Senfes, unlcfs by its EffeEis ', 
firft Caufe nor is it perceived by them any more than Light 
^^}^^%. is by the; Ears: Our Reafonin^s therefore about 
blhidMan ^^"'''^ Principle will be like thofe of a i?Iind Mm about 
about Light, A blind Man may be aflured that there is a 
light, certain thing called Light, which the Eye can per- 
fince It IS ceive, as the Nofe can Smell ; he may be taught 
fea of° * ?^^° ^y t\\^m who fee, to underftand many Acf- 
"Senfc. vantages of Light, namely that it can dirc^^ the 

■ ■ ^teps. 

Sed. 3. Concerning the Origin ^EviL' 4^ 

Steps, that it can ivarmi that it derives its Origin 
from a large remote Body, i.e. the Sun; that by 
the help of it very difiant Bodie^ may be perceived, 
with their Forw J and other Qualities unknown tohim ; 
and that Fire which affords only heat to him, can 
give Light alfo to them who fee: LaRly, that it 
arifes from fome Motion in the minutefl Partifles 
of a Fluid. 

II. From thefe ^.v/crWProperti s h£ might dif- Yet wc 
courfe of L'ght, and in fome Mcalure underfland know a 
the reafonings of other Men upon itj he would g'^'^^^'na- 
believe it to bediftind from Heat; he would ea- "-^ J"^' 
gerly defire, and willingly undergo many Hard- j^g {^^ 
ihips, to enjoy the Benefit of it ; yet would he 
never have any fuch Senfe of it as thofe who fee. 
After the fame manner we may know many things 
about this adive Principb, which we are compel- 
led, by the force of Rsafons, to believe certainly 
to exiff, tho' we are no lefs ignorant of what it is 
in itfelf, than the blind Man is of the Senfation 
which Light produces in thofe v;lio fee *. 

III, For Inftance; In the firft Plice we are certain Tlut aU 
that all other things come from this aElive Principle: och^^r 
For nothing elfe as v/e h:ve Ihewn before t. con- '^^'"S^ . 
tains in irfelf Necejfary Exifisnce or aftive Poii-eri f^Q^^^], 
entirely independent of any other; as therefore 

itfelf is from none, fo all others are from it. For 
from hence we conclude that tliis Principle does 
exiff, becaufe after confjdering the refl of the 
things which do exifl, we perceive that they could 
neither i;e nor a5}, if that had not exiflcd, and ex- 
cited Motion in their. 

IV. Secondly, we are certain that this Principle That it is 
is One, Similar and uniform : For Aiatter is as to <>»«' 

* This Compart [on ii farther ilUijirated h^ thi Author of the 
Procedure of Huiii^n Underltanding, in hn Int>odu^io»,^Con-. 
cerning the ufc n-vhich is wade of it. See. Rem. \. 

f §. 2. Paragr. 3, 4, 5, ^c. and Rcmarfc C. 


46 Concernmg the Origin o/'Evil. Chap. f. 

its EJfence, every where One and alike; the fame 
muft be faid of Space, if we grant it to be any 
thing diftind from Matter : much more muft the 
Caule which fills Space with Matter be One^ Jimplc 
md uniform, (lo.) 

V. Thirdly 


fio j This Argument (as well as Come cidicri.- hereafter men-- 
ilon'd) were the Foundatioa of it true, can but be call'd a pre 
fumptive one at beil : nay, in truth the contrary will rather 
follow from the multiplicity and di-verfty of created Suhjiances. 
We fhall therefore endeavour to give a dilHnfl proof of the 
5m/g- and Attributes oC God, fo hx at lead as the knowledge of 
them may aficd: our prefent Subiect. 

Now thefe feem capable of a clear deduction from this one 
felf-e'videntVnnc\Y>\c* I exijl. I myfelf exifl: therefore _/cw^- 
thing exifts. ICfomethlng exiits /'M-zf, then fomething has exirted 
altuays. Otherwife that fomething wliich now cxiils, mult once 
cither have been made by nothing, i. e. beep caufed by no Cau/et 
which is abfurd ; or elfe have tnade itfelf, i. e. have a£led be- 
fore it exifted, or been at once both Effe£l and Caufe ; which 
is alfo abfurd ; or, laftly, (which is the only fuppolition leftV 
it muft have been produced by fomething, which had its Ex- 
iltence from fomething elfe, which alfo depended on fome other 
Caufe, and fo on in an infinite Series of Caus'd or Succcifn^e 
.Beings, without any eternal or firll Caufe ; which is alfo ab- 
furd. For either fome one Part of this infinite Series has not 
heew fuccejji've to any other, or elfe all the fevcral Parts of it 
have been fucceflivc: iC fo?ne one part of it has not, then there 
\va.s afrf, v/hich deftroys the Suppofition ; if all the feverai 
Parts of it have been iucceflive to each other, then they have 
all once hetw future, and if they have been all once future, 
then there was a time when jione of them exiited ; and if 
there was a time when «5«f of them exilled, then either all 
the Parts of this infinite Series, and confequently the ^jhole^ 
muit have arifen from nothing, which is abiurd; or elfe there 
mult be fomething in the mchole befidc what is contained in all 
the parts ; which is alfo abfurd. Or thus : Since all the Parts 
of this infinite Series ^rz fucceffive ov future to one another,' 
they muit once either ha\c been all future, i.e. non exifient, 
(and then the fecoiid abfurdity will follow, /. e. that this , 


f See Kcmarli a. (it thi aid of Ghap. V. 

Sed. 3. Cojicernmg the Origin o/'Evil. 47 

V. Thirdly^ that it is Infinite both in Nature and Infinite in 
Fewer : For Unce it exifts of it/elf^ there is nothing ^^i"''^ 


whole Series arofe from nothing) or elfe all but fome o«f, (snd 
then the firft will follow, /. e. that it had a Beginning) which 
one added to the reft either makes them infinite, which is ab- 
furd ; or they are infinite without that one, and then that one 
added to them, either makes one more than infimte, or adds 
nothing at all ; both which are Absurdities. 

Ifitbefaid that an Infinite Series is fuppofed to have no' 
<vjhole', I grant it, and on that very Account the Suppofition i^ 
abfurd, fmce whatfoever has Parti muft have a whole, whiclx 
whole is nothing but a certain number or aggregate of thele 
Parts. But as no number can be fo great but that we may 
affign a greater, it follows that neither Number itfelf, nor any 
thing to which number can be applied, i. e. which confifts of 
Parts, is capable of real abfolute Infinity *. 

From the ImpofTibility of an Infinite Series we gather the 
Eternityf oC fame one Thing or Being [That every one is not 
in like manner eternal a parte ante, or ne~oer had a Begin- 
ing ; particularly that no Body or malerial Syfie?n can be fo 
(and the fome Reafons hold equally againft any ifnperfeSl im- 
tnaterial Subfiance) is fufiiciently prov'd in the Enquiry into the 
Evidence of the Chrifiian Religion'^..'\ 

From Eternity comes Independence or Selfexifience. For 
that which never had a Beginning of Exillence, could not 
poffibly have any Caufe of that Exiftence (for then it would 
not be th.QfirJi Caufe, contrary to what we have proved above) 
or could depend w^on no other thing for it, /. e. muit be in^ 
dependent of all others; or, which is the fame thing, mull ex- 
ill of itfelf, i. e. he fiif cxifienl. 

Eternity a parte pofi, or neccjjary Exifience; or an impofTibi- 
ty of every ccafing to be, follows from Independence ||. For 
what depends upon no Caule can never be alter'd or deftroy'd 
by any, (as is fhewn in Note 4. and Remark e.) and theretorc 
muil continue as it is. 

From Independence comes alfo Omnipotence. For a Being 
that depends upon no external Caufe for his Exiftence, and 
has aSiive Po^.ver, (as was fhewn at the fmie time that we 
proved his Exiftence, and by the fame Medium) cannot de- 
pend upon any for the exertion of tliat Power, ai\d confequent- 


* Rem. b. t R. c. I R. d. ]j, R. c.. 

and P<nu- 

48 COnc'^rntng the Origin bf^v'A, Chap. I. 

that can bound its Nature or Power. *Tis to be 
obferved farther, that the number of poJJJhle thing-*^ 



I7 no /i mi fs Clin be applied to either liis Exitlence or Power<j 
i'or Limitation is an e^u7 of lome fnperior cau/e, whicJi in tiie 
prcftiit Cufe there c.innot be: confequently to liippoic Limits 
wlicre there c;ui be no Limitcv-, is to fuppofe an EffeSi <v:ithout 
a Caufe *. 

To fuppofe this being limited inov by its own 'Nature, is 
to fuppofe fome Nature antecedent., or limiting S^tality fuperior 
\o that Being, to the Exillence of whom no Thing, no 
Quality is in any xQ{y^Q.&. antecedent ox fuperior : And to fuppole 
that there is no fuch thing as ABion or Po^er in a Being which 
appears, to be the Fountain of all Aftion and Power, is (if poi- 
fible) the woril: Suppofition of all. 
. Liberty is alio included in the Idea of Omnipotence: /Icli-ve 
Po^..ver implies Freedom; Infinite Ponxcr is abfolute Freedom. 
What therefore has no Bounds fetto its Po^ver, what can have 
t\o oppofition made to its WJl, nor Rellraintlaid on its Adi- 
ons, mull: both will and ^A/ree/y. This Attribute is alfo prov- 
ed from the Beginning of Alotiun, and the Creation and Dif- 
pofition o^ indifferent things f. 

But tho' this Being hfree, and as fuch the Author of Change 
in other Beings, yet he mull himfelf be Unchangeable. For all 
Changes have a Beginning, and confequently are Effects of 
fome prior Caufes: But there can be nothing />w;- to the Ex- 
igence of this Being, ^sXit'isEtertial, neither any C^z^ofit, 
as he is independent; nor confequently any change in it: ex- 
cept we could fuppofe him to change himfelf, which is the fame 
Abfurdity as to produce hirafelf, i. e. to be at the fimc time both 
Fffea. and Caufe. 

Thus we come to the Knowledge of an Eternal, Independent y 
Omnipotent, Free, and Vtuhangeable Being. 

Qmnifcience, as well fome of the foregoing Attributes, may 
be jnore eafily deduced thus. We find in ourfelves fuch Qualir 
ties as T^hought and Intelligence, Po-ixer, Freedom, ijfc. of w hich 
we have intniti-ve Kno^ijledge, as much as of our own Exijlence; 
and that to have thcfe is ^ perfection, or better than to be-with- 
out them : We find alfo th.u thefe have not been in us froni 
Eternity, confequently ihcy mull ha\c had a Beginning, -mA' 


* Rom. r. 
f See Mute E, and |hc' Rofcrenecsl 

•Sed. 3. Concur ?ii?tg the Origin of TLwW. ^c^ 

is conceived by us to be infinite, at lealt in Pffiuert 
but nothing can be foffibl&, to wiiich there is nuc 



^oitfc^quently {ome Cau/e, (for the fame realbn that :i Ba'Kg, 
beginning to exifl in time, requires a Caufe) which Caufe, as 
it mull htfiiperior to its EffeB, has them in zfupcrtor Degree*j 
and if it be the JirJI Caufe, as itfelf can depend upon no other, 
muft have them in perfeSiioti, or in an infinite or ujiUmttcd 
Degree (if thefe Words can properly be here apply 'df.) 
Since Bounds or Limitation would be without a Limiter (as has 
been fliewn) /. e. an Effeft without a Caule. 

The Pheno?nena of Nature alfo lead us up to One fuch firft 
Caufe, which is fufficient for their Produdlion, and therefore 
none ellc are necejfary ; and tho' fe-veral more independent Be- 
ings might pofhbly exifl, yet would they be no Gods to us ; 
for they would have no manner of Relation to us, nor we any 
thing to do with them :{;. Since therefore the iame Rcafoii 
-holds for no more than One fuch, to fuppofe more than one is. 
at lead unreafonable. 

Thefe feem to be all the fitnple Attributes obfervable in the. 
Divine Nature, which, as they are differently combined by 
us, come under different Nam^s. Thus the unlimited Exer- 
cife of God's Kno-Miedge and Ponver demonllrates him Omni- 
prefent, i. e. at all times and in all places fo prefeat with every 
Creature as to have an abfolute Knoixledge of and Paov^r ovei: 
it ; always to fupervife and govern it||. 

His enioying all conceivable Perfedions in an entire abfo- 
lute manner, denotes him Infinite, or rather abfolutely Per- 
fea%; and, which is the fame thing, his being capable of no 
ivant, defeSl^ or unhappinefs whatfoever, defines him All-fuf- 
ficient. . 

The Moral Attributes 6'i God may be deduced from thefe 
natural ones, and are immediate Conlequenccs of theiiv wl;en 
cxcrcifed on other Beings. They feem to be the Perfeclioa 
of his external Ads rather than any new internal Perfetiiions 
of his Nature, and may be termed his faomiary, relative J t- 

E And 

* 5ee the latter part of R. k. 
t SeeR. 1. t R.g. il R- h. 

^ See Wollaflan, p. 70, 93. 
** See the Impartial Euqiury, ^c. p. 29, 6-" 
vr N?fe ;2. 

5© Concemi?jg the Origin o/'Evll. Chap. 1. 

feme Poller corre/pondent , that might adually 


N "f E S, 

And tho the Exiftenceofany moral Quality or Ai^ion is not 
capable of ftrift Demonftration, bccaufe eveiy moral Adiion 
or Quality, as fuch, depends upon the Will of the Agent, 
which nuift be abfolutely free : Yet we have as great AfTur- 
ancc that there are moral Qualities in God, and that he will 
always aft according to thefe moral Qualities, as the nature of 
the thing admits, and may be as well fatisfied of it as if we 
could dcmonftrate it*. 

I fnall begin again with a Self-evident Propofition. 

Pleafure is difl'erent from Pain ; confcquently there is a dif- 
ference in things. Pleafure hft for, or agreeable to the nature 
ofafcnfible Being, or (as thefe words are commonly ufed) a 7m- 
tural Good i Pain is U7ifity or is a Jiatural E^oil : Confequently 
there is a natural _/?/«^ zn^ iinfitnefs of things; or (which is the 
very fame, and what thefe Terms fhould always mean) Natu- 
ral Good and E'vil. 

The voluntary Application of this natural Good and Evil, 
to any Rational Being, or the Produflion f of it by a rational 
Being, is Moral Good and Evil : Confequently there is fuch 
a thing as Moral Good and Evil. An Inclination to and Ap- 
probation of this Moral Good is in every rational Creature %, 
and is perfedive of its Nature, and theiefore it mull be 
communicated by, and confequently be inherent in the 
Creator [j. 

To act agreeably to this Inclination and Approbation is alfo 
a Peifeflicn ; the contrary an Imperfection ; confequently 
the, as it is a Perfection found in fome Degree in the 
Creature, mull belong to and be in the highell Degree in the 
Creator, who has been already prov'd to have all naturalY&x- 
feftions in an inlinite or pcrfedl Degree §; and therefore he 
muft have all nwral ones fo too. 

As his Knonxledge and Po-Tverarc pcrftB, he muft always both 
perceive and be able to purfue this Moral Good. And as his 
Happivefs is complete., there can be no poffible Reafon why he 
ihould ever m-nll the contrary ; nay, there is a good Reafon 
why he fliould not, namely, otherwife a perfedl Thing would 


* See Dltton on Moral Evidence, p. i, 2. 

t R. i. 

X See the latter Part of Rem. i. 

II R.k. § R. i 

Sed:. 3. Concerning the Origin ^/Evil. ^r 

effed itj iince therefore the things that are pofli- 
E 2 blc 

i\r o r £ 6", 

<!:ontradift itfeif, and will a Defi^ov hnpcrfcci'ion, 1. e. be per- 
fe(£l and not perfedl at the fame time : or a Being infinitely 
happy, and who loves and approves hlmfelf becaufe he is id, 
■would hate and difapprovc the very fame thing in others, i. e. 
would love his own Nature, and yet hate any thing that rc- 
fembles it; which is abfurd *. It follows then that he muft 
always knonju, be able, and nvllllng to do, and therefore aSiually 
do what is abfolutely beji, i. e. produce the greateft fum of 
Happinefs, or be abfolutely and completely Good. 

This alfo was included in the Inclination and Approbation 
above mentioned. For if he has given us Benevolent Ai- 
fe£lions and a Senfe which approves them, he mud hlm- 
felf have both the fame Affections, and the fame Scnfe of 
them f . 

Again; the Idea of GW^^yJ properly implies a Difpofition 
to communicate Happinefs to others; if then this Being be- 
good, he muft aftually have communicated Happinefs to others; 
and mice verfa, if he have communicated H^appinefs to others, 
he mull \i^gQod: But this Being has communicated Happinefs 
to others, therefore he is Good. 

The Idea of W'lfdom implies his Knowledge and Obfervance 
bf the moft proper Methods of this, and is included 
in his Omnifcience ', it being nothing but that very Knowledge 
conlider'd with relation to Pradice. It appears farther from 
confidering the only Caiifes of Imprudence in Men, which are 
cither Ignorance, ParliaUty, or Inattention ; none of which can 
have place in God : He cannot be ignorant of any thing, 
fince both all things and their Relations to each other, proceed 
from him : He cannot be wvjd by any Po-iver or fivayd by any 
Interejl, fmce (as has been fhevvn) he is independent and all fuf- 
f-ciejit ; and he cannot be inattentive, fince he always fees every- 
thing intuiti'vel^ and at once ; and confequently he muft al- 
ways knonx} and do what hfttcjl and avifcji to be done. 

From which alfo follows his Jujiice: For he that, fees all 
the Circufnjiances of things ■^ndi the Ratifications of Fcrfons ■xcA 
\\fis, Ability to regulate thefe, and no manner of lanptation to 
do otherwife, muft certainly fuit thefe Circuniftances to thofc 
Qualifications, or provide that Perfons receive the natural and . 


* See Scois Works, Vol, 2. Diic- ^'^IV . p. ^c, •: 

t Sec'R. i." 

52 Cojicerningthe Oxi^inofE^iW. Chap. I* 

ble cannot be limited, there muft alfo be a Canfe 



proper Confequcnce of their Adlions ; or (which is the fame) 
do with every Pcrfon what is exaftly j///? and right. 

The fame alio holds for his Holinefs and Veracity, or rather 
Faithfulnefs. As to the former, he muft always diflike and de- 
tell Evil, fince it can never become in the leall agreeable to 
his Pcrfc^io>is, or fcrviceable to his Ufe : As to the latter, he 
muft adhere to Truth, as it is a PerfeSlion, and co-incident with 
Cood, If^c. fince he can have no poffible Reafon or Moti've to 
deviate from it*. 

Thus may we reafon about the feveral moral Perfeftions of 
the fuprcnie Being, as they are commonly diftinguifh'd. But 
( w hich fliould chiefly diredl us in thefe our Enquiries is 
the Idea of his hijinite Goodnefs, which implies, or rather in- 
cludes them allf. Nay all the other moral Attributes (>f 
they can properly be called Attributes) arc fo far from exilt- 
ing apart frOm this, that they ought to be confider'd only as 
fo many different Fie-ivs of the fame Goodnefs in the Creator, 
and various Sources of Happinefs to the Creature. Thefe are 
always fub- ordinate to and regulated by this one principal Per- 
icflion and brightelt Ray of the Divinity. Thus we con- 
ceive his Jujiice to be exerted on any Being no farther than 
his Goodnefs neccilarily requires, in order to the making 

/that Being, or others, fenjihlc of the heinous Nature and perni- 
cious Effeks of Sin ; and thereby bringing either it, or fomc 
othtrs, to as great a Degree of Happinefs as their feveral Na- 
tures become capable of J. His Holinefs hates and abhors all 
Wickednefs, only as the necejjary Confequence of it is abfolutc 
and una\oidablc Mifery ; and his Veracity or Faithfulnefs fcems 
to be no farther concerned for Truth, than as it is connected 
with and produdive of the Happinefs of all rational Beings : 
to provide the propercft Means for attaining which great End 
is the exercife of his IVifdorn. 

.1 have all along dsclin'd the Argument a priori, drawn from 
the Antecedent iiecefftty o'i Exifience, as well for the Reafons 
giv'en in R e. as alfo, bccaufe it fcem'd not to carry fame 
Atlril)Ules fo fu as thcv might be deduced a poferiori, awd to 


* See B_p. TVin-insN^t. Rel. C- lo. p. 142. 6th Edit. 
f See Tillotfon Scrm. 90. 2d. Vol. Fol. p. 679. Or 
Stackhvufci Body of Divinity C. 5. Scd. is. p. toil 
J R. m. 

Sei^. 3 . Concerning the Origin qf'E\i\. j j 

infinitely powerful. For as one Pollibility re- 

E 3 quires 


be fcaree confillent with others. That the Sc/f-cxiftent Be^ 
ing, for inftance, is not a blind, unintellige-nt Neceflity, but in 
the moll proper Senfe an underjianding and really aSll've Be- 
ing, cannot be demoriftrated ftridlly and properly a priori, as 
Dr. Clarke fliys* with a great deal ofRealbn ; and how nb- 
folnte NeceJJtty is reconcileablc with nhfolute Freedom Teems 
hard to conceive. For why fliould not this Neceffity extend 
to all the Operations, the Wills, the Decrees, as well as the Exi^ 
fience of the firfl: Caufe; and take away that Freedom of De- 
termination, that entire Liberty (i{ Indifference, which our Au- 
thor has fufficiently proved f, to be a property of GWhimfelf, 
as well as Man ^ And if we cannot jidmit it in one Cafe, 
why fhould we in the other ? 1 don't f\y this NeceJJity is in- 
conliftent with perteil Freedom piS the former is an ImperfeSiiou, 
fince we do not conceive it to be fuch any firther than as it 
proceeds ab extra, from fome fuperior Caufe impofing it. But 
this I fay, that be it what you pleafe, the very Nature and Idea 
of it feems repugnant to that of Freedom, i. e. the Po-iver of de- 
termining in Cafes a,hfolutely indifferent, n.mthout any pre-vious 
Reafon ImpuHe, or Neceffity -ivhatfoever ; and confcquently 
thefe .two can never be co-exiflent in tYitfame Caufe. He that 
confiders this attentively will, I believe, find it to be more 
than a mere ^ibble on the Words J. 

Laftly, This Neceffity of Exiilcnce, being (as Dr. Clarke con- 
fends||) fimple and uniform, without any poffiblc difference or 
'variety, Ihould admit of no difference or variety of any fort, 
or in any refpeft ; and confcquently mull exclude all di'vcrjit)', 
or different Kinds of PerfeBion {as Vv'ell as different Perfons) 
from the Divine Nature, v/hich is fuppos'd to exift thereby. It 
mull be utterly inconfiftent with that Variety of Attributes, 
fuch as Knonjoledge and Ponver, Sec. which we conceive to be 
very dijiind Properties, and which Dr. Clarke, and every one 
elfe, concludes to be effcntially in God. 

If the Learned Dotiors Notion o^ abfolute Neceffty ■pro\es 
all this, I humbly conceive it proves too much, and if it 


f Demonji. p, 5-2. fth. Edit. 

f Chap. 5. §. I. Subf 4. and elfewhere. 

X See R. e. and Note 43. 

\ Demonji. Prop. 7. 

54 Concerning the Origin c/'Evil. Chap. I, 

quires an equal Caufe, fo infinite Poffibilites require a 
Caufe infinitely powerful, (it.) 



does not prove this, I cannot apprehend how it proves any- 
thing at all. 

(i I.) I fliall give the Reader this Argument as it is propo- 
fed after another manner by Dr. fiddes, and the Anfwer to it 
by Mr. Colhber. 

' To {liy a thing is poffible, is to fay there is fome things 

< fome pnj^er or other capable of producing it. For mthhigy 

* or what has no power, can produce no effect. The Power 
« therefore which is to bring what hpojjible into Being, is ne- 

< cefTarily fiippofed already to <*xiil; otherwifc a FcrfeRion 
« might arife out oi mti-entify, or without a Caufe ; and what 

* wc conceive poffible would be really impoffible *" 

Which the Author of the Impartial Enquiry, U'c. confute* 
bv a parallel Inftance. 

* If a Perfon having firfl: proved the Exiflence of a Power 
' that is perfect, and made it appear that a perfect Power can- 
' not but extend to whatever 13 a capable Objedt of Power, 
« or includes not a Contradiction ; fliould proceed to prove 

< that the JR of Creation implies no Contradiftion, and then 
« at laji fliould conclude that therefore Creation is a poffibili- 

* ty {i. e. effeclible by the exercife of that perfe6l or almigh- 
« ty Power, w'hofe Exifcence he had before demonftrated) I 
' conceive there could be no reafonable exception againft fuch 
« a method of arguing. But if, on the contrary, he fhould 
? fay, I plainly perceive there's no Contradidion in the Sup- 

* pofition of the Creation, or produftion of a thing that was 
' not, and Ihould from thence immediately infer that a Power 

< capable of Creation exifls, this would be a very preporterous 
f way of demonftrating: Which yet is the fame method \\\i\\ 
c that of the prefent Argumcnt'|-." 

The fame way of reafoning has been made ufe of by the 
Cartejians and feveral of our own Philofophers to demon- 
Ifrate the Being and Attributes of God from our Ideas of them 
3n the following manner. 

We can have no Idc,\ of any thing, but what has cither an 
aJiUal or a foffihle Exiflence ; but we have an Idea ot God, /. f. 
of a Being ci iniiiiite Perfections, which may pollibly exilt j 
■ " ' therefort; 

^ Theolog. Spec. p. 15, 

^ Impartial ^n^iiir^} p. 1 78. 

Sect. 3. Cmcernhig the Origin ^Evil. t^i^ 

VI. Fourthly, Since S^ace is conceived as rilere- Free 
ly idk and indijfcnnt with refped to Repletion 

E 4 or 


therefore he muft have an aflual Exillenc^: For aitual Kxi- 
ftence is a Degree of Perfeci:ion, and the foremention'd Idea, 
according to the Suppoficion, inchides all poOible Perfe<5lion, 
therefore it mail include that, otherwife we fliould have an 
Idea of fomething abfoliitely perfecl without one polTiblc De- 
gree of Perfection, which is a Contraditlion in Terms; 

But this is all begging the Qiieftion. For it is not the bare 
fuppofmg it to have all poflible Perfeiftions that infers its aBual 
Exijiefice, but &iC proving it to have them. Indeed if we fup- 
pofe it to have all poffible Perfedlions, ws muft at the fame 
time necellkirily fuppole it to exift, fmce Exiftcnce is a poffi- 
ble Perfeftion ; otherwife we fnould fuppofe it to have all 
poffible Perfe61:ions, and yet to want one, which is a Contra- 
diftion. But llill this is only an ExiPcence ex Hypothefi, a true 
Confequence from doubtful Premifes, and which will as eafily 
follow from the fuppofal of its having but any One perfection, 
fmce that mull: neceffarily imply exiftcnce. The certainty 
than of fuch aftual exift.ence docs by no means follow from 
the {appokd pojJihi/Uy of it, as thefe Men would be under- 
ftood: This Conclufion will never hold good ; what cannot 
be fuppofed without a Contradidlion, certainly does not 
exij?, therefore what can be fuppofed without a Contradidion, 
certainly does. 

Others endeavour to prove the exjjlenu of God from our 
Idea of him alter this manner. Whatever we have an Idea 
of, that either is, or if it be not, it is pojjihle for it to hs i 
but we have an Idea of an Eternal ^v^d neceffarily exijlent Being \ 
therefore fuch a Being cither is, or it is poffible for it to be. 
But if fuch a Being either now is not, or once nioas not, or 
ever will not ailually be, it would not be poffible for it ta 
he at all (except it could make itfelf, or be made by No- 
thing) contrary to X.h.t former Part of the Suppofition : nor 
would it be either £/<?;■««/, or neceffarily Exijlent, contrary to 
the latter. Therefore fuch a Being now is, and always was, 
and ever will be. Or fhorter thus: Our Idea of God is an 
Jdea of fomething which implies no contradiciion, and 
therefore fuch a Being may poffbly he ; and therefore he tniijl 
aSlualh be, or clfe he could 7iat pffihly he, which is contrary 
to the Hypo thefts. 

No'.y to make this or the like Argument of any force, it 


56 Concerning the Origin ^KviJ. Chap. I, 

or Vacuity ; fince the Matter which fills Space is 
in like manner merely paflive and indifferent with 
i^-fpeet to Motion and Reji ; it follows that the 
Caiifc \\\\\d\ fills Space with JVIatter, and produces 
Motion in that Matter, is perfedtly/r^^ ; fo that the 
Creation and Motion of Matter mull be the Works 
of free Choice, and not Neceffity, in the Agent. 
Forj if the Agent cffeded thefe by Neceffity, they 
would alfo be necedary EfFefts, and could not be 
conceived to be in themfelves indifferent to Exifl:-? 
cncQ or Non-ExiftcHce, as proceeding from a ne-« 
ceffiry Caufe"^. 


jnuft be clearly provM thatwehav^e fuch an Idea o^ 3 necejfarl- 
iy e XI flent Being ■\%\\\\\ infer its a6lual exiflence ; (whichroay 
perhaps appear fomething doubtful from Remark e.) and alfo, 
that this Idea n ftriSly innate or connate with us, and confe- 
Iqiiently capable of being urged a priori, for a Proof of the 
Exillence of fome Being correfpondent to fuch an Idea ; (which 
5s now generally given up) For if this Idea be only gathered 
a pofteriori, vix. by a dedudlion of Arguments from our own 
Exiftence, then it is only a Confequence of thefe Arguments, 
•and cannot of itfelf be alledg'd as a dillinfl: one. For how can 
'any Idea confequent upon fome certain proofs of fomething a 
fofiCi-iori, be an antecedent, independent proof of the fame 
thing a priori? Befides, either thefe arguments are enough 
to convince any Man of the Exiftence and Perfedions of God, 
or they are not ; if they are, this is unnecejjary, if they are 
not, this is ifififffcient ; nay, it is none at all, iince 'tis a bare 
confequence o^ thciC, and entirely yoaW/fi/ in them, and there- 
tore muft ftand or fall with them. It is fubmitted to the 
Reader whether the famous Arguments drawn from our Ideas 
C){ Htcrniiy, hifivitx, ^\. be not of tlie fame kind with the 
foregoing. 'Ihofe that have a Mind to be farther acquainted 
with the proofs of a Deity drawn from the Idea, may find the 
Qiieftion fully difcufs'd in Cnd-.\:.orth, p. 721, ijfc. or in Fid- 
iias's Iheol. Spec. B. i. P. i. C 9. or in the Impartial Enquiry 
dnro the Exiilence cf God. B. 2. Parti. See alfo Parker. 
Difput. Vl.Sedt. 10, zo, 24. orOi^. Theol.Nat. p. 26, n,^'c. 
* For an excpllent llluftration of this Argument, fee D{. 
Clarke's Dc77ionjirdt. p. 24, 2<j, 26. and (><^, 66, 67. (;th Ed. 
See alfo Cud'ivorth, p, 667, il^c. and the hnpartial Enc.'ury^ 

p. 31, 32, i^\/'- ' ■ . '■'' 

S,e£t, 3' Cofjcerning the Ovigin of "Ewil. 57 

VII. Fifthly, Tho'by our outward Senfes, and That jtis 
the Notices which they convey to us, we cannot aconfcious 
go beyond Spaccy Matter, MoHoh, fenjible Qualities, g'f 'S^"^ 
and this ^tiive Principle which ^e are Ipeaking Qmnijcient 
of; yet, if we infpect our own Minds, we miey 
contemplate a Self<onfcioHS and thinl^ng Priwipie 
within us, whofe A,v5lions are to ivill, refnfe, douht, 
rea/ofj, affirm and deny, which carry nothing of 
Extenfion along with them, nor necelTarily include 
it in therji, nor have any Relation to Place or 
Space; but are entirely abfl:ra6led from the No- 
tions of external or internal. That there is fuch 3 
principle in us we are certain, not only from gur 
Senfes, or the impulfes of external Objecfts, but al- 
fo from Refledion and Self-confcioufnefs. *Tis to 
be obferv'd farther, that we can at our Pleafure 
move fome Parts of Matter, and fliake the Limbs 
of our Body by Thought only, that is, by Voli- 
tion "^^ whe^ice it appears, that Motion may be 
produc'd in Matter by Thought ; and that fome- 
thing of this Kind is to be attributed to the firft 
Caule, in order to put Matter into Motion, nay, 
to bring it into Being. Cogitation alfo. Will and 
Confcioufnefs, or Faculties equivalent to thefe, are 
neceffary to a free Caufe^ ^nd on that Account to be 
attributed to the firft Caufe, being (as iliall be 
fhewn below) perfedly Free; Which Caufe, fince 
it is infinite (as we have prov'd) in its EfTence 
and Power, it muH: be fo likewife in Intelligence j, 
viz. Omnipotent and Qmvifcient, 

Vlil. Sixthly, Since this Principle (which we That he 
pU God) is the Caufe of all things, and infinite ^^s for ai^ 
in Knowledge as well as Power, it follows that he ^^^' 
afts, not by blind impulfe, but for an End; and 
has ordei'd his Works by fuch Wifdom, as to be 


* That Volition and ASiion are perfeclly diflinft, and miift 
proceed from two diftercnt Po^vers, Sec Note 42. That Jc" 
//o« alfq is tsyo-fol44 See Note 43. ■ •' 

5 8 Concerning the Origin o/' Evil. Chap. I, 

confiftent wich chemfelves, and not deftruftive of 

each other. 

That the IX. Seventhly, Since God is perfed in himfelf^ 

^^^^°f^ fince all Things fublift by his Providenee, and 

ivas to ex- ^^"^ ^^ need of him, but he of none ; aud (ince 

ercife the he can neither be profited nor incommoded by 

power, his Works, nor affefted by their Good or Evil j it 

and to follows that he made thefe Things for no advantage 

cate the °*' "'^ own, and that he neither receives nor ex- 

Goodnefs pe<Ss any Benefit from them. For by creating 

of the things without himfelf, he mufl necefTarily have 

P^J^X- fought either their Benefit or his own; but what 

Benefit can God feek for himfelf, who poffeffes all 

Good? That certainly which was wanting to him, 

and necefTarily mufl be wanting to a Being even 

abfolutely perfed, till he has created fomething; 

I mean the Exercife of his Attributes 7vithouty the 

communicating of his Power and Goodnefs : That 

therefore only mufl he be fuppofed to have fought 

in the Creation and Difpofalof his Works, (ii.) 


' NO T IE S 

(i2.) Some have objefled here, that according to this No- 
tion, there muft have been a Time before the Exigence of any 
created Beings, when God was neither infinitely happy, nor 
abfolutely _§-90^*. But the one Part of this Objedtion evident- 
ly arifes from a Miftake of our Author's Notion, who has of- 
ten told us, that he does not fuppofe any thing external to the 
Deity, to add the leaft to his own Happinefs, or effential Per- 
fetlions ; (and indeed to think othcrwife, would be worfe 
than to imagine the Fountain fed by its own Streams ; or the 
Sun cnlighten'd by its own Rays) but only to manifeft them to 
us his Creatures, and encreafe our Happinefs and Perfection, 
by our Knonvledge and Imitation of them. T\\t other part can- 
not be of force againft Creation in any particular time, bc- 
caufe it will hold equally againft it in all times ; Againft the 
very polTibility of Creation in General : fmce with God there 
is no prior and pojlerior, no difference of time applicable to his 


^ See Bp. Pearfon on the Creed, 24. E(Ut. p. 63, 63. 

Sea. 3. Concerning the Origin o/Evil 5? 

Not that Exmnds can add any thing to GoA, 
for they have no manner of Proportion to his 
Tower or Nature ; but he has in himfelf the ade- 
ciiiate Exercife of his Power namely in the Con- 
templation and Love of himfelf. Externals there- 
fore can neither encreafe or diminilli the Exerafe 
of his Powers, which before was infinite, God is 
indifferent therefore as to thefe, nor does hi^ Ex- 
ercife withoHt plcafe him, otherwife than as he has 
chofen to exercife himfelf thus; as will be fliewn 
below ^. And hence it manifeflly follows that 
the World is as well as it could be made by 
infinite Power and Goodnejs. For fmce the Exer- 
ercife of the Divine Power, and the Commu- 


Exiftence, as we have endeavoured to prove in R. c._ Be- 
fides, is it not abfurd to talk of Time, before the beginning of 
Things, which (as we have fhewn in the lame Fiace)^ can 
only be conceived as co-exiftent 'with, or rather con/equenimlto 
die'Being of thefe things? 'Tis in vain therefore to ask, why 
were not Beings created /ooner? Since no Part of Duration 
conceivable can ever be affigned when fome were not created, 
and every Period of Time has equal relation to Eternity 
* As to the fecond Senfe of the Queftion (lays Cud^vorth) Why 
« the World tho' it could not poffibly be from Eternity, yet 
< was no fooner, but fo lately -tnade ? We fay that this is an 
« abfurd Queftion, both becaufe Time was made together witrt 
« the World, zn^ there was no fooner or later before Ttme i and 
« alfo, becaufe whatfoever had a Beginning, muft of Neceliity 
. be once but a Day oU. Wherefore the World could not 
. noffiblv have been fo made by God in time, as not to be 
. Tnce but/., or/. no./ old and no -J^ - ^°J 
« ;r is" D 887 See the fame more at large in Fiddes s theot, 
<^r B - Part I . Ch. 2. and in Bentiefs Boyle's LeSl- p- 
\\: -,,V^thEdit.or7.«/«Vs ReafonahlenefsofChrijiiariity 
\ Vnl 2 C Q or Sir M. Hale\ Frirn. Originat. of Mankind, 
Si C 6 Where you have all the abfurd Queries of that 
kind foiidly and acutely anfwerd. ^^ 

* ^es Chap. 5- §. 1. Subf. A., 

<5o Concerning the Origin i^Evil. Chap. I, 

iiication of his Goodnefs, are the Ends for which 
the World was framed) there is no doubt but God 
has attained thefe Bnds. 
When the X. I knpY/ 'tis commonly faid, that the World 
World is ^^5 jnadc for the Glory of God: But this is after 
laid to be I r ^^ i-ta/- r ^, ■ ■' 

created for '^ mdmer of Men, For Defire of Glory is at^ 

Gois Glo- tributed to God in the fame manner a> ^nger-, Lovcy 

ry, 'tis af- Revenge^ Eyes and Hands (u4.) When therefore tiie 

ur the Scripture teaches us, that the World was created 

^^^rof fQ^ jj^g ^Iq^^ ^f ^^^^ ,jj^ ,j^ {^g underftood tliat 

the Divine Attributes, namely Poiver, Goodnefs and 
Wifdomt fhine forth as clearly in his Works, as: if he 
had no other intent in making them befide the 


N 07 E S, 

\A.) We fee many Things are afcribed to God in Scrip- 
ture by way of Accommodation ; as Hands and Feet, Heart, An- 
ger, Revenge, and Repentance. And fince we underlland all 
thefe to be fpoken of him by way of Condefcenfion to our Ca- 
pacity, why fhould we not underftand the Defire of Glory to 
be afcribed to him in the fame way ? Efpecially fmce we mull 
conceive God to be obliged by his Goodnefs to fet a great 
value on his Glory, and to require the promoting of it from 
us as a principal Duty. For the good and Advantage of all 
reafonable Creatures depends on the Obedience that is paid 
to God's Law ; and there cannot be a more eftcdhial Means 
to promote that Obedience than a due Senfo of the great and 
glorious Attributes of God ; of his Wifdom, Power, juflice , 
and Goodnefs. The more lively thefe are reprefented to in- 
telligent Beings, the more willing and careful they will be to 
obey God, and the more afraid to offend him ; and therefore 
it is agreeable to the Goodnefs of God to exaft our Endea- 
vours to beget this Apprehenfion in us and all other thinking 
Beings, Not for any Adyantage this Glory brings to God ; 
but becaufe the Reputation of the Lawgiver and Governour 
of the World is a Means necclfary to advance the Good of 
his Creatures, and therefore it is our Duty and Intcrelt ir> the 
higbeft Degree to promote that Glory : and tlicrcfore God 
may be faid to do all t\iings for his Glory, becaufe if that were 
the end of all that he has done, he could not be more 
concerned for it nor Avould it be more our Duty to pro- 
piote it. 

Sed. 3. Concerning the Origin of EvW. 61 

Oftentation of thefe Attributes ; nor could they have 
anfwer'd that end more fitly if they had been defign'd 
{or Glory: But ftridlyfpeaking, the Power of God 
is infinite, and when he ads tor the Good of his 
Creatures according to that infinite Power, he is inji' 
nitely good. Infinite knows no Bounds, nor has the 
Goodnefsof Godany other Bounds befidehis Wif- 
dam and Power, which are alfo infinite. And irt 
reality this makes moft for the Glory of God viz.* 
to have created a World with the greateft' 

GoodneG. (15.) 


I^ T E S, 

(12.) 'The Reafon why God mauo the World (fays the 
< learned Author fo often cited above) was from his own over- 
' flowing and communicative Goodnefs } that there might be. 

* other Being'? alfo happy befide himfelf, and enjoy them- 

* felves. And afterwards, • God did vst- make the World* 
' merely toofleiUate his Skill «k^ Power, but to commvnicati his 
' Goodnefs, nvhich is chiefly and properly his^ Glory, at thC(, 

* Li^ht and Splendor of the Skti is tht Glory of it* . 

We have a fine Paragraph or two to the fame purpofc m 
Mr. Wollajlon'% Dilin of the Religion of"NcUure,_ p. 1 1 5 — I 20. 

The fame Notiou is well Hated, in Scot\ Chrijlian Life » 
where the Glory of God and the Happincfs of Man are fhewu 
to be co-incident f. As this feems to be very often mifunder- 
ilood, it may not be improper to infert a Pallage or two from_ 
that excellent Anthor. * % A true Survey and infpeaion ot 
<■ God's l^ature will inftruft us, that being infinitely perf eft, a* 
' he is, he muft be infinitely happy \^\'Oci\n himfelf; and fo can 
« defign no fclf-end v.-ithout himfelf; and confcquently that, 
« the end for u'hich he requires our Service, is not any Ad- 

* vantage he expcds to reap from it, or farther addition to hi* 
« own Happinefs, he being from all Eternity /^/t/?, as complete- 
< ly happy as he can be to all Eternity to come ; and therefore 
« what other End can he be fuppofcd to aim at, than our Gooci- 

* and Happinefs.? It is true indeed, he dcfigns to glorify him- 
' /'^//'inoftrHappinefs; but how ? not to; rcnieu himfelf «?ffr<f 

' ^ * glQU- 

* htell. Syflem. p. 886. 

f See Vol. I. p. 4, 5. 

% Vol. 2, Clwp.6, p.4a-T» 43 i' 

Bz Concemhig the Origin (p/Evil. Chap. 1 

That God XI. By Good I here underftand that which is 
nride the convenient and commodioni, that which i<5 correjpon- 
well as it ^^'^^ ^^ '■^^ u4ppetite ot every Creature. God there- 
could be iore created the World with as great Convenience 

made by . and 

the high- 

GoodS- NOTES. 


dom, * glorious by it than he is, in himfelf, for it is impofiible ; but 

* to difplay, znAjhcw forth his own eflential Glory to all that 

* are capable of admiring and imitating him, that thereby he 

* might invite them to tranfirihe that Goodncfs of his into 

* their Nature, of which his Glory is the Shine ■z.vALnftre; 

* and thereby to glorify thetn/elves ; and what can more effec- 

* tually difplay the Glory of a Being who is infinitely --wife zn(i 

* po-ji:erful, and good, than to contri've and eJj'tB the Happinefs 

* of his rational Creatures, who, of all others, have the moft 

* ample Capacity of Happinefs ? 

And again : ' * But doth not the Scripture tell us, that he 

* doth all thijigsfor his o^jjin Glory, and that he obtains this End^ 

* as well by punijhing, as by renvarding his Creatures ? Very 

* true, but then it is to be confider'd that the Glory he aims 

* at, confifts not in receiving any Good from us, but in doing 

* and communicating all good to us. Vox infinite Goodnefs 

* can no other-^xifc be glo7-ifed, than by its own overflowings 

* and free communicarions, and it can no otherwife be glori- 

* fied in the Punifliment of its Creatures, but only as it doth 

* good by it : For fhould it punifli without good reafon, it 
« would reproach and vilify itfelf : but if it doth it for good 

* reafon, it mull be becaufe it is good either for itfelf or othe}-s : 

* for itfelf \t cannot be ; for how can an infinitely happy Bc- 

* ing reap any Good from another s Mifery ? And therefore it 

* mull he for the Good of others, either to reduce thsfe who 

* are pimiflied, or to ■warn others by their Example from run- 

* ning away from their Duty and Happinefs. So that to do 

* Good is the end of God's Punifliment ; and becaufe it is fo, 
' he is glorified by it : And confidering that he is fo infinitely 

* happy, that he can no ways fervc himfelf by ourMifcries, it 
' is impollible he fhould have any other end in concerning 

* himfelf ihoMi us, but only \.\\c great, God Hie otiq of doing 
'us Good, and making us happy." Sec alfo Difcourfe 14 in 
tiie fame Vol. p. 302. 


* Vol. js. p. 204. Fo!. 

Sedl. 3- Coficeniaig the Ongm of Evil, 63 

and fitnefs, wich as great Congruity to the Appe- 
tites of things, as could be effeded by infinite 
Power, mfiom, and Goodnefs, If then any thing 
inconvenient or incommodious be now or was from 
the beginning in it, that certainly could not be 
hindered or removed even by infinite Power, Wifdom 
and Goodnefsi (14.) 


To the fame Purpofe Is Smith's excellent Difcourfe of t!lc 
Ixifience and Nature of God Ch 4. and 7 f- And D'Oyly\ 
firil Dijerfatlon, -p. 12 2. and Rymers GeJieral R^nfoifation 
of Reward Religion, p. 260 — 267. and p. 511. Bp. Kufs 
Remains ift Difcourfe » and Bp. Burnet's Expofition of the 
^Articles, p. 27. 4th Edit, and our Authors Sermon on Dii'ine 
Predefination, &c. §. 33. For a fufficient Anfwer to the Ob- 
jedion drawn from Prov. 16. 4. k^fillotforis 2d Vol. of 
Sermons, Fol. p. 681. , , 

(14.) Our Author rightly concludes from the Nature una 
Will oiGoA, as difcover'd above, that nothing can be made 
by him (by whom are all things made) really unworthy of, or 
inconfiftent with thefe ; however unaccountable and irregukr 
things may at prefcnt feem to us; For, having demonftratcd 
the Divine Perfeftions in one Senfe a priori, i. e. prior to the 
Examination of particular Phenomena, no feeming difficul- 
ties or obje£tions whatfoever a pofteriori, i. e. from theie 
Phenomena, ought to invalidate the Belief of them, but 
fhould be all overruled by, and giveaway to thefe; except 
they amount to an equal degree of Clearnefs and Certainly 
with the Proofs of theYe themfelves; and alfo cannot poffibly 
admit of any manner of 5o/«//Wconhftent with them; neithei 
of which Cafes can ever be made out, as will, I hope, appear 
in the Following Chapters of this Book. 

t See Selea Difcourfes, p. 136- a^^^ ^\7> ^"'^ 39i' 


64 Concerning the Origin ofEv'A, Chap". 1. 

R E MA R K S referred to in Note 10. 

[Remark a.] That this propofifion fnu'fl: be allow'd for 
fe}f-e'vidcnt, and as fuch, incapable oi proof, appears from the 
abfurditiei which they all run into tvho attempt to prove their 
own Exiilence from any other medium, <viz: from any of their 
operations. ' I think, fay they, therefore / ^w ;' i.e. /, who 
atn, think ; tlxcrefore /, who think, am. I being fuppofed 
to exiji, do tliink, therefore this thinking proves that Exijlence. 
Is not this plainly arguing in a circle, and pronjing a thing by 
prefuppofing it? And is it not full as clear to me firft of all 
that I am, as that / think? Tho' I could not be certain of my 
Exigence except / perceiifd fomething ; yet fpre the percep- 
tion of my own exiftence mull be both as ffl/-^andas evident 
as any other perceptions. The firft Propofition therefore is 
felf- evident. I begin with eur own Exiltencc becaufe we have 
intuitive Knowledge of no other. 

[R. b } See the abfurdity of this infinite Series, as to Ge- 
nerations, Motion, Number, Magnititde, ^c. in the Notes 
3, and R. d. All or any of which Arguments demonllrate the 
Abfurdity of it, as it is fairly and fully Hated by Dr. Green in 
his late Philofophy*. Where you fee the true old Atheijiic Series 
in a diftercnt drefs from that in Dr. Clarke's 2d Propofition. 

The fame way of reafoning is made ufe of in a P hilofophical 
EjJ'ay tczvards an Enji^ion of the Being and Attributes of God, by 
Seth PFardj-, This piece being fcarce as well as curious, an 
exftraft from it may not be difagreeablc. ' That the \^orld 
' was not eternal, but created, is demonftrable from things that 

* are vifible : Our Argument fhall be from Generation. 

* Whatfoever is begotten, was begotten of fome other ; for 

* nothing can poffibly beget or make itlelf, otherwife it will 
« follow that the fame thing is, and is riot, both at one in- 

* ftant, feeing it is both the producer, and the thing to be 
' produced. It is to be produced, and fo it is not yet; it is 

* likcwife a producer, and that fuppofcth tliat it is in Being : 
' It is therefore in Being, and it is not in Being, that's a 

* manifelt contradiction. Wherefore nothing can generate, 

* make, or produce itfelr": wj^ecefore every thing that is be- 

• gotten* 

» B. 6. C. 5. ^. 8. p. 753. 
t 2d. Edit. Oxf 1655. 

■Sedl, 3. Coj'tcmiztig the Origin o/'Evih 6^ 


« gotten, is begotten of fome other, and then the cfther whlth' 
' Degot It, either was itfeltin the fame manner begotten, or it 

* was not ; if it was not, we are already come to the firfl Prin- 
' ciple, which was unbegotten ; and fo have diicover'd a God- 

* head. If it was begotten, either we muil: follow up the 

* Courfe of fucceflive Generation to fome firfl Produdion- 

* from a Caufe eternal, or elfe we miiil necefiarily fiy that 
' the Courfe of Generations had no beginning, and confe- 

* fequently that infinite Succeffions are alrca"iy pail:, which is 
■= as much as to acknowledge that an. infinite Number of Suc- 
ceffions are paft, and if paft, then they, are at an end ; So we 
have found an infinite Number Avhich hath had an end, 
that is another Contradiclion. Again; if any fhall affirm, 
that the Courfe of Generation had no beginning, but thai 
the number of them hath been infinite: I,et usjuta Cafe* 
and reafon with him. We will imagine the Generations of 
Abraham, for Example, and Jofepb the Son oi Jacob the Sou 
oilfaac, the Son oi Abraham. I dem:;nd therefore whether be- 
fore the Birth o^ Abrahatn there had paft an infinite Series of 
Generations, or not ? If the Series was finite, the Work of Gc- 
neracion had beginning ; which is the Concluiion I contend 
for: if the Series paft was infinite ; then at the Birth of 
Jafeph, 'tis evident that more Generations were paft, fo we 
nave found a Number greater than that which was fuppos'd. 
to be Infinite: and confequently that was not Infinite; 
(o that it was both Infinite and not Infinite, a manifeft 

< But if we fay thxt Abraham'? was Infinite, and that (o 
was Jofeph's alfo, then it will follow that the Number of 
Abraha/ns was equal with the N.imLer oi J ofeph'' s ; but 
Abrahatns was but a Part of Jofpl's, wherefore ths 
Part is equal to the Whole. Elfe admjt that, Ahraham\ 
V.'as finite, but when it came to y.ofephi that then the 
Number was Infinite, it follows then that a finite num- 
ber added to a finite fhall make an Infinite, which like-. 
wife is againft the common light of re.ifon. We fes. 
therefore that fupponng the Eternity of the World, or the 
Infinity of Generations, doth force the Mind to con- 
trdidions, and confequently the Fitlion i^ vain and ut- 
terly impoHible. And as. we have argued , in the wa.y • 

* of Gencratioi^, fo we may likewife in every thing where 
■'■there-is a Motion, or Mutation, that is, in ail. the parts 

* of rh« vjfibl? World. The Crc<iti(>A ;h?rcfore of tha, 

F W«r]i., 

66 Concerning the Origin ofEvW. Chap. I. 


< World, from the vifible things thereof, is manifcft. 
' ^E. D. *. 

And again -f-. * Well having concluded the Creation and 

* Beginning of the World, we fee it follows that thence 

* we conclude the Eternal Power and God-head ; that is, 

* the Eternity and Power of the God-head. As for Eter- 

* nity, we have by undeniable Confequence refolved all 
' Motions in the World into the Bofom of a Firft mover, and 

* if v/e fuppofe him a Firll Mover, the Suppofition will evi- 

* dently conclude that he is Eternal, i. e. that he is without 

* Beginning of ElTence, or without any term or limit of Du- 

* ration. For if it had any Beginning of Effence or Durati- 

* on, that beginning of Being prefuppofeth a priority of not- 

* being, (that is, adtual Being is not of the Effence of it) and 
' fo that we m;iy, without any Contradiftion, fuppofe it not 

* to be yet in Being; that is, we may bring our Underlland- 

* ings, without Error, to the Apprehenfion of it as being yet 
« in the State of Pwver onlv, or Potential-being, fo as things 
« are in their Caufes. So then, let us conceit it in this State, 
' ar.d compare this State with the other when it had Being ; 

* and it is evident that this Paflage, or Tranfuion from want 

* of Being to a Being, canno: be without a Motion, nor A-Io- 
' tion viihout an adual Mover : but that which moves a 

* Thing from not being to a State of Being, is neceffarily a 
' precedent Mover to that which from it receives its Being ; 

* So then that which is fuppofed to be the lirfl original Mo» 
' ver will have a Mover, which fiiall of ncceffity have gone 
' before it, and confequently it will be both a Firft and not a 

* Flrlk TvJover, which is a plain Contradiction. Inftead of 
« multiplying Arguments without ncceliity, we will only re 

* turn by the Foctfteps of our Analyfis, and fo from the Be- 

* iiig of the firll: Mover conclude the Etcr,iity. If it be a 

* full Mover; then it had no former Mover; andiffo, then 

* it never was produced from Nothing into Being; andiffo, 
' then it never had any beginning of its Being, then it is 
' Eternal. Therefore whatfoever is the firfl Mover, it muft 

* ofneceiTity likeu'ifc be Eternal: but from the common af- 
' fcdlions of tainfrs vifiblc, we did before dcmonftrate an Ori- 
' i^inal and firll iMover: Wherefore the Viffole things of this 

* World, iLcy likcwifc do evidi the Etcinity oi' the God- 
' hcadj. / ' " ' 

♦ Ani 

* P. 19, i P. 2». fl; P. 2^-. 

Sed. 3. Concern? ng the Origin ofE\\\. by 


* And that God was a God of Power, it was demonflrated 
« then, when we found him to be the firil Caufe and original 
* Mover and Creator of the World*. 

[R. c] The generally receiv'd Notion of Eternity, as cell- 
firting in a continual addibility of fucccffi-oe Duraticn, is, I 
think, the very fame thing as an infinite Series, zni. confequent- 
]y liable to the fame objcclions: We muH therefore try to 
refcue this Divine Attribute from fuch an abfurd interpre- 

Now, if we attentively examine our Idcei of Elrrnity, I 
believe we fhalJ find that it amounts to thus much : 'viz. uni- 
form, i}Z'variable Exi jinnee : or Jimple Ex'fience join'd with 
Nccejfiiy: by which laft Word we only underhand an Impo/Jl- 
hility of hwving e^jer began, or of e'ver ceajlng. This I appre- 
hend to be all that can confiilently be affirnvd of the Divine 
Exillcnce in this rcfpc-ft, and perhaps v,e may more e.ifily 
and fafely determine what the manner of it is 7iot, than v.'haL 
it is ; V. g- that it continues not by time, or in place-. In- 
deed local Exienfion zxA fuccrjf've Duration are modes of the 
Exigence of mo'l: Beings, and therefore we find it very diffi- 
cfllt to confider any exiilence without them : But as we have 
endeavoured to fhew the poflibility of removing lac fot-mer 
from the Divine Elfence, in Notes 3, 6 and 7 fo iiere, J, think, 
it may be flicvn alfo that the latter has no neceiiary connec- 
tion with it, but rather the contrary. 

In order to do this, it will be necefTary to explain what we 
mean by Time, which (according to Mr. Locke) is of the very- 
fame kind •vvlih Duration ; and may properly be termed a part 
of it. This is very well defin'd by Leihnitz, to be the Oider 
of Succi-fion of created Beings. We maniteilly get the Noticn 
of it by reflefting on (he Succefhoi/cf Ideas m our Mind?, 
which we are apt to conceive as a Chain dravvn out in length, 
of which all the particular Ideas are confider'd as the Link:. 
Whereas, had Vve but one in^oariate perception, withoL't any iuch 
Succellion of Ideas in oar Minds, we could have no fuch no-, 
tion as this of Duration, but that of pure Exigence only. Now 
Exijie?ice being evidently a fimplc Idea, (iho' perhaps Dura- 
tion be not) is confequently incapable ol: a Definition, and 
we need, I think, only obferve of it here, that it we join our 
1^?^0l Duration to it, we flill add nothing to the Idea of it 
•as it is in itfelf, but merely a relation to £^t$rnai things ;j 

F 2 which 


68 Concerning the Origin of Evil. Chap.l. 


which Idea of Duration therefore feems purely accidental i6 
it, and no neceffary Ingredient of the former Idea, which is 
complete without it. T'ime then, or Duration, is an Idea en- 
tirely refulting from our Confideration of the Exiftence of Be- 
ings with reference to a real or imaginary Succe£io7t. Whence 
it will follow in thc/r/? place, that we cannot poflibly frame 
any Idea of this hind of Duration without taking in SuccefG- 
on ; and fecondly, that we cannot eafily feparate the Exigence 
of any finite, changeable Beings from, this kind of Duration. 

Our next Enquiry rauft be whether this Idea of Duration 
be connected with the Exiilence of ihofe Beings entirely as 
they exiji, or only as they exill in fuch a particular manner : 
Whether it belongs to all Exiftevce, as Exijience, or only to a 
particular 5'£?;-r of Exiil:ence, "jIz, that which includes the fore- 
mention'd relation to Succeffion. The latter, I think, will ap- 
pear more probable, when we refledl that it is only from the 
'variahifnefs and contingency of our own Exiftence, that all our 
Succeifions fpruig: Whereas, were we entirely ivde-pendenty 
we muil be abioiutely in:?mitable, and \r\V2in-ih\y per?nanent i 
and alfo, that we can contemplate even this Exiilence of ours 
without any Succeflion, i. e. we have a Power of confining our 
Thoughts and attending to one Idea aJc?!^ for fomc fmall time 
(if that Word be excufible here) exclufive of all ether Ideas 
and confequerxtly excUdive of Succeffion. This Mr. Z-of^^ al- 
lows, being \vhat he calls an Ivjiatit, which, fays he, < is that 
' ivhich takes vp the Ti?>ie only of one Idea in our Minds, with- 

* cut the Succeffion of another, wherein therefore we perceive 

* no Succeffion at all *.' 

Succeffion therefore does not appear to be neceiTarily join'd 
with the Idea of ablbhite exiftence, fmce we can confider 
one (for how fmall a time focver) <vjithout, and independent of 
the other. Nay, laftlv, there is a certain Exiftence to which 
it cannot poffibly be in anv fenfe apply'd, and that is a Per- 
fed one. Suppofe this perfeft Being alone in nature, as we 
anuft believe him once to have been, and then \\\^^x. change o^ 
Nature, or SticccJJlan of Ideas can be found ? Whatyi'.vA- of Mo- 
ments, what altnatic?! or increafe CM\ we imagine in his o<vn 
unilorm, invariable Effence ? What Idea have we o\ Duration 
asapply'dto his E.xiftcncc, antecedent to his Willing and Cre* 
eiiing External things? Such Duration then as we are ac- 
qaaintcd ivitli, can, I humbly apprehend, have no manner of 


* EJFay en Human Under jlarJivg, B, 2. Ch. 14. §. 10. 

Se(5t. 3. Concerning the Origin ^Evil. 69 


Telatlon to this immutable Being, wliilc fuppos'd to exift a- 
ione: But as foon as he detcrmin'd to exercife his feveral 
Attributes in the produ6lion of fomething without hinj^ch'^ 
then we l;iave reafon to think that Time, Succejfion, and Increafe 
began. ^' Tho' the eternal Being had no nccelTary Succcffi- 
*' on "in his own Nature, yet being perfeflly felf aSii've aiid 
*' free, thence it proceeded, that the exercife of his freedom 
" in decreeing and producing the Creatures, in fuch a njan- 
*' ner and order as was judg'd fit by his mofi: perfedl Wifdora, 
" became the Original of whatever real Succefhon has been 
" in Nature, and fuch SuccelTion as w? arq apt to conceive 
" to ]xx\Q preceded, is no other than imaginary." "^ 

To the feveral Objedlioas againft this Notion dra^yn from 
God's eternal Wifdotn, Ideas, Decrees, iSc. fee a fuiiicicnt An- 
fwer in the fame place. 

i fhall tranfcribe this Author's reply to the moft common 
and confiderable one about the Schoolmens pundum Jians, 
which we alfo elteem as indefenfible an Hypothefis as the 

" Spmc will pcffibly objedl that if there was once no rea^ 
" Succeffion in Nature, it will follow that the divine Exi" 
"■ rtence was then at leafl (as 'tis ufually faid to be) Infanta 
*' nequs. But to this it may be reply'd Exiilencc is no* 
" thing, ifdiftinguifh'd from the Being which exifts. Con- 
*' fequently, there can no real Qaantity belong to it as fo di- 
•' .^inguifh'd. Wherefore it cannot properly be denominated 
♦' either_/f«//^ or Infinite, fucceffi've ox injlantaneous. For thefe 
*' are Attributes which have a Reference to ^antity, and can 
♦' no more agree to exiftence, which is byt a Morf'/? of Beings, 
♦f th?,n they can to Neccffity, or Contingence, v/hich are Mode? 
" of Exiftence. To define Eternity or neceflary Exiftence 
•' by Infinity qr the Negation of Lin^its, fecms to be no leii 
■" impertinent, than to define Virtue by the Negation of i?^^ 
" or Blue. For Exiftence (which has no Quantity or Dimen- 
" fions) hath no more Analogy to Extenfion and Limits 
•' than Virtue (\vhich hath no Colour) hath to Red or Blae. 
*<■ And for the fame Reafon it is no lefs improper fo define ic 
'^' to be injiantaneous, fince even an Infant (as likewife an Atom) 
*' is conceiv'd as qaantity, tho' the minuteft imaginable, ^at 

F 3 "if 

^ Impart. E^iuiry p. zoS, 

yo Concerning the Origin 5/" Evil. Chap. I. 

R E Af j4 R K S, 

*' if it cannot properly be denominated inft.intaneoii3, much 
/*' lefs can it be facceir:ve*. " 

To which give inc leave to add the Tcftimony of Cud-Tvortb -{-, 
Having confuted the abl'urd Notion of the World's Etcr- 
ternity, he adds: " Here will the Atheiit think prefeiitly he 
** has got a great advantage to diiprove the Exijience of 
'f ' a God. Do not they m.^ho thu: dejlroy the Eternit-j of the 
'*' World at the fame time alfo destroy the Eternity of the 
" Creator? For, if Time itfc^f ^ixirre 7rJ Eterval, then., 
** homo could the Deity or any thing elfe be fo ? The Athciil 
f' fecurely taking it for granted, that God hirafelf could not 
*' be othernjjife Eternal than by a fucceffive flux of ivf7iUe'Ti7ne, 
" But we fay that this will on the contrary afford us a pkin 
*' DefnonJI ration of the Exijietice of a Deity. For fince the 
*' World and Time itfelfwere not i7ifinite in \\\t\xpaf Duration^ 
*' buthad a Bcgijuiiyig, therefore were they both certainly made 
*' together by fome other Being, who is, in order cf Nature, 
*' fenior 60 T/;;zf, and fo 'zvithout Time, before Time : He being 
" above that fuccefive Flux, and comprehending in the 
** Stability and immutable Pe7fcHioti of his own Being, his 
■" 7'eferday and to D^v, and for Ever. Or thus: Some- 
*• thing was of Necefiity i7ifnite in Duration, and without 
*' a Beginni72g; but neither the World, nor Motion, nor Timc^ 
"' i. e. no Succefinje Being vv-as fuchj therefore is there 
** fomething elfe, whofe being and Duration is not fuccefi've 
**' and foiving, but ferma7mit, to whom this Infinity be- 
" longeth. The Atheifis here can only fmile, or make 
*' Faces; and fliow their little Wit in quibling upon nunc 
■*' jians, or a fa7iding No-tv of Eternity ; as if this funding 
*' Eternity of the Deity (which with fo much reafon hath 
f been contended for by the s.ncisnt genuine Thcijis) were 
*' nothing but a pitiful f/.tall tnoment of Ti7ne f ending fill; 
*' and as if the Duration of all Beings whatfoever mull 
<* needs be like their ov.'n ; Whereas the Duration of every 
*' thing mull of neceffity be agreeable to its Nature ; and 
*' therefore as that whofe i7}iperfcB Nature is ever flo-^:i7ig 
*' like a River, and confifls in co7itinual Motion, and changes 
" one after another, mull reeds have accordingly a fuccrjfi-je 
*- and fo'-jji:.ig Duration, Aiding perpctuiilly from prefuit 
" " into 

* Impartial Enquiry, p. 210. Sec alfo Epifoplus Inil. 

Theol. L. 4. C. 5, 
f liitdl. Syfl. p. ^44. i^'c. 

Seel. 3. Concerning the Origin ofEvih 

*« into pafi, and always pofting on towards the future, 
" expecSting fomething of itioli' which is not yet in Being, 
" but to come ; {o rauft that whofe perfeSi Natu>-e is 
" ejjentiaily imfuutahlc, and always the fame, and neccjfa- 
" rily exiftent, have a permanent Duration ; never lofing a- 
" ny thing of itfelf once prefent, as Aiding away from 
" it ; nor yet running forward, to meet fomething of 
*' itfelf before, which is not yet in Being, and it is as 
" contradifticis for jt ever to have begun, as ever to 
*' ceafe to be ". 

After all, it muft be again confefled, tli^.t the Idea of 
Succeffion (as Mr. ColUber obferves) fo infinuates itfelf in- 
to our idea of Exiltence, and is fo clofely connected 
with the Exiftence of all finite Beings, th^t wt find it 
extreamly difiicult to imagine the Eternal Exiilence of 
God, any other wife than as an Eternal continued $eries or 

Our conflant Converfation with mateiial Objects m:\kcs it 
alnioll impoiiible for us to confider things abilraftcd from 
Time and Place, which (as was obferved bcfoie) are A'lodcs of 
the Exiileace of molt things, and therefore we arc apt raflily 
to apply thefe Confiderations to the great Author and Prefer- 
ver of all Things. We Teem to think that as the moft ex.ilted 
Idea we can form of God's Eternity and Qmni-prcfnce muil be 
infinite Duration, and unbounded Exienjion, fo thefe are to be 
flrjflly and pofitively attributed to him ; whence muit fol- 
low ail the Abfurdities of Paji and Future, Extenlion in this 
znd t/yat Place as compatible with the Divine Elfence. Where- 
as abfoliite pofitive Infinity (fuch as belongs to God * ) docs, in 
iis very Notion exclude the Confideration o{ Parts; fince no 
Addition of any Parts whatfoever can amount, or in the leail 
degree approach to if (Tho fuch negative Infinity as belongs 
to all ^antity, cannot poflibly be confider'd otherwifef.) So 
that whofoever acknowledges God's Perfections to be llriftly 
infinite, does, by that Confelfion, deny that they may be coafi- 
dered as made up of Parts: That Immerfi'-y can be compofed 
ol -iXiy finite Extenfions, or Eternity qow^u ofmultipIyM Dura- 
tions, and confequently, that there can be Length or Space, Di- 
Jiance qr Time, paJi or future, with the Infinite and Eternal 

F 4 Qod 

* 5eeNote3. and R. 1. 
\ Sc?Note3, and R. 1. 

^2 Concerning the Orlglji o/'Evil. CJiap. I. 


God*. When therefore we fay that God nhvavs hvas, or ever 
ivill be, v.'e don't mean by thefe and' the like Woi'ds, that hi-s 
Exiftencc has (Iridly any relation to Times pail or future, 
that it is ar all increaled, altered, or affected thereby; but 
on] V thus much is intended, 'viz. then whenever wc fuppofe 
any other Beings exilting, or Time and Succeflion begun^ 
then it was, is^ or will be poiTible for ihefe Beings to 
sffirm in any Part of this their Time or SuccefTioh, that 
God alfo exijls. In the fame manner as it may be affirm- 
ed of fome Propofitions that they always were and will 
be tnie, that they are true in this or that, and every Place : 
tho* fuch- AiTertions arc exceedingly improper, becaule 
Prcpofit ons or neceilary Truths have no manner of Re- 
lation to either Time or Place. All Expreflions therefore 
which imply Sacceffion, fuch as, nxias,' <voill he, ahvays, 
tvi-hen Sic. as well as thofe that imply Locality, fuch as Ubi 
nvberCj &c*. can only be applied to finite temporary things-, 
which exift in Time and Place : With which things fo exift- 
sng, as well as every Point of Time and Place, the Deity is 
iuppofed to be co-exifient ; tho' his own Nature and Effence be 
very different from thefe, and have properly no manner of re- 
lation to or connection with them. If then wc will attribute 
Dr. ration to him, it muR he permanent, u n/uccej/i've Dnrjitioii, 
i. e. Duration of a quite difJercnt ^vWfrom what we meet with 
/lere. But it is to be rememberd that we don't pretend co 
explain the Nature of Eternity, or to dettermine th^ manner Oi 
fuch Exirtence as excludes all SuaeJJion; fince it is fufhcient 
for us here to fhew the pofTibility of conceiving the thing in 
general, the certainty of it having been demonllrated alrea- 
dy, when we proved that fomething muft be Eternal, having 
alfo fhevvn that Eternity could not confjft in fuccefllve DUr 

. If then the Divine Exiflence cannot include fucceffion of 
Parts, Qr our kind of Duration, (which perhaps by this time 
may not fecm altogether improbable) neither can his tffintial 
Attributes. His Kvoivledge, v. g. can have no relation to times 
faft or future, to fore or after ; nor can any objetS be 
iaid to be at a Dijiance frgm it,- or ai,y imaginarj' diilance fv,£ 
^o: nds to. i i- , ^ ' 

', ^\iQ chief Reafon why •-^e don't perceive and know any 


* See Locke on Hum. Uud. 13. 2, C. J 5. §. ^2 
t See H. h. : : ."' 

5^6:. 3- Concerning the On^in of 11V\\. 73 


thing that his a real Exifteace, is bacaufc that Exillence is 
remov'd from us bv the Diftance of Tm^ or i^lace'-, But this 
Realbn cannot hold with God, ^vho is (tho' in a manner far 
xlifFerent from his Creatures) ahvays prefint to all times and 
places, and confcquently mult behold all things exifting there- 
in, as well as we fee any objecl at due Diftance direftly before 
us. Thus he that is travelling on a Road cannot fee thofe that 
eome behind or are gone far before him; but he who from 
forae Eminence hthoMs the ^hole Road from end to end, views 
at once all the diftant travellers fucceeding one another. But 
this, I think, is fo evident in itfelf that neither Argument 
nor Simile can make it morefo. See Martin % Difcourfc of Na- 
tural Religion Part i. C. 8. or Note 76. 

Hence then appears the Impropriety of thofe Terms, Di'vine 
Prefcience, ? redcflination, ^c. which have fo long puzled the 
World to no manner of Purpofe; And the only Conclufion 
at laft mufl be, that all things which cvtr ivere ox luill be, 
which with refpedl to fome former or latter times, and to Per- 
fons placed therein, may be call'd pajl or future, are always 
equally and at once prefent to the view of God; that to him 
ftridl}^ and abfolutely a thoufand Tears are as sne Day, and one 
Day as a thoufand Tears, and that whatever Difficulties feem to 
attend this conception of things hQ.\ng fuccejji%<e to us, artd not 
fo to him, can be no Argument againll the Matter itfelf, which 
is demonllrable ; biit only one of the many Inftances of the 
Weaknefs of Human Underftanding' in things pertaining un- 
to God- 

Againft the common Notion of £/^r«/Vj, fee the Spe^ator, 
N. 590. or M. Ha/e^s Prim. Orig. of Mankind, §. I.e. 6. 
p. 123. or a Philofophical EJfay, &c. by Seth Ward, p. 23. or 
Gre'vo i Cofenologia Sacra, B, i. c i. par. 9. or Ode. Theologia. 
naturalis, p. 220. 

Both this Attribute and Omniprefenceare alfo well treated 
of by y. Smith, in his Difcourfc concerning the Exi fence and 
Nature of God, C. 2. §.4, 5. Selc^ Difourfes, p. 125, 126, 
t5fc. and by D. Martyn. Difcourfc of Natural Religion Part I. 
C. 7, and Dr. Sherlock on the Trinity p. 76, ^c. 

[R. d.] ' Kerq we find certain Chains of Caufes and Ef- 
f feBs, and many Parts of thii Syfem owing their Exifence, 

* and the jnanner of their Exillence, to a preceding Caufe, con- 

* fequently we cannot, with any Poffibility of Reafon, affert 

* that the nvhole Syflem exills without a Caule, for this is the 
f ^me ii to affert that the Parts do net belong to the nvhole. 

• ■ " ■ - t-Again^ 

74 Concerning the Origin of Evil. Chap. I, 


f Again, a material Syftem compofed of Parts that are change- 

< able, cannot exift without a Cauie dijlinii from, and /»7or to 
« fuch a Syftem. For wherever the-e is a Change, there mull 

< be a Caufe of that Change, otherwife there would be a Be- 
' ginning without a Canfe. The Caufe of this Change can- 

* not be in the materials of th's Syftem for the very fame Rea- 
« fon ; therefore it mufl be in fomething dijlin^l from and pri- 

* or X.O the Syftem itfeif. The fame will be the Cafe as to 

* Motion in a material Syftem; there is no Motion but what 

* is the efi^ed of a fon/ter Motion, confequently there is no 

* Motion in furh a Syftem which has been from Eternity, or 

* which ha5 not been Caufed, Sec* 

* From the ImperfeBion alfo, or Unhappinefs which we fee 

* in this Syftem, in Man particularly; from the Frame and 

* Conjiitutictt of it, 'tis evident that it did not exift without a 
« caufe. 

* The Queftion then will be, what is the Caufe of its Ex- 
« iftence ? Now that cannot be in itfelft for then a thing 
« would be before it was, which is a Contradiction. It fol- 
f lows then, that fome other Being is the Caufe of its Exiil- 

* ence; and the next Queftion will be, ^vho is this Being? 

* Now as whatever began to exift muft owe its Exiftence to 
« fome preceding Caufe; fo that Caufe, if it has not exifted 

* eternally, muft likewife owe its Exiftence to fome other pre- 

< ceding Caufe, and that to another, and fo on till we afcend 
"= to {x}n.tfirjl Caufe, or to) a Being that is Eternal, and exifts 
« abfolutely ou/Vi'oz/^ Caufe. And that there is fuch a Being 

< is evident, otherwife, as nothing could begin to exile witli- 

* out a Caufe, fo nothing that is not eternal could ever have 

* exifted -f-. 

[R. e.] That the Idea of Self-Exifence can imply nothing- 
more than a Negation o^ Dependence on any Cauie; and thai 
Tiecefftty of Exifence can only be confidcr'd as a Confequence 
refulting fromi fuch Independence feems very clear. A Being 
which is the firft of all Caufes, itlelf abfolutely uncaufcd^ 
cannot have any thing in any manner of Conception prior to; 
it, or which may be confider'd as a pofitive Ground oi its Ex- 
■Jilence. We can therefore only prove his Exiftence a poferi- 


* Sue CoUiber'' s Impartial Enquiry, p. 31, 32, life. 

f Enquiry, p. ii, 12, 1 8, ffff. See alfo Dr. Bentley'si 
JBoyle's Left. Scrm. 6. p. 127, i^c $x\\ Edit, aid the other 
Authors referred to in .Note 3. 

Sed. 3' Concerning the Ou^ivi of ^vW. y^ 


@n and argue from the manner of it in a negative way. Se^ 
Note 4. From the order of Caufes \vc gather that he miift ne- 
cefTarily have beeii from all Eternity, othcrwiie his Exilcence 
vyoukl have arolc from nothing ; and that he muit continue to 
all Eternity, otherwife an end would be put to that ExilU 
ence by nothing. But tliis is flill only a Confcq7i.ential'H<i.LQ.{'- 
lity ariling fronr^ tiie Abfurdity \vhich would attend the con- 
trary Suppofitiong, and to infer any thing from hence con- 
cerning the Modus of the Divine Being fcemr. to be building 
a great deal more on this Argument than it will bear. This 
is indeed a ^eafon by which we find that he mult always exift, 
but it is a Reafon to us only, and does not aifedl hk own Na- 
ture, or the Caufeof it, and when it is apply'd to that, I think 
'tis ufed equivocally. Conceiving that he cannot poffibly be 
fuppofed not to exiii, is far from conceiving honjo or ^johy he 
aclually does exifi j we can eallly fliew a Reafon for the one, 
but it feems above human Comprchenfion to accoimt in any 
Refpeft for the other : Nay, the Attempt to do it feems alto- 
gether as abfurd and ufelefs, as endeavouring to fliev/ how or 
why a thing is what it is : How a Firft Caufe is a firfl: Caufe ; 
or why Truth is Truth. 

Farther : This eternal Being, we fay, is hidependent ; or, ^ 

which is the fame thing, Self-exijlent, i. e. his Exiflence de- 
pends upon nothing beftde himfeli ? But does it therefore pofi- 
rively depend upon hiinfelf? Will it follow that becaufe he 
has no external Caufe, therefore he muft have an int-crnal one ? 
Or becauie no ground or reafon of his Exiflence can be drawn 
from any other Sublhnce, therefore one muft be contained ia 
his onvn Suhjlance, or felf? This is uling the Word Self-exiJI- 
ente in two different Senfes, both as negatl-ve and pojitive, 
which have no manner of Conneclion with each other, and 
the latter of which will perhaps appear to be no very good 
one. It is not then apparent^ yet that there needs any Phy-^ 
Jlcal Reafon at all for the Exijlence of the etertml, independent 

Nor, Secondly, if there did, would this NeeeJJjty 0? Nature 
ufually afhgned as fuch, fcrve for that Purpofe. For firll it is 
not the itfcU, that would be to make the fame thing 
the Ground of iifelf j which is noni'cnfe. 'Tis therefore a Per- 
fefl!o:i. Property or ^:///;7^v/^ of that Subftance (we know no 
other Dillinrtion) and as fuch mull:, in the Order of our I- 
deas, bcConfcquent upon the cxiilcnce of that Subftance in 
ivhicli it is ilippofed to inh<^re. Whatever it is;, it has in fomc 


jb Ccncerning the Origin of^vW, Clwp. I. 


j-e-'pcift or other a relation to the Subjcdl to which it belongs. 
i,et it thcii be n\ Attribute fiti ceneris., cujus cunque generis (if 
we mean any thing at all by this Word) it mu.t be predicated 
of, and prefippofe its Subjecl and confequently cannot, accord- 
ing to the Order of our Ideas, be the antecedent ^»i3^wi^ or 
foundation of it. And to endeavour to clear it (as fomc do) by 
making it not an Attribute of the Suhftance, but of the attribute 
of the Subftance ; or as they phrafe it, a Property of a Proper- 
ty; is only thurfting it ftill farther back, and making it pofte- 
rior in conception to both the Sabftance and its Attribute or 

But Thirdly, fuppohngthis Necejfiif, this Ground ot Renfon, 
could be confider'd as antecedetit to the Divine Nature, and in- 
ferring its aftual exigence, wc are got upon one Step farther yet; 
for, will there not be th« fame neceffity for demanding a reafon 
for that reafon, aground for that ground, and fo on in infinitum? 
And what fhall we get by fuch an endlefs progreiTion ? Why 
Ihould we not ftop at a firft Being, as well as at this Ground, 
which muft itfelf want a Foundation if the other does, fmcc 
there cannot be any intuitive Knowledge in either; and the 
fame reafons which are given for flopping at this Ground wWl 
hold equally for Hopping before v/e come at it, and convince 
us that we might as well, or perhaps better, acquiefce in the 
«6?a/3/ Exiftence of the firft Being. We muft then reft fomc- 
Avhere: We muft either admit one firft Caufe of all Things 
and Qualities, itfelf ^Ar//?/?7o- without Caufe (for that is imply'd 
in its being call'd the firft) or an infinite feries of Beings ex- 
ifting without any original Caufe at all; i.e. e\t\icr fi)me one 
thing muft be without a Caufe or e^jery tbing. 

Here then are two Difficulties ; the Icfs is to be chofen ; 
let us fee which that is. Now if the Manner ofi Exijietice in all 
thefe Beings were entirely the fame, I grant m would be as eafy 
to fuppofe ^// of them f'A-//?/;/o' without a Caufe, as One. But 
hcrel think lies the Difference : There was a time when all 
of them, except one, were indifferent either to exifience or nonr 
exifience; were nothing. Therefore for them that were once 
indifferent to exifience ox non-cxfimcey to be aftually determin'd 
ipto Exiftence, to be brought from nothing into fiomethivg^ or 
inade whatlhey once were not; is a real change, an adion, an 
effeEl, and as fuch, muft require fome cha7tger, agent, caufe. But 
on the other hand, all that we know of this one Being, is, that it 
r.B'w exifs and alivayi did fo ; that it never had a Beginning of 
^ts exifience, wai never dunged Irom w^iat i? isj never mefi^ 

Sed. 3. Concerning the Origin o/'EviL jj 


Or p?odnced : Here is no eQ'cB^ and therefore no reafoit 
nor roo7n for a ground or cauje. Nay, to ifllgn one in any 
refpe£l frior to its exiftence, as it nuift be fuppofed to be 
if confider'd as a Caufe; (and it muft be confider'd as a 
Caufe, or cxtrinfic Principle, if confider'd at all ; I mean 
fo as to be made any ufe of in the prefcnt Queftion, or to 
infer any thing concerning afiual Exifience) I lay, to affign 
any Ground priof to the exijicnce of this Being, v.-ould be to 
prove this Being -not €ter7ml, nor the Jiiji Caufe : as at- 
tempting to prove a /elf-evident propofition is endeavour- 
ing to fhew that propofition not to be fclf evident by af- 
figning a clearer. 

Now to lay down fome necejpt'f^ ground, or reafon of Exlil- 
"ence, muft either be to propofe it by v/ay of Caufality^ or to fix 
no manner of Idea at all to thefe Words : and indeed no 
manner of Idea feerrjs polfiblc to be fix'd to them, which is not 
utterly inconfiftent with exiftiiig without Caufe, as that Be- 
ing is prov'd to exift. For why do we conlider that Ground ox 
Reafon in the order of our Ideas as antecedent to the Exiltencc oi 
the Being, otliervvife than as it fecms in the Order of Nature an- 
tecedenilj neceffary to the Exiftence of that Being? To which 
neverthelefs we alloiv, th:>t no 'Thing, Mode, ^ality vvhatfo- 
ever can -be really antecedent. —The Cafe will be no better if 
we imagin« this neccffity coetaneous, or co-ex; jlcnt with the 
Exiftence of the Being which is fupported by it; Since this 
is to fuppofe that adually exifting alrcndy, in order to the 
Exiftence of which this neceffity is introduced; and alio 
feenis much the fame as an effe£t co-cxifent with its 
Caufe. For as we faid before, tliis N eceffuy nm^ either be a 
Caufe, or nothing at all to the prefent purpofe. And that it 
was propofed as fuch by the Author that introduced it, is I think 
pretty plain, from his terming it fometimei a formal Cauie, 
and lometimes one which operates*. 

The whole Cafe then feems to ftand thus. On the one 
hand there is a certain alteration made, a pofitivc effect pro-* 
duced without a Caufe ; which is a clear Contradi&ion. Ou 
the other luirtd there is a difficult''! indeed, but not an apparent 
Contradiftion : There is fomewhat exifting of which we can 
give no account (the mmner of whole Exijience is difiercnc 


* See Dr. Clarke % Anfrver to the 3d. Letter, p. 473. and 
Anfwer to the 6th, p. 48S. Liiiss i, 8, 35. Sevcnith iiditiowr 

78 Concerning the Origin ^/EviL Chap. !» 


from that of an/ thing clfc) n-hich will admit of no Caufty 
tlie Idea oT which is entirely repug:i:mt to that oS Caufality. 

Thif may be hard to conceive, but cannot be deny'd with- 
out afHrming fomething worfe, namely an exprefs contradic- 
tion, as has been (hewn above. In order to fet this in as clear 
a light as is polTiblc, I ihall take the Liberty to infert a Paffage 
from the learned Writer cited in Note 3. and 9. ' The Idea 

* of a Self-Exiftent Being is the Idea of a Being that alivays 

* -vjas, is, and luill be, becaufe he ahvavs was, is, and will be 

* infinitely ^?^/^ to be» If you ask why he is fo, I know not; 

* V/liv I believe fo, I think I know; it is becaufe he has /;;_/a<f/ 
' exifted from all Eternity, which he could not have done, had 

* he not been inlinitely able to exifc. If vou afk after tne 

* ground or foundation of this infinite Ability, it is the fame 
' that is the ground or foundation of all his other Perietlions, 

* his infinite Nature, Eflence or Subftance ; if you afk farther 

* for the ground oithai, I muft call it trifling: if you affign 
' abfolute Nece//il\>, I mufl afk what's next ? Or what that 
' means? Or refer you to the Indian Philofopher's Elephant 
' and 'Tortoife, as the beft comment UDon abfolute, antecedent 
' Necf/fity: 

Neither need we run ourfelves into fuch Abfurditles as thefe: 
This independent Being exifis becaufe it does exifi ; or, it exifls ' 
by chance. Since it is enough for us to fay. There can be no 
Reafonq.<jhy it docs exifi; or, which is the very flime thing llil), 
no Caufc, either £^a>;// ov Formal \ no caufal Necefnty, or 
antecedent Ground of its Exiftence. 

I fxiail only beg leave to obfcrve one thing more in this 
place, namely, that all the abovementioned reafoning about 
necejfary exifiencc fecms to be built upon that falfe Maxim 
which Leibnif» lays down as the foundation of all Philoso- 
phy (and which Dr. Clarke was very ready to grant iiim, fmce 
it was the foundation of his ov.n Euok on the divine Attri- 
butes) namely, that Nothi>!gis njuifhoit arenfon, ixihy it is rather 
than not, and ivhy it is fo rather than cther<iuife. Tho' the Dr. 
is foon forced to deny this very Principle, when (in his Way , 
of confidering ^ime and Space) he propofes the fnere Will of 
God, as the only reafon why the World was c/eated at fuch a 
certain period of time, ;ind in fuch a particular point of Space*. 
Of \\'\\\c\\ Divine Will, or of its dctcnnination, according to 
hirofclf, there can po.Tibly be no n;afi;Ter oireafon, fmce he fup- ' 


* 3i/. Re^ly. N". 5. p. Sxl 

Bed:. 3. CoriCerning f be Origin of Evil. 7^ 

R E M A R K S. 

pofes thefe effefls of the divine Will to be, in every poffible 
manner of Conception, abfolutely e^uai and indiffe7-ent, and 
confequently it Vv'ould be abfurd to fuppofe any reafon of fuch 
fpecial Will., or fuch particular dctenninat'ion. If then we 
iiiay fnppofe two things in nature abfolutely and in every 
refpefl equal (which Leihnitx^ to be confiftent with himfelf, 
and I believe for no fufficient reafon elfe, found it necefiary 
to deny) the preference of cne of thefe before the other mull 
be abfolutely without a reafon. And tho' there may be a fuf- 
ficient reafoA for a perfon''s <'.5fing in general, rather than not 
aiSting at all, yet (as Leibnitz well obferves*) except there 
be one alio for his r.cling in a certain particular maimer, whicii 
in the prefent Cafe there cannot be (according to Dr. Clarke''^ 
own ConcelTion -f-) the abovementioned Principle is intirely 
overthrov/n. See more of this in Note 42, and the lattsr part 
of N. 45. 

The fame Argument will hold againft Locke's Hypothe- 
fis of Anxiety, if it be confidered as the fole and abfolute 
determiner to all Artiont, fince it can never determine the 
Mind to Will one Aftion before another, where both are en- 
tirely equal ; of which kind numberlefs occur in life, as will 
be fheV/n at large in its proper place. 

I^R. f ] For a Being to be limited, 01 deficient in any refpeft» 
is to be dependent on iome other Being in that refpciSt, which 
gave it juil: fo much and no more || ; confcquently that Be- 
ing which in no refpedl depends upon any ether, is not limit- 
ed or deficient at all. For tho' Figure, DivifibiUty, ifc. 
and all manner of Limitation, is in one Senfe {'viz. in Beings 
effcntially imperfedl) as Dr. Clarke obferves **, properly a 
mere Negation or Defied; yet in another, njiz, iu a Being which 
is cifcntially perfejl in any refpeft, Finitenefs muft be con- 
ceived as a pofiti've Effed of fome Caufe retraining it to a cer- 
tain Degree. In all Beings capab'e of Quantity, Increafe CS'r. 
and confequently /^^/ffi/!^^/^ o'l PerfieBion or abfulnte Infinity i 
Limitation or Defect is there a necelTary confequence o{ Exi- 
fietKc, and cloiely convened with, it, and is only a Negation of 
tlwt Fcrfcfcion which is cnth-dy incompatible with thdr Efiencei 

an 4 

* ^(h Letter N". 17. p. 169. 

f N°. I, 2. p. 12. of Ijis ^i/j Reply. 

% See Note 45. 

jj See Scott in Note zr. 

** Dem. p. 56, 57. 5th Edit. 

8o Conteming the (Origin o/'Evil. Chap. I. 


and dif.refore in theft it requires no farther Caufe. Btit iii a Be- 
ing naturally capable o'l Perfiaion or abfolate h;finityy all Im- 
ferfeSiioii or Tiv.itenefs, as it does not ticaJf'arHy flow from the 
Nature of that Being, it fccms to require iomc gmund or rea- 
fon, which reafon mufl therefore be foreign to it, and confe- 
quently is an effect of fome other., ejcternal Caufe, and confc- 
quently cannot have place in the Firft Caufe. That this Be- 
ing is capable of Perfecflion or abfolute Infinity, appears, I 
think, from hence, that hd is manifeftly the Subjed of one 
Infinite or pcrfeifi Attritnite, ^ois. Eternity, or abfolute inva- 
riable Exiilence. His Exiil-.Mce has been fliewn to be perfedl 
in this one refpedl, and therefore it may be perfect in every 
other alfo. Now that which is the Subjedl of one Infinite At- 
tribute or Perfeftion, and may have others fo too, muji have 
all of them Infinitely or in Perfection : Since, to have any 
Perfections in a finite limited manner when the Subjeft and 
thefe Attributes are hoxh capable of ibift /;;/?;;//>-, would be the 
foremention'd abfurdity of pofitivc Limitation without a Caui'e. 
This method of arguing, will prove any Perfection to be in 
the Deity injinito 7?:odo, when v.e have once fhewn that it be- 
longs to him at all : at leall, will fliew that ic is mireafonable 
for us to fuppofe it limited, whun we can find no manner of 
Ground for any Limitation, which is as far as we need, or per- 
haps can go. 

[R. g.] That the Word God is generally underflood in % 
relati-ve Senfe fee Nev:ton. Pri>rc. Schol. Gen. fub. fin. p. 523. 
^t-^ 3d. Edit, or Maxrjjell\ Apendix to Cumberland, p. 106. 
or Ch amber i under the Word God. 

To fhew that there is only oue Eternal Self cxiftcnt Being, 
which bears the Relation of God to us, feems to be going as 
far as either is neatfiaiy or natural Light will lead us. As Dr. 
Clarkeh Dcmonltrationof this and fcveral other Attributes is 
entirely founded on his Idea o'l NeccJ/itj of Exiilence, as that 
alio is nn Space, Duration Sec *. they muil Hand or fall toge- 
1)1 cr. They who endeavour to deduce it from Independence 
Or Omnipotence evidently prefuppofc it in their definition of 
fliefe Attributes. 

The foregoing Paffigc and part cf Note 10, to which it refers, 
having been called in Queltion by the Author of Calumny 
110 Con-viBion, or, a Vindication of the Pica for human Reafon, 
p. 58.&'c. r fha'l eridcavoar to explain ihtm in this Edi- 


* See Note 3. iinJ R. c, p'. (36.' 

Se<a. ^, Conccrm?tg the Origin of Evil. §x 

R E M A R IC S. 

don. The Phenomena of "Nature lead us. up to 07ie fi'ft Caufe, 
ihhich is fuffident for their Produ3io7i, and therefore none ctfe arc 
neceffary; i. e.neceflary to the Production ofthefe Pheiome- 
na, according to the former Scnfc of NcceJ/ity l:iid down in p. 
23 f . and which is the only Scnfe that Word could be ap- 
ply'd in here without Equivocation. Jnd tho" fc^oeral more in- 
dependent Beings might pojjlbly exif, yet <vjould the^ he no Gods to 
us ; they n.vomd hwve no relation to us, nor ^we any thiri's to do njnth 
them; i. e. if the Suppofition of their Exiflencc were not re- 
qulfite to the Production of this Syftcm we could perceive rio 
ncceffity for it at all, we could never difcovcr it by rea- 
fon, and therefore it would be nothing to us. And tho' two' 
or three fuc'h Beings fhould exiil and adl' in the Formation 
and Government of their dillinvi Syllems, or agree in one, yet 
till their Exillencc and Operations were made known to us,' 
and a natural Relation difcover'd, nothing would be owing 
from us to them, they would have no religious or moral Rela- 
tion to us (if I may fo fpeak) we fliould have no reafon to call a- 
ny more than one of them our Creator, Preferver, and Gover- 
nour, which Senfe the Word God more efpecially bears, as this 
Author I'm fure will not deny. 

Since the fame Reafon holds for no more than oncfuch, tofup-. 
pofe more than one is at leaf unreafonable . By an unreafonable 
Suppoiition here I mean a gfoundlefs one, or that which has 
no reafon to fapportif, as the fame Word is ufed concerning. 
Iifnity, p. 63 *. It is unreafonable for us to f up pofe it limited 
Hjchen ive can fndno manner of Ground for any Limitation. Such 
Siippofitions as thefe ought never to be built on in philofophy, 
but yet when they are advanced I fhould not th'nk that my 
not feeing any reafon for them is an effectual conutatiou of 
them. There may be rainy Beings in Nature that no 
apparent relation to any thing I know of, and confcqaently 
for or againll: whofe Exiftence I can fiiid no reafon. I fliould. 
be glad therefore to fee upon what this Author grounds the fol- 
lowing Confcquence which he adds, ' the fame Reafon holds 

for no more than one, therefore there is but one:'' If by the 

Word Reafon he means a Rc3.ion a priori, I muH expe>ft fome 
better Proof of it then I have hitherto been able to meet with 
before I can admit it; And it was exclufively of any fuch 
that I afi'ertcd that they ^who endeavour to deduce the Unity from 
Independence or Omnipotence, pre jtippofe it in their Deflation of 

G theft 

I I/? Edition. * 17? Ediiitn, 

82 Concerning the Origin o/'Evil. Chap. I, 


theft Jttrihutes; which I think they do in the following man- 
rer. Having proved the Exiftence of fome firfl Caufe, which 
as fach can depend upon no other Caufe for its Being and Per- 
feftions, and therefore muft exill alone or be originally felf ex- 
ijient', (all which is dcmonftrable, hut does not Ihew us why 
there may not be twenty fuch firft Caufes, all underived and fo 
{^x independent ) having got thus far in their Proof of Indepen- 
dence, they add another Idea to it and include an abfolute In- 
dependence in every refped, an infinite extent or excrcife of 
its feveral Attributes on every Being in Nature; which fuppo- 
fes that there are no other Beings of equal Perfedions with 
himfelf, but that he exifts alone, or is fclf-exijlent in another 
Senfe of thcfe Wordr, which does not at all follow from the fc rm- 
er. In like manner inllead of defining Omnipotence to be Power 
perfeft in kind, which has no defedl or mixture of weaknefs 
in it, or a Power in God over every thing which he has pro- 
duced, (which is enough for our purpofc, and all perhaps 
that can be ftridtly demonflrated, but yet docs not infer Unity) 
they make it a Power over every thing which exiits befide 
himfelf, which again fuppofes that there are no Beings ot the 
Cime kind with himfelf, which I apprehend to be begging the 
Queilion. If this Author takes thefe two Attributes in the 
larger Senfe, I fhould be oblig'd to him for a Proof of them 
from any Medium but that oi a?itecedent NeceJJity, which I fear 
is a Principle that may with equal Reafon be brought to prove 
any thing. I muft confefs that to me who am oblig'd to draw 
all my Notions and Arguments concerning the Deity from his 
Etiedis, it would be difficult to demonftrate againil the Sup- 
pofuion of more than one uncaus'd adlivc Beings governing in 
their feveral Provinces, and each producing (not whatevei* 
was abfolutely poflible or_yf/ to be produced* h\\\) what w«s 
poffible or fit for hipi to produce ; tho' I don't know any 
Ground for fuch a Suppofition. I fliall make no obfervatioii 
on this Author's eight Arguments for the Unity till he has ta 
ken an Opportunity (as he promifes f) to confider what has 
been faid againil the Principles on which they are founded, 
which I heartily defire. His Appendix Ihall be examin'd la 
its proper place. 

[R. h.] We cannot include any fuch Notion in Omnipre- 
Jenu, as makes the Deity prefent in hisjimple EJpnce to (i. c. co- 
extended or CO expanded with} ei'try point cf the boundkfs Im- 

ntenfity 5- 

* P. 59. f. P. Ulh 

Sedt. 3, Concerning fbeOrigmrfEyiU $ 

R E M u4 R K S, 

^enfity^ ; finee this Idea of Extenfion^ or Expanfion, feems 
plainly inconfiftent With that Jimplc EfTencc f. Not that we 
fuppofe thefe Attributes o'l Kno-^ledge and Vcvjcr adtingyr/^- 
rate from his EfTelice ; but we fuppofe his Eiience to have no 
iBore nehitio7i to the Idea o^ Space, Place, ^here, isfc. than ei- 
ther of thefe Attributes has J. 

Dr. C/arh's Query, ' how can it be fhewn upon any other 

* Principle than tliat of Neceifary Exirtenee, that his ^owra- 

* % Wifdotn and Po'v^er muft be prefcnt in thofe boundlefa 

* Spaces where we know of no Phcnofnena or EfftSls to prove- 

* its Exiflcnce II ? ' is well anAvcr'd hj Epifcopius. I fiiall 
give it in his own Words. * Hoc (ncmpe Deum ejfe extra 

* mundu7n) non modo prorfus ejl ky.i/,-m.y^^a'i, jcd etiafn 'ualde. 

* ahfurdum ; c^ma tot urn atqueomne illud fpatium quod extra banc 

* mundum eJfe dicitur, nihil omnino reale cji, fed pure putc ima- 

* ginarium, & prorfus nihilum ', tit autem Deus eJJ'e dicatur in 

* pure pute imaginario, & prorfus }tihilo, per fe abfurdum ef. t 

* quia effe in dicit realem hahitudinem ant dsnominationem ab eo 
' in quo quid exi flit : Realis autem hahitudo ^ denominatio a ni- 

* hilo, five ah eo quod vihil reale e(i, accipi nulla mo do potefi. 

* Dicere Deum ibi habere intrinfuam tff ahfolutam prs.jentiam 

* c^uain fe ipfo realiter exifit, efi fingere prefcntiamfine Relati- 

* one aut denominatione ad id cui quid pr&f ens effe dicitur, quod 

* implicat contradiBione7n. Intr in/tea eniin frje abfolata pr&fcn- 
« tia, qua quid in fe ipfo realiter exi flit, non eft pr&fentia in ni- 

* hilo; fed meraeffentia five exiftentia extra nihilum §.' 

That a wife and powerful Being knon^)s and aBs upon all par;s 
6f the Univerfe is plain from EffeBs, but to go beyond this 
into what is call'd extraniundane Space, and prove the Exift-. 
encc of Knowledge and Power where there is nothing ro which 
they can be referred, nothing to be or ailed upon, is to 
us incomprehenfible. And no lefs fo to fpeak of the PrefaKt 
of thefe Attributes, or of a Being endowed with them, f/^/-' 
an immaterial uncxtended one) to any point or Part ot Ex- 
tenfion ; except it be metaphorically, as eternal Truths are 
laid to be the fame in every time and place, ^c. Tho' in rca-- 
Jity they have no relation to either one or other, but are in* 
G 2 commsafuratp 

* T)x.Clarke\ Demonft. p. 47,- 

f See Note 6. 

"j: See Note 7. 

I Anfrucer to jth Letter, p. 499. , 

^ Lift, ^hsol L. 4. c, 13. p. 204- 


% Concernhig the Origin o/'Evil. Chap. I* 

R E M ui R K S. 

commenfufate to and of a nature quite different from botk 
Time and Space, as wc obfei-ved in R. c. 

To argue that every Subftance which affefts another muft 
be p-cftnt to it, from the old Maxim that nothing can acl nvhere 
it is not, is ftill fuppofmg that a Spirit exifts Jomcwhere, or is 
circumfcribed bv feme Parts of Space: 'Tis confining its Ex- 
iftenceto one particular Mode, concerning the Modality of 
which we can only reafon negatively, cviz. that it is not the 
fame as that of Matter, or by way of Extenjion in any Senfe. 

To the trite Objection, that what has no Magnitude, or is 
no 'where, is therefore Nothing, fee a fufficient Anfwer in Cud- 
<ivorth, p. 770, to 77B, iffc. How this agrees with Philo't 
Paradox, that God is e'uery <vuhere and yet no inhere, fee ibid. p. 
773. Eut the ftrongefl Confirmation of this Opinion, which 
Dr. More^\\cs, Nullibifm, may be drawn from the learned Dr's 
Arguments againft it in his Enchir. Metaph. C. 27. 

[R. i;] By the above mentioned Pleafure or natural Goody 
1 mean that Pleafure which every one feels in himfelf. By 
the ProduBion of it here I underfland both the producing 
fuch in himfelf, and alfo in others ; to both which he is e- 
qually deccrmin'd by his Nature, tho' from quite dilferent 
Principles. To the former he is directed by Self- Love: To 
the latter by a certain difintcrefted benevolent Inftinft or Af- 
fccflion ; and that which determines him to approve this Affec- 
tion and the Actions flowing from it is called his moral Senfe. 
The former of thefe In(lin6ts, as it implies Increafe ofHap- 
pinefs, is only applxable to finite, impcrfeft Creatures : The 
latter may be common to us and the Deity ; Who could have 
been dctennin'd to create us only by fuch a difintereiled Be- 
nevolent Afledion as this is fuppofed to be. This is always 
approved by the Moral Senfe; tho' it may be doubted whe- 
ther fuch a Senfe be confined entirely to it. See Butler^ Dil- 
fert. on the Nature of Virtue p. 315. 

The Object of both thefe Initincts is natural Good; and, I 
think, moral Good may be allowed to confilt in the Profecution 
of either, or borh of them together, fo long as the former is 
in due Subordination to the latter. 

That all the Notion we can pofTibly frame o^ Moral Good 
or fcvV, of Virtue or Vice, l3c. confilts entirely in promotino^ 
thi* natural Good or is-z// is fufficiciuly confirmed by Sherlock *. 
' Whereas, fsys he, u e diltingu.Hi between Moral and Natural 

* Good 

* 0?i yudgment, p. 20, to Zi^. 

&d. 3 . Cone er fling the Origin ofEwW, 

* Good^nA Evil ; the only difFerence between them is this, that 

* Moral Good and E'uil is in the Will and Choice, Natural 
y Good ^indi Evil IS in t\\& Nature of things ; that which is o-ooi'/ 

* or hurtful to ourfelves or others, is naturally Good ox Evil ; 

< to love J to chufe, to «(? that which is good or hurtful to o«r- 
« y^/wj or others, is morally Good ox Evil; or is the Good or 

< £<y// of our CZ'»/V^ or ASiions. If you will but recoiled your 
« felves, you will find that you hive no other notion oi Good 

< or Evil but this : when you fay fuch a Man has done a very 

* Good ox very Evil Adtion, what do you mean by it? Do 

* you not mean that he has done fomething very good or very 

* hurtful to himfelf or others ? When you hear that any Man 
« has done Good or Evil, is not the next Qaellion, 'what good 

* or what hurt has he done ? And do not you mean by this, 

* Natural Good or Evil ? Which is a plain Evidence, that 

* you judge of the Moral Good ox Evil of Adions, by the 

* Natural Good or Evil which they do'. See more on this 
Subjeft delivered in the fame Place, with an elegance and 
perfpicuity peculiar to that Author. And to the fame purpofe 
is Turner^ Difcourfe of the Lavjs of Nature and the Reafon of 
their Obligation. 

This feems to be the ultimate Criterion of that Fitnefs, Con* 
grnity, Reafotiablenefs and Relation of Things, fo often repeated 
by fome late Writers, voithout or beyond which I can fix no 
meaning at all to theie Words. And this Criterion fhould J 
think, have been more clearly and diilinflly fpecify'd. For 
when you fay any thing \%fit ; muft we carry our Enquiries 
no farther ? Is it not a very proper QneiUon, to alk,/or vjhat 
is it fit? Fit, Congr-uotis, &c, (as well as the Word NeceJ/arp 
are mere relative terms (as we obferved in Note 4.) and evi- 
dently refer to fome E?id, and what can the end be here but 
Happinefs * ? Thcfe Relations, &c. may perhaps in fome tq- 
lerable Senfe be called Eternal and Immutable, becaufe when-- 
ever you fuppofe a Man in fuch certain Circumftances, fuch 
Confequences and Obligations did or will always certainlT" 
-follow f . 

What is now good for me in thefe Circumllinces and Re- 
fpcfts, will always be fo in the fame Circumllances a id Re- 

G 3 ipeds, 

^ See an excellent Piece entitled. Divine Bencvo'ei-re; par- 
ticularly, pages 15, 22, 30, 31, 32. 

f See 'Loch: 5 Effay, B. 4. C. 11. § \\. or Turner m t\ 
lavjs of Nature, und their OMig^tion, §, 20 or Note :- 

86 Concenilng the Origin ^EviL Chap. T*- 


fpefts, and can never be altei'd without altering the Nature 
;of things, or the prcfent Syfiem : but we cannot imagine thefe 
Relations therefore to be any real Entities, or to have exifted 
from all Eternity, or to be antecedent to, or independent cf 
the Will of God himfelf ; as fome Writers feem to have donc', 
if they had any determinate meaning^at all (for which See Mr, 
Hutchefons, lUuftrat. §. 2. p. 250, 25 1.) We cannot, I fay, 
imagine them to be either ftridily eternal or independent of the 
Will of God, bccaufe they mull neceffarily prefuppofe a deter- 
mination of that Will, and are in truth only Confequences of 
ihe Exillence of things proceeding from that Determina- 
tion *. Much lefs can we apprehend how thefe Relations, 
&c. * Jre to be chofenfor their oijon Sokes and intrivjic Worth ; 

* or ha've a full obligatory Potver antecedent to any re-ivard 

* or punifnment annexed either by natural Confequence or pO' 

* ftti^'e Appointment to the Obfer'vance or NegleSi of them f .' 
Since the Natural Good or Happinefs confequent upon and 
conneded 'vvith the Obfervance of them, is to us their folc 
Criterion, the Argument and Indication of |;heir Worthy the 
Ground of all their 0^%<2//<2K. 

* The Notion of abftratt Fitnefs is pretty well handled by 
Turner. ' The LaiAJs of Nature for which is the fame, Nu' 

* /ural Right and Wrong"] are fuch Laws and Rules of Life, 

* as to the Breach of which there is a natural Punifhment an- 
" nexed. For to fay a thing is cfTentially good or evil, to call 

* it by hard Names, and to affirm that it hath a Natural Tur- 

* pitude ; or, to pafs a Compliment upon it, and call it a 
'^ Moral Reftitude, and fuch like,fine fcholaftic Terms — with- 

* out affigning a particular Reafon of Intereft, why we Ihould 

* do the one or avoid the other, is as much as to fay, a thing 

* is good for nothing ; or it is bad, but we know not why ; 

* or it is good or bad, for a Woman's Reafon, becaufe it is : 

* And this Reafon will ferve as xvell to prove that Murder 

* or Adidtery are good things, as that they are bad ones J. 

* The Laws of Nature, therefore, have every one of them 
' their Sanation in them/elves\\, i.e. fome things naturally 

* tend to our Happinels, and others to our Mifery, and for 
« that Reafon they become natural Laivs to us;, or are Rules to 

■ * diredt 

* See «?«/- Authoi-j C. I. §. 3. par. 9. and C. 5. §. J. par. 
23. iffc. cW Note 52. ' 

: •{• Evidences (fNaf and Rev. Religion, prop. 1. §. 7. p. 2 1 8, 
^ la-j.sofNat.8ic, §. :, . , •' \\ Uid. §. 2. 

Sed. 3. Concerning the Origin ^Evil. dj 

\ R E M A R K S, 

* diredi our Aftions by; and we zrcohligd to do the one and 

* avoid the other upon a Principle of Self happinefs, and 

* Self prefervation, which is the very Root and Spring of all 
' Obligation whatfoever *. 

* From whence we may difcern the Vanity and Folly of 
' tliofe learned Men, who are ufed to talk fo loudly o'i ejfen- 

* tial ReBitudes, and eternal Notions, and I know not what 

* phantaftical Ideas, in an abftradled way ; whereas there is 

* indeed nothing which is cither good or bad merely hy it/elf, 
« but every thing which is good, is good, that is, ufeful to 

* fomething ; and every thing which is bad, is fo with refer- 

* ence to fome Nature or other, to which it is more or lefs 
^ pernicious and deftruftive: from whence it follows (the 

* nature of Obligation being a refult arifmg from the ufeful- 

* nefsor hurtfulnefs of a thing propofed to be the Objedt of 

* a free Agent's choice, with refpeft to that Agent which is 
^ converfant about it) that all Obligation mull be not of a 

* fimple, but of a compound, or concrete nature, and muft al- 
.* ways have an infeparable refpedl to the Intereft or Happi- 

* nefs of thofe to whom that Obligation is binding. And it 
f is not only true, that our Intereft and our Duty are both of 

* them the fame, but that it is abfolutcly impoffible any thing 

* fhould be our Duty, which is not our Intertill into the Ear- 

* gain ; for no Man can poflibly be obliged to that which all 

* things confider'd, will be to his Difadvantage \.^ 

Farther, moft Authors who treat of the Produflion of this 
Natural Good or E'vil in fuch a manner as to conftitute Right 
or wrong, moral Good or Evil, i^c. appear either to equivo- 
cate in a double meaning of the Words : 'uix. as they imply 
producing Happinefs either in our/elves alone, or in others^ 
(which are two very different things, and fhould accordingly 
be always dillinguilh'd) or elfe to be deficient in pointing out 
a Rule, and proving an Obligation to it in the latter Senfe, njiz. 
with refpedl to others. This great defedl in their Syltems 
feems to arife from not fufficiently attending to the above inen- 
tionM Moral Senfe or Confcicnce, (is the meaning of this latter 
Word is ti^'d by Mr. Butler X ) which ii of itfelf both Rule 

G 4 and 

* Laivs of Nat. Sec, § 6. 

•f- Ibid. §.14. See nlfo the Supplement to the Nature of thi 
Sacraments, Sec. The EfTay on Moral 0'olig.ition, or Divine Be^ 
nevole?ice, or Mr. Clarke's Foundation :f Morality, or Bp. GallrsF^ 
ill Bojjle's Lcfft. p. 93, ^c, X Senn. 2i/and ^d^ 

88 Concerni?ig the Oxi'^iM ofEvil, Chap. I. 


;and OhUgRthn. As an Infihia, it direfts us to approve fuch 
AcHons as tend to produce Happinefs in others, and fo is a 
"Ride whereby we determine all fuch Adions to be virtuous j 
as it gives us pain, or makes us uneafy at the Neglect ot thefe 
Anions, or at the Praclice of the contrary ones, it fo far obliges 
us to purfue them, or makes the Praclice of them necefTary to 
our Happinefs : Which is the true meaning of the Word oblige^ 
[OiS wa.s {hewn in the pre/immry Dtfferfatio?!; and is proveq 
more at hrgchy Cumber/an^*.) 

That, and that only can be faid to oblige us, which is ne- 
tejfary to our Eappinejs, and every thing does fo tar oblige as it 
is neceflary. Now, as the Sum of our Happinefs depends up- 
on the whole of our Exilicnce, that only can be a complete and 
indifpcnfible Obligation, which is equal and commenfurate to 
the Sam total of oar Happinefs. Or, that Being only can 
abfolutely and effectually oblige us, who has it in his Power 
to make our whole Exiftence happy or miferable; and or 
confequence, the Deity who alone has that Power, muft necef- 
arily be taken into all Schemes of Morality, in order to fuper- 
induce a full, adequate Obligation, or fuch an one as will 
hold at all times, and extend to every Aftion ; and an endea- 
vour to exclude the Confideration of his Will, or to deduce all 
Obligation from any Principles independent of it, has, I 
think, occafion'd another great PefeiSl in moft of our moderii 

iV^. J?. What has been here faid about Injl'm^, JffeSiioti, Mit- 
ral Sen/e, &c. may feem to imply that thefe are all innate: 
contrary to what was proved in the Preliminary Dijfertatioii; 
And indeed this was drawn up at firft upon a Suppofition bf 
the Validity of that Notion^ which many may perhaps efteem 
Valid ftill, and therefore I let the Argument ftand in the old 
Terms : efpecially as it it is nof at all afFe£led by the Truth or 
Falfity of that Notion ; fince it will really come to the fame 
thing, v/;th regard to the Moral Attributes of God and tl^e 
Nature of Virtue and Vice, whether the Deity has implanted 
thefe Inftin-fts arid Afleftions in us, ox lias framed and difpp- 
|ed us in fuch a mmner ; has given lis fuch Powers, and pla- 
ced us in fuch Circumilanccs, that we muft ncceflarily acquire 
tHm ; they'll be alike natural^ and equally valuable parts of 
. Oat Conliitut;on in either Senfc, as all A^cioms fire equally cer- 


* C. 5. |. 27. See alfo Pufejidorf^ B. i. C. 6. §. 5. N. 4. 

and §. 8. Note'i. *■■ •—.:-•'. 

Sed. 3» Coficerning the Ongia of EviL 89 


tain and felf-evident in Mr. Locrs Scheme of no Innate Princi- 
ples, and the old one. 

And tho' I take implanted 5^K/^^, InjilnBs, Appetites y Paf' 
fans and Affecllom l^ c. to be a Remnant of the OldPhilofophy, 
which ufed to call every thing hinate that it could not account 
for; and therefore heartily wifli that they \vere in one ^enfe 
all eradicated, (which was undoubtedly the Aim of that great 
Author laft mention'd ; as it was a natural Confcquence of his 
firil Book) ytX. as common ufe has fix'd this Notion of Innate- 
nefs to them, I am obliged to follow my Author, and treat 
of them in the common Language. Only let it be obferved 
here once for all, that every Argument which is built upon, 
thefe Senfes, l^c. will be equally conclufive whether they be 
implanted or acquired. As to the prefent point in particular, 
Mr. Hutchefon has fully proved that in faft we are led infen- 
fibly, and by the Circumflances of our Being, to Iqve and 
approve certain Aftions which we call virtuous : Which is 
enough for my purpofe as was hinted above. Againjl the 
Notion of implanted InfiinSs, See Velthuyfen de Principiif 
jufti y decori, p. 73, &c. AmfM. 1651. pr an EJflay on Mor(il 
Obligation.^ Chap. 5. 

[R. k.j'That God muft have the fame Judgment and Ap- 
probation of this Moral Good, which all Rational Beings na- 
turally have * ; and that we muft judge of the Nature and 
Perfections of the Deity, only by that Nature and thofe Per- 
iedtions which we derive from him, is I think, very plain : 
I mean, that we muft not endeavour to conceive the feveral 
Attributes of God hy /nhjlituting fomething in him of a quite 
different kind, and totally diverfe from that which we find in our- 
felves, (as the learned Author of the Procedure of fJuman Un- 
derjianding feems to declare, p. 133, and elfewhere) even tho" 
that could be in fome refpedls fimilar and analogous to this: 
But we arc to fuppofe fomewhat of the \ try fame Aind and 
Jirt, the fame Qualities or Properties in general to be both 
in him and us, and then remove all manner oi Defe£iox hnper- 
feilion which attends the particular Modus or Degree of their 
Exiftence, as they are in us. Thus we afcribe to God all 
Icinds of apparent Perfcdion obfervable in his Creatures, ex- 
cept fuch as argue at the fame time I'mperfediion (y. g. Mo- 
tion, which neceifarily implies Limitation) or are inconfiftent 


*_SeeS«/'s Chriftian Liie^ Part z. Q, l. p. zi» zz. ifi 

9© Concerning the Origin of Evil. Chap. I, 


with fome other and greater Perfeflion (v g. Materiality, 
which exdudes Knowledge and Liberty * ) We alfo remove 
from him all nvanty dependence, alteration, uneal nefs, &c. In 
Ihort, all that rcfults either from fimple finitenefs, or from the 
mere Union of two finite imper^eft Subflances, fuch as con- 
ilitiite Man. And when we hnve thus apply'd every thing in 
every manner of Eziftence whch fecms to imply PerfeftioH, 
and excluded every thing in every manner of Exiftence which 
jmpLes or includes the contrary, we have got our Idea of an 
abfolutely perfecl Being, which we call God. 'Tis therefore 
attributing to God fome real Qualities of a certain determinate 
jkind, (v. g. Knowledge or Power, Goodnefs or Truth) the 
nature of which Qualities we do perceive, are direftly con- 
fcious of, and knoiu, which gives us an Idea or Conception 
cf him, and "3. proper one too, (it any fuch Dillinftion of Ideas 
were allow'd) and not imagining fome others, we cannot tell 
©f what fort, totally different in nature and Icind from any that 
we ever did perceive or know ; which ^vould give us no Ide§ 
icr Conception at all of him, either proper or improper. 

In like manner we frame a partial conception of a Spirit 
in general (which we confefTedly have) not by fubftitiiting 
fome properties different in kind from thofe which we perceive 
in our own Spirit ; but by fuppofing the very fame properties 
z. e. in kind (<i;/k. Thought and A5lion\ to be alfo inherent in 
fome other immaterial Beings which we therefore call by the 
fame Names. Now this is (as far as it goes) true, real know- 
ledge, and may be apply'd and argu'd on intelligibly : buc 
the other would, I fear, take away all poITibility of arguing 
about the feveral Attributes or Properties of the Deity from 
thofe of ourfelves, and 'vice njerfa ; all our rcafonings upon 
them (as the learned Author fays o^ Metaphor, p. 134 ) tvould 
be precarious, and without any folid foundation in the Nature 
of things. Such analogical Knowledge then as that, is (ac- 
cording to my Notions of Knowledge) ftriftly and properly 
none at all ; and if the Author ufes Analogy in that Senfe, 
*twill, I believe, be ftill taken only for a foit or degree of 
Metaphor, after all he has faid, in the laft Chapter of his firil 
Jook, to diftinguifli them, 

I would here be underftood to affirm thus much of the fin^- 


* See Tillotfon, Serm. 76. 2<^Vol. Fol. p. 569, l^c. Dr. 
J. Clarke on Moral E'vil, p. 95, &'c. and Scott's C^r^iaa 
^^f, Part 2. C. 6. §. 2. p. 447, ^f. I ft Edit. 

6ea:. 3' Concerning the Ovigm of 1£.\\\, ^% 


pie Nature only, or Kifid, or our ahJlraSi Idea of thef^ Qua» 
lilies themfel'ves, and not of the manner of their Exiftence : 
which two [tho' this Author is pleas'd to ufe them promifcu- 
oufly in p. 84, ^r.] feem yet very diilinft Confiderations. 
For we apprehend feveral Properties, or Qualities, as exifting 
in our own Nature, independent of any particular manner ; 
nay, in very different manners : v. g. Knovv'Iedge, either by Sen- 
fation or Refledion, by Deduftipn or immediate Intuition: 
Love attended with a certain degree of Pleafure or Pain, ^c. 
and therefore we fuppofe that thefe Qualities may exift in the 
Divine Nature in a manner entirely diflcrent from what the)r 
do in us, and yet be the very fame Qualities ftill; which Mo- 
dus of the Divine Being, or of any of his Attributes, is total- 
ly unknown to us, and we can only guefs at it by fome di- 
ftant refemblance or Analogy \ which Analogy 1 would there- 
fore apply to this Mo^-^jof Exiftence, and to this only; which 
feems fufficient for all the great Purpofes of Religion, and in 
which Senfe the Notion is exceeding juft and ufeful, but 
cannot, I think, be extended to our Idea of the nxihole Nature 
and Genus of the Attribute itfelf For if the Divine Attributes 
be toto genere dillinft and different from thofe Qualities 
which we efteem perfcdlions in our felvqs or others, if [as 
the fame Author urges *,] ' the greatejl perfeSiions of thofe 

* Creatures ijohich fall under our Ohfervatton, and thofe <u;e fnd 

* in ourfelvss particularly [and thefe he will grant to be alf 

* that we have any Idea of] are really hut fo many Imperfedi- 

* ens, ivhen referrd or attributed to the Divine Nature, as it is 

* in itfelf in any meaning ivhatfoever, enjen <with the moft exalted 

* meaning nxje can poffibly annex to ihem^ [the Author under- 
ftanding, 1 fuppofe, as ufual, the luhole Nature and diflirr- 
gui/hng kind of thofe Qualities in themfelves.] Then, how 
fliall we difcovcr which kind of Qualities God prefers before 
the contrary ? How can we be certain that thefe in particu- 
lar are agreeable to him ? ok how fhall we hope and endea- 
vour to make ourfelves like him ? Can we know the nature 
of one thing by another, entirely diiFerent from it? Or can 
we imitate what we don't at all apprehend? ' It is foolijhp 
[fays A. Bp. Tillotfon~\ for any Man to pretend that he cannot hioit^ 

* nvhat yufice, andGoodncfs, and Truth in God are', for if lue d^ 

* not kno^v this, *tis all one to us njjhether God be gxod or not ; nor 
\ iould ■'.'.•£ imitate his Goodnefs : for he that^mitateSi endeaivours. 

* Pag. 82. 

9^ Concerning the Origin ofEwih Chap. \l 


* to he like fomething that he knoivs, and muji of vccejjtty hwve 
' fame Idea of that to nvhich he aims to be like ; fo that if fwe had 
*■ 710 certain and fettled Notion of the J ujlite and Goodnefs and 
' Truth of God, he njoould he altogether an unintelligible Being : 

* and Religion, nvhich conftfls in the Imitation of him, ivoulJ 

* he utterly impofftble* .'' Thefe Confequences will hold equally 
againft the Dodrine deliver'd by our Author in the Sermon 
annex'd, if he did not fuppofe that there were fome Qualities 
in Men in fame refpeiis really correfpondent to thofein God, and 
{o very like them that nothing cou'd be more fo except that 
which exifts in j^ the very fime Manner and Degree too, /. e. in 
a. perfe^ one. If this be hi's meaning, [as is not improbable 
from his Anfwer to the like Objeftions in §. 22. where he 
declares that the Divine Attributes have much more Reality 
and PerfeSiion in them than the things by which we re-; 
prefent them, ^c-] If, I fay, he be taken in this Senfe, 
as I would willingly underftand him, he is perfeftly clear 
from the exceptions made above. I wilh the learned Au- 
thor of the P roce dure, tffc. cow'd be fhown to be fo, who is 
generally fuppofed to have purfucd his notion of Analogy 
farther than moll Perfons will be able to follov/ him. As 
he has chargM our Author with a mijlaken nxiay of treat' 
ing the SubjeSl f , I hope he will be ready to excufe any 
for obferving what they conceive to be a miftake in his owij 
method, efpecially if they endeavour to Ihew direSh that th? 

foundation of Analogy, as he has placed it, i s falfe and ground » 
lejs\: which Foundation is the general nature or diftinguifl^- 
ing kind of thefe Qualities. Now the nature of the foremen- 
tion'd Qualities muft either be wholly the fame in God and us, 
or wholly different: if the former be maintained, then this ana- 
logical Senfe is turn'd into an identical one ; if the latter, then 
can no manner of Refemblance or Analogy be drawn between 
them ; fince one nature (as has been obfcrv'd) cannot in the 
leaft help to reprefent or explain another cjuite different from 
It; I mean, inthofe very points vi^ herein they differ; for that 
is to be different and not different, alike and unlike in the 
very fame refpefl, at the fame time : And then this analogical 
Senfe is turn'd either into a difparate or quite oppofite one, i. e, 
into no analogy at all: Or laftly, they mull be partly the 


* Sec A. Bp. Tillotfons Serm. 76. Vol. 2. Fol. p. 672, aa^ 
p. 678. 
"I" Introdmaion p. ly, % Ibi^, 

Sc<5l. 3. CoficerntJig the Origin ^Evil. 93 


fame, and partly different, or alike and unlike in different reffeBi 
(which is the thing we contend for) f/z. alike in PerfeSiiony 
or in being Perfeftions of a certain kind, and unlike in DefeSly 
or impcrfefHon ; /. e. mixed with the contrary Qualities : 
or the fame in Nature, or Effence, but different in Degree, and 
the manner of Exiftencc. Or take it thus : the Qualities at 
fuch, or confider'd in the AhfiraSl, are the fame ; as exifting in 
a particular SubjeSi, different. In an infinite (or rather per- 
feh) Subjeft, they exiil perfeBly, or in the highejl Degree \ 
they are abfolute, without any Mixture or DefeSi. In a finite 
or imperfe6l one they are limited, allayed, or defeBive ; they 
exift in an imperfeSi Manner, or inferior Degree. Confequently 
we conceive them to be alike in both as Perfe^ions, or Quali- 
ties of a certain nature or kind; unlike only as mix"d with 
ImperfeSiion, or as confined to a certain Degree. If therefore 
the Author founds this Analogy on the very Nature of tha 
thing, he feems to incur the foremention'd abfurdity, of fup- 
pofing a nature contradidlory to itfelf ; i. e. analogous to 
fomcthing from which it is at the fame time totally and entire- 
ly different. If, with us, he will pleafe to dillinguifh between 
the Nature of the thing in general, and the particular Modus 
of its Exiflence, he muft with us alfo remove this analogy 
from the former foundation, and {\x it upon the latter. — Far- 
ther, no Similitude whatfoevcr, whether deduced from human 
Reafon or Holy Scripture, can have force enough to pcrfuade 
us, that the Rvhole nature of thefc things is quite different from 
what we apprehend Or can conceive them to be ; fince it is 
univerfUIy allow'd, that no comparifon can [as we common- 
ly fiy] run upon all four ; or [which is the very foundation 
and defign of this whole analogical Scheme] can ever confti" 
tutc a proper and conduji've Argument, in order to prove to us 
fuch a paradox : and if fo great Strefs is to be laid on any, 
V. g. that of a Looking-Glafs, ufed in a ftricl Philofophical 
manner, [as the Author of the Procedure feems to do *J why 
may not fome urge it ftill farther, and argue that as the 
Image of your Face fuppofed to be feen in the Glafs, is no-' 
thing real, folid, and fubibntial contain'd in the Glafs itfclfi 
but barely an appearance exhibited in the Brain ; fo all the 
conceptions which we pretend to have of the Divine Na- 
ture and Attributes, are nothing at all in God himfelf, but 
mere Phantafms and delufive Images, exifting only jn our 
oVi'n Mind. This, will tlicfc Men lay, muft appear abfurd at- 

* Pag. J I 2, ^f. 

94 Concirning the Origin o/'Evil. Chap. I. 


firft Sight, and yet may be drawn from the Similitude with 
as much Propriety as the reft; coniequently the whole Scheme 
of this Analogy is to be reje£led as entirely falfe, and at laft 
the true Medium of all our Knowledge in the Nature of thefc 
things, will be what we truly and properly perceive of them, 
in fome fmall degree in ourfelves. 

If it be objected here, that the Nature ■xr\6. Modus of any 
thing muft be the very fame, fince by different Natures arc 
only meant different Manners of Exiftence. 

I anfwer: By the Nature of any thing, I underfland Its 
feveral dtjlinguijh'ing Properties. By the Nature of any Prcperiy 
1 underftand fome certain pofitive Mark or CharaSler which 
diftinguiflies that property from any others. Thus, by the. 
nature of Body, I mean, folid, divifible, figurd and moveable 
Extenfion. By the Nature of Solidity, I mean Refiltence, or 
a power of excluding other Bodies out of its place; which 
Mark fufiiciently diftinguiflies it from Divifibility, or any 
other property belonging to the fame Body, as well as all the 
forementionM properties diftinguifh a Body from fomething 
elfe : both which we may therefore properly enough be faid 
to perceive or kno^v; tho' perhaps we may never in like man- 
ner know hoiv thefe feveral Properties are united together^ 
and come to form one Aggregate or Suhjlance; nor ^whence 
this Power or Property of Rcliftence proceeds, or how it is 
cans'' d, which is what we underftand by the Mod^w of each. 
So that knowing or having a clear determinate Idea of a cer^ 
tain Thing or Quality, fo as to be able to diftinguifh it from 
another Thing or Quality, and always to perceive it to be 
really thus ; is quite different from knowing how the faid 
Thing or Quality comes to be thus : Honu or Why it is, arc 
Modes of Exiftence, and differ plainly from n.vhat it is, or what 
Idea we have of it, which denotes its Nature or EJfeme. 

Againft this Notion cf Analogy, as apply'd to the nvhole Na' 
ture of the Attributes of God, fee Fiddes's Body of Divinity, 
B. I. Part 2. c. 13. and his PraBical Dijcourfes, Fol. p. 234, 
^c. or y . C lor kepn Moral Evil, p. 95, tsc. ox Chuhh^TraBs 
p. 146, i^c. or, the prefcnt State cf the Rcpiiblick of Letters for 
fuly 1728. or, a Vindication of the Divine Attributes, by Dr. 
Ed-iuards. See alfo the Minute Philofopher, V. i. p. 247. 

Some objedVions having been made to this Remark by an 
eminent Writer*,. 1 fliall here fet down the Siibftance of his 
Arguments and what I take to be an Anfwer. 

* Caftfof Reafon,- by If. levj, p. 6S, ^c\' 

Sed. 3» Cone erniftg the Oxi^m of Ewih ^g 


In the firfl: place, the learned Author would have it obferv'd 
that in a comparifon made between the Attributes of God and 
and thofe Qualities which we eftcem Perfedions in ourielves, 
it is affirm'dthat they are of the fame Nature or EJJencey and 
ytt partly the fame and partly different, p. 68. 

Anf^er. "Nature or Ejfence is only that which determines 
the i'/m^^ of thefe Qualities, or denominates them of this or 
that Sort : this may be the fame, tho' they be different in ano- 
ther fenfe of the word Nature, t. e. as including every thing 
which does or may attend the whole of their Exiftence. Thus 
Coodnefs or Benevolence is of the fame kind in God, Angels 
and Men, <viz. a Tiifpofition to cotrmtinicate Happinefs, which I 
Call the Nature or Ejfence of it; but differs as it is attended 
with Pleafure or Pain ; as calm or paj/tonate, which I call 
manners of Exiflence : or as it is more or lefs intenfe, pure or 
unmix' d, which I term Degrees of Perfediion. 

For affirming things to be the fame in nature which are 
in fomc refpedls very different, we have this Author's own 
Authority, p. 149. * As Love is the fame paffion in all Men 

* yet it is infinitely different; as Hatred is the fame paffion' 

* in all Men yet with infinite differences ; fo Reafon is the 

* fame faculty in all Men yet with infinite differences. 

2dly. 'Tis urged that all the Attributes inherent in the Di- 
vine Nature arc KeceJ/hry, eternal, infnite, immufahle, indepen- 
dent, &'c. all the Qualities in human Nature the diredi con- 
trary, therefore they cannot be partly the fame, but muft be 
nvbolly different: as different in their Nature as mutable is 
from immutable, Iffc. Jbid. 

Jnftv, Eternity, Neceffity, ^c. don't at all affe<ft the Na- 
ture of thefe Attributes or Qualities in our fenfe of the Word 
Nature, i. e. do not make 'cm to be Qualities of fuch a 
fort, any more than if they were in a contrary Hate. Knonju- 
ledge is no more K?2ovjhdge for being eternal or immuta- 
ble. Power is as much Po<vjcr whether it be independent 
or derived, whether it ceafe to morrow, or laft for everii 
and foofthe reft, 

jdly. If the Attributes in God and Qualities in Men be 
dike in PerfeSlion, they muft be alike in Eternity, neceffary Ex- 
iftence, l^c, becaufe thefe things conftitute the Pcrfeaion ofthe' 
Divine Attributes, p. 69. 

Anfw. This is taking the Word PerfeHion in a lenfe diffs- 
*ent from that in which we underftand it, and in which this 
Author himfelf feem'd to ufc it in the laft Page, where ha 

^6 Concerning the Origin c/Evil. Chap. Id 


mentions thofe PerfeBions fivhkh are in ourfel-ves. In this plac« 
he means the ahfolute perfeflion of any thing in all rcfpcBs :^ 
1 take it only for fome certain Quality, which as fuch is called 
a Perfeclion, /. e. valuable, or the foundation of Happinefs 
to a Being in one refpecl, tho* not in others. Thus Know- 
ledge, as far as it is Knoivledge, or can be intitled to that 
Name, is as much, or as rea'.lv, a pcrfedtion in Man as in God: 
the Jdea of this Quality as diftinguifliable from any other 
Quality is the fame in both; tho' there be a difference as to 
extent or freedom from Ignorance, which is the Degree oi it; 
or as it does, or does not confift in Dedudlion, or arife from 
Senfition, id'c. which are Modes of its Exiftence. 'Tis there- 
fore properly alike in PerfcBion, or in itsheinga PerfeHion of a 
certain kind ; unlike in DefeSi, or in being attended with Im- 
perfedlion in Manner or Degree. 

4thly. If Power in Man and Power in God are alike in 
FerfeBion but unlike in DefeB, they muft be alike in Otmiipo- 
ience, but unlike in Z)^^? o/^Po^^.-^;-, Ibid. 

jinfw. Rather they muH be alike as far as they are fimply 
Po'wer, or agree in the general Idea of it ; but unlike as far as 
they are Power 7nix'il with, impotence; or as the Exercife of 
'em is attended or nor attended with Uneajincfs, &c. 

5thly. What is alike in Perfeclion mult be alike in Impcr- 
feftion, unlefs a thing may be like another in Sirengthy but 
not like it in the vjant of Strength, p. 70 

Jnfiv. May not a thing be like another in having fome 
Strength, tho' not like it in having the_/2z;/(f Strength ? fure it 
is no inconfiftency to fay things are of the fame Nature or 
Cetius-, tho' in a different Degree, 

6thly. That which differs only in Degree can only difi«r 
in a certain Degree, hnt fnite and infinite^ mutable znAimtnu- 
table c^rC the faid to differ only in a certain Degree, Ibid. 

Jnfjj' An abfolute or jmfaphfical Inf?iite, which is the 
only one that can be applied in the prefent Cafe, is a pofitive 
Idea of fome certain Qiiality in the JbfraB, in the highej} 
Degree, or to which nothing of the lame kind can he added i 
fincc then there is a hlghejl in all fuch Qualities as Goodnefi 
Po^ver, &c. contrary to what we find in mathematical Quan- 
tities) they may be faid to differ in a certain Degree, fee R. I.' 
Mutability or Immutability arc nothing to thefe Qualities af 

7th]y. To fay that they differ only in a Degree or Manner 
of Exillencc fuppofcs that Degree or 7nanner of Exiftence iigni-' 


Se6t. 3« Concerning the Ongm of 'EwW. (fj 


fy; the fame thing, whereas they are exceedingly different, 

Anf^M. Or, is here taken disjunSl-veh. Tho' thefe t^vo a-, 
nountto thcflime thing: A different Dey^-ee always imnlys s 
different Manner of Exiftence. 

. 8thly. The Exi(lence of God differs from the Exigence of 
M^n in the Manner of Exiftence but not in the Degree of 
Exiftence. p- 71. 

Jnfi.u. Exijience is properly no Attribute, nor is it capable 

9thiy. If tlic'ir manner of Exiftence muft bvc nllthit Dif- 
ference there is bcuvccn ftniieand iniinite, &c. then it can fig- 
liify httle whether you. fay ihey are drfferen!; in theii: Naturit 
or EjTmcey or only different in their Manner ot Exiftence. 

Jnfiv. Let the Manner in which Divine Knowledge exifts 
be never fo different from that of human Knowledge, yet fo 
long as it is Knowledge, or agrees in the general Idea with what 
Men call Knowledge, it muft fignify fomcthing m.ore than if it 
Avere totally different, of quite another kh:d and had p.o more 
refcmblance to it than Kno^vlcdge has to Pc^jjer, as feems to be 
tlie Cafe upon the Analo ical Scheme. 

lOthly, Who can tell the Nature and Effcnee'^ of any 
thing any farther than he knows the Manner of its Exift- 
ence ? Ibid. , 

Aafrju. The kature or Ejence of any Quality according 
tons, is only its abjiraa. Idea, or that which determmcs it 
to be of this or that Sort, which muft be the fame in what 
Manner foever it exifts, or is exhibited in any particular Sub- 
je6l. See Note i. . 

iithly. But the foregoing Diftinftiou Utppofos a real dtf-.. 
ference between thefe two, and that a thing, has not fuch x 
Manner of Exiftence becaufc it is of , a Nature, nor is of 
fuch. a Nature becaufe it has fuch a Manner of Exiftence. 

Anf^^^. No move it is, in our Scnfe of the >Vcrd A<?^V,'r?, 
Knowledge does not come by Senfation or Refleaion m parti- 
cular becaufe it IS Knowledge, nor is it therefore ^.Knowledge 
becaufe it comes by Senfation or Reflexion. Goodne/s, Poii-cr, 
&c. are of the fame general Nature in Men and Angels, tho" ^ 
they be more imperfeaiy difplayed in one than in the other; 
which can arife only' from the different Capacities of theSub- 
'fSti that rcecive tl^m ; or in oiIk:^' Word?, !rsm the d liferent,, 

98 Co?icerm/ig t be Or igm of EwW. Chap. I. 

R E M A R K S. 

manner of their Exiftence in thofe Subjects ; which Mannef 
is therefore entirely independent on their abflraft Nature nor 
have they any relation to each other. 

1 2thly. He muft fhcw that the Manner of Xlnderfianding^ 
Will or Potver in God and Man is not at all ov.^'ing to 
the Nature ol Under Jlandlngy Will or Poixjer in God or Man 

P- 73- 

ji?tfw. The Manner of thefe Qualities may be fuppofed to 
be very different, and yet the Nature of them (in our Senfe of 
that Word) will continue the fame, which fhcvv's fufficicntly 
that the former is not owing to the latter. If pn// be defi- 
ned a Ponjjer of Preferring or Ckoofing ; is not that the fame 
whatever it prefi^rs, or however it be moved fo to do ? Whe- 
ther it choofe Good or Evil, whether it be determined by 
Anxiety or the lafi; Judgment, or nothing at all? llPonx-er be 
an Ability to produce ChaJige, is not that the fame whether it be 
done in Thougi.t 01 Motion, v/hethcr it be attended with P/ea- 
fure or Pcin? IfUnderJIandinghQ a Conjcbufnefs of fo7nething, 
is iwt that the fame whatever the manner be in which it is ac- 
quired, exercifed, or cxifts ? Is it more or kfs yr.derjlandivg 
for being got by DeduBion or immediate Intuition, by Eyes 
or Ears, or any other Way ? 

i3thly. The Difficulties charg'd upon the Doftrine of ^k- 
alogy arc the fame in the other Account, which fays that the 
Divine Attributes are diftercnt in the Manner of their Exiit- 
ence from the ^nlitie^ of Men. For if they differ infinitely 
and immutably in their Manner of Exiflence, are we not as 
much at a lofs to know what they are, and as unable to imitate 
that which flands at an infinite and immutable diilance from us, 
as if we had faid that it is diilerent in Nature from our 

Anfiv. Is it rot much more eafy for inc to imitate perfc(ft 
or abfolute Goodnefs, when I know the nature ct Goodnefs 
in general, and fee it partially exiiibitcd in the World, than 
if I only believ'd it to be fomething tranfcendaitly high (as 
this Author defcribcs it*,) and totuU\' different from any 
kind of Goodnefs which I can form an Idea of, and as retnote 
as my Idea of Goodnefs is from any other Idea ? \^ the nature 
or the Qualities be but iixt, the Manners of their Exiilence, 
however diliant, niter not the Cafe, Tho' I don't fee how 
thofc in the Deity can he properly faid to be infivitcly diftant 


* P. 65, 67. 

Sed. j. Coffcermttgfh^OngmofRwW. 99 


from thefe in us If we ha'/e any Degree r>t all oP them, and 
if we have not, 'tis pLiin wc can knc,,' nothing at all of 

I4thly. Let us fuppofe the Creation of ail things out of 
rothing to be an Eff'eSi of Divine Power, rnd changing the 
Shape of a Piece of Wood to be an Effl'^ of human Power. I 
afl; whether tliefe Effects are toio p-enere diftindl and different in 
their Nature? 

Anfiv. The Effe£ls are different, the Idea o^Cmife or Poniu- 
er arifing from thefe Effeds is the fime. I fhould liave the 
Idea of Power ec^uall)^ (tho' not o'i equal Power) from feeing a 
Change made in a Piece of Wood, as from the Creation 
of it. 

I5th!v. If the nature of Caufes can be at all known by 
their Effofts, is it not reafonable to fuppofe thefe Ceufes 
muft be as different in their Natures as their Efftfts are? 

P- 75" 

Jnfw. No : They both agree in the general Idea of Caufe; 
which is all that we require to conditjte their Nature ; and all 
thefe Arguments are built only on a different Senfe of that 
Term, as cbfervM above. 

i6rhly. Has any one loft his Reafons for fearing and ador- 
ing the Divine Power becaufe it can only be compared to hu- 
Ti;an Power, as inji;iite may be compared to finite. Has he no- 
thing to ground his Fear upon, becaufe this Power has fuch a 
reality as nothing can reprefent to him as it is in its oWn nature ? 
&c. Ibid, and p. 76, 77. 

An/iv. Finite and Infinite (wherever thefe Terms can pro- 
perly be applied) fuppole the !ame comTtion Nature, Kind ov 
&ert, and differ only in Extent. If therefore Divine Po'-jjer^ 
IVifdom and Goodnefs may be fo compared to human Power, 
Wifdom, and Goodnef?, they are Qi!.i!ii.ie3 of the fame Nature 

Kind, or Sort, which fecms to he giving up the Quefiion. 

If they cannot be fo compared i fliould begird to know in 
wliat they are alike, or wherein this Anamy between them 
confiib : Or in fliort, how wc fiiall at all be the tvifer by 
it. For to believe the Reality of that which nothing can 
give us an Idea of as it is in Its own Nature, will be aC 
lift I fear, no more than believing the reality of we know not 
what; which can never be a good Ground tor any rational 

[R. I.] By the W^ords, Infinite Degree, hern and ^boye, we 
dwn't ,^ry indefinite Addition, or encreafaijleuefr. of thef^ 

H' i fcveraV 

100 Co?2cermrig the On^m of EvW. Chap. I. 


feveral Attributes partially confidcr'd (to which fuch terms 
arc vulgarly, tho' not fo properly apply'd) but only an entire 
abfolute PcrfeSiion, without any kind o^ failure or deficiency in 
thefe refpefts : Which we have intimated in Note 3 . * and 
elfcwhere, to be our Notion of Infinity as apply'd to any of 
the Divine Attributes. ' Thus Infinite Under Jlanding and 

* Kno^-ivledge is nothing clfs but ferfeil Knowledge, that which 

* hath no dcfecl or mixture of Igriorancc in it, or the Know- 

* ledge of whatfoever is knowable. Infinite Ponjjcr is nothing 

* elfe but ■pcrftSl Power, thit which hath no defect or mixture 

* of Ijfipotency in it : A Power of producing and doing all 

* whatfoever is pffihlci i. e. whatfoever is cojicei'vahh, and fo of 

* the reft, 

* Now, that v/e have an Idea or Conception of Pfr/>(f?/i?;/, 

* or a pcrfeSl Being, is evident from the Notion that we have 

* of hnperfeSlion fo familiar to us : PerfeSlion being the Rule 
' and Meafure of Impcrfedion, md not ImperfcBlon oi Peifedi- 
' on, as a Jiraiglt Line is the Rule and Meafure of a crooked, 

* raid not a crooked of a firaight. So that Perfedtion is firlt 

* conceiweahle in order of Nature, before hr.perfeilion, as Light 

* before Darkncfs, a poftti^je before the pri'vcJion ox defect. For 

* Perfcftion is not properly the want of Imperfection, but 

* Imperfection of Perfection, 

• Moreover, we perceive feveral Degrees of Perfeftion in 

* the EfTences of things, and confequehtly a Scale or Ladder 

* of Perfeciions in Nature, one above another, as oi li-ving 

* and animate th.'mg^ ^hov efetfele/s and inanimate, o'i rational 

* thmgs Tihovcfenj.'ti'vc; and that by reafon of that Notisn or 

* Idea which we firil have of that which is alfilutcly perfed, 
' as the Standard by comparing of things with which, an^ 

* meafuring of them, we take notice of their approaching more 
' or lefs near thereto. Nor indeed could thele gradual Jfcent!: 
' be infinite, or without End, but they muft come at laft 
' to th.^t which is abfolutcly perfeft, a.s the top of them all, 
' Lailly, we could not perceive Impcrfct'lion in the moft 
' perfect of thofe things which we ever had Senle or Expe- 

* riencc of in our Li\es, had we not a Notion or Jdea 
' of that which is ahfolutels pcrfeSl, which fecretly com- 
' paring the fame with, wc perceive it to come fhort 

* thercoff . 

« Where- 

* P. I J, 16. t CW-c^r/Z', p. 64S. 

Sed. 3. Concerning the Origin ^Evil. loi 


■' Wherefore, fince Ivfinlte is the fame with abfolutelyperfcBy 
' we having a Notion or Idea of the latter, mull needs have 

* of the former. From whence we learn alfo, that tho' the 
' Word Infinite be in the Form thereof Negatkoe, yet is the 
« Senfe of it, in thcfe things which are really capable of the 
' fame, pofihnje, it being all one with ahfolutely perfeSi: As 

* likewife the Senfe of the Word Finite is negative, it being 
' the fame with Imperfect. So that finite is properly the Ne- 

* gation o^ ifi^nite, as that which in order of nature is before 

* It, and not Infinite the Negation of Finite. However, in 
' thefe things which are capable of no true Infiinity, becaufe 
' chev are cffenlially fi?iite, as Number, corporeal Magnitude, 

* and Time; Infinity being there a mere imaginary thing, and 

* a non-eutitv, it can only be conceived by the Negation oi Fi- 

* xite, flswe'alfo conceive Nothing by the Negation of Some- 
' thing, that is, we can iiave no pofiti-ve Conception at all 

* thereof". 

Now, all this is not attempting to make the Attributes of 
God pofitive/y infinite by fuperadding a Negative Idea of Infi- 
nity to them: (as the Author of the Procedure ^c. juRly ur- 
ges againft Air. Locke, in B. i. c. 3. p. 82, and the f^me might 
with equal Juftice be objedled to Dr. Clarke, vv-hen he applies 
infinite Space and infinite Duration to the Deity, and calls 
one his Immenfity and the other his Eternity.) But it is mak- 
ing them pofitively and abfolutely /)^//>6'7, by firfl proving them 
to havefom.e real Exijlence in the Divine Nature, and then by 
removing from it all PofHbility of Want, or Deficiency y Mix- 
ture, or Allay, as cxplain'd in the laft Remark. 

[R. m ] By the Word Jufiice, as it relates to Puniniment, 
we mean the Exercife of a Right, or doing what a Perfon has 
a Moral Poiver to do. Mercy implies his receding from that 
Right, or not exerting that moral Power. When we apply 
thefe Terms to the Deity, we conflder his D'fpenfations iixa 
partial View, i^/s. only with Relation to the Perfon offend- 
ing, and himfelf the oifended ; or as mere Debtor and Credi- 
tor, exclufiveof all other Beings, who may be affe£led there- 
by, and whom therefore we Ihould fuppofe to be regarded in 
thcfe Difpenfations. In this Senfe thefe tv/o Attributes have ^ 
dillinft Meaning, and may both be always fubordinate to 
Goodnefs, but can never be repugnant to each other. Thus, 
where a Creature ^las forfeited its Right to a Favour, or in- 

^ Cudivarth; p. 6^^. 

102 Concerning the Origin ^Evil. Chap. I„ 

R E M A R K S, 

cnrrcd a Penal*/, by the breach of foiae Covcnarjt, or the 
TranfgrelTiOii of ioine Law, ihe Creator, corifider''d with refpedl 
to that Being a-Ione, and in thofe Circumllances, has always a 
Right to withdraw the Favour, or to infliil the Penalty ; and 
will profecutc that Right, whenever he iinds it ncceffary to 
fome farther End: But yet his Goodnefs may incline him often 
to fu-fpend or remit it, on fome foreign Motive, ^iz. on ac- 
count of the prefcnt Relation between the Criminal and other 
Men, in very different Circumflanres, or in view of a future 
Alteration in the Circumitauces of the Criminal himfelf. Now 
as thefe Motives belong to, and are generally known by God 
alone, tho' they may influence his Actions towards us, yet they 
don't at all afFed his Right over us, and therefore ought not 
to diminifli our Love, Gratitude, iffc to him in any particu- 
lar Inilance cither of Judgment or of Mercy. Whenever we 
fuffer for our Crimes, we have no Reafon to complain of any 
Injury, nor can he, when upon the foremention'd Motives he 
forgives us, ever injure himlelf. For Juftice, confider'd barely 
as a Right or Moral Poi.t:er, evidently aetnands notliing, nor c-aw 
properly be faid to olVge one way or other : And therefore the 
Being pofTefs'd of it is at liberty either to fufpend or exert it ; 
but he Vvill never ufe this Liberly otherwifc than as his Good- 
nefs requires, confequently ynjlke and Mercy in luch a Being 
ran never clafh. 

Whether this Way of conceiving thefe Divine Attributes 
be not attended with lefs Pifficulty than the common manner 
of treating them under the Notion of^ two Infinites diametri- 
tally oppofite, mull be left to the Judgment of the Reader. 

As to the Nature of Difrtbuti--ve Juftice, or the. true Reafon 
of Renvards and Funijhments, fee CQiliber's Impartial Ensuiry 
3. I. CXI. prop. \%, ■ * 


Chap. IIJ 103 


Conce?''ning the Natiire and Divijton 
(^/'Evilj and the Difficulty of trac- 
ing its Origin. 

GOOD end Evil are cppolites, and arife By Evil 
from the Relation which things have to ^^'^ under- 
each Other: For imce there are lome things which foever is 
profit, and others which prejudice one another j incommo- 
lince fome things agree, and others difagreej as dious, in- 
we call the former Good, fo we ftile the latter E- <^o"v^ni- 
vil. Whatever therefore is incommodious or incon- jj-ouble- 
venient to itfelf, or any thing elfe ; whatever be- fome. 
comes tronblejome, or fruftraces any Appetite im- 
planted by God; whatever forces any Perfon to 
do or fufFer what he would nor, that is Evil. 

II. Now thefe Inconveniences appear co be of Evils are] ] 
three kinds, ihofe of ImpcrfeSiion, Natural and ?• j'^^^ 
Moral ones. By the Evil of Imperfetiion I under- thofe'of 
ftand the Abfence of thofe Peifedions or advan- ln>perfcc- 
tages which, exift elfewhere, or in other Beings : tio", Na- 

;Py Natural Evil, Pains and Uneafineffes, Incon- *""^ f"^ , 

■^ • J f^ r • c ^ ■ • Moral. ,.; 

veniences and Diiappointmenc or Appetites, arw -^ 

fing from nitural Motions: By /floral, vici- 
ous Eledions, that is, fuch as are hurtful to our - 
felves or others. 

104 Concerning the Nature Chap. II. 

TheDiffi- III. Tliefe Evils muft be conHdei-'d particularly, 
culty 13 ^ ^^j-j^ ^jf. ^^Q ^.j-, ^i,,.^y j-^Q^y tj-^gy jn;,y be reconciled 
now tieie ^j^j J ^ of an infinitely powerful and 

come inLO , , . , ^ , , t- r i 

the Work bemticient Author ot Nature. For lince there is 

i,t ota God l\Kh a ljeing,"^'ris a k'd, as we faid before, whence 

of the come Evils? Whence fo many InLonvmences in 

hjghelt ^i^g Woik of a mofl z^od^ moft powerful God'^ 
Goodners , , i i/> l l j- 

and Power Whence that perpetual VVar between the very £- 
lements^ between Animdi^ between Menf Whence 
JLrroYi, Mijerks and F'lccsy the conftant Compani- 
ons of" hum^in Life from it^ Infancy? Whence 
Good to Evil Men, Evil to the Good? If we 
behold any thing irregular in the WoilvS of Men, 
if any Machine annver not the End it was made 
for, if we find fomcthing in it repugnant to it- 
lelf or other-, we attribute that to the Ignorance, 
Imfjorence, or Malice of the Workman : >vBuc-/^ ^^ 
ilnce the'e Qualities have no place in God, hov/ 
come they to have place in any thing? Or, Why 
does G|pd fuffer his Works to be deformed by 
them ? ' 
5omc that IV. This Queflion has appeared fo intricate and 
were uii- difficult, that fome finding themfelves unequal to 
f^}^'^ ^° . the Solution of it, have deny'd, either that there 

Difficulty ^^ "^"y ^^^ ^^ ^^^' °^ ^^ l^^j^i any Aui-hor or Go- 
have de- vemor of the World: Thus Epicurus, and his 
iiyM the Adherents: Nor does Lucretipts bring any other 
Exilknce i^ojfon for his denying the Sjflem of the World to 
^fhe ° ' ^^ ^^^ ^ff^^ ^f ^ Deity i than that it is Jo very faul* 
have flip- ij^* Others judg'd it to be more agreeable to 
pofed a Reafon to affign a double Caufe of things, than 
double none at all. Since it is the greatefl; Abfurdity 
'^"?' in Nature to admit of Actions and Effefts, with- 

out any Agent and Caufe. Tbtfe then perceiving 
a Mixture of Good and Evil, and being fully per- 
fuaded that fo many Confuiians and Inconlillen- 


? p. 2. ?, l^, A 

Chap. II. and Dhijion of V.^\\, 105 

ties could not proceed from a good Bein^, fupppf- 
ed a tmlcvqlent Principle, or God, direc^-ly contra- 
ry to the good one; and thence derived Corrup- 
tion and Death, Dileafes, Griefs, Miferies, Frauds 
and VUlanies ; from the good Being nothing biic 
Good : Nor did they imagine that Contrariety 
and Mifchief could have any other Origin than a'n 
Evil Principle. This Opinion was held by many 
of the Ancients, by the Alanichems, PaHlicians, 
and almoft all the Tribe of ancient Heretics. 




(15.) In order to give fome Light into the Opinions of 
thefe Men concerning the Origin of Evil, I fhall tranfcrib'p 
a Paragraph from Ba\les Diftionary, in the Article Manicheesy 
Remark D. where he introduces Zoroajler defending the two 
oppofite Principles above mentioned, * Zoroajier, fays he, would 

* go back to the time of the Chaos, which with regard to his 

* two Principles, is a State very like that which Ho Mj calls the 
' State of Natur", and which he fuppofes to have preceded the 

* Ellablifhrnent of Societies. In this State of Nature, one 
' Man was a Wolf to another, and every thing belonged to 

* the firfl: occupier; ngne was Mailer of any thirig, except 

< he was the ilrongell. To get out of this Confufion, every 

* one agreed to quit his Right to the whole, that he might be 

< acknow ledg'd the Proprietof of fome Part, they enter'd into 

* agreements, and the War ceafcd. Thus the two Principles 

* weary of this Chaos wherein each con foimded and overthre\v 
' what the other attempted to do, came at laft to a(i Agree- 

* mcnt; each of them yielded fomething, each had a ftiare 
' in the Produciion of Man, and the Laws of the Union of 

< the Soul : The good Principle obtam'd thofe which procure 

* to a \h,\\ a thouland Plcafures, and confcnted to thofc 
' which expofe him to a thouland Pains; And if he confented 

* that Moral'Good fhould be infinitely lefs in Mankind thai^ 
' Aioral Evil, he repaired the Damage in fome other kind of 
*■ Creatures, whereiji "V'ice flipuld be much lefs than Virtue. 

* If many Men in this Life have more Mifcry than Happl- 
' nefs, this is recompenced in another State ; what they 
' have not under a human Form, they find un^^er anotijer. 

* By means*of this Agr^ement^ the Chaos becam<; difembroil'd. 


1 06 Concerning the Nature Chap. IT. 

There are V. And there are fome ftill who think this 

fome who DifJiculry unanfvverable. Tbey confefs, indeed, 

nbn that' ^^^ Suppofirion of 2 double Principle to be ab- 

jt is unan- furd, and that ir may be deinonftrated that there 

Averable, is but one Author of all things, ahfolutely per- 

aiid that fgf^ .^^^ good; yet there is evil m things, 

*L^ ^^T^' this they fet and feel: But whence, or how it comes, 

fer'd a bet- ^^^Y ^""^ entirely ignorant ; nor can human Reafon 

{er fokiti- (if we believe them) in any meafure difcover. Hence 

on, by they take Occafion to L-^ment our Unhappinefs, 

fuppofing 2j^(^ complain of the hard Fate attending Truth, as 

itwo ran- *■ *j ^r^^„ 

ihau the 


do byown- 

ing only * the Chaos, I fay, a paffive Principle, which was the Field 

Qn<z. ' of Battle between thefe two adlive ones. The Poets * have 

* reprcfented this difentr.ngling under the Image of a Quarrel 

* ended. You fee what Xoroafter might objed', valuing 

* himfelf upon it that he does not throw any imputation upon 
' the good Principle of having with full purpofe produced 

* a Work, which was to be fo wicked and miferable ; but 
' only, after he had found by Experience that he could do 

* no better, nor more efteftually oppofe the horrible Defigns 

* of the Evil Principle. To render his Hypothefis the Icls 

* ofFenfive he might have deny'd that there was a long War 

* between the two Principles, and lay afide all thole 

* Fights and Prifoners which the Manicheans fpeak of. The 

* whole might be reduced to the certain Knowledge of the 

* two Principles that one could never obtain from the other 

* but fiich and fuch Conditions : an eternal Agreement might 

* have been made upon this Foot. 

For a farther Explication and Amendment of their Hypo- 
rhefis, and Replies to fevcral Arguments urg'd againit it, fee 
the Words Manicheans, Marchionites, Patdicians, Origen and 
%oroajler^ in the abovemention'd Dictionary. 

That there is no Occnfion for any Hypothefis of this kind, 
will be fhewn in the following Chapters. Let it fuffice in this 
Place to point out fome of the Abfurdities of the Hypothefis 

-^itfelf.fAnd firft, it may be obferv'd, that the Suppofition of 

an ahfohte and infinitely E'vil Principle (if thefe Words mean 


* Hanc Desii ^ Mdior Litem Natura diretnit. Ov. Met. 

I I. V. 21. 

Chap. II. and Dhifion o/* Evil. jo^ 

often as a Solution of this Difficulty is attempted 
unfuccefTfulIy. The ALinicheans folve the Pheno- 
mena of tilings a hundred times berter (as ihefe 
Men think) with their mofl abfurd Hypothefis of 
two Principles, than the Catholics do with their 
nioft true Dodrine of one perfect, abfolutely pow- 
erful and beneficent Author of Nature. For the 
jyhnicheans acquit God of all manner of Blame 
as he was compelled by the contrary Principle to 
fuffer Sin and fvjifery in his Work, which in the 
mean while he oppoles with ail his Power. But 



fuch a Being as is totally opponre to the good One) is an ex- 
prefs Contradiclion. For as this Principle oppofes and refills 
tlie infinitely good One, it alfo muft be independent and in- 
finite: It mull be infinite or abfolute in Knowledge and 
Power. Bat the notion of a Being infinitely Evil, is of one 
infinitely Impcrfeft ; its Knowledge and Power therefore muft 
be infinitely imperfect ; /. e. abfolute Ignorance and Impo- 
tence, or no Knowledge and Power at all. The one of tlief^ 
Beings then is abfolutelv perfect, or enjoys all manner ofpofi- 
tive Perfections, confequentiy the other, as it is diredlly tlie 
Reverfe, mull be purely the Negation of it, as Darknefs is of 
Light; /. e. it mull be an hfinlte DefeSl, or mere nothing. 
Thus this Evil Being muft have fome KnouAedge and Pp%ve>\ 
in order to make ahy oppolition at all to the Good One j but 
as he is direddy oppofite to that Good or Perfedl One, he can- 
not have the leaft Degree of Knonxiledge, or Po^juer, lince thefe 
are Perfedions: therefore, the Suppofition of fuch an Exiil- 
ence as this implies a Contradidtion 

But fippofmg thefe Men only to mean (what any under- 
{landing Perfon among them mull mean) by this Evil Prin- 
ciple, an abfolutely viale-vole-ni Being of equal Power, and o- 
ther natural Perfedtions with thofe of the Good one. ^V^* It 

* would be to no purpofe (lays ABp. '■lillotfon* ,) to fupppfe 
' two fuch oppofite Principles — For admit that a Being infi- 

* nitely mifchievous, v/ere infinitely cunning, and infinitely 
' powerful, yet it could do no Evil, becaufe the oppofite Prin- 
% ciple of iufiuite Goodncfs being alfo infinitely wife and 

' P0WGf« 

f ?. Vol. o£ Seim. Fol. p. 690. 

io8 Concerning the Nature Chap. TI. 

according to rhe Catholics, as their Adverfanes ob- 
jedl, he permits thee volunt^-ily nay is the Caufe 
snd Author of them. For if, as thefe Men argue, 
there be but one Author of all thing*;, Evils alfo 
ihould be rcferr'd to him as their O iginal; but it 
can neither be explain'd nor conceiv'd how infi- 
nite Goodnefs can become rhe Origin of Evil. 
If God could not hinder it, where ii his Power? 



« powerful, they would tie up one another's Hands : So that" 
« upon this Suppofition, the Notion of a Deity would figni- 

* ty jufl nothing, and by virtue of the Eternal Oppofiticn and 

* Equality of thefe Principles, they would keep one another 
< at a perpetual Bay, and being an equal Match for one ano- 

* ther, inftcad of being two Deities, they would be two Idols, 
^ able to do neither Good nor Evil. 

I ihall only produce one Argument more as to Moral Evil, 
out oi Simplidus''s Comment on BpiBetus, which, by the Con- 
feffion of Bdyle himfelf, ftrikes home the Dodlrine of Two 
Principles, though it be confidercd with the greatelt Sim- 
/.--^ He fays *, * It entirely deflroys the Liberty of our Souls and 
' necejfttates them to Sin, and confequently implies ct Contradiiiion. 

* For, Ji nee the Principle of Evil is eternal and incorruptible, and 
f fo potent that God himfelf cannot conauer hi?n, it fol'c^js that 
i the Soul of Man cannot rejiji the hnpulfe h <i.vhich he moves, 
' it to Sin. But if a Man be invi7icibh driven So it, he cotn- 
^ fnits KO Murder or Adultery, Sec. by his o^vn Fault, but by a 
' fuperior external Fault, and in that Cafe he is neither guilty 

* nor punijhable ■ 'Therefore there is no fnch thing as Sin, and con- 
' fequently this Hypothefs defrays itfelf; fince if there be a Prin- 

* ciple of Evil, there is no longer any Evil in the World. But 

* if there be no Eiiil in the World, it is clear there is no Prin- 

* ciple of Evil ; <vjhe7tce ^ve may infer, that thofe 'voho fuppofc 
f ftch a Principle, defray, by neceffary Confeque?ice, both Evil 
' and the Principle of it. 

More of this may be feen in Beyle's Explanation concern- 
ing the Manichees at the End of his Didtionary, p. 66, ^c. 
See alfo Gurdoti's Boyle's LeSiures, Serm. 5. or Siillingfieej''^ 
' ' Ori^, 

f P. 152. ^d. Lond. 1670,. » 

Chap. II. a^id Blvljmi of EviL 109 

If he could, and would not, where is his Goodnefs ? 
If you fay that Evil neceifaiily adheres to fome 
particular Natures ; lince God was the Author of 
them ail, it would have been better to have omit- 
ted thofe with tlie concomitant Evils, than to 
have debafed his Workmanfhip with sn allay of thefc 
Evils, (i^.) 



t)iig. Sacra, B. 3. C. 3. §. 10, 12. or Sherlock on Judgmenti 
lit Ed. p, 173. 

Neither does Bt^vlc's amendinent of this Hypothefis free 
it from the Difficulty. He fuppofes the two Principles to ' 
bf fenfible of the above mention'd Confequcncc arifing frorri 
their Equality of Power, aud therefore willing to cotu pound 
the Matter, by allo^^ing an equal Mixture of Good and Evil 
in the intended Creation. But if the Quantity of Good and 
Evil in the Creation be exaftly equal, neither of the Princi- 
ples has attain'd or could expeii to attain the End for which it 
was fuppos'd to ad. The Good Principle defigti'd to pro- 
duce fome abfolute Good, the Evil One fome abfohitc Evil ; 
but to produce an equal Mixture of both, would be in cffe<it 
producing neither: Ono would iuft counterballance and de- 
ih-ay the other ; and all fuch Adtion would be the verv' fame 
a3 doing nothing at all : And th:U fuch an exaft Equality of 
Good and Evil muft be the Refult of any agreement between 
them is plain: For as they are by Suppofttion perfectly equal 
m Inclitmtion, as well as Poiver, neither of them could pofiibly 
concede, and let its oppoiitc prevail: The Creation tliereforc 
cannct be owing to fuch a Compofiticn. 

But the beft Confutation of this Scheme may be found ii; 
the Cliapter before us ; v/herc ouj Author fliews that it does 
not at all anfwer the end for which it was introduced. This 
completes the abfurdity of it. 

(16.) Since this Objeftion contains all that can be faid up- 
on Evil in gcncrsl ; and it appears to me abfolutely neceiHiry 
for every Man to do Juftice to Objedions, who expects thaJ:' 
others fhould receive any Satisfaftion from his Anfwers, I 
jhall infcrt it, as it is proj.Qfed in its fall Force by Cndv^orth *. 
' The fuppofed Deity and Maker of the World, was either 
f willing to aboliili all Evils, bat not able; or was able anct 

* willing; 

* ^Triic Litcll. Sjjl. p. r8, 79. 

no Concerning the Nature Chap. It. 

This Dif- Vr. It is well known, that this Difficulty has 
^^"^^y.^^^ exercifed both the antient Philofophers and Fathers 
jhePl^ilof. of the Church: (17.) And there are fome who 
ophers and deny that it is yet anfwcr'd; nay, who undertake 
Fathers of to refute all the Solurions hitherto oJBFer'd; nor Jo 

theChurch j pj-Qp^ifg ^ connpkte one in every RefpcvSl, tho' 1 
and lome , ' ., . ' 1 r- ,, . ^^ •' ^ ', . ^_ . _ 

deny that "^P^ ^^ ^^^ "^ ^"^^ following Part ot this Trea:if2 
it is an- that it is not wholly unanfweraile. 
fweredyetjj^u^Vir. It is manifeft that tho' Good be mixed 
^, . ^ith Evil in this Life, yet there is much more 

There is •' r^^^-l 



than Evil NOTES. 

m the 

World. c willing: Or, thirdly, he was neither willing nor abie : Op 

* lallly, he was both able and willing. This latter is the on- 
' ly thing that anfwers fully to the Notion of a God. Now, 
' that the fuppofed Creator of all thing,"-, was not thus both able 

* and willing to abolifii all Evils, is plaiii, becaufe then there 

* would have been no Evils at all iefc. Wherefore, fiuce there 

* is fuch a Deluge of Evils overflowing all, it muft needs 

* be that either he was willing and not ab|2 to remove 

* them, and then he was imi^/itent ; or elfe he was able 

* and not willing, and then he was en-jious ; or laftly, he 

* was neither able nor willing, and then he was botli impotent 

* and eti'uious. ' 

Almo!l the fame occurs in Lacia:it'iui *'', and is cited, and 
fulhciently refuted by our Author in C. f. §. 5. Snhfcd. the 
laft : See alfo Pi-udentii>$ in E a:na>-t'igcnla, v. 640 he 

The Subilance of all Bayie's Objcdions may be feen in a late 
Boo!; Cc'jrd Yree Thoughts on Rdrgion, 'iS'c. C. 5. p. 104, i^c. 
The Anfwers to them follow in their proper Places. 

(17.) Any one that wants to be ucq^uainted vvlth the An- 
tiquity of this I>irpute, or the Perfons engaged in it, or thc 
way of managing it made ufe of by the Fathers, may conf'ilt 
the Beginning of Dr. C/arh's Enquiry iiuo the Caufe and O- 
figin of Evil; and Unfle'i Dictionary, in the Auicles Ma- 
nicheans. Remark B. Manionhes, Remark F. 3nJ F A. rauiid- 
ans. Remarks isT, and K A. and Zoroafur, Remark E. Or 
Ctidvjorih, from p. 213, to 224. or Stillingf.-ei^ On'ghn's Sa- 
a-A, B. 3. C. 3. §. S, 9. IT, 12, life. o\- Fabric. Blblloth . 
GrAc. V. 5. p. 7.37. or his Delectus Jrgunientofiim, i^Cf C\ 

De Ira Dei, G. 13. p. 435. Edit, Cunt. 


Chap. li. nnd Divijion of Evil. 1 1 1 

Good than Evil in Natiire,^and every Animal pro- -A -^^ 
vides For its Prelervation by In(lin6t or Reafon, 
which it would nevtr do, if it did not think or 
feel its Life, with all the Evils annex'd, to be much 
preferable to Non-exiflence. This is a Pi oof of 
the Witdom, Goodnefs, and Power of God, who 
could thu> temper a World infefted with fo many 
Miferies, that nothing fliould continue in it which 
was not in fome Meafure pleafed with its Exiftcnce 
and v/hich would not endeavour by all poinble 
Means to preferve it '^. 

VIII. Neither does the Siippofition of an Evil 'TI? no 
Principle help any thing towards the Solution of ^efs re 
this Difficulty. For the AfTerters of two Prin- T*?^^'^" 
ciples maintain that the great and good God Gcgjj^efs 
tolerates Evil purely becaufe he is forced to it to have 
by the Evil One, ai d that eiiher from an A- created 
greement between themfelves, oraperpetupl Strug- ^^^'^ 
gle and Contcft with each other. For fince the ^yji'-ffj}, 
beneficent Auilior of Nature was hinder'd by the iawwou'd 
Evil Principle from producing all the Good he be coi- 
was willing to produce, he either made an Agree- ''"P'^ed by 
raent wirh it to produce as much as he was al- ^j|^,^'^r'', 
iow'd, but with a Mixture of Evil, according to as would 
the Agreement : or elfe there is a Mixture of corrupt 
Good and Evil proportionable to the Power t-'^em- 
v/hich prevails in either of them. Hence they fr^l^'U 
think the good God excufaSle, v/ho conferred as pofincn^of 
many Bleihngs on the World as his Adverfary a double 
permitted, and would have tolerated no manner Principle 
of Evil, iinlefs compeli'd to it by ihe sdverfe ^^ ^^^^^'r 
Power. So that he mufl eitlier create no Good ^^^^,-^^^ ''^ 
at all, or f.iffer an Allay of Evil. toward the 

All which very great Abflirdiiies hsve this far- Solution 
ther Inconvenience, that they do not anfv/er the of this 
very End for v/hich they v/.re invented. For he is Difficulty, 

* 3^ Note Z. 


II z Concerning the Nature Chap. II. 

tio lefs culpable who created any thing whiai he 
knew would be rciider'd mifciabie by another, than 
if he had made that which he fore aw would 
bring Mifery upon itself, If therefore God might, 
confidently with Goodneis, create Things which he 
knew the Evil Principle could and would corrupt, 
as the AJatJtcheaKs aflerted; then he might, con- 
fidently with the fame Goodnef, have created 
Things that would corrupt themfelves, or were to 
perilli in a Trad of Time. If then, according 
to the Defenders of this Hypotlieii'^, God ought 
to have omitted, or not created thoCe Beings, in 
whole Natures Evil or Contrariety is inherent, he 
ought alfo to have omitted tho'e, whole Natures 
he forefaw the Evil Principle would corrupt. And 
if there was fo much Good in rhefe, as made him 
think it better to create them, tho' they were to be 
corrupted fome time or other by the oppolite Prin- 
ciple, he might aUo judge it prefeiahle to produce 
the fjme, tho* they were at length to perifh by 
their own inherent Evils. Nor v^'ill God be forced to 
tolerate Evil in his Works more according to the 
Manicheam, than the Catholics. For as lie mighc 
have not made thofe Beings which have Evils 
neceifarily adhering to them, fo he might alfo 
have not made thofe v/hich he foreknew the 
contrary Principle would corrupr. Aftsr the <amc J 
manner in both Cafes he would have prevented E- ' 
vil, and fince he could, why did he not? The 
Suppofition of two Principles conduces nothing 
J at all therefore to the Sokuion of this Difficulty. 




(B.) To this it l\as been obieftc^^, Firft, tint tlie Kecr-- 
iiiination is not jull, bccaule there is a great Dii^'crcnce be- 
tween a C.uiic thr.t doth not prevent an Evil which he conld 
riot prevent, ai;d "another that fuilcrs -Jr.e which he could hnvc 


riiap. ir. and Divifwn of Evil. j i o 

(y^IX. But if we can point out a Method of re- If it can 
conciling thefe Things with the Government of ^^ ftewn 
an abfolurely perfed: Agent, and niake them not ^^''"^^tdoea 
only confiftent with infinite Wifdom, Goodnefs "radift'i" 

and finite 
■ ' • Power and 

NOTES. Goodnefs 

to permit 

prevented ; that it is agreed amongft alJ orthodox Chriftians jj^^f \\\tCe 
that God could have prevented the Fall 0*1 Adam, and there- nccelf 'I 
fore the Blame of it lies on him ; Whereas according to the -j-jCg c ^ 
Syflem of two Principles he could not hinder it, and there- f],„ „ 
fore is excufed this way, but not the other. -r ,. 

• Put lannver, it is plain that the Objeilor does not under- j.u„ ^l 
fland the Force of the Argument. For according to it^ God „ '1 
could have prevented this Evil. He fore fa w the ill Principle rj-o- t^. 
would corrupt Mankind, and he was under no NecefTity to u ' r 
make fuch a Creature as Man, and thereby to gratify his Ene- j 
my, who, he faw, would make him miferable. He could 
therefore have prevented this Evil by not creating Man, and 
is full as blameable for making him that he forcfaw the ill Prin- 
ciple would involve in Sin and Mifery, as if thofe had befallen 
Man by his own ill ufe of his Free vjill. , 

But 2dly. Who are thofe Orthodox that agree God could 
have prevented the Fall of Man ? Thofe that I am acquainted 
with reprefent the Matter otherwife. They fiy that confi- 
dering the Nature of Man and the Station he held in the 
World, and the Inconveniencies that mull: have happen'd to 
the whole Syftem of free Beings, by hindering Adam from the;- 
Ufe of his free Will, his fall could not have been prevented 
without more hurt than good to the whole Creation. There 
was no Neceihty on him to .fin, but there was a Neceffity on 
G'bd to permit him the Ufe of his free Will ;n that Cafe, and 
the Confequence of that being his Sin, God Vv'as under a Ne- 
ceffity notwithftandinghisinhnite Power, Wifdom, and Good- 
nefs to permit his Fall. He could have prevented it 'tis true.' 
by taking away Free Will from Man, that is by not ma- « 

king fuch a Creature as Man, according to the Catholics ; and, 
he could have prevented it the fame way according to the. 
Man'ichees ; for according to them he was under no NecefTity to 
make fuch a Creature; and 'tis as hard for one to give an Ac-, 
count why he did make him when he know he would fall, a3 
for the other; fo far as 1 fee, the Difficulty is equal on both. 
Siippofuionsj and both mvift hav.e recourfs to the {xm^ Ar.fvver j 

ii4 Concerning the Nature Chap. II. 

and Power, but neceflaiily refulting from them 
(fo that thefe would not be Infinite, if thofe did 
not or could not pofiTibly cxift) then we may be 
fuppofed to have at laft difcover'd the true Ori- 
gin of Evils, and anfwer'd all the Difficulties and 
Objedions rhat are brought upon this Head, a- 
gainfl rhe Goodnefs, Wifdom, Power, and Unity 
^ijpj-of God. -^Let us try therefore what can be done 



fvia. that the Wifdom of God judg'd it better to have Maa 
with his Sin, than the World ihould want fuch a Crea- 

But 3dly. 'Tis objc£led tliat the Manichees have in reality 
three Principles, two a£live, a good and a bad one, and a 
third paffive or indifferent, that is Matter*: Tho' they 
voiichfafed the Name of Principles only to the a£live. 
That this indiiierent Principle was the Prey of the iirfl 
Occupier, and the Evil one feized it as foon as the Good, 
and would not fufFer him to make good out of it, with- 
out a mixture of Evil. 

But this is nothing to the Purpofe ; for it fuppofes a 
demonilrablc Falfliood, that Matter is felf-exiltent, whereas 
there is nothing plainer than that Matter has a Caufef ; and 
to build Hypothcles on manifeft Falihoods is unworthy a 

adly. Even in this way the good Principle might have 
prevented Evil ; for he might have let the evil Principle 
alone with his Matter, and then he could never have 
made any thing of it ; for his Produ61ions muft all havo 
been abfolutely evil, and whatever is {o mcit immediately 
deftroy iffelf, or rather in truth nothing could have been pro- 
duced by fuch a Being. 

All his works muft have contained in them all imaginable 
Evil and Repugnancy; all the Parts of them mull have been 
incongruous aud inconfiflent, and confequcntly have deftroy'd 
themfelves and one another. Nay, fuch a Being could have 
properly no Po^erzt all ; for if he produced any thing which 
was confillent, it wou'd be fo far good, and fo good wou'd 


• This Sayle calls Chans. See N. 15. 
f See Remark d. 

Chap. II. cind Dlvlfmi of Evil, 

each Kind of Evil i and firft, concerning the Evil 
of lmprfeUion» 


proceed from a Principle abfolutely Evil, which Is no lefs a 
Contradidion than that Evil fliould be produc'd by one abfo- 
lutely Good : Which if it be allowed, there's no farther Occa- 
fion to enquire after the Origin of Evil at all. For chat may 
proceed from an infinitely good Being, as well as good caa 
from one infinitely evil. From hence it is evident that the 
bringing in of two Principles does not in the leaft account for 
the Origin of Evil. 


I 2 


ii6 Chap. III. 


Of the Evil of DefeB. 

Things A ^ ^'^^ the ^vi\ of ImperfeBio^, it is to be con- 
can be no JL^ fider'd, that before the World was created 
otherwife Qq(\ exifted alone, and nothing belide him. All 
God ^^1 livings therefore are out of nothing, and \thatfoever 
fed. exiils, has its Exiftence from God; neither can 

that Exiftence be different either in Kind or Degree 

from what he gave *. 
All crca- II* Secondly, God, tho' he be omnipotent, can- 
ted th ngs not make any created Being abfolmely perfe^, for 
are necel- whatever is abfolutely perfed, muft necellarily be 
farily^im- ^^^^ exiftent. But it is included in the very No- 
fince they ^'^" ^^ ^ Creature, ;:s fuch, not to exift of itfelf, 
do not but from God. An abfolutely perfed: Creature 
exill of therefore implies a Contradiftion. For it would be 

them- q[ itfelf and not of itielf at the fame time Ci8.) 
fclvcs. ^^^ 


C\^-^' {i^.yt'A perfeJl Creature \s a Contradiftion in terms. Foi' 
if it hzperfeSi it is independent ', and if it be independent, it is 
no Creature. Again ; to fuppofe a created Being infinite in any 
refpcft is to fuppofe it equal to its Creator in that refpe£t j 
and if it be equal in one refpeft, it miift be fo in all ; fince 
an infinite Property cannot inhere in any finite Subject, for 
then the Attribute would be more perfedl than its Subjed, all 
uhich is abfurd. Granting therefore this one Principle, 
which cannot be dciiy'd, (-^va. that an Effed mull be inferior 


* Sec Si.Qtt in Note 33. 

Chap. III. Of the Evil of DcfeB. iiy 

Abfoluce Perfection is therefore peculiar to God, and 
if he fhould communicate his own peculiar Perfec- 
tion to another, (C.) that other would be God. 

I 3 The 


to its Caufe) it wIH appear that the Evil orimperfedlion, fup- 
pofing a Creation, is neceflary and unavoidable ; and conle- 
quently, all other Evils which necefl:\rily arife from that, are 
unavoidable alfo. What our Author has advanced upon the 

n following Head feems perfcftly conclufivc. 

\^{C) This Pofition feems very agreeable to the Catholic 
Faith, which teaches that the Father did communicate his Na- 
ture and all his Perfeftions to the Son, and with him to the 
Holy Ghojl: Each of them therefore is very God under a 
different 5«/^f«f^. ^The Divine Nature which is inherent -f — -^ 
in them may be conceived to be of itfclf, but the Modus of 
Exiltence cannot. "^ Now the Church looks upon the Nature^- 
thus fubfifting ?.s a Perfon. ^-Not that it is a Perfon in the fame+ 
manner as the human Nature fublifting by itfelf,i-but by Rea-^ 
fon of a ce_rtaia_SimiHtude and Analogy which they have be- 

-^ween them.-^Since Divine Matters are not Objefts of the 
Senfes, they cannot be known by Marks imprefs'd upon us by 
Senfition ; they are therefore conceived by Similitude, Re- 
lation, Proportion, or Connection with fenfible things :4The 4 
Paifions, Affections, Intelleft, and Will, are the Principles 
of our Adlions, and therefore we attribute thcfc to God.4-For-f 
if we were to do thofe things which God performs, thefe 
would be the Principles and Caufes of them : We attribute 
therefore to God fomething analogous or equivalent to thefe, 
but we know that it is as diflant as finite is from infinite. 
C3*>Nay, 'tis demonftrable that neither Will, nor Love, nor An- 
ger, nor Juftice, nor Mercy, are in God after the fame man- 
ner, as they exift in and are conceived by us *. -^But we -/- <:.^v 
muft make ufe of thefe Words becaufe we have no better, and 
they fufficiently anfwer the End for which God would have 
us to know him f-Now after the fame manner we point out +- ..=^ «*=5rr 
the Diftindtion declared in Scripture between the Father, Son., *v\,,^ 

and Holy Ghojl, by the Word Perfon, becaule we have nothing 
nearer to compare them by ;>sjnd the Reprcfeatatiou under this +• 
Analogy '^z\s!^ us very well what we may hope for from each 


* See Wollajlon, p. 115, 116. and ^/>/;,/:'./'/«j Inft. Thcol. 
\i. 4. C. 22. p. 310. or'c.ur Author'^ Scrniqn on Prcdufti, 
jiation, &c. 

1 18 Of the Evil of Befe5i, Chap. III. 

The Evil of Im^erfdiion muft therefore be tole- 
rated in Creatures, notwithftanding the Divine 
Omnipotence and Goodnefs :<f-For Concradi61:ions + 
are Objeds of no Power. + God might indeed have -1- 
refrain'u from creating, and cont nii'd alone, felf- 
fufficient, and perfed: to all f.ternity, but his in- 
finite Goodnefs would hy no Means allow it; this 
■ pblig'd him to produce external things; which 



of them, and what Worfhip we ought to pay them. Tho' at 
the fame time \vc are certain that thefe differ no lefs from 
human Perfons, than the Divine Intelledl does from human, 
or the Principles of Divine Adions from human Paffions ; for 
inftance. Anger, Hatred, and the like. VTis flrange therefore ■/- 
that Men who would be elleem'd learned, fliould difpute a- 
gainft a Plurality of Perfons in the Deity alter the very fame 
Way of Reafoning with which Cotia in Cicero argues againfl: 
the Intelligence, Prudence, and Juflice of God*, namely, 
becaufe they cannot be in God after the fame manner as we 
conceive them to be in Men ;"^forgetting, in the mean time, 4- 
that thefe are attributed to God by a kind o^ Jualogy and Ac- 
commodation to our Capacity, and rather from the Rcfem- 
blance of things done by God, to thofe done by us, than of 
iheT'rinciples from which they proceed, -^at the Scriptures f 
and the Church have fufficiently forewarn'd us to beware of 
this erroneous Way of Reafoning. For when God is defcribed 
under thefe Figures, Similitudes, and Analogies, left we fhould 
take Images of things for the things themfelves, and fo fall 
into abfurd Reafonings about them, the fame things are de- 
Tiy'd of God in one Senfe, that are affirmed of him in another. 
Thus God is often faid to repent; and in another Place 'tis 
deny'd that \\z repents as a Man. »?Thus Light is afcribed to-f 
God, as his Habitation ; and elfewhere, thick Darknefs. 
He is often faid to be fcen, and vet is called invifible. The 
Father is God and Lord, and alfo the Son and the Holy Ghoft ; 
and yet it is faid there is but one God and Lord. v^All whicJif^T^C^ 
and more of the fame kind, we muft believe to be thus exprci- 
(ed for no other Reafou but \o hinder us f.'-om imagining them 
I . . . ...... ^ ■ ■'..■'■ " to 

* ^lalcji autrm Deum, i^c. Cic ck Kat. Dcor, §.15. Ed. 
Lond. -- See ouy.. Author s Serm. ^. 37, 

Chap. III. Of the Evil of BefeSi. 1 1 9 

things* fince they could not poifibly be perfecl:, 
the Divine Goodnefs preferr'd imperfed ones to 
none at all. i^Imperfedion then aroie from the In--f- 
finity of Divine Goodnefs. Had not God been 
infinitely Good, perhaps he might not have per- 
mitted imperfedl Beings; but have been content 
in himfelf, and created nothing at all. 

I 4 III. 

jsr O T R s. 


to be afcribed to God in the fdme manner as they are in us *, 
but Smatterers in Learning rejeil and ridicule thefe Forms of 
Speech as ^Enigmas, being ignorant of both the Sacred and 
Ecclcfiaftical Dialed, which they refufc to learn,"^tho' we muil+ 
make ufe of it in Divine Matters, or elfe entirely refrain from 
all reafoning about them. f-For fmcc they are known no other- J- 
wife than by Similitude and Analogy, they cannot be defcribed 
otherwife, as any one will find who tries, "f But it is no won--f 
der if thefe Men, while they take fimilies for the things them* 
felves, fhould eafily imagine that they difcover abfurdities in 
■them. If they do this on purpofe, cunningly, and with an ill 
Intent, they are Villains i but if thro' Ignorance or Error, 
they deferve pity, if they did not fwell with a proud Conceit 
of Science, and exalt themfelves above the Vulgar ; who yet 
are much wifer than thefe Philofophers. > For they fear the-f- 
Anger of God, love his Goodnefs, embrace his Mercy, adore 
his Juftice, and give Glory to the Father, Son, and Holy 
Ghoft, and yet believe in and woriliip one God, moft per- 
fe£l, and free from PafTions. Whereas the Smatterers in Sci- 
ence have got nothing to place in the Room of thefe, which 
they themfelves, much lefs the Vulgar, can underftand ;> or -h 
which can equally excite the Affeftions of the Mind, or pro- 
mote Piety. (D.) 

(D.) It has been objefted againft the foregoing Paragraph 
and Note, that the Author by his Principles necelfarily intro- 
duces Imperfection into the Godhead. For he owns what- 
ever is not of itfelf is imperfeft, but the Subiiftences of the 
Son and Holy Ghoft, that is their Perfonalities, as he confefTes, 
:jre not from themfelves, and therefore muil: be imperfedt~f-To *- 


* This is a good Inference from thefe and the like Expreffions, 
hut can hardly be fuppofed to have been the principal Deftgn, much 
lefs the only Reafon, of them. For more hifanccs of this Kindt 
Jee the foremention dZermo7i, §. 23, 37<. 

120 Of the Evil ef DefeSt, Chap. III. 

'Tistobe HI. Thirdly, There are infinite Degrees of Per- 

^^^^''"^"^' fe^lion between a Being ahfoltnely perfe^ and JVo- 

Divme ^ '^'«^' Of which, if Exift nee be conceived as the 

Plcafure Firlt, every thing will be fo many Degrees diflan^ 

what De from Nothing, as there are PerfefHom to be found 

p'^^r^A^^ in it joyn'd with Exiilence. In this Scale then 
Pcrfeaion ^^j ^jjj ^^ ^^^ ^^^^ ^^^ Nothing the Bottom ; 

thinw mufl: ^nci how much farther any thing is dillant from 
have, fincc nothing, it is fo much the more perfed, and ap- 
all things proaches nearer to God. How much any thing 
are nece - refcmblc God in Perfedion, or how nearly 

fanly atari ■• • , , I 

infinite approacf^ 


from the NOTES, 


J erfeftion. j^js j anfwer, that we may confider the Attributes of God, 
and likevvife the Perfonalitics in the Divine Nature, either ab- 
llradly, i e. as didinguifli'd in our Minds from the Nature; 
or as they are identified with it. If we confider them abftraftly 
it is true they are not from themfelves, but from the Nature : 
So the Wifjom and Poiver of God are not from themfelves but 
from the Divine Nature which neceffarily includes Wifdom 
and Power: And fo the Ferfonality of the Son and Holy Ghoft 
are not from themfelves, but from the Divine Nature which 
necelTiirily includes the Father's begetting his Son, and the Ho- 
ly Ghoft's proceeding from both. But if we confider thefe as 
in re the fame with the Natufe, then they are from themfelves; 
the fame Nature is in the Father, Son and Holy Gholt, and 
the three Ferfonalitiesnecefrarily arife out of that Nature, and 
therefore may be faid to be neceffary and from themfelves. I 
do confefs the Perfonality of the Son is from the Father and 
that of the Holy Ghoft from the Father and Son ; hut thisis 
ftill by the NccciTily arifmg from the Nature. The Father be- 
gets the Son, not out of Choice, but Necelfity of Nature ; 
and that Nature is in the Son, and therefore his Subfift:ence 
and Perfonality is from his own Nature, that is from Jiimfclf, 
and he is «i;T«3fo5. The Perfonality of the Son is indeed 
from the Father, but that doth not hinder it to be from the 
Nature in the laft refort; and neceFarilv too, tho' medinnte 
Verfona Patris. When therefore it is laid that the Divine Na- 
ture which 15 inherent in them may be faid to be of itfelf, but 
not x\\z Modus fab ftf.endi, it it not meant that the Modus fuh ft p^ 
fW/doth not proceed from the N.uure which is in the Son 

Chap. III. Of the Evil of DefeB, 121 

approach to him (E. ) we know not; but we 
are certain that there is always an infinite Diftancc 
between them. It muft have beendetermin'd there- 
fore by the Will of God, where he would flop, fince 
there is nothing but his own Will to bound his 
Power. ^Now it is to be believ'd that the pre- -^ -^pv. 
fent Syftem of the World was the very beft that 
could be, with regard to the Mind of God in fram- 
ing it. (19.) It might have been better perhaps 
in fome Particulars, but not without fome new, 



and Holy Ghoft, and fo is in that Senfe ex/e, but that it is 
not immediately from it, but mediante Pafris Subjijientia. 

(E.) Suppofmg the World to be infinite, there would be, 
as far as appears to us, infinite Orders of Creatures defcending 
gradually ft-om God to Nothing: But fmce neither our Un- 
derftanding can comprehend, nor does the Nature of Quantity 
and Motion feem to admit of Infinity or Eternity ; 'tis bettet^ 
to refer the Matter to the Divine Will. For it an Infinity in 
Creatures be impoffible, 'tis the fame thing whefcver we flop: 
Since all Finites are equally diftant from Infinite. If therefore 
God had created twice, or a thoufand thaufand times as great, 
and as many Beings, and a thoufand thoufand Ages fooner than 
he has, the fame Objeflions might he made. Why not before ? 
Why not more ? The World therefore muft either have been 
created infinite and frorn Eternity, which the very Nature of 
the thing feems not to allow, or it is all one when and hovy 
great it might be, and not determinable by any thing befides 
the Divine Pleafure. See Chap. 5. §. i . Subf. 4. and J. Claris 
on Nat. Evil. p. 90, 93, 280, l^c. 

(19.) In order to confirm this belief, and come to a right 
Knowledge of the whole Queftion before us, it is neceffary 
to enquire a little into the meaning of thefe Words ; to con- 
fider (with reverence) what this Mind of God might be in 
framing the Wqrld, and what was the moft proper Method of 
anfwering it. Now it appeared from the Conclufionof the firlt 
Chapter and Note 13. that the fole Defign of Almighty God 
in creating the Univerfe, was to impart Felicity to other Be- 
ings : and in the beginning of this Cliapter it was proved thfjt 
any Happinefs thus communicated could not be infinite. His 
Defigu tiien is completely anfwer'd, if the greatell Degree of 

. Uappi- 

122 Of the Evil of Defe5i. Chap. III. 

and probably greater inconveniencies, which raufl: 
have l;)oiled the Beauty either of the whole, or of 
fome chief Part. 



Happinefs be imparted of which created Beings are capable, 
confident with one another ; or when the utmoft poflible Good 
h produced in the Univerfe collectively. This alfo fhews us 
what we are to underftand by the 'very beji Syjiem, viz. one that 
is fitted for, and produdlive of the greatellabfolute^<?«^;WGW: 
The Manner of effefting which comes next under eoniiderati- 
on. As to this, it is queried in the firft place whether all A- 
ni'mals ought to have been created equally perfed; or feveral 
in different Ranks and Degrees of Perfection ; and fecondly, 
whether God may be fuppofed to have placed any Order of Be- 
ings in fuch a fix 'd unalterable condition as not to admit of ad- 
vancement : to have made any Creatures as perfedl at firft as 
the Nature of a created Being is capable of. The former of 
thefe doubts is fully difcufs'd in this and the following Chap- 
ter, §. 2. The latter feems not fo eafy to be determined. They 
who hold the afhrmative argue from our notion of infinite or 
ahfolute Goodnefs, which muft excite the Deity always to com- 
municate all manner of Happi?iefs in the very higheft Degree, 
for the fame reafon that it prompts him to communicate it ever 
in any degree. But this, fay they, he has not done, except he 
at firll endow'd fome Creatures with all the Perfeftion a Crea- 
ture could poflibly receive, and gave to every fubordinate Clafs 
of Beings*, the utmoil Happine/s their feveral Natures were 
capable of. Neither can this Opinion be confuted from Holy 
Scripture, which declares that God made innumerable glorious 
Orders of Cherubim and Seraphim, all far abov e our Compre- 
henfion, and fome, lor any thing that we know, in the very 
next Step to the Top of the great Scale oi Beings, and only Se- 
cond to the Almighty. Thofe that hold the contrary Opinion 
diflinguilh between Happinefs and Perfection, and think that 
thefe do not either neceffarily imply, or infeparably attend each 
other. They deny therefore the confequence of the former 
Argument, and aflign this Reafon for it, 'vix. becaufe a Being 
produced in the higheft degree of natural Perfedlion which a 
Creature is capable of, and ftill continuing in th.& fa7ne, will not 
receive as much Happinefs in the main, as others that were 
placed in a much inferior State at the firft. This, tho' it may 


* Concerning thefe ClalTes, fee Notes 22, arJ 24. 

Chap. III. Of the Evil of BefeB, 123 

IV. Fourthly, From hence it appears alfo thar All things 
all Beings cannot have equal Perfedions, For die ^^^^^ "OJ^ 

World ''" ^,^"^"/ 

NOTES, ilncefome 

appear fomething like a Paradox, yet upon farther confiderati- 
on will perhaps be judg'd not improbable. Thus, for a Crea- 
ture confcious of no deficiency of any thing necelTary to its 
well-being, to meet with a perpetual acceflion of new, un- 
known Pleafure, to refleft with comfort on its pail: Condition, 
and compare it with the prefent, to enjoy a continued Scries 
of frefli SatisfaiStion and Delight, and be always approaching 
nearer and nearer to Perfection, this muft certainly advance the 
Sum of its Happlnefs, even above that of others, whofe conditi- 
on is fuppofed to have begun and to continue in that degree of 
perfeftion where this will end (if there could be any end in 
either) and which never knew defeft, variety, or increafe. A 
finite Being fix'd in the fame State, however excellenc, muft 
according to all our Conceptions (if we be allow'd to judge 
from our prefent Faculties, and we can judge from nothing elfe) 
contrafl a kind o^ Indolence or Infenfib'ility {r e. cannot ahvays'be 
equally afi-'eftcd by an equal degree of Good in the Objeft) 
which Infenfibility nothing but alteration and variety can cure; 
It does not therefore feeni probable that God has adlually fix- 
ed any created Beings whatfoever iu the very highefi: degree of 
Perfedion next to himfelf Nay, it is impoffible to conceive 
any fuch highefi Degree, and the Suppofition is abfurd, iince 
that which admits of a continual addibility, can have no 
highefi. Since then the Creation cannot be infinite ; and fi- 
nites, how much foever amplified, can never reach Infinity or 
abfolute Perfe£lion *, we can fet no manner of bounds to the 
creating Powqr of God : But mufl refer all to his Infinite Wif- 
dom and Goodnefs : Which Attributes we know can never 
be exhaufted, nor will, we believe, produce any Beings in fucl| 
a State as fliall not leave room enough for them to be itill grow- 
ing in Felicity, and i"or ever acquiring new Happinefs, togq-^ 
ther with new Perfection. 

This notion of a growing Happinefs is embraced by molt 
Divines, and affords the ftrongeft Motive for endeavouring to 
improve and excell in every Chriftian Grace. 'Tis beautifully 
touch'd by Mr. Addijon. Speftator N°. III. " nere is 
** not, in my Opijiion, a jnorc pleajing and triumphant Conjidera- 

" tioTi 

* See Note E. or Q^or Dr. Bentley's Bojk^s LeSl. Serm. 6^ 
p. 236, 237. 5th Edit. 

are Parts 
of others. 

124 ^f i^^^ ^'v^l Hf I^^fi^' Chap. III.' 

World muil netfiTarily be compofed of various 
PartSy and i\\o{k parts of others, and fo on. But a 
Part muft needs come fhc>rt both of the Divine 
Perfedion., and the Perfedion of the Whole. For 
it is nothing with Regard to all the Perfeftions 
^v^iich it has not, whether thefe be Divine, or cre- 
ated j 


" tion in Religion, than this of the perpetual Progrefs ivhich the 
5* Soul makes tonjjard the P erfeBion of its Nature, nxiithout e'ver 
*' arri'ving at a Period in it. To look upon the Soul as going on 
"from Strength to Strength, to confder that She is to Jhine for 
" e'ver ivith neiv Accefions of Glory, and brighten to all Eterni- 
** ty, that she nvill be fill adding Virtue to Virtue, and Kna^w- 
** ledge to Knonvledge, carries in it fomething ijuonderfullj agree- 
** able to that Ambition <vjhich is natural to the Mind of Man, 
*' Nay, it muji be a ProfpeB pleaftng to God himfelf, to fee his 
f ' Creation for ever beautifying in his Eyes, and draining nearer 
" to him by degrees of Pefemhlance?'' 

That the Happinefs of Saints and Angels may be continu- 
ally increafing, fee 'Tillotfo}t's 77th Sermon, Vol. 2d. Fol. p. 
578, ^c. 

• From thefe Confiderations, and fome which follow in the 
remainder of this Note, it may perhaps feem probable that ia 
us, and all Beings of the like nature, changes from worfe to 
better muft be attended even with greater degrees of Pleafure 
than a fettled permanence in any the higheft State conceivable 
of Glory or Perfection, and confequently become neceffary ti) 
the completion of all finite Happinefs. 

But in Oppofition to all this, Bayle urges that Encreafe or 
Alteration is not in the leaft requilite to a lafting Felicity even 
in ourfelves. 

♦' That 'tis no ways neceffary that our Soul fnould feel E- 
<■* vil, to the end it may relifh what is Good, and that it 
•' fhould pafs fucceffively from Pleafure to Pain, and from 
<' Pain to Pleafure, that it may be able to difcern that Pain is 
*' an Evil, and Pleafure is a Good. We know by Experi- 
*' ence that our Soul cannot feel, at one and the fame time, 
" both Pleafure and Pain ; it mull: therefore at firft either 
*' have felt Pain before Pleafure, or Pleafure before Pain, if 
f« its firft Senfation was that of Pain, it found that State to be 
" uneafy, altho' it was ignorant of Pleafure. Suppofe then 
f* that its firft Senfation lafted iTiany Years, without Interrup- 

Chap. III. Of the Evil of DefeB. 125 

ated; and fince one Part is not anorher, nor the 
7vhole^ 'tis plain, that every Part wants the Per- 
fedions not only of the whole, but of other Parts 
aHb. And that the whole is more perfed than a 
part is evident from hence, that it necelTarily in- 
cludes the multiplied Perfedion of every part; 



*' tion, you may conceive that it was in an eafy Condition, ot 
** :n one that was uneafy. And do not alledge to me Experi- 
'^ ence ; do not tell me that a Pleafure tvhich lafts a long time 
*' becomes infipid, and that a long Pain becomes infupporta- 
" ble : For I will anfwer you, that this proceeds from a Change 
** in the Organ which makes that Pain, which continues the 
*' fame as to kind, to be diiFerent as to Degrees. If you have 
" had at firll a Senfation of fix Degrees, it will not continue 
*' of Six to the end of two Hours, or to the end of a Year, 
«« biit only either of one Degree, or of one Fourth part of a 
" Degree. Thus Cuftom blunts the Edge of our Senfations: 
" their Degrees correfpond to the Concuffions of the parts of 
•' the Brain, and this Concuffion is weakened by frequent Re- 
*« petitions: From whence it comes to pafs that the Degrees 
" of Senfation are diminifhed But if Pain or Joy were com- 
*' municated to us in the fame Degree fucceffively for an hun- 
*' dred Years, we fhould be as unhappy, or as happy in the 
*' hundreth Year, as in the firft Day ; which plainly proves 
*' that a Creature may be happy with a continued Good, oc 
" unhappy with a continued Evil, and that the Alternative^ 
*' which LaSlantius fpeaks of*, is a bad Solutioa of the Diffi- 
" culty. It is not founded upon the Nature of Good and 
*' Evil, nor upon the Nature of the Subjedl which receives 
*' them: nor upon the nature of the Caufe which produces 
*' them. Pleafure and Pain are no lefs proper to be communi- 
" cated the fecond jMoment than the firft, and the third Alo- 
*' ment than the fecond, and fo of all the reft. Our Soul is alfo 
*' as fufceptible of them after it has felt them one Moment, as 
" it was before it felt them, and God who gave them, is no 
" lefs capable of producing them the feccnd Moment than 
«' the firft f." 


* See Note 79. p. 447. 
t Critical Diii. p. 2486. 

126 Of the Evil of Defect. Chap. III. 

and befides, the parts when joyned together and 
connefted, acquire a new and peculiar Perfedion, 
whereoy they anfwer their proper Ends, which 
they could not do aOjnder; they defend themfelves 
fnuch better, and airift each other. The Perfec- 
tion of the whole therefore, is not only more ex- 



As this is one of the ftrongeft Objedtions, and applicable to 
&]\ kinds of Evil, I have quoted it at length (tho' ibinc parts 
may not relate immediatey to our prefent purpofe) and fhall 
endeavour to give a full anfvver to it in the following Notes. 
It will be confider'd with refped: to Moral Good and Evil, in 
Notes, 68, 83, 84. Let us confine ourfelves at prefent to Na- 
tural Good, which may be divided into fenfitive and intellec- 
tual. As to the former, we perceive that the Mind, for the 
Augmentation of its Happinefs, is endowed with various 
Senfes, each of which is entertain'd with a variety of Objedts; 
irow, any one of thefe Senfes can convey fo much Pleafure for 
fome time as is fufhcient to fill our prefent narrow Capacit}', 
and engrofs the whole Soul, She can be entirely happy in the 
Satisfaftion arifmg from the Sight, Hearing, t^c. or from 
the Memory, or any other Mode of Perception by itfelf. If 
therefore any one of thefe Organs could (as Z?/ry/p fuppofes) 
continue to communicate the fame Degree of Pleafure to us for 
an hundred Years, all the rell would be unneccfTary : But an 
All-wife Being, who cannot a£l in vain, has implanted this 
Variety of Senfes in us ; this then is a good Argument (to thofe 
who allow fuch a Being, upon the Belief of which I am now 
arguing} that none of thefe particular Senfes could continue in 
its prefent State, and always communicate the fame Degree of 
Happinefs. Farther, his Suppofition will appear to be impof- 
lible, from confidering the Nature and Properties of that Mat- 
ter of which the fenfuive Organs are compofed. If there be 
(as Bay/e maintains) fo clofe a Conncfcion between the Soul 
and certain Modifications of Matter, as that the Degrees of fen- 
fitive Pleafures are diminifhed by a ChMge in the Organ, by 
weakening the Concuilion of fome pnrts of the Brain by frequent 
Repetitions ; then we fay, 'tis plainly impoffible that the fame 
Degrees fliould be continued by this Organ, which, as it is 
material, is perpetually expofed to this Chavge, and liable toi' 
Difiblution, and neccflarily weakened by \^\^{q. fre(]u,cvt Con- 
ciiffions. Every Motign in it muft in time be flopped by 


Chap. IIL Of the Evil of BefeB. 127 

tenfive than that of the Parts, by the accumula- 
tion of many Parts, perhaps equal to one another; 
but more intenje alfo, by the Addition of certain 
Degrees, whereby the whole muft of Neceffity 
excell the Parts. As therefore we have proved 
that an abfolutely perfed: Creature is an Impoffi- 


N i E S, 

contrary ones, as our Author has fully fliewn in Chap. 4. 

§. I. 

If he fuppofes that the fame Degree of Pleafure may ftilfbe 
communicated tho' the Organ alters, he fuppofes that there is 
no fuch Conneftion between any Portion or Pofition of Matter 
and our Spirit ; which is directly contrary to his former Sup- 
pofition, and alfo to truth, as will perhaps appear from the fol- 
lowing Chapter. If then Bayle imagines that the fame or dif- 
ferent Matter, when moved or at reft; or when moved in diffc- 
lent Diredions, may ftill affe6t the Mind in the very fame man- 
ner, he muft either take it for granted that the Affedlions of 
Matter are no Caufes of the Senfations of the Mind, that is,, 
contradi6l his former Suppoficion ; or elfe he muft fuppofe 
ihe fame Effefl to proceed from different Caufes ; either of 
which will tend equally to advance his Syftem. But in re- 
ality, this Decreafe of Pleafure in Familiarity and Cuftom. 
does not perhaps entirely depend on any Change of the cor- 
poreal Organs, but on the original Faculties of the Soul it- 
{t\^, as may be gathered from fome fuch Obfervations as this 
which follows. View a delightful Landllcip, a pleafant Gar- 
den, or any of the Figures which appear moll beautiful, renew 
the Profpecl once, or twice, to Day, to Morrow, and at feve- 
ral diftant Periods ; it fliall afford a great degree of Pleafure 
for fome time, while any No'velty may be fuppofed to remain j 
but that Pleafure perifhes together with this Novelty, tho' the 
external Organs of Vifion fcill continue perfeft, and your 
Senfations are moll: evidently the lame the laft Day as the 
firft. You are able to behold the fame Scenes over again, 
with the fame e.^fe and acutcnefs, but not with the fame In- 
tenfenefs of Delight. To attempt a Mechanical Solution of 
this by a fuppofed alteration of feme imaginary 'Traces in the 
Brain (which yet, if they were allowed, cannot mend the 
matter a jot, as was jnft now fliewn) will only throw us into' 
ftili greater DilFiculties, as any one that attentively confiders 
the whole of that chimerical Hvpothefis mull conclude* and 


128 Of the Evil of Defedl. Chap. III. 

bility, fo it may be proved from hence that all 
tannot have an cqud Degree of Perfedion. For 
the World confifts of Parts, and thofe again of 
others, perhaps divifible in mfinittrm : But that e- 
very lingle Part lliould have the Perfcftion of all, 
or many, is impoiliblei and we are not to arraign 


" NO T E S 

r'F which Bnyle, who foon perceived tiie Defedts and Abfurdiv- 
ties of moft other Syftems, was undouhtediy convinc'd. It 
feems to fne much more properly refoivablc into a native Pro- 
perty of the Soul itfelf. Is it not probable that the Mind of 
Man is originally framed with a Difpofition for, or Capacity 
of being delighted with Variety? That it cannot be always 
on the fame Bent, but as it is cndow'd with different Fa- 
culties, fo thefe relieve one another by turns, and receive an 
additional Pleafure from the Nonjelty of thofe Objefts about 
which it is converfant ; and that by this means it enjoys a 
greater Sum of Happinefs than it could other ways attain to? 
See the Spedator, N". 59O. N*', 625. of No. 411. or Watts 
on the Fajjiom, §.4. 

I Ihall only add ah Obfervation on this Head frora the Au- 
thor of the Vindkatioh of God'' s Moral CharaSler, p. 21. which 
fhews us the Neccffity tor this Variety or increafeablenefs of 
Perfeflion, in order to our Imellednal Happinefs, fince moll of 
that arifcs from our pall Defects. ' ^j Intelle£lual Happi- 

* nefs, 1 ?nean the Difcovcry and Cbntemplation of Truth, 

* nuith regard to ■n.vhich I have this to obfervc, that all the 

* Pleafures ive tafe of this Kind are oiAiifig either to our 

* preceding Ignorance, to the Care aud Pains nve take in 

* the Difco'very of Truth, or to the Degree of our Know- 

* ledge, <when <zve 'attain to a greater meafure tha7i other 
*■ Men. All Truth, ixihen conftderd fcparate from thefe, is 
' alike as Truth ( tho^ not of the like hnportance to us J the 
' Objed of the Underfianding, and as fuh, it viujl afford 
*. the fame Delight. If ive all could, -zvitb equal Eafeand 

* Clearnefs, fee all the Relations of things, they miijl all in 

* the Nature of the things equally affeSl us. We Ihould 

* tafe as much Plcafuie in knonxjing or contejnplating that 
', t'Zvo and tv:o makes fur, as in kno-iviiig or contemplating 

* any P ropoftion ixlhich noiv appears the mcjl difficult, and 
*._/& affords the jnof Pleafure: Or rather, ive fjould 7iot 

* hai'e Pleafure from any of them. Kovj if this be the 

ehap. III. Of the Evil of BefcB. 12^ 

the Power or Goodnefs of God for not work- 
ing Contradictions. There muft then be many, 


N or E S. 

'' Cafe, then is is evident that the Capacity ive have fb^ 

* tajling this . kind pf PJeafure renders us capable of its 
' contrary. • If'e could not be delighted in the Difovery or 

* Contemplation of Truth, if nve 'were not capable of being 

* ignorant, and of the XJnhappinefs njohich arifes from it ^^ ' 
This is the Confeqii€nce we would draw frojn al) that 

xvent before: But of this more at large under the Head of 
Moral, Ei'il. . . .. 

We reply then to Bayle, that this Alternatinje or Variety of 
either Good or Evil, fo far as concerns the pteferit Argument 
h founded on the Nature of the SubjeSi njuhich recei'ves thttn, 
and that our Soul in its prefent State, is not fo fufceptible of 
them after it has felt tjlem two or three times as at firft. What 
it might have been made capable of, is nothing to the Pur- 
pqfe, fince (a« it was obferved before, and mull often be re- 
peated) we are to confider Man as we find him at prefent; and 
<;lrawall our Arguments, not from fuch Faculties as are per- 
haps in other JBeings, b"t from thefe only which we per- 
ceive and experience in him. If thefe cannot be alter'd and 
improved confiftently with each other*, nor fubjeifted to any 
general Laws more fuitable to his prefent Circumftances, and 
produ(fl;ive of more good to the whole Syftemf, then, all 
Arguments built on this Topic againft the Divine Attributes 
muft fall to the Ground-^ Thefe and the like Suppofitions 
therefore, 'uiz. that the fame Degree of Pleafure might be com- 
municated to us fuccejjinjelyfor a hundred Tears', — if underftood 
of one uniform Caufe producing it: 'That our Pleafures, (mean- 
ing fenfiti've ones) might not depend upon the Fibres of the 
Brain, — and. That thefe Fibres /hould not nxiear out at all\ , — 
or, if thefe Fibres did wear out, that the P leafure Jhould ne'vcr 
decay, — are all unreafonable Suppofitions : They offend a- 
gainft the Rule laid down above, and always to be remem- 
bered, of taking the whole of human Nature as it is; of con- 
fidering our prefent Body and Spirit, and the obvious Proper- 
ties of each, and the kno\yn Laws of their Union together. 
All fuch Objeflions therefore are befide th-e Qiicfiiion ; and 
founded upon the old abfurdity of reducing us to a different 

K. Claf 

* See Note 28. , f Sec Note 25. 

tSeeJSflv/t'sDia. p. 2487. 

Of the Evil of DefcB. Chap. III. 

perhaps infinite (20.) Degrees of Perfedion in 
the Divine Works; for whatever arifes from AV 
thing is necelTarily imperftd; and the lefs it is 
removed from nothing ^taking Exifience for one 
Degree as we faid bcforej the more imperfcd it is. 
There is no Occafion therefore for an Evil Prin- 
ciple to introduce the Evil of Dcfed, or an Ine- 
quahty of Perfeftions in the Works of God : For 
the very Nature of created Beings re- 
quires it, and we may conceive the Place of this 
malicious Principle to be abundantly fupplied from 
hence, that they derive their Origin from -A/b- 
thing. (zi.) 


Clajs of Beings, when (as will appear prefently) all conceiva- 
ble Clafles and Orders are already full. 

Thus much for one Query about the manner of creating 
things, 'VIZ.. whether any fhould have been fix'd immutably 
in a certain Degree of Perfeftion: Our Author proceeds to 
examine the other, ^oiz. Whether all Things could and ought 
to have been at firft created in the fa?fic Degree of Pcrfeftion ? 
(20.) That is indefinite, or greater than any given Number ; 
for neither the Univerfc itfelf, nor any thing that belongs to 
it, can be properly and abfolutely Infinite, as our Author 
maintains in his Note E, and we have largely proved from 
Cud-zvorth, (Sc. in the former Chapter. 

(21.) It is fcarce nccelTary to obferve, that this muft all 
along be underftood only Materiallf, i. e. that thefe things 
were not produced from any Matter pre-exijlent, but were 
made i% chc I'vtuv, and brought into Being from mere Nof2- 
Exijience. For the PolTibility of which, and the Opinion of 
the Antients on this Subjeft fee Cudiiorth, C. 5. §. 2. p. 
738, i^c. The other Senfes of the Words, ws. That any 
thing can come from nothing caufally, or be produced kf no- 
thing, or by iijcif, or <ra-ithout an Efficient Caufe, are manifcft- 
]y abfurd, as is demonftraicd at large in the fame excellent 
Seflion. For an Illulbation of our Author's Notion before 
us, {tc Scott'' s Clrifiian Life., Part 2. Vol. i. C. 6. §. 2. p. 
446, 447. I ft. F.dit. * Gud is the Caufe ofVerfeBion only, 
' but not of Defcd', which fo hx forth as it is vatttral to cre- 

* aieJ 

Chap, ni Of the Evil of DefeSl. 13 1 

V. Fifchly; 'Tis plain, that Creatures are not Things 
only unequally impcrfed: in refpeft of their Parts "ecefllinly 
and Vnder-partSt and fo on, which by continual ' ?-i^^^' 
Sub-divilion, approach m a manner to nothing j fedions 
but a neceffary inequality arifes among them alio with re- 
in refpeft to their uittributes. For a conicious or '^^^'^ ^^ 
thinking Subftance is more perfed than one that [j-ju,^. f 
wants Senfe or Undsrllanding. If it be ask'd, but it is' 
How is it agreeable to the Divine Goodncfs to agreeable 
have created thefe alfo? I anfwer. If the Crea- ^^ ^^e 
tion of thefe be no impediment to the ProduCli- q j r 
on of the more perfeft; if neither the Number to create 
nor Happinefs of ihe more perfeft be diminiflied thofe 
by the Creation of thofe th it are lefs perfect, why v/hich are 

K z will ^'^'^ P^"^- 

fedir, if 
NOTES, „^|^i„. 

, ,■ . . drance to 

* ated Beings hath no Caufe at all, but is merely a Negation or theNum- 
= Non-entity. For every created thing was a Negation or Non- ber or 

* e,ntity before ever it had a pofttlve Being, and it had only {(y conveni- 
< much of. its /irzW//'L'^ Negation taken a^ujay from it, as it had ence ot 

* pojiti've Being conferred upon it ; and therefore, fo far forth the more 

* as it is, its Being is to be attributed to the Sovereign Caufe perfedV 
« that produced it ; but fo far forth a3 it is not, its not Be- ones. 

* ing is to be attributed to the Original Non-entity out of 

* which it was produced. For that which was once Nothing, 

* would y?/// have been Nothing, it not been for the Caufe 

* that gave Being to it, and therefore that it is fo far Nothing 

* ftill, /. e. limited and dcfeBiaie, is only to be attributed to 
' its own primitive Nothingnefs. As for inftance, If I give a 

* poor Man a hundred Pounds, that he is worth yS ?nuch Mo- 

* ney is wholly owing to ?ne, but that he is not worth a hun-. 

* dred more is owing only to his own Poverty } and juft fo, 

* that I have fuch znA fiich Perfe^lons of Being is wholly ow-f 

* ing to God who produced me oat of Nothing ; but that I- 
*. have fuch and fuch Dcfeds of Being is only owing to that. 

* iVo7z-^«//Vj; out of which he produced me.' . 

The fame Notion is largely difculTed ia Eilhardi Lubini 
Phofphorus, ISc. Chap, 6, 7, and 17. From Vv'hom it appears,, 
that mod of the anticnt Philofophers meant no more than this 
i»y thdr Evil Principle, 

' ' .■■•n 

'22.; Froi?3. 

132 Of the Evil of DefeB. Chap. IIL 

vill it be unfit to create thefe too? Since God 
does what is beft to be done, nothing more or 
greater can be expedcd from the moft benevolent 
and powerful Author of Nature. If therefore it 
te better, cceteris p^rihus, that thefe more imper- 
fe(5t Beings fhould exifl, than not, it is agreeable 
to the Divine Goodnefs that the beft that could 
be fhould be done. If the Production of a lefs 
perfed: Being were any hindrance to a more per- 
fed: one, it would appear contra; y to Divine 
Goodnefs to have omitted the more perfect and 
created the lefs ; but fince they are no manner of 
of hindrance to each other, the more the better. 



(22 ) From the Suppofition of a Scale of Beings gradu- 
ally defcending from PcrfeSlion to Non-entity, and compleat in 
every intermediate Rank and Degree (for which fee Note 24.} 
^ve fliall foon perceive the Abfurdity of fuchQueftions as thefe. 
Why was not Man made more perfed: ? Why are not his Fa- 
culties equal to thofe of Angels? Since this is only afking 
why he was not placed in a quite different Clafs of Beings, 
when at the fame time all other Claffes are fuppofcd to be al- 
ready full. From the lame Principle alfo we gather the In- 
tent of the Creator in producing thefe fcveral inferior Orders 
imder our View. They who imagine that all things in this 
World were made for the immediate Ufc of Man alone, run 
themfclves into inextricable Difficulties. Man indeed is the 
Head of this lower Part of the Creation, and perhaps it was 
defigned to be abfolutcly under his Command. But that all 
things here tend diredly to his own ufe, is, I think, neither 
eafy nor nccclTary to be proved. Some manifcillv Icrve for 
the Food and Support of others, whofe Souls may be neceflary 
to prepare and prcferve their Bodies for that Purpofe, and 
may at the fame time be happy in a Confcioufncfs of their own 
Kxiilence. 'Tis probable that they are intended to promote 
each others Good reciprocally : Nay, Man himielf contri- 
butes to the Happinefs, and betters the Condition of the Brutes 
in feveral Refpecfts, by cultivating and improving the Ground, 
by watching the Scafons, by protcding and providing for 

Chap. III. Of the Evil of DefeB, 133 

VI. An Inftance will make this more clear. Sup- This con- 
pofethat God made the World /«/V^; fuppofe that ^^^^^y 
Spirits, or pure immaterial thinking Beings, are J^^nceof 
the mo/i perfeH Species of Subftances: Suppofe in Matter, 
the laft Place, that God created as many of this which is 
fort as were convenient for the Syftem he had made, "plmpe- 
fo that if there were more, they would incom- JJ^Jf "g ^-^ 
mode one another; yet there would be no lefs ^^^^^ 
Rx)om for Matter, then if there were none at 
all, (F.) This Suppofition is by no means ab- 

K 5 furd 5 


them, when they are unable to protect and provide for them- 
felves*. Others of a much lower CLifs, may, for ought wc 
know, enjoy themfelves too in fome Degree or other; and 
ahb contribute to the Happiaefs even of fuperior Beings, by 
a Difplay of the Divine Attributes in different Ways, and af- 
fording ample Matter of Refledion on the various Ranks and 
Degrees of Perfeftion difcoverablc in the animal World ; 
wherein the higheft Order may with Pleafure contemplate 
numberlefs Species infinitely below them ; And the lower 
Clafs can admire and adore that Infinity of Divine Wifdom 
and Goodnefs and Power which fhines forth in fo many Be- 
ings fo much above them. They may conduce to the Beauty, 
Order, and Benefit of the whole Syftem, the general Good 
of which was the Aim of its Creator, and with regard to 
which every Part is chiefly to be elleem'd f . They may 
have ten thoufmd Ufes befide what relates to Man, who is 
but a very fmall Part of it : Several Inltances might be giv- 
en which would make this very probable; at lealt the con- 
trary, I tHink, cannot ever be proved. Seo C. 4. §. 2. Subl\ 

(F.) If any one had a mind to f^Il a certain VefTel with 
Globes of various Magnitudes, and had diftinguiih'd them in- 
to their feveral Degrees, fo that thofe of the fecond Degree 
might have Place in the Interftices left by thofe of the firll ; 


* See Chubb'^ Sup. ^c. p. Jz. and Dr. J. Clarke, p. 284, 

t See Cudworth, p. 875, 876. or Tillotfon Serm, 91. p. 
683. 2d Vol. Fol. or Ray on (he Creation, Part 2. p. AZJ. 
4th Edit, or Note G. 

134 Of the Evil of Defeat. Chap. III. 

furd; for fmce thefe may be conceived without 
local Extenjio^, and have no relation to Space or 
Flacc, as Bi dies have *, in whatever Number they 
were created, they would contribute nothing at all 
either to the filling up of Space, or excluding Bo- 
dies out of it, yet they would have a certain Sy- 
(lem or Society among themfelves, which might re- 
quire a determinate Number, which if it were ex- 
ceeded, they muft become troublefome to one ar 
nother by too great a Multitude in a finite World. 
Nay, if the World were fuppofed to be infinite^ 
and as many fuch Spirits created as were pofTible, 
yet would they be no impediment to Matter, or 
Matter to them, neither would their Number be 
lefs, nor their Convenienfes fewer, becaufe Matter 
did or did not exift. Since then material and im-^ 
material Beings confift fo well together, is it not 
agreeable to tlie greateft Goodnefs to have created 
bothf Let Matter be flupid and devoid of Senfe 
as it is; let it be the moft imperfed of all Sub- 
dances, and next to nothing, (fince not to per- 
ceive its Exiitence is little different from Non-ex- 
iflcnce) 'tis better to be even fo, than not at all; 
for Exiftence is, as we faid, the Foundation, or firft 



and thofe of the third Order in the intcrftices of the fecond, 
and fo on. 'Tis evident that when as many of the firll: Mag- 
nitude were put in as the Vefl'el could contain yet there would 
be Room for thofe of the fecond. Neither could any wife 
Man afk why the whole Veffel was not filled with the greater 
Globes, or why all of them were not of the fame Migai 

This Inftance may afford an Anfwer to fuch as demand 
why God has not given a different and more perfecfi: Nature 
to Animals, ntiz. There was no room in the mundane Syrtem 
for Beings cf n more perfcc" ^ature. But when as many 
1 :S . .. Creatures 

* See Note '/. 

Chap. in. Of the Evil of Defeci. 135 

Degree of Perfedion, and the next a^ it were to 
this, the fecond is perception of Exiftence. But 
you'll fay. Why did not God add this Second De- 
gree to Matter? I anfwer, if tliat could, ic is 
probable it would have been done : But fince we 
fee that Matter is in itfelf a piflive, inert Sub- 
ftance, we muft believe that its Nature would not 
admit of Senje^ or if it had been capable of Senfe, 
that greater Inconveniences would liave flowed 
from thence, than if it had been made infenfible, 
as it is. (25.) However, without this there would 
be a kind of Foid in the Univerfe, and fomething 

K 4 want- 


Creatares were made of the fuperior Order as tlie Syllem of 
the World was able to conta'm, whether you fuppofe it finite 
or infinite ; nothing liinder'd but that there might he room 
for others of a lower Degree : As when as rnany Globes of 
greater Magnitude were put into the Vefl'el as it could hold, 
yet there was ftill a Space for others of a lefs Dimenfion ; 
and To on in infinitum. When therefore any afk why God did 
not make all of the fame Perfeilion with the Angels: 

We anfwer, that after as many Angels had been made as 
were convenient, there was a Place left for inferior Animal";, 
and after as many Animals of a more perfeil Nature were 
made as the Syitem required, there was ftill room for other 
more imperfeft ones ; and fo perhaps in infinilum. 

If you afk why God does not immediately tranfplant Men 
into Hewen, fince 'tis plain they are capable of that happier 
State : Or why he detains them ib long from that Happinefs, 
and confines them on the Earth as in a darkfome Prifon where 
they are forced to ftruggle with fo many Evils. 

I anfwer, Becaufe the Heavens are already furnlfli'd with 
Inhabitants, and cannot with convenience admic of new ones, 
till fomc of the prefent Pofleflbrs depart into a better State, 
or make room fome other way for thcfe to change their Con- 
dition. See Note y. 

{23.) Mattel; as fuch, is at prefent incapable of, or has pro- 
perties totally inconfiilent with Thought and Sclr-niotion, (as 
Is at large demonftrated by the Authors referred to in Note 7.) 
it is therefore in a Degree below Animals, or ("as our Au- 
thor fays) next to Nothing. But yet, fuch as ii ii, 'tis firft, 


136 Of the Evil of Defea. Chap. III. 

wanting which might exift : But it was better that 
there Ihould be Matter than nothing at all, and 
fince one fide was to be chp^en, the Divine Good- 
nefs prefer'd Matter, becaufe that was the greatef 
Good. For, fince it is no hindrance to the Mul- 
tiplication or Convenience of thinking Beings, 
nor climinifhcs the Number of the more perfeds 
*tis plain it adds to the Pcrfedion of the Univerfc, 
2nd whatever it be, tho' the mofl: imperfeft thing 
m Nature^ 'tis gain to the whole. It was there^^ 



abfolutely neceJTary to many Animals, and fecondly, would 
not be fo convenient for their Ufe^ if it could think. It is the 
Bajts or Support of Animals in this our Syllem ; it \?, as w^ 
may fay, the Cafe and Covering of their feyeral Souls j it ferves 
for the clothing of that Cafe, for their Food, their Defence, and 
various ufes. JJut were \\ all Life, or confcious (not to in- 
fill on the Abfurdities of fuch a Suppofitipn in itfelf) whas 
^lifery and Confufion would arife? If all were Animals. 
what mull thefe Animals fubfilt on? If they were of the 
fame Nature with fuch as we arp acquainted with, they muft 
alfo be fuflain'd after the fame manner, i.e. they muft live 
by FooJ, and confequently jive upon, and continually torment 
pnd confume one another; and confequently more Happineft 
would be loft than got by fuch |->ife, which is as plentiful at 
prefent^, as feems agreeable to the Syftem. If Matter as Mat- 
ter, were endowed wjth the Power of Self-Motion, whg^ 
Ufe could .we put it to? What Clothing or Habitations? 
Whaf Inftruments or Utenfils could we make of it? But 
this, I think, needs no farther Explanation. Matter then, in 
^ts prelent State, as united with and lubfervient to luch Spi- 
rits as. we conceive ours to be, is in gcnpral more conducive 
to the Good apd Happincfs of the whole, taan it would be 
::i any other conceiv;ible manner of Exiftence, To afk yet 
\\\\y fome certain Portions or Syftems of it might not have 
pccn made more perfefl, or why it was not farther "fublimated', 
refined, and io unaccountably modified as to be rendered c.i- 
pable of Thought ; is the abfurd Qiieuion above mentioned, 
njiz,, Why was it not made fcmething elfe, or removed into k 

■' '■' '. " ^' ■ ^'''i\%^ 

'^ See Note 26^ 

Chap. III. Of the Evil of Dfe^, 137 

fore agreeable to the greatefl: Power and Cood- 
nefs to^ have created this aUo ; nor need we the Df?- 
miurgm of the antient Heretics to produce it, as 
if unworthy of the great and good God. The 
Evils of Imperfe(5lion then muft be permitted in 
the Nature of things; an inequality of Perfec- 
tions muft be' permitted alio, fmce it is impoflible 
that all the Works of God fliould be endowed 
V/ith equal Perfe«3:ions. (Q.) 

•' . " '■ '■ yii. 


Kigher Oafs ? When at the fame time there appears fo much 
Reafon for the Exiftence of fuch a thing as this now is ; and 
all fuperior ClafTes are concluded to be full. What Reafon 
there is for this laft conclufion may be feen in Note 24. 

(G.) The Author has been blamed here formaking any Dif- 
ficulty about fuch Evils as thefe of Imperfeftion, which are 
properly fpeaking no Evils at all. 'Tis trifling, fay the Ob- 
jeftors, fince we fee that the Perfeftion of any Sfrudlure or 
Machine confills in this, that the Parts thereof have different 
Powers and Offices, and therefpre \ve can eafily conceive it tq 
be no Imperfedion in the Machine of the World that its Parts 
are of unequal perfcjdlions ; for thofe that feem to have the lefs 
Perfection would not anfwer their Defign, nor fi)! their Places 
if they werQ not fo unequal. And as for inanimate things they 
are neither capable of Good nor Evilj it fignifies nothing 
v/here they are phced, or to what A'lotions they are fubjeftedj, 
fmce they cannot complain or be fenfible of their Condition. 
Confecjaently there is no fuch thing as the Evil Qi Imperfec- 
tion, but all is properly Natural. 

To all which we anfwer \Ji. The World and every Part of 
it is in its own Nature imperfect, for whatfoever is naturally 
perfcdV, is felf fufficient, and does not ftand in need oi the 
Combination of more Parvus or the Affilfance of other things i 
for tha^ Complication of parts which is obfervable in' Ma- 
chines is neceifaiy upon this account only, that one may fupply 
the Defecls of another. 

zdly. From hence it is evident, that the Pcrfedion of the 
I'aits is not to be eftimated from their own private Conveni- 
ency alone, but from the Relation which they have to the 
whole. And there's a great deal of Difference between rela- 
ijvc and abfolute Perfection { a thing may psrfqdly anfwer the 
' • ' ^ ' Office 


'Tis lefs 
to the 
to have o- 
than to 
have crea- 
ted thefe 
more im- 

Of the Evil of Defccf. Chap. IIL 

VII. If you fay, God might have omitred the 
more imperfed: Bcmgs I grant it, and if that had 
been beft he would undoubtedly have done it. But 



Office it bears v^Ith regird to the whole, without any Conve- 
nience to itfelf, nay to its own Dcftrudion. 

^dly. It appears that notwithllanding the Infinite Power, 
Wifdom, and Goodnefs of God, Creatures mult necelTarily 
labour under the Evil of Imperfection; and that this Imper- 
fection is to be coniider'd two Ways, the one with regard to 
the whole, the other in refpeft of particulars. 

4thly. The Good of the whole cannot be in every thing at 
all times conMent with the Good of each Particular. For 
as every Part is in its own Nature imperfedl and limited, 'tis 
poffible for it not to be Self-fufficient, and that it may have as 
much Occafion for external Affillance, as reafon to affiil others. 
The Poffibility of fuch a State follows from the very Nature 
©f Limitation and Imperfeftion. For fuppofmg more thing5 
than one of a limited Nature, if they have any intercourie to 
gether, they muft neceffarily affedt each other. And it be- 
longs to the Divine Goodneft fo to frame them, that they fhall 
affift and relieve each other. Now limited Natures ought to 
have limited Powers and Acts, nor can all Faculties agree to 
every Nature, lince they may be different, diltinct and oppo- 
fite. And tho' thefe Agents which have contrary Faculties 
cannot promote each others Benefit immediately ; yet by tak- 
ing a Compafs, and confpiring to aft in concert, they may 
conduce to the good of the whole and of each other. But 
fmce created things are almoft infinite, and endowed with an 
infinite diverfity ot Powers and Properties, and fince an inter- 
courfe is eitablifhed between all of them io that they 'may a<ft 
upon, and be a(£led on by each other, it is impolnble but that 
fome Oppofition and Contention fhould arife among the parts; 
which nevcrthelefs may make for the Benefit of the whole; 
neither can thefe Oppofitions and Contentions be any bar to 
the Divine Power and Goodnefs, fince they proceed not from 
any Defeifl in the Creator, but from the necellary Imperfecfli- 
on of fuch things as are in their own Nature limited and fi- 
nite, but which are necefiary to the Good of the whole Sy- 
flem, the general Benefit whereof is to be preferred to the 
Good of fome particulars whenfoever they are inconfiftent. 
There muft then be Defedls, or want of Perfcftion in feveral 
parts of the Creation, and this Wantof Pertcction mull of Ne-, 


Chap. III. Of the Evil of BefeB. 13^ 

it is the p.irt of infinite Goodnefs to chufe the ve- 
ry beft; from thence it proceeds therefore, that 
the more imperfedt Beings have Exidence; for ic 



ceffity bring many Inconvenlencies on the Perfon whofe Lot 
it is to fill that Part of the Univerfc, which requires a Creature 
of fuch an imperfedl Nature. For Example, a Man has no 
Wings, a Perfeftion granted to Birds. 'Tis plain, that in his 
prefent Circumilances he cannot have them, and that the Ufe 
of them wou'd be very milchievous to Society ; and yet the 
Want of them necefiarily expofes us to many Inconveni- 


ijc^ A Man falls from a Precipice or into a Pit ; Wings wou'd 
fave him from the Fall, and relieve him from his Imprifon- 
ment ; whereas now he breaks his Bones or IlarTCs by his Con- 
finement. A thoufand Inftances may be given where the 
Evil of Imperfection necefiarily fubjeftsus to Difappointment 
of Appetite, and fevcral other natural Evils ; which yet are 

-, all neceflary for the Common good. 

i/r^ If it be afk'd why God, as he is of Infinite Power and 
Wifdom, did not order things in fuch a Manner that the good of 
the whole (hould in all cafes and at all times confpire with that 
of each particular. Or ifthefe Evils necefiarily arife from the 
mutual Intercourfe of Parts of a different and contrary 
Kind, why did he ordain fuch an Intercourfe ? Could he not; 
have created all Things in fuch a State of Perfe£lion, that 
they fhould find their Happinefs in themfelves without the 
Help of any thing external ? At leaft he could have made 
thofe things, which he himfelf had the Framing of, in fuch a 
Manner as to have no Intercourfe with any Being but himfelf. 
For they might have had enough to exercife their Faculties 
upon in the Contemplation and Love of the Divine Nature ; 
which would have been fufiicient for their Happinefs, with- 
Qut any Cornmerce with or Dependence upon other Creatures ; 
efpecially fuch as would incommode them. Why therefore 
did God choofe fuch a Syileiu as made room for other imper- 
feft, miferable Bemgs. 

/^We anfwer, that granting fuch Creatures as thofe above- 
mention'd to be poflible, God has aftually created as many of 
that Kind as the Syftem wou'd admit, infomuch that if there 
had been more it wou'd have been more inconvenient. Nor 
is it of any confequence whether we fuppofe this Syftem to 
be Finite or Infinite. If Finite, 'tis plain that a certain Num- 

140 Of the Evil of DefeB, Chap. III. 

was agreeable to that not to admit the very leaft 
Good that could be produced. Finite Goodnefs 
Diight poffibly have been exhaufted in creating the 


NO r E S, 

ber mny fill it fo that there will be no room for more. If 
Infinite;, infinite Creitures of the fame Kind will equally 
fA\ an infinite Syficm, as a finite Number will fill a finite One; 
for there's the fame Proportion. In this then as well as the 
former Syftem there will be no Place for more. But yet 
xvhen this Syftem or Order of Creatures is filled up, there 
wou'd be room left for other lejs perfe£t Orders, whofe Na- 
tures and Faculties might hive a mutual Relation to each otier 
and whofe Happinefs might require their mutual Help and 
Afliftance. 'Tis certain that many and various Orders -and 
Begrees of this Kind were polfible; neither would they, if 
created, be any Impediment to the more perfcft Orier, which 
is already compleated, and the Number of which could not 
be encreafed without Damage to the Syftem ; neither would 
the Addition of thefe inferior Orders and Degrees, lefTen the 
Number of the prior and more perfedl Ones. 
Q^^Whzt therefore was to be done ? Let us now fuppofe God 
deliberating with himfelf (as a Man wou'd do) whether he 
Ihould create any of an inferior Order. If he does, 'tis ma- 
nifeft that he will introduce unneceffary Imperfeftions into 
his Works. Nay, fince fome of thefe may have Natures and 
Powers contrary to each other, it will be poflible for Clafh- 
ing and Oppofition to arife among his Creatures. If he does 
not create them, he will appear unkind in grudging and re- 
fufing them a Benefit, which he was able to conirRunicate 
without Detriment to the Syftem. For I fuppofe thefe infe- 
rior Ones not to be fo very imperfe£t, but that their Exiftencc 
wou'd be decm'd a great and valuable Blefhng. 
g^ Who does not fee what way the Divine Goodnefs wou'd 
incline in this Debate ? For fince it was better that thefe fliou'd 
be, than not, is it not agreeable to infinite Goodnefs to 
choofe the beft ? At leaft fuch a Choice could be no Inj ury to 
the greateft Goodnefs. 

Whatever Syftem God had chofen, all Creatures in it could 
not have been equally perfeft, and there could have been but a 
certain determinate Multitude of the moft Perfed, and when 
that was Compleated, there wou'd have been a Station for Crea- 
— itiires lefs pe rfe6l,-<-and it wou'd ftill have been an Inftance of. 
Goodnefs to give them i Being, as well as others: And 
"* therefore 

Chap. III. Of the Evil of DefeB. 141 

greater Beings, bnc Iriftnitc extends to all. The 
infinite Power and Goodnefs of God then were 
the Caufe why imperfed Beings had Exiftence to 



therefore whatever Syilem had been chofen, it would have 
come to what we fee, perhaps it wou'd have been worfe/SJnce ^ *~A.i»^^ 
therefore whatever God had chofen, there mud have been De- 
grees of Perfeflion, and one Creature mull have been more 
imperfeft and infirm than another, ought we not to conclude 
that our prefent Syftem is at leaft equal to any other that we 
could have expefted ? 

p>- Hence it appears why God created fach Beings, as mufl 
neceffarily have an Intercourfe with each other, and how a- 
greeable it was to the Divine Goodnefs not to deny them Ex- 
iftence. There could be no reafon to afk why he did not 
make them of a more perfedl Order, fmce as many of that' 
Kind are made already as the Syftem could' receive, of v^hac. 
Kind foever that Syftem were fuppofed to be. Neither could 
the Benefit of the whole be rendered abfolutely, in all Cafes,, 
and at all times confiftcnt with that of Particulars. For tho* 
this might perhaps be effetled in the more perfcft Orders, yet 
it is plainly impoffiblc in the lefs perfect ones, fuch as have a 
Connexion with Matter, that is neceffarily fubjefl to Con- 
trariety and DifFolution ; and cfpecially thofe which have fo- 
lid and hard Bodies. Either therefore no fuch Ani.iials as 
thefe were to have been created, or thefe InconVcniencics to- 
lerated : Suppofing always that their Exiftence is a Bleffing 
to them notwithftanding thefe Inconveniences, and that more 
Good than Evil accrues to them from the Poffeflion of it. 

pt- From hence it U'ill appear how fruitful a Source of EvilV 
this Imperfeftion of Creatures may be, and that from this 
Head there flows a Poflibility of Evil among the Works of 
God, notwithftanding Infinite Power and Goodnefs. How 
every particular Evil may be reduced to this Origin, fhall be 
fhewn (God willing) in the Sequel. 

In the Interim who can doubt whether this Source of all 
Evils be itfelf to be call'd an Evil ? Evil is by many defanecf 
a Privation of Good. In this it agrees with Defeft or Im- 
perfeftion, and a Man is called Evil, or an Adion Evil, 
which brings us into Inconvenience?, or is prejudicial to the 
Author or any other Perfon. With how much more rcafori 
then may Imperiection be called an Evil, fince 'tis the Ori- 

142 Of the Evil of hefe6i. Chap. III. 

gether with the more peifed. 'Tis plain therefore 
that the Syftem of the World may be the V/ork 
of a Deity i tho* it has this Fault, Nay, that is was 



gin of all the Evils we endwc, or which arlfe in the Mun- 
dane Syfcem. 

^But inanimate Things, you fay, are capable of neither 
Good nor Evil, and therefore it does not, fignify in what 
Condition they be placed, fenfible Things only can be mife- 
rable. I anfwer, 'tis true inanimate Creatures are not capa- 
ble of fome kind of Evils, W3. Pain, Grief, or undue Elecli- 
ons; but are there no other Evils which they may be fubje6t 
to ? Who wou'd not think himfelf ill dealt with, if he fhould 
be reduced to the State of an inanimate Creature ? He wou'd 
feel no Inconvenience, fay you. 1 grant it, but this very not 
feeling is dreaded by us as one of the greateil: of all Evils. 
This Deprivation ofSenfe therefore, is far from being defira- 
ble, and confequently far from being good. To be deprived 
■ of Senfe is what we call an Evil oi Lofs, tho' it be not a fenii- 

ble one. 
I^^^-If any one fnould take away a Man's Feeling by a blow or 
jiny other way, nay if he did not rellore it to him when he 
had this in his Power, wou'd he not be mifchievous and in- 
jurious to him, tho' the Sufferer be not at all fenfible of the 
Injury? Now who can affirm that God cou'd not have en- 
dowed every thing with Senfe, at leail have join'd a fcnfitive 
Soul to every Particle of Matter ? May we not complain 
therefore that he has not done it ? It is not equally difadva'nta- 
geous for inanimate things never to have had Senfe, as for ani- 
mated Beings to be deprived of it? 

And yet fome are fo perverfe that they will not have this 
Imperfeclion called an Evil, tho' it really be as great an one as 
the other. 

&*-However, we mail: obferve that inanimate Things are not' 
made for themlelves, but for the Ufc offuch as are endowed^ 
with Senfe and Reafon, they have therefore a relative good 
or Evil, both in regard to God, and to thole Creatures for 
\vhofe Ufe they v/erc deiign'd, and as far as they anfwer the 
End they were made for we efrecm them good, fuch as do 
othcrvvifeare Evil: Of which Good or Evil tliere is no other 
ground but their Perfeclion or Imperreftion. 

Tho Origin of Evil is the fame therefore in both fenfitive" 
sfiid inanimate Beings, w'k, the Abfehcc of Pcrfc(ftion. 


Chap. III. Of the Evil of DefeB. 143 

created is evident for this very Reafon, becaufe it is 
imperfeUi for if it were Self-exijlent, it would be 
a&folmely perfe^* (l^.) 

N T £ S. 

(24.) The chief Argument of the foregoing Chapter is 
beautifully illuflrated by Mr. Addifon'm the Spc&ator, N". 5 19. 
As frequent ufe will be made of this Obfcrvation concerning 
the Scale of Beings, I hope the Reader will excufe my tran- 
fcribin^ fo much of the abovemention'd Paper as is neceflary- 
to explain it. 

(;&-' Infinite Goodnefs is of fo communicative a Nature, that 
it feems to delight in the conferring of Exiftence upon eve- 
ry Degree of perceptive Being. As this is a Speculation 
which I have often purfued with great pleafure to my felf, 
I fhall enlarge farther upon it, by confidcring that part of 
the Scale of Beings which cjnes within our Knowledge. 
There are fome living Creatures which are raifed juft above 
dead Matter. To mention only the Species of Shell-Fifii, 
which are formed in the Fafhion of a Cone, that grOw to' 
the Surface of feveral Rocks, and immediately die. upoa 
their being fever'd from the place where they grow. There, 
are many other Creatures but one remove from thefe, which 
have no other Senfes befides that of Feeling and Talle. 
Others have fall an additional one of Hearing, others of 
Smell, and others of Sight. -fit is wonderful to obferve, bv •#- 
whit a gradual progrefs the World of Life advances thro' 
a prodigious variety of Species, before a Creature is form- 
ed that is compleat in all its Senfes ;t-and even among thefe -f ^^^wv.. 
is fuch a different Degree of Perfeftion, in the Sen fe which 
One Animal enjoys beyond what appears in another, that tho' 
the Senfe in different Animals be dilHnguifh'd by the fame 
common Denom.ination, it feems almofl of a different Nature. 
If after this We look into the feveral inward Perfeftions, Cun- 
ning and Sagacity, or what we generally call 7/?/?/;/^*, we 
find them rifmg after the fame manner imperceptibly one a- 
bove another, and receiving additional Improvements ac- 
cording to the Species in which they are implanted. +This-f- -=^~ 
Progrefs in Nature is fo very gradual, that rhe moft perfeft 
of an inferior Species comes very near to the raoft imperfeft 
of that which is immediately above it. ^'Thc exuberant and -f- 

• ovcr- 

* To which we may add, Will and Liberfy. See Belle's 
©i4l. p. 2609. 2610. 

144 ^f (^^^ -Ei;/7 of Defea. Chap. III. 


« overflowing Goodnefs of the fuprcme Being, whofe Mercy 
' extends to all his Works, is plainly ken, as I have before hint- 

* ed, from his having made io little Matter, at Icall ivhat fills 

* within our Knowledge, that does not fwarm with Life: 

* Nor is his Goodnefs lei's feen in the Diverfity than in the 

* Multitude of living Creatures. Had he oijly made one 

* Species of Animals, none of the reft would have enjoy' J 

* the Happinels of Exillence, he has therefore fpacified in his 
' Creation every Degree of Life, every. Capacity of Being, 

* The whole Chafm in Nature, from a Plant to a Man,, is fil- 
' led up with diverfe kinds of Creatures, rifing one over ano- 

* ther, by fuch a gentle and eafy afcent,- that the little Tran- 

* fitions and Deviations from one Species to another, are al- 

* mort infenfible. This intermediate Space \^ fo v/ell huf- 

* banded and managed, that there is fcarce a Degree of Per- 

* fedtion which does not appear in fome one pa^t of the World 

* of Life. Is the Goodnefs or Wifdom of the Divine Being 

* more manifefted in this his Proceeding ?.t There is a Con- j 

* fequence, befides thofe I have already mentioned, which 
' feems very naturally deducibJc from the foregoing Conilde- 

* rations. -t If the Scale of Being rifes by fuch a regular Pro- 

* grefs, fo high as Man, we may, by a parity of Reafon, fivp- 
' pofe that it Hill proceeds gradually thro' thofe Beings which 
' are of a fuperior Nature to him ; fince there is an infinitely 

* greater Space and Room for different Degrees of Perfection 
' between the fupreme Being and Man, than between Man 

-* and the moll defpicable Infed. ^fhis Confcquence of fo great 

* a variety of Beings which are fuperior to us, from that vari- 
« ety which is inferior to us, is made by Mr. Locke, in a Paf- 

* lage which I fliall here fet down, after having premiied* that 

* notwithitanding there is fuch infinite Room between Man 
' and his Maker for the creative Power to exert itfelfin, it 
' is impoffible that it fliould ever be filled up, fince there will 

* be ftill an Infinite Gap or Dillance between the highelt cro- 

* atcd Being and the Power which produced him.' . 

The fine Paflage there cited from Mr. Locke, occurs in the 
3d Book of his Effay, Chap. 6. §. i z. 
Sec alfo Notes, K. and 26. 
From the foregoing Obfervation, that there is no manner 
oS Chafm or Voidy no Link deficient in this great Chain, ot Be- 
ings, and the Re.ifon of it, it \\\\\ appear extremely probable 
alfo that evtry dilUndt Order, every Clafs or Species of them, 
is' as full as the Nature of it would admit, and God faw pro- 

Cbap. if I. Of the Evil of Defedi. 



ftv. There are (as our Author fays) perhaps {o many in each 
Clafs as could exift together without ibme inconvenic-nce or ii?i- 
cafitieff to each other. . This. is eafily conceivable in Mankind, 
and may be in fuperior Beings, tho' for want of an exaft 
Knowledge of their fcveral Natures and Orders, we cannot 
apprehend the manner of it, or conceive how they affeft one 
another; only this we are furc of, that neither the Species, nor 
the Indivi4«als_in each Species, can polhblybe Inhnite ; and. 
that nothing but an ImpaJJlbillfy in the Nature cf the thing, or 
fome greater Incon^venicnce^ can rellrain the Exe.-cife ot the; 
Power of God, or hinder him from producing ftill more and 
more Beings capable of Felicity. When we begin to enquire in-, 
to the Number of thefe and the Degrees of their Perfection, we 
foon lofe ourfelves, and can only refer all to the D.vme Wii"- 
dom and Goodnefs '.iCFrom our previous Notices of which At— f- 
tributes, we have the higheft Reafon to conclude that every- 
thing is a? perfedl as poflible in itspwn kind,' and that every 
Syftem is in itfelffull and complete. 

1^ '" 


CH A;P, 

146 Chap, IV. 


Concerning Natural Evil. 


Of Generation and Corruption. 

A Crea- TT appears from the foregoing Obfervations that 
ture can- X Created Beings mufb necelTarily be defective, i. e. 
not com- fome muft want the Perfeftions which others have. 
Its Fate ^"^ ^^^^^ ^^ ^^^ impoffible for them to enjoy either an 
tho' it be abfolute or equal Perfeftion ; alio, that thereis no Oc- 
lefs pertea cafion for an Evil Principle oppofite to infinite Good- 
than o- j^gj-j ^^^ Power. And from hence we may affirm that 
God, tho' infinitely good and powerful, could not k- 
parate things from the concomitant Evils of Imperfec- 
tion, and did not el}eem it unbecoming himfelf to cre- 
ate the Good, rho' that brought fome Evils along with 
it, fo long as thefe Evils are lefs than the Good with 
which they are connefted. Nor can the Creature jufl- 
ly complain of its Condition, if it have not all, or e- 
qual Perfc6lion with fome others; fmce 'twas ne- 
cefTary that it fhould fill the Station wherein it was 
placed, or none at all. This we have fhewn fufficient- 
ly, I think, in the former kind of Evils, viz, thofe 
Qi Imverfeclion. 


Sed. r. Concerning Natural Evil. 147 

II. The fame muft be attempted in the fecond The Ori- 
kind, viz,, the Natural. Now, as all created Be- S'" of 
ings are made out o£ Nothing, and on that account are |-,.o"^\/i * 
necefTarily imperfeft ; fo all natural things have a Re- ter, is the 
lation toj or arife from Alatier^ and on this account fource of 
are neceSarily fubjeded to natural Evils : Nor is the Natural 
rife of all created Beings from Nothing a moe ^j^ • .-r' 
fruitful and certain Caufe of the Evils of Imper- ^^.^^ ^^^ 
fedion, than the rife of all natural things from thirg is 
Matter is of all natural Evils. (H.) If therefore the Caufe 

L 2 we ofthofeof 

I m per- 

NOTES. ^''"^^ 

(H.) The Ol:je£tion againll this Pofition ftands thus. Not 
only Generation and Corruption arc natural Evils, but like- 
wife Pains of Body and Diffatisfaftion of Mind, Diflippoint- 
ijients of Appetite and Death. Now it is manifell that all ma- 
terial Beings are not fubjeit to thefe, particularly Man in Pa- 
radife as to his Body was material, and yet free from Death, 
and all natural Evils, and the fame is true of the BlelTed ia, 
Heaven. Since therefore material Beings may be fee from 
all natural Evils, it follows that they are not neceffarily fub-. 
jeft to fuch becaufe they are Material, and confequently we 
muft look for anotlier Origin of natural Evils dillind. frora 

^ Matter, . 

'^^T^The Anfwer to this Objeftion, that feems to have fo great. 
force in it, is not difficult. 'Tis manifeft from the Book that 
when it affirms all material Beings are liable to natural Evils, 
it is not meant that they ^are always a£lually affedled by them, 
but that they are capable of being fo afFefted at certain Times, 
and in certain Circumftances ; and yet their Circumftances may. 
perhaps be fo ordered that they fhall be always free froin. 

For Example, Man in Paradife was naturally Mortal, and 

tho' we do not know what fort of Body he had, yet we are 

fure that he had an Appetite to eat and drink, and needed 

thefe to fupport him. ... . 

How then could hg avoid Pain,' Difappointmcnt of Appe- 

-f^ite and Death ?aI aftfv/er by being placed in fuch Circum- 
ftances that he fhould always have fufficient Provifion ready 
to fatisfy his Hunger and Thirft, and fuch a Knowledge of 
all things, that could hurt him, that he might eafily avoid, 
them. His Blood was infi.^mable then as well as now, and 

con fa- 

148 Concerning Natural Evil. Chap. IV. 

we can ihew that thefe Evils are fo neceflarily 
conneded with this Origin that they cannot be 



confequently he was fubjeil to a Fever. His Limbs might be 
broken and disjointed then as well as now, and that muft dif- 
able him to manage his Bufmefs, and difappint a natural 
Appetite of moving where his Occafions required. But God 
gave him the Tree of Life as a Remedy againft all natural 
Diftempers and Decays of Body, and either fuch a Profpedt 
of what tou'd hurt him as might enable him to avoid the 
Occafion, or elfe if that happeu'd he was reftored by the ufc 
Cof the fame Tree of Life, v After all it doth not appear from 
Scripture, that Man in his Innocency was fecure from all natu- 
ral Evils, but only from fuch as might deprive him of Life, 
or make that Life uncomfortable to him. If any Divines 
have gone farther it is mere conjefture, and no part either of 
the Faith taught in Scripture, or conveyed to us by the Catho- 
lick Church. The Author of the Origin of Evil has given his 
Thoughts concerning the Eftate of our iirft Parents more ful- 
ly in a Difcourfe on Cc7i. ii. 17. Where he founds himfelf on 
the Word of God and fpeaks conformably to the Senfe of the 
Primitive and reformed Churches, but it were too long to 
infert here *. 

From what has been faid already I fuppofe it is manifeft, 
that the Happinefs of Man in Paradife is no Argument againil 
the Pofition in the Book, that all things material are liable to 
natural Evils, to Corruption and Diflblution, and if united 
to a Spiritual Subftance that has Senfe or Reafon, they make 
it likewife capable of Pain, and of the Diifatisf^dion that a- 
rifes from the Difappointment of Appetites. 

As to the Blcfied in Heaven, their Cafe is much more eafy 
to be accounted for, and I think thofe Words of the 4th C. 
S. 3. Subl". 2. are fufficient. ' I anfwer, thefe Bodies are not 

• tlierefore immortal, bccaufc they are naturally incorruptible 

♦ for that would be inconlillent with the Nature of that Mat- 

* ter whereof thev are compofed) but becaufe they are put in- 

• to fuch Places and Circumltances by the Deity, that they 
' can even with Pleafure forefee, and prevent all fuch things 

* as tend to introduce either Corruption or Pain.'' I am apt 
to think the Objector either never read, or did not ^confidcf 
this when he made the Objeftion. 

* See the Sermon annexed. 

Sedl. I. Concerning Natural Evil. 149 

feparared froni ir, it follows that the Strudure of 
the World either ought nor to have been framed 
at all, or that thefe Evils muft have been tolerat- 
ed without any Imputation on the Divine Power 
and Goodnefs. But it is better that they iliould 
be as they are, fince they could not be more per- 
fed. Let us examine the particular Sorts of na- 
tural Evils, and if there be nothing in them 
which could be removed v/ithout greater Damage 
to Nature, and introducing a larger Train of Evils, 
the Divine Goodnefs may fecurely applaud itfelf, 
fince it has omitted no manner of Good nor admitted 
any Evil which could poflibly be prevented, /. e, 
hach done in every thing what was beft. 

III. God has accomplifh'd this in the Creation Matter is 
of Matter, as we faid before, nor has he been lefs ufelcfs ex- 
b(eneficent in what relates to the Motion of Mat- ?^^P^ ^' 
ter. In the firft Place, Matter, tho' in itfelf un- ^^^l °'- 
ad;ive, is neverthelefs capable of Adlion, viz,, local 
Motion, which is the Aftion that belongs to Mat- 
ter. But 'tis better that it fhould ad: as far as it 

is capable, than be entirely flill and fluggifh: If 
it were without Motion, rigid and fix'd in the 
fame Place, we cannot conceive what Benefit it 
could be of either to itfelf or any thing elfe: But 
when 'tis put into Motion, it may be of ufe, as 
is plain from Experience; tho** not always without 
a Mixture of Evils: But Adion is, cdterii paribus, 
preferable to Inadivity ; it is therefore agreeable to g^^^j^ y^^^ 
the Divine Goodnefs to produce Motion in Matter, don was to 
if the Good arifing from thence do not overballance berais'din 
the Evil, and fo long as no Evils are permitted which Matter, as 
are feparable from Motion, nor fuch as can affed ^^^f^^^ \^ 
Spirits, which are purely immaterial. into parts 

IV. Now, if it be granted that God could, con- Hence the 
fiftently with his Goodnefs, both create Matter d^wA Genera- 
put it into Motion, it necelfarily follows that its Cg^/ 
Motions muft interfere with one another. If you ^on of 

" J, 5 fajr Bodies, 

i£;o Concerning J^atiiral ^s'A. Chap. VI. 

fay that Matter might move uniformly and all to- 
gether, either in a direct Line or a Circle-^ and the 

- contrariety of Morions by that means be pievent- 
ed: I anivver, The wliole Mafs of Matter would 
be no Ids rigid and ufelefs with fuch a Morion as 
this, than if it were entirely at refl ; it would nei- 
ther be more fit for Animals, nor more adapted to 
the ufes which it now anfwers. Such a Motion there- 
fore was to be excited in it, as would feparate it 
into parts, make it fluid, and render it an Habita- 
tion fit for Animals. But that could not be with- 
out contrariety of Motion, as any one that thinks 
of it at all will perceive: And if this bs once ad- 
tnitttd in Matter^ there nece0arily follows a Dm- 

fon and DifpiYity of Parts, Clajljing and Opfojition 
Comminiitiot-g- Concretion and Repuijion, and all thofe 
Evils which we behold \n Generation and Corruption. 
God could indeed have removed all thefe irom 
■Matter, by taking away its Motion, but they are 
either to be tolerated, or Matter muft remain fix'd 
and immoveable in the fame Situation. Some may 
ask, why God would not produce fuch Motion 
in Matter as might render all its Concretions fo 
perfed: as not to be liable to Dijfolmion or Corrup- 
tion. For fince the Power of God is infinite, 
nothing on his fide hinders this from being done; 
what hinders therefore on the fide of Matter? I 
anfwer, Its Motion and Divifihility. For if you 
fuppofe any fort of Motion in Matter, it mufl 
neceffarily be cither ufelefs, as we faid before, or in 
(Tfpojite BireBions, The mutual cla filing of thefe 
Concretions could therefore not be avoided, and as 
they flrike upon one another, whether we fuppofe 
them hard cr foft, a Concuflion of the Parts and 
d Separation from each other would be neceffari- 
ly produced : But a Separation or Diflipation of 
the parts is Corruption. This therefore could not 
be avoided without violence done to the Laws of 
- Motion 

Sed. T.' Concerning Natural Evil. i^i 

Motion and the Nature of Matter, For to hinder 
moveable things from ever interfering, and the 
Parts which are naturally feparable from ever fe- 
parating by mutual impulfes, would require a per- 
pcmal Miracle. (2,5.) 

V. Secondly; Since it is proper that Matter ™'«" 

^,,1 ^ ■ «,/•• J-i 1^1- under ccr- 

fhould be put mto Motion, 'tis better that this ^^j^^ j ^^^^^ 

fhould be done according to fome certain Laws tends 

and in an orderly Courfe, than at random, and as more to 

it were by chance. For by this Means the Sy- the prefer- 

ftems compofed of Matter will have both more J'j'^i"?"^^ 

durable and more regular Periods. The firft E- jj^^,^ jj-j^ 

vil arifing from Matter was, we faid, the jarring of were left 

Eleaaents ; from hence comes this Corruption at ran- 

and DifTolution, Inftability and Viciffitude, It may ^^^j^ 

be furprizing, that all thefe fhould proceed from a q^^ jj_ 

flable, fix'd and uniform Good. But we have ^ rihuted 

made it appear that Matter could not move at all Bodies 

without thefe, and it was more eligible that the into vari- 

World fhould be liable to them, than deftitute of «"s ^y- . 

L 4 Ani- ^^^^"^• 


(25.) That is, there could be no general pre- eftablifh'd L anxjs 
of 'Nature, but God muft continually interpole and effeft t.\Q' 
ry thing by his own dired and immediate Power: The bad 
confequences of which are very obvious. There could be no 
Jrts and Sciences, no Skill or Indujiry ; no regular Methods of 
providing for our Bodies, or improving our Minds in the 
Knowledge of things. All which evidently prefuppofe and 
are entirely founded on fome fettled, certain Laws of the 
Univerfe difcoverable by us. 

' We are fo far acquainted (fays the Author of the Religion 
' of Nature Delin. p. 96.) with the LawJ of Gra-vitation ani 
« Motion, that we are able to calculate their Effeds, and ferve 

* ourfelves of them, fupplying upon many Occafions the de- 
« fed of Power in ourfelves by Mechanical Powers, which 

* never fail to anfwer according to the Eftablilliment ^r.' 
Concerning the Neceffity of the prefent Laws of Motion, and 
the Fitnefs of them to attain the intended Ends, fee Dr. J. 
Clarke on Natural Evil, p. 92, ^c and 250,, 158. 

(L) Tis 

1^2 Concerning Natural Evil. Chap. IV. 

Animals. And that thefe Evils ijiould not multi- 
ply beyond Neceffity the pivine Goodnefs has 
taken care, by reftraining its Motion under cer- 
tain Laws, fo as to make it fteady, and as conftant 
as could be ; fo that the Machines compofed of it 
might be as little fliock'd with contrary Motions 
ss polTible, and endure for a long time ', nay fome 
of them in certain Places and Circumftances for 
pver. For if no parcels of Matter were direded 
by any certain and determinate Rule, fuch a cpn- 
fufed Motion vould jumble every thing together, 
nor could any thing lafl: for ever fo fhort a time. 
On this account God eftablifh'd certain Laws' of 
Motion, and perpetual Rules; and framed the 
great Mafs of Beings into certain Machines and 
Syftems, which have fuch an exad Correfpondence 
as to contribute their mutual Afliftance towards 
preferving the Motion and Order prefcribed by 
the Deity. (L) Neither was it convenient that 



(L.) 'Tis objefled that the Author avoids the chief Diffi- 
culty, and which flood moft in need of an Anfwe?-. For he 
iuppofes certain general Laws upon the Eftablifhment whereof 
Evils muft necefTarily invade the Works of God ; but he'doei 
not tell us why God eftablifhed thefe Laws, which mull 
bring fo great Evils along with therh : could not an Omnipo- 
tent, All knowing, and abfolutely Good God have made o- 
ther Laws free from all thefe Defcfts ? Why did he bind 
himfelf to fuch univerfal Rules ? Could he not have interpof- 
ed his Omnipotence and difpens'd with thefe Laws, and there- 
by prevented every Evil which wou'd arife from the Obferv- 
ance of them ? The Author is filent on this Head. 

But it is evident that the Author had thefe Difficulties in 
view, and has given a proper Reply to each. Wherever he 
has mcntion'd any univerfal Law, he fliews that it arifes 
from the very Nature and Conftitution of things, and that a 
better could not poffibly be made, nor one which is more ne- 
^QiXary for rh^ Frcfcrvacion of thofe Beings to which it is gi- 
l'> • '- '■ *- .; " ■'••'•..'. ' ven; 

Sed. I. Concerning Natural Evil. 153 

Matter fhould every where confift of the fame 
kind of Parts ; but rather that it fhould be in one 
place very fluid, fimilar and homogeneous, fuch as 
we believe the z/£ther to be ; in another, folid and 
compad, as the Earth is, and perhaps the Stars; 
in another, rnix'd with heterogeneous Particles, 
fuch as we find the Air and Water. 

VI. We mult confefs that fuch a Mafs as the It appears 
Earth is, fcems not fo beautiful or fo fit for Mo- !j^°^ 
tion, as the pure fluid JKthcr; 'tis alfo more liable o/fg/p^^g. 
to Corruption and Changes; yet it is moft cer- nomena, 
tain that the Earth was not cpnlfituted in this man- that the 
ner for no reafon at all, or unneceflarily : Perhaps Syftems of 
the Muttdaae Syftem could no more confift with- ^J^^ U"'- 
out thefe folid Mafles, than the human Body with- ^ ^^^ 
out Bones. No fober Man doubts but God could and beau 
have difpofed this Material World into other Sy- tiful. 
Items; and of what kind foever thefe had been, 
Qur reafon could never have comprehended the 
contrivance of them. For, fince our Planetary 
Syftem is incompiehenfible to us, much more will 
the Fabrick of the whole Univerfe be fo; but as 
far as we do underftand the Difpofition of it, all 
is well, elegant and beautiful: and if, among all 
the Phenomena of Nature, we were only acquainte4 
vith Lightfi that would fl^ev/ us the juft and ad- 


ven : And tnat it could not be difpens'd with, at leafl: frequent- 
ly, without detriment to the whole*. 

If therefore all the Fault muft needs be laid upon God ; 
yet he is not to be blamed for fi>.ing fuch general Laws, but 
rather for making fuch imperfedl Creitures, which ncceffarily- 
required thefe Laws and were incapable of better. This is the 
true ftate of the Quellion, and of this the Author has alfo 
^',lvcn an account in the foregoing Chapter. See Note (G.) 

* Sc-e C. j-. §. 5. Subf, ^. 

154 Concerning Nafiiral "Evil. Chap. IV. 

mirable Strudureof it. Ic is reasonable therefore to 
believe that this is rhe very beft, and attended with 
the leaf} In^ onvenieri"'°s. 
'Tis rafh YH, You'll fay chat fome particular things 
tha^tMat- "^^b^"^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ better. Bur, fince you do not 
ter might thoroughly underhand the whole, you have no 
be diftri- right to affirm thus much. We have much great- 
buted into er Reafon to prefume that no one Part of it could 
better Sy- ^^ changed for the better, without greater "Detri- 
fince we ™£nt to the reft, which it would either be incon- 
donot fiftent with, or disfigure by its Difpioportion*. 
thoro'ly For we have fhewn before that all mraner of lur 
ft"^d^']i conveniencies could not be avoided, becaufe of the 
prdent. ^ Imperfedion of Matter, and rhe Nature of Mo- 
tion. That State of things was therefore prefera- 
ble, which was attended with the feweft and leaft 
Inconveniencies. And who but a very raili, in-* 
difcreet Perfon will affirm that God has not ad- 
ually made choice of this? Nay, who can do it 
with any Shadow of Reafon, unlefs he throughly 
underftands both this and that other which he 
would prefer to it? Whoever pronounces upon 
them before this, gives Sentence before he has 
look'd into the Caufe, and is at the fame time both a 
partial and an incompetent Judge. 

It concerned us the more to have this well ex- 
plained, that being convinced of the Convenience 
or Meliority of the whole Material Syfliem, we 
may more eafily perceive the Origin of thofe Evils 
which neceffarily follow from the Contrariety of Mo- 
tion, and the Corruftion of things. 

^ See Note 28. 


Se(5l. 2. Concerning Natural Evil. i£^ 


Concerning Animals and the Variety 
of them. 

SINCE Matter is not S elf-con fcious, nor able Matter 
to enjoy itfelf, nor capable of receiving any ^°f^ ^^^ 
Benefit from itfelf, it follows that it was not made be made 
for itfelf, but for fomething elfe, to which it was for its 
to be fubfervient in Senfation Thought, or Fru- own fake 
rion. We find by Experience that Matter can be ^^"^^j,^^^ 
thus ferviceable to a thinking Being, tho' ftupid confcLus 
and infenfible itfelf: 'Tis probable therefore that 'tis there-* 
God defigned and direded all Matter to this end forede- 
as far as was poiTible. Hence comes the Union %"'^ fot 
of fenfible and thinking Beings with the Particles ^f^ni-^ ' 
of Matter, as we experience in ourfelves. The mals. 
fame may be faid of all its Parts, as far as the 
order and conftitution of things allow'd. There 
IS nothing therefore in vain, nothing idle, nor any 
Region without its Animals. For fuppofing, S5 
we faid, fo many pure Spirits feparate from Mat- 
ter, to be made as were convenient^ as thefe ac-^ 
cupy no Place*, there would be no lefs Room 
for other thinking fenfible Subftances that Hood 
in need of Matter for the Exercife of their Fa^ 
eulties, and enjoyment of themfelves, which for 
tjie future let us call Souh, (K.) 



(K ) The Author has endeavoured to account for this Varie- 
ty of Creatures in the following Manner. AH ^eings could 

■ not 

* See Note j7, ■ 

"\^6 Concerning Natural Ew'iL Chap. IV. 

'Tis pro- 11. Now, fince the Striidure of this viliblc 
bable that \Yorld confifts of various Bodies, viz,, pure JK- 

vary ac- ^^^r, 

to the va- NOTES, 

riety of 

thole re- not be placed in the fame Degree of Happinefs or in the fame 
gions order of Perfeftion, neither could all of the fame Order be in 

which the fame Degree, or enjoy the fame Conveniencies. The 

they arc good of the whole wou'd not allow it. For Inllance, fup- 
deftin'd pofe a certain Order of intelligent Creatures made by God, 
to inha- which have a mutual Intercourfe, and ftand iu need of each 
bit : others Afliftance to promote the comnjon Happinefs, which 

Therefoie they are obliged to promote with united Powers and Incli- 
the M- nations. 

ther and! 'Tis plain, that there's a Neceffity for Government among 
Air, in all them ; for as they have Appetites and Choice, and a limited 
probabili- Underllanding, 'tis impoffible for them to adminifter the Af- 
ty, have fairs of the Publick (in which the good of all confifts) by the 
their pro- fame means, at the fame time and with a joint Endeavour, 
per Inha- without devolving a Right to determine thefe things on fome 
bitants, one or more Perfons. Whence arifes a Neceffity for Rule or 
.ns well as Government among fuch reafonable Creatures. Nor could 
the Earth, it be avoided where there is both a mutual Intercourfe and 
a limited Underftanding. On which account, the fame is 
obfervable among the Angels themfelves. 

But now 'tis plain that thofe who happen to have this Go- 
vernment over fuch as are naturally their equals, are in better 
Circumllances with regard to externals, than thofc w hich have 
only the Honour of obeying. They may with greater certain- 
ty and eafe, and in more Cafes obtain their Ends, efrcft their 
Choice, and accomplilh their Dcfires, (/. e. be happy) than 
thofe whichjare obliged to poftpone the Gratification of their 
Scnfes and the Execution of their Dcfigns, and abfolutely 
conform themfelves to another's Will, which they mull: ne- 
teil'arily do who are fubjeft to the Rule of others. 

And yet it is impoiTible that this fliould be every one's Lot. 
"Tis impofhble all fliould be Rulers and none Subjects. From 
this Example we fee how the Relations which Creatures have 
to one another, may put a Reftraint even on infinite Power, 
io that it Will be a Contradiction for them while they keep 
the Nature which they have at prefent, to be in fome refpedts 
other wife difpofed than they now are, nor can all of the lame 
Order be gratified with the fame Conveniencies. From hence 
it follows either that a God of infinite Wifdom and Good- 
^ liefs, is obliged by thefe Attributes to rgiUain his Power 


Sccft. 2. Concerning Natural Evil. i^;^ 

ther, Air, Earth, p^t. 'tis highly probable, as we 
/aid before, that each of thefe has its proper In- 
habitants, viz,, by the Union of Souls with Par- 
cels of Matter. Without fuch an Union, we can- 
not apprehend how there fhould be either ^Ethereal 
or Aerial Animals. For the moft fluid Bodies if 
not united to an immaterial Soul, or compacted 
together, would be immediatly diffolved, and eve- 
ry blaft of Vv'"ind would diflipate fuch Animals : 
Either then thefe vafl Fields of Air or ^ther 
muft b^ entirely deftitute of Inhabitants, which 
very few will believe, who behold every clod of 
Earth ftock'd with Animals ; or furnifhed after 
fome fuch Manner as we conjecture. Ci<S.) If 

you ^ 


from creating any fuch Creatures, or that he mufl aflign them 
Stations very diftant from the highcft Happinefs which they 
are capable of Hence alfo it appears, why all things do not 
anfwer every one's Appetite. Why we are not enriched with 
as many Benefits as the Capacity of our Nature fecms to re- 
quire. For tho' the infinite Goodnefs of God encourages us 
to promife ourfelves thus much, yet Wifdom and Juftice fet 
bounds as it were to his Goodnefs, and fhevv that this cannot 
be done without Detriment to the whole ; that either this In- 
convenience muft be tolerated, or no fuch Creatures made ; 
and that it was better not to give fome fo great a Degree of 
Happinefs as their Natures might receive, than that a whole 
Species of Beings fhould be wanting to the World. 

If it be afk'd why God did not make this Species in another 
and more perfeft Manner, fo as to be free from this Inconve- 
nience. I anfwer, that then it would have belonged to ano- 
ther Species, and been of a different Order of Creatures : 
And I fuppole as many of the Species to be made already as 
the Syftem would adnjlt, but chat there was ftill room for thele 
inferior ones, which muft neceffarily have had the Nature they 
now are of or none at all, as has been often laid, and I'm 
unwillingly obliged to repeat it. 

(26.) We have a bcautifnl Dcfcription of our Author's 
conjc6lure in the Spectator, N°, 5-19. ' If we confider 
* thole Pans of the Material World which lie the neareft to 

' us 

t^S Concerning Natural Evil. Chap. IV. 

^ou fay, here's Room for pure Spirits. I anfwer; 
Since thele do not fill up Place, nor have any Re- 
lation to it, 'tis th: fame thing wherever they be, 
and Material Subftances have nothing at all to do 
■Jrvith them: It is not therefore neceflary to fuppo'e 



* us, and arc tliereforc fabjett to our Obfervations and En- 
' quirles, it is amazing to confiuer the Infinity of Animals 

< with whici'i it is ilockcd. Every part of Matter is pco- 
« pled ; every green Leaf fvvarms with Inhabitants. There 

* is fcarcc a fingle Humour in the Bodv of Man, or of any 
<^ other Animal, in which our Glafics do not difcover myri- 

* ads of living Creatures. The Surfice of Animals is alfo 
« covered with other Animals, which are in the fame man- 

* ner the Bafis of other Animals that live upon it ; nay, we 
' find in the moll: folid Bodies, as in Marble itfelf, innu- 
« merable Cells and Cavities that are crowded with fuch im- 

< perceptible Inhabitants, as are too little for the naked Eye to 
« difcover. On the other Hand, if we look into the more 
^ bulky Parts of Nature, we fee the Seas, Lakes and Hivers, 
« teeming with numberlefs kinds of living Creatures: We 
«' find every Mountain and Marfli, Wildernefs and Wood, 

< plentifully ftockcd with Birds and Beafts, and every Part of 
' Matter affording pro^-er neccffaries and conveniences for the 
^ Livelihood of Multitudes which inhabit it. The Author 
^ o^X.h.c Plttrality of PForlds draws a very good Argument from 

* this Confideration, for the peopling of every Planet ; as in- 

* deed it feems very probable from the analogy of Reafon, 

* that if no part of Matter which we are acquainted with, 

* lies wafte and ufelefs, thofe great Bodies which are at fuch 

* a dilhxnce from us, fhould not be dcfart and unpeopled, but 
*' rather that they fliould be furnidied with Beings adapted to 
*' their refpcflive Situations. Exijlence is a Blefling to thofe 

* Beings only which arc endowed with Perception, and is in 

* a manner thrown away upon dead Matter, any farther than' 

* as it is fubfcrvient to Beings which are conicious of t^eir 

* Exillence. Accordingly ■we find from the Bodies \vhich 

* lie under our Cofcrvation, th.u Matter is only made as the 
'■ Bafis and Support of Animals, and there is no more ot the 

* one than what is nccefiary for the Exigence of the other.' 
See alio Dr, Sotth Works, Vol. 2, Difcoulfe 15. p. l^^'i 
^c. Fol. 

Sect. 2. Concerning Natural Evil. ^ 159 

fuch large Trads of Air or ^Ether void of Animals, 
in order to make Room for thefe, for which it 
would be no lefs commodious, if repleniQi'd with, 
than if deftitute of Animals. If then this be grant- 
ed us we may affirm that there is as great varie- 
ty of Souls, as of Anim?ls; and that it is one 
Species which exerts its Operations by the help of 
^therial Matter, and another which ftands in 
need of Aerial, and a third of TerreQrial. Nei- 
ther will every Element be fit for every Animal, 
but each will have its proper Inhabitants : Nor can 
there be any juft Caufe of complaint that they are un- 
eafy out of their proper Element, that Men cannot 
live any while commodioufly in -^Ether, nor perhaps 
-/Etherial Animals upon the Earth : For 'tisfufficient 
if every one nouriihes its proper Inhabitants, accord- 
to the Nature and Conftitution of each. 

III. That is afoolifh Objedion therefore of the TheEartfr 
Epicm-ean LtarePius "^ , that the World owes not its as being 
original to a Divine Power and Goodnefs, becaufe '■^'^ ^^^f-^ 
Mountains Woods and Rocks, large Fens, sndthe Mundane^ 
Ocean cover fo great a fhareofit: that the burning Syaem, is 
heat, viz. of the Torrid Zone^ and the eternal Frojt, not to be 
viz. of the two Frigidy take up almoft two Parts chiefly rc- 
ofit; fmcetheSea, the Rocks, Winds and Moun- S'"'?"^^^;'^ 

• \ n r • 1 • r r • - yet IS nOt 

tarns, are not entn-ely uielels m then- present Situati- made to 
on; which was requifire for the good of the Uni- no pur- 
verfe, and the Order of the Mundane Syftem. Nei- pofe, ci- 
ther was the Earth or its Inhabitants to be regarded J'^"0"'- 
in the firft Place. For, fince it is but a fmall Part of 
the whole, and almoft a Point, where would have 
been the Wonder if it had not been fit for any 
Inhabitants at all K If it did but promote the good of 
the whole, while itfelf was barren and empty. If 


* See Dr. Bentlfys Eighth Sermon §. lo. p. 329. 5th Ed. 
^r Bates on the Exifience of God, Sec. Ch. i, 2, and 3. or 
Cockburns Effays I ft Part, EfT. 7. par. 5, is'c and 2d Part, 
EfT. 4. par. 5, i^c. and the Authorr mznuoyx'di in Netc 3SJ. 

i6d Concerning Natural Evil. Chap. IL 

tliis had been the Cafe, it would not have proved an 
ufelefs part of the World, any more than a Nail is of 
a Man's Body ; and it is as abfurd to defire that all 
parts of the Univerfe Ihould immediatly afford Habi- 
tation to Animals, as that every Part and Mem- 
ber of an animated Body fhould by itfelf confti- 
tute an Animal; 'tis fumcient if every particular 
Member confpire with the reft, and exercife its 
own proper Funftion, and confequently that the 
Earth, which is a Member of rl^ie Univerfe, have 
its peculiar ufe in promoting the Good of the 
whole. If therefore the whole Earth was fervice- 
able, not to preferve Animals, but only Motion, 
nothing could be objeded from thence againft the 
Goodnefs of its Author, Neither would it ap- 
pear ftrange to any that cohfiders the Immenfity 
of the Works of God, and how minute a Portion 
of them the Earth isj if it were entirely deftitute 
of Inhabitants : Nor would it therefore be in vain. 
How much more then may we admire the Good- 
nefs and Wifdom of God therein, who has filled the 
whole and every part of it with Life. 
The Earth IV. He knew beft what Creatures every part 
""■■^■^ l''^ . of it was fit for, and has affigned to each its pro- 
as a Wheel P^*^ Place, as IS evident to every Obferver : The 
m this Mountains, the Woods, the Rocks, the Seas, have 
Automa- their proper Inhabitants, which they fupply with 
^^°^,^^^ Nourilhment. The Syftem of t lie World requi- 
widiout ^^^ ^ Globe of folid Matter fuch as the Earth ii 
which its and we have Reafon to believe that this is, as it 
Motion were, a Wheel in the great r Automaton, without 
would be which its Motibn would be very imperfe(5l". But 
in tS'j-n-" ^^^^*^^s this principal End, the Divine Wifdom 
tcrim it ^^^^ fhat it might ferve for Nutriment to feveral 
alFordsan k'inds of Animals, that no manner of Good there- 
Habitati- foie niight be omitted which was confiftent with 
Food! ^^^ primary End, he filled it with all thofe Ani- 
Animals. ^''^^^ ^^"^^^ i^ ^^^"^ capable of, nor could the Earth, 


Sed. 2. Co?icermng Natural 'E\\\, 261 

aflford Suftenance to any fuperior or mote proper 
Beings. God has given thofe Parts to the Brutes 
wjiicn are unfit for Menj and that there might 
be nothing ufelefs, which yet could not be alccr'd 
without Detriment to the whole, he has .idapted 
Animals to &very Part and Region of it ; and 
Iince the Habitations could not conveniently be 
converted into any other Form, he provided fuch 
Animals as wanted and were agreeable to thefe 
Habitations. Hence Mountain^, Woods and Rocks 
give Harbour to wild Beafts, the, Sea to FillifSy, 
the Earth to Infedis. Neither ought ws to com- 
plain that the whole Earth is not of ufe to Man, 
lince that was not the principal End it was made 
for; but, on the contrary, Man was for this reafon 
placed upon the Earth, becaufe it afforded a convex 
nient Receptacle for him. And what if it had 
been totally unfit for Man ? Would it therefore have 
been in vain ? By no means. On the contrary, we 
are certain that God would have given it other Inha- 
bitants, to whofe Maintenance it might have been 
fubfervient. (27.) 


(27.) Our Author's Argument here might be carryM much 
farther, and the Infinite Wifdom of the Creator demonftrated 
not only from his having rhade nothing in vain, or ufelefs iri 
itfelf, but alfo from the dillinft and 'various Relations w\iic\i 
every thing bears to others, and its contributing to the good of 
the whole : From the double, the manifold apparent Ufes of 
almoft every thing in Nature. 

Thus the Mountains mentioned in the Objeftion of Lu^ 
cretius, and vs/hich many Moderns alfo have mifreprefented as 
deformities of Nature, have not only their own peculiar Inha- 
bitants, but alfo afford to other Animals the moll commodi- 
ous Harbour and Maintenance, the beft Remedies and Re= 
treats. To them we owe the moll pleafant Profpedts, the 
■ 5noft delicious Wines, the moll curious Vegetables, the rich- :. 

M eft 


Earth is 
made not 
for Man 
alone, but 
for the 
to think 
favours of 

Concerning Natural Evil. Chap. IV. 

V. Thofe therefore who urge the unfitncfs of 
certain Parts of the Earth for the Suftenance of 
Man, as a Fault and Defed of the Divine Skill 
in making them, are oblig'd to prove that the 
Earth was made for the fake of Mankind only, 
and not of the Univerfe; and that every thing in 
the World is ufelefs which does not immediately 
tend to the ufe of Man. But this is abfurd, and 
what no one would objed, who is not blinded 
with Pride and Ignorance*. We ought rather to 
admire the Power and Goodnefs of God who has 



efl and mofl: ufeful Metals, Minerals, and other Foflils ; and, 
what is more than all, a whollbme Air ; and the Conveni- 
ence of navigable Rivers and Fountains. 

The Ocean, bcfides the Support of its own Inhabitants 
{which are, in all probability, as numerous and various as 
thofe of the Earth) provides alfo vaft Quantities of Vapours, 
which refrefli and fruftify the Earth itfelf, and nourifli and 
fiipport its Inhabitants, producing Springs, Lakes and Rivers. 
The leffer Seas, Fenns and Lakes, are fo admirably well diftri- 
buted throughout the Globe, as to afford fufficient Vapours 
for Clouds and Rains to temper the Cold of the Northern Air, 
to cool and mitigate the Heats of the Torrid Zone, and re- 
frefli the whole Earth with fertile Showers : As is fully prov- 
ed by Mr. Derham ■\. 

As to the variety of Ufes which the fame thing is render'd 
capable of, and manifeilly defigned for by its All-^vife Au- 
thor, fee Collther''^ Impartial E7iquir\ into the Exijience, Sec. of 
God, p. 80. * To obtain a great number of Ends by as few 

* means as may be, is the higheft point of Wifdom. But no- 

* thing can be imagin'd more admirable in this rcfped than 

* the prcfent frame of things. Thus tho' the human Body is 

* compofed of a great variety of Parts, yet how much more 

* numerous are their Ufes ? How many are the Ufes of the 

* Hand, which directed by Reafon is inftead of all other In- 
' ilruments ? How many Advantages do we owe to the Eye, 

* the Ear, and the Tongue ? And if we take a deeper View, 

* ani 

* See Note 22. 
+ Thyfico-llml. £. 2. C. 5. & B. 3. C. 4. 

peel. 2. Concermng Natural ^w\\. 163 

fb temper'd his Works, though they be immenfe 
and infinitely various* that there is nothing in 
them which exifts not in the very beft manner 
with. refpe(5i: to the Whole, and which he ha^ not 
repleniili'd with its proper Inhabitants. And fince 
the Variety of the conlliruent Parts and Regi- 
ons of the Earth is no greater than the Nature of 
the whole Machine required, nor the Species of 
Animals fewer than the Food would fupply, we 
muft conclude that there is nothing deficient or 
redundant in it. (z8.) 

M 1 


^ and look into the minuter parts of which thefe are compound- 
« ed, what can be more admirable than the Variety of Aims 

* and Intentions that may be obferved in each ? The feveral 
« Ufes of the Strudiure and Pofiticn of each fmgle Mufcle have 

* l>een computed by Galen in his Book de Formationc Fostus to 

* be no lefs than ten. The like may be obferved with refe- 

* rence to the^ Bones and other fimilar Parts, but efpecially 

* with refpedt to the Members of fuch as are heterogeneous 

* or diflimular.' p. 8i. 

The fame is fliewn at large by Dr. Gre'w, Cofmologia Sacra, 
B. I. C. 5. par. 13, 14, ^c. or W. Scott on the IVifdoni and 
Coodnefs of God, Serm. i. p. 15, ^c. or Bp. Wilkins Princ.of 
Hat. kelig. C. 6. 

(28.) Hence I think we may fafely conclude with our Au- 
thor in general, that there could have been no partial Alte- 
ration of this Syftem, but for the worfe, as far as we know ; 
at leaft not for the better. They who hold that there might 
have been a total one, that the whole Scheme of Things 
might polTibly have been alter'd or revers'd, and that either 
the diredt contrary, or a quite different one, would have; 
been more worthy of God; the Men, I fay, that hold this, 
are oblig'd to fhew the poliibility of conceiving it, and to. 
explain the manner how it may be, before we are oblig'd to. 
believe them. They muft flievv that the fame things which 
are now conducive to our Happinefs, and confequently the 
Objc£ls of our Love, might as eafily have tended to our Mi- 
fei\' : and confequently have been as reafonably the Qbjeds 
of our Averfion; that the fame Paffions, Objects, Exerciies, 
and Inclinations which now create plcafure in us, might 


164 Concerning Natural Evil. Chap. IVi 


have produced a diiFerent, a quite contrary effeft, or no efFeft 
at all. This they are obliged to do : and when they have 
done all this, and compleated their Syftem, and made a total 
alteration of things, as they imagine, for the better, they are 
at laft only got to the above mention'd abfurdity of putting 
this Syftem into a higher Clafs, whereas all the different 
Clafles in every conceivable Degree of Perfeftion, were fup- 
pofed to be entirely filled at the firft. We muft therefore take 
things as they are, and argue only from the prclent Nature 
of them colleftively : In which View we fliall find no poflible 
alteration of any thing, but what would produce the fame or 
greater Inconveniences, either in itfelf, or others, to which 
it bears a ftridt relatibh. Inftances of this kind are every 
where to be met with: particular Proofs of it in the natural 
World, occur in Dr. Bentleys Boyle's LeB. particularly with 
regard to the five Senfes of the human Body, p. 95, 96. [See 
aKb Locke on Human Utiderjinnding, B. 2. C. 23. §. 12] with 
refpeft to the figure and ftature of it, in Gren.vs Cofmologia 
Sacra, B. I, C. 5. §. 25, ^c. and to the fcveral Parts of it, 
all over Boyle *, Cheyne, Derham, Neiventyt, Ray, Cockburny 
Ed-vuards, W. Scott, or Felling, 

The fame might eafily be fhewn in the immaterial World; 
aud in the moft exceptionable Part of it, viz. the Soul of 
Man, its Knowledge, Freedom, AfFettions -f-. 

I fhall take the liberty to borrow a Section from Mr. MaX' 
if^/Z's general Remarks on Cumberland, C. 5. which fets this 
Subject in a very good light. " The Nature of Things in the 
*' natural World is fo exactly fitted to the natural Faculties 
*' and Difpofitions of Mankind, that were any thing in it 
*' otherwife than it is, even in Degree, Mankind would be 
«' lefs happy than they now are. Thus the dependence of 
•' all natural Efix;£ts upon a ic^N Jimple Frinciples, is vvonder- 
*' fully advantageous in many refpedts. The Degrees of all 
«* the fenfible Pleafures are cxadtly fuited to the ufe of each i 
<• fo that if we enjoy'd any of them in a greater degree, we 
«< Ihould be lefs happy : for our Appetites of thofe Pleafures 
** would by that means be too ftrong for our Reafon ; and, 
** as we are framed, tempt us to an immoderate enjoyment 
** of them, fo as to prejudice our Bodies. And where wc 

" enjoy 

* On F/W Caufes. 
t See Sir M. Hale's Prim, Orig. cf Matik C 2. Pe H^, 
mint, p. jz. 

Ssd, 2. Concerning Natural Evil. 165 


•'' enjoy fome of them in fo high a degree, as that it is in 
" many cafes very difiicult for the ftrongeft Reafon to regulate 
«< and moderate the Appetites of fuch Pleafures, it is in fuch 
** Inftances where it was necefTaj-y to counterpoifc fome difad- 
•* vantages, which arc the confequences of the purfuit of 
*' thofe Pleafures. Thus the pleafmg Ideas which accom- 
** pany the Love of the Sexes, are neceffary to be poffeircd 
**"in fo high a degree, to ballance the Cares of Matrimony ^ 
" and alfo the Pains of Child-bearing in the Female Sex. 
" The fame may be faid of our Intelledual Pleafures. Thus 
*' did wfi receive a greater Pleafure from Benevolence, 
" Sloth would be encouraged by an immoderate Bounty. 
*' And were the Pleafures of our Enquiries into the Truth 
" greater, we fhould be too fpeculative and lefs adtive. It 
** feems alfo probable, that the Degree of our Intelle£tual 
*' Capacity is very well fuited to our, Objects of Knowledge, 
** and that had we a greater degree thereof, all other things 
'* remaining as they are, we fhould be lefs happy. More- 
*' over, it is probably fo adapted to the Frame of our Bodies^ 
** that it could not be greater, without either an alteration ia 
" the Laws of Nature, or in the Laws of Union betweea 
" the Soul and Body. Farther; were it much greater tharj 
** it is, our Thoughts and Purfuits would be fo fpiritual and 
" refin'd, that we Ihould be taken too much off from the fen- 
*' fible Pleafures : We fhould probably be confcious of fome 
*' Defeds or Wants in our bodily Organs, and would be 
** fenfible that they were unequal to fo great a Capacity, 
*' whicji woujd neceffarily be followed by Uneafinefs of 
*' Mind. And this feems to hold in the Brute Creation : 
** For, methinks it would be for the difadvantage of a HorfCs 
** to be endowed with the Underftanding of a Man ; fuch an 
" unequal Union mufl be attended with continual difquie- 
*' tudes and difcontents. As for our Pains, they are all either 
f/ Warnings againit bodily Diforders, or as fuch as, had 
•f we wanted them, the Laws of Nature remaiping as they 
*' are, we fhould either have wanted fome Pleafures we now 
*,* enjoy, or have poffeffed them in a lefs degree. Thofe 
<' things in Nature which we cannot reconcile to the fore- 
•^ going opinion, as being ignorant of their Ufc, vve have 
** good Reafon from Analogy to believe, are really advanta? 
^f geous, and adapted to the Happinefs of the Intelligent Beings 
" of the Syftem : though we have not fo full and com- 
** pi^ie a Knowledge of jhe entire Syftenn, as to be able ta 
' " - M 3 " poinj 

1 66 Concerning JSJ'atural Evil. Chap. VI, 

'Tis pro- 
bable that 
the Solidi- 
ty of our 
todies is 
the caufe 
why we 
them whi- 
ther we 

A Soul 
united to 
a portion 
of Ethe- 
real Mat- 
ter, ^c. 
can move 
It \\h'ther 
it will, 
and prc- 
ferve its 
fuch a 
js immor- 


Of Death, 

WE know by Experience tiiat Souls united 
to Bodies move them fome way or other; 
viz,, by Thought and Volition : for thus we move 
our own. And 'tis probable that the Gravity, 
Solidity, and Hardnefs of our Bodies, together with 
the Kefiftence of the adjacent ones, are the Caufes 
why we cannot move them every way as we pleafe. 
II. A Soul when united to a portion of ethe- 
real, uniform, and perfeftly fluid Matter, free from 
the Impediment of Gravity aud Refiftence, may 
in all probability move its Body whitherfcever ic 
pleafes. Such a Body therefore would be perfectly 
obfequious to the thought and will of the Soul 
that inhabits it: and if it receiv'd any detriment from 
the neighbouring Bodies, it could repair it by its 
Will alone ; at lead: To long as the ^ther continu- 
ed in its Fluidity and Purity. Unlefs the Animal 
theiefore willed the contrary, its Body would be 



*' point out their Particularities. From thefe Obfervations 
'^' wc may conclude, that all the various Parts of our Syflcm 
?' are fo admirably fuited to one another, and the Whole con- 
*' trived with fuch exquifite Wifdom, that were any thing, 
• ' in any part thereof, in the leaft othcrv.'ire than it is, with- 
"• out an alteration in the whole, there would be a lefsSum 
" of Happincfs in the Syftem than there now is* " 

See alio the Ingenious Author of the Nature and ConduB of 
ihf PaJJjor.s, p. 179, ?.oi, 202. 

Eut this will be more fully confidered in the 4th Se£Hon. 


Sedl. 3' Concerning Natural Evil. 167 

incorrtiptihle, and always fit for Union, i.e. immortal. 
If any one objeft that the Bodies of the Blefifed, 
which we call Cdeftial, need no Motion or Cha nge 
of Condition, fince they enjoy continual Pleafure ; 
for no one moves or changes his Stare, but in order 
to remove fome prefent Uneafinefs. I anfwer; Thcfe 
Bodies are not therefore immortal, becaufe they are 
naturally incorruptible (for that would be incompa- 
tible with the Nature of that Matter whereof they 
are compofed) but becaufe they are put into fucli 
Places and Circumftances by the Deity, that they 
can, even with Pleafure, forefee and prevent all fuch 
things as might tend to introduce either Corruption or 
Pain. Neither does their Pleafure or Happinefs con- 
fifl: in Reft properly fo called, but in Aftivity, 
in fuch A6ts and Exercifes of their Faculties as 
they choofe : Now, fince they may exercife them- 
felves perpetually according to their own Choice, 
and there is nothing to hinder them, they may be 
perpetually happy; as will be declared below. All 
which are different in folid Bodies. 

III. We cannot certainly determine what Life The Body 
is in thefe Animals which have folid Bodies,* but ofatenei- 
we fufficiently apprehend -where it is, from certain ^" j .'■ 
Marks and Tokens. For where there is a cir- ^mA of 
cular motion of the Fluids, there is Nutrition and VefTel, 
Increafe, there is, as I coniefture, fome fort of which 
Life. Now 'tis evident that this circular morion ™^^ °^ 
may be interrupted by the force of the adjacent Bo- ii^jniJurs^ 
dies: the folid Body of an Animal is a kind of may flow 
VefTel in which the Humours have a flux and re out, and 
flux through certain duds and channels framed J^'-' '^^'"<:"' 
by Divine Skill, in the morion of which Life cea^°^'°^ 
confifts. Now this VelTel may be broke in pieces Such .^m- 
by the impulfe of other Bodies, fince by the na- mals then 
tive imperfection of Matter it is capable of Dif- ^^^^ "^tu- 
folution : but when the Veffcl is broken, the J"^! ■^ ^^'°''"' 
Fluids therein contained mull nrceflarily flqw our, 
' " M 4 ■ the 

"l68 Concerning Natural Yjs'A. Chap. IV, 

the circular motion muft ceafe, and together with ip 
animal Life. Such Animals therefore as have fo- 
lid Bodies, are by Nature Mortal, and cannot laft 
for ever, without violence done to the Laws of 
Nature, of Matter, and Motion; There muft then 
have been either none at all created, or fuch as are 
naturally Mortal. 'The imperfeflion of Matter could 
not fuffer it to be otherwife. For the hard and 
folid parts belonging to thefe Bodies are of fuch a 
Frame as muft neceflarily be fhaken and feparated 
by others of the fame bulk and hardnefs. Every 
t^ing therefore that confifts of fuch kind of Parts, 
may be corrupted and diffolved. (i^.) Therefore 
.'■ the 


(29 ) This point is very well illuftrated by Dr. "J. Claris 
on Natural Efil, p. 245, iffc. whofe Reafoning is entirely 
built upon Sir. /. A'^^'ou/ow's Experiments. " Human Bodies 
" as well as thofe of all other Animals, and of Plants, are 
" compounded of very different Materials, fjx'd and voU- 
«' tile, fluid and folid ; as appears by the refolution of them 
*' into their conftituent Parts ; and they are nourilh'd in xhs 
" fame manner, 'viz. by attraftion. For as a Spunge by 
" Su£lion draws in Water, fo the Glands in the Bodies 
" of all Ariimals draw different Juices out of the Blood, ac- 
"=' cording to the particular Nature and Conftitution of each 
,*' of them : So long therefore as the nourifhment is proper 
'=* to alTimilate itfelf to the feveral' parts of the Body, as it 
f approaches them in its feveral channels i or fo long as tie 
«' folid Particles (fpppofe of Salts, which are abfolutely ne- 
f' ceflary to the prcfervation of all Creatures) retain their 
*' form and texture ; fo long Life is prefervM and main- 
*' tain'd. And when the nourifhment becomes unfit to afli' 
'♦ milate; or the faline Particles (which towards the Center 
f are very denfe, and therefore capable of flrongly attrail- 
f ing the Fluids to them) lofe their power of Attradlion, 
** either by being divided into lefs Particles (as they may be 
f by their watry parts infmuating thcmfelves into their Pores 
?' with a gentle heat) or elfe by having thofe watry Parts 
V violently feparated from thjm : in either pf thefe Cafes all 
f* their Motion will ceafe, and end in Corruption, Confu- 
I' fion and Death. And this is abundantly coniirm'd by 

Sc5:. 3. Concerning Natural Evil. 56^ 

the Divine Power and Goodnefs did the verY befi; 
even in creating Beings that were mortal : for an 
Animal fubjed to Death is better than none at all. 
•" IV. But God, you'll fay, created Man at firll This Hy- 
immortal, as we underftand by facred Hiftory : P^'^^^'^J],^ 
Mortality is not therefore an infeparable at ten- ^yj^^ fa- 
dant on folid Bodies. I anfwer; It does not ap- cred Hif- 
pear to us of what fort the Bodies of Mankind tory, con- 
were before the Fall, and confequently nothing \^^'^_ 
can be argued from thence againft the rieceffary mortality 
Mortality of all terreftrial ones. Farther, we fhould of the firft 
remember that our firft Parents were naturally Man. 
mortal i but that God covenanted with them for 
Immortality as a matter of Favour, and upon par- 
ticular Conditions. Not that they fhould have 
continued upon Earth for ever; but that Cpd 
promifed to tranflate them at a proper time by 
his efpecial Favour, and preferve them in a place 
fit for the Enjoyment of Eternity : as we believe 
he did with Enoch and £lias. But as foon as this 
Covenant with God was broken by Sin, Man 
was reftor'd to his Native Mortality, and fubjedd 
to thofe other Inconvenience to which the Or- 
der of Nature, and the Chain of Natural Caufes^ 
fender'd fuch Bodies as thefe of Mankind obnoxi- 

N OT E S^, 

« Experience, in that every thing which is corrupted or 
*' putrify'd is of a black Colour ; which' fliews, that the 
•* component Particles are broken to Pieces, and reduced fo 
^' fmall, as to be unable even to' refleft the Rays of Light. 
«' Thus we fee that. Death, or the Diffolution of the Body, 
<' is the neceffary Confequence of thofe Laws by which it is 
«^ framed and generated : and therefore is not in itfelf pro- 
*« perly an E^ofl, any more than that Fabric can be filled ///, ■ 
*< the Materials, or manner of building of which, would not 
«« permit it to !atl a thoufand Years, nor was originally in* 
-«' tended to condnue half fo long.'- 


■17^ Concerning Natural ^^'A. Chap. IV; 

ous. For though God has not fo fir tied himfelf 
up to the Laws of Nature but that he may in 
many Cafes iufpend and fuperfede themj yet this 
is not done frequently, nor to be expeded for the 
fake of Sinners. God can indeed preferve Man 
from aEiud Death i but thac a folid Machine 
confiding of heterogeneous Parts, fuch as the hu- 
man Body is, fhould not be naturally Mortal, is 
impoflible: 'Tis a Contradidion therefore that 
Man, in the prefent State of things, fhould be by 
Nature immortal. (L.) 



(L.) All the Objeclions brought againft this Seftion are^ 
that the Author maintains fome things in it which deftroy 
his own Hypothefis. ill:. He holds that a Soul united to 
an aetherial, uniform matter, perfeflly fluid and without 
weight or refiftence may tranfport its Body where it pleafes, 
and if it receive any damage from the neighbouring Bodies 
it may repair it again, by the power that the will of fuch 
a Creature has over its own Body : fo if it pleafe it may be 
immortal. From whence the Obje£lor concludes, that ac- 
cording to the Author, there is no connexion between a 
Creature made of matter and mortality, or any natural Evils. 

But furely this is raiflng Objeftions againft a Book before 
one read it. For if he had read it, he might have feen that 
the Author exprefiy affirms that thofe Bodies are not im- 
mortal, becaufe incorruptible by Nature, for the Matter of 
which they confift will not permit them to be fo, but be- 
caufe they are placed in fuch Stations and Circumftances, in 
which they may foreknow and prevent with pleafure all thofe 
things that caufe corruption or pain. From whence it is 
manifeft that the Author fuppofes thcfe corruptible, as well 
as our earthly Bodies, but it does not follow from thence 
that they muft be corrupted. There's a great difference be- 
tween the Power and Aft ; nor is it a good Confequence, 
this is capable of being corrupted, therefore it muft be a£tu- 
ally fo. The Circumftances plainly make the difference be- 
tween Bodies of this fort and ours that are folid, heavy an4 
heterogeneous, fubjeft to the fhock and impulfe of others 
i^hat are like wife hard, heavy. Sec. 

^ut then, zMy, the Objedlor alleges that this ought not to 


Sed. 2. Cojicernijig Natural 'Evil, I'ji 


he fo ; for how knows any body that fuch compofitions as 
thefe have any more malignity in them then fiibtil uniform 
Bodies ? Anfw. If by malignity be meant aftual Corruption, 
every body muft fee that thefe are more liable to it than the 
other : that a heavy Body can't be moved with the fame faci- 
lity that a Body exempt from Gravity can, that a certain 
portion of matter to which the Soul is immediately united, 
and v^hich it ufes in Senfation, will become unfit for it 
when it is diflipated or mix'd with heterogenous particles, 
and that in the Earth it muft meet with fuch, whereas therq 
are no fuch particles to mix with it in an uniform ^ther. 

Our firft Parents knowledge or Power, if they had conti- 
nued in their Innocence, could not have prevented all effefts 
of thefe, tho' God out of particular favour wou'd have pre- 
ferv'd them from the worft and moft mifchievous of 'em, 
which are reckon'd up in the Book*, and this but for a 
time, till he found it convenient to tranflate them to a bet- 
ter place, Tho' after all, we know not how the Bodies of 
our firft Parents were framed, or what alterations were in- 
troduced on their finning, and therefore no good Argument 
can be taken from thence. 

But, 2)%i 'Tis pretended that to fay, on Man's finning 
God abandon'd him to his natural Mortality, and to the 
other inconveniences that necefl!arily follow the Lav/s of Na- 
ture, is a fort of Contradiction. For if there be a natural 
NecefTity that Man fliould be expofed to Pains and Deaths 
his Innocence could not protedl him from them. 

But this is ftill to confute Books without reading them. 
The Author does not fay that Death or Corruption necefiarily 
follow the Laws of Nature, but only that they are the Effedls 
of thef^ fame Laws when left to themfelves, which God did 
not think fit to do in all things whilft Man continued InnoT 

Nor laftly, does it follow from thence, as pretended, that 
Matter is indiflerent to Diifolution or Continuance of itfelf,, 
and only determin'd to one or other as the Creator pleafes* 
For the Poffibility of Corruption is inherent in all Matter,, 
but whether it Ihall in all times and places aflually be cor- 
rupted depends on the Pleafure of God, and in many Cafes 
on the Pleafure of other Agents, and that the Matter of hu- 
man Bodies in their prefent Circumftances fuou'd not be cor- 
rupted, is impoffible. 

172 Concerning Nattiral ^v\\. Chap. IV. 


purSouk Of the PaJJion^. 

bodies of 

a peculiar QUPPOSING the Union of a thinking or 
Crafts, ^ fenfitive Soul with Matter, its Thought and 
i^dtfor ^i^^ ^^^ neceffarily be afFeded by the Motions 
der'd or of that, as body muft be again by thefe. For 
xemov'd, fince the Soul is of fuch a Nature as to require 
the opera- Matter of a peculiar Crafs and Figur?y in order to 
T"s°l ciifcharge its Fundions, it follows that when this 
are cither Difpofition is faulty, or quite fails, the Qperati- 
hinder'd. ons of the Soul muft be impeded, or entirely ceafe ; 
ordeftroy- nor can it poffibly be otherwife while the Soul 
^^' ^nd Body are of luch a Nature as they really are. 

The Soul I-^* Since therefore it is no diminution of the 
and Body Plvine Goodnefs to have affign'd fuch a Nature 
2dmit;ofa to them, as was fhewn before; we muft alfo ad- 
inutual jjjjf Qf 2 mutual Sympathy between them. NoW, 
"^l^"^hence ^^ ^^^^7 "lutually affed each other, the confequence 
k IS the will be that it is the principal bufinefs of the Soul 
firftcareofto preferve the Body from harm. In order to 
the Soul to jhis^ 't;is necefTary that the Soul fhould have 4 
keep the perception of what is good for, or prejudicial to 
From ^ ^^^^ Body ; and this could not be more effedually 
|iarm. procured, than by providing that thofe things which 
tend to Its preferVation fhould communicate an agreea- 
ble fenfation to the Soul, and what is pernicious, 
a difagrecable one. For otherwife, the firft thing 
we met with might deflroy us, v/hile we were 
unaware or regardlefs of it; nor fliould we be 
folhcitous to avoid a River or a Precipice. 


Sed. 4. Concerning Natural Evil. 173 

III. *Tis necefTary therefore that the Soul and The fenfe 
Body fhould afFed each other mutually; that the ^^^^"^^ 
Impairing or DifTolution of the Body fhould ere- "0 preSr© 
ate uneafmefs, which, by its importutiity, might Life, as 
recall the Soul that was indifpofed or otherwife alfo the 
engaged, to take care of the whole; nor ought ^^^^°^ 
it to ceafe urging, till what was hurtful be re- * 

moved: without this importunity perhaps the 
ftrongeft Animal would not laft even a Day. The 
Senfe then of Pain or Uneafinefs produced in the Soul 
upon the Mutilation or DifTolution of the Body, 
is neceffary for the prefervation of Life in the 
prefent State of Things. It may be proved froirx 
the fame Principles, that the averfion to, or dread 
of Dtathi is not in vain, fince it cannot even be 
conceived how a frail and mortal Body, toffed by 
continual Motions, and tumbled among other hard 
Bodies, fhould efcape Diffolution, if the Soul which 
moves that Body were not forewarn'd to avoid Death 
by the natural horror of its approach. (M.) 


NO T E S. 

(M ) Here the Enemies of the Unity of God allcdge that 
they are fatisfy'd, that Matter muft be moveable, that a' 
Body compofed of folid and heavy Parts, as ours are, envi" 
ron'd with other Bodies in continual Agitation and perpe- 
tually liable to their Shock, mult be alfo fubjed to be broken 
and dilTolved, but then why fhould fuch Separation and Dif- 
fblution caufe uneafy Sentiments in us ? 'Tis true, if a Man 
fee benighted in a Wildernefs and deprived of Light, he may 
fall into a Pit and break his Bones ', if he fall afleep, the 
Wind may blow down a Tree on him and crufh his Body, or 
Cut off" a Leg or an Arm ; thefe are by the very Nature of Mat' 
ter eafily feparable ; hut our Mifery doth not conlift in lof- 
ing thefe, but in the Trouble and Concern we have for the 
Lofsofthem. If the lofmg them caufed no Pain or Vexa- 
tion to us, we were as happy without as with them. Now 
they fuppofe that the Soul is united to the Body on what 
Terms God pleafes, and that he could as eafily have joined 
jheSenfations gf Pleafure with thefe In^prefTions on our Bo- 


i'?^ Concenihig Naf lira! "Evil. Chap. IV, 

The reft of IV. Now the reft of the Paflions are Confe- 
the Paf- quences of Pain, Uneafinefs, and dread of Death ; 
connedld '^''^* Anger, Love, Hatred, &c. An Animal in 
wkhthefe. the preient State of things, muft therefore either be 
obnoxious to thefe, or quickly perifli. For 'tis 
impoflible that the Soul fhould have a difagreeable 
Senfation, and not be an^ry at the Caufe which pro- 
duces it : and fo of the reft. 



(i^ies, as that of Pain, and that an infinitely good God wou'd 
jfiave done fo, if a contrary Power had not hindered him. 

For ought I find the whole Difficulty concerning natural 
Evils is reduced to this Point, and methinks 'tis ftrange that 
any Strefs fnould be laid on it ; W'hich will appear if W8 
confider, -•■' 

I ft. That the Argument is drawn from a Matter concern- 
ing the Nature of which we have no Knowledge, I mean 
from the Union of the Soul and Body, and from the Man- 
ner in which the one affeds and operates on the other. We 
can give no account how one Part of Matter afts on another, 
jhow they are united, or what it is that makes them ftick to- 
gether. Much lefs do we know how a Soul and Body are 
united to one another, or ho^v it is poffible that there fhould 
be a mutual Adlion and Readtion between them, and there- 
fore to fay that this proceeds from an Arbitrary Power, or that 
it might have been other wife, is to affirm what Nobody either 
^ doth or can know. We fee the A£tion of one part of Mat- 
ter on another is neceflary, and arifes from the Nature of it : 
Ifit had been otherwife, it had not been Matter but fome- 
thing elfe, and he that would not have it fo, would not have 
God to have created any Matter at all; which, as the Au« 
thor flievvs, had been to leflen God's Goodnefs, and to hin- 
der him from doing a thing which was better done than let 
alone. And how doth the Objeftor know but 'tis the Na- 
ture of Souls, and as nccefiary to them to be affefted thus 
with certain Motions of Matter, as for one Part of Matter to 
be moved by the Impulfe of another? If then our Souls did 
not receive thefe Imprcffions from the Motions caufed in our 
Bodies by external force, they would not be human Souls, 
but fome other Creatures ; of which fort, I fuppofe there were 
aS many created as the Syikin vvou'd allow, and therefore there 

Se£t, i. Concerning Natural Evil. 1^^ 

V. God could have avoided all this by ordering The Paf- 

that the Soul Ihould not be afFefted by the Mo- 1;°"'^^^°"^* 

tions of the Body ; or at leaft, that every thing "oided o"- ■ 

done therein fhould be agreeable : But how dan- therwife, 

gerous this would be to Animals, any one may than by 

underftand, who recoUeds how very fhort their ordering 

Lives muft be, if they died with the fame Plea- g^^^^^ ^ 

fure that they eat or drank or propagate their fhould not 

Species. If on tearing the Body the Soul had be afFedted 

cither no Senfation at all or a pleafant one, we '^^^^. ^^'^ 

fhould be no more aware of Death than of Sleep, ^r°o°"i°. 
, , . , . . 1 n T»*'^ the Body : 

nor would it be any greater mjury to kill a Man By thefc 
than to fcratch him. And thus Mankind would means 
quickly fail. We muft then either have been Animals 
arm'd with thefe Paffions againft Death, or foon J'^^^^^f^^J;. 
have periih'd : But the Divine Goodnefs chofe that ^^^^^ 
Animals fhould be fubjed to thefe, rather than the 
lEarth ftiould be entirely deftitute of Inhabitants. 


muft either be wanting in the World this Species of Beings., 
or they muft be fubjedt to fuch Impreffions. If therefore 
it be better for Men to be as they are, than not to be at all, 
God has chofen the better Part in giving them a Being, and 
afted according to his Iniinite Goodnefs. 

But zdly, If all the uneafy Senfations caufed in us by the 
Incurfions of external Bodies tend to our Prefervation, and 
without them we could neither live nor enjoy ourfelves for 
any time; then they do more good than hurt, and confe- 
quently are a Prefent worthy of God to beftow on us. Now 
this is demonftr:ited by the Author in his Book, and 'tis con- 
fefs'd that as things are now ordered, the Senfe of Pain is 
neccflary to oblige us to avoid many Perils. 

But then again 'tis urg'd, that this doth not remove the 
Difficulty, becaufe it is alledged by the Followers of Manes 
that thefe Pains are from the evil Principle, and as the good 
caufes the Tafte of A'feat on the Tongue to pleafc, (o the Evi^ 
caufes the Fire to create Pain in us when it burns us. 

zdly. They allcdge that there was no Necelhty for thele 
Pains, becaufe Adam was without them in Paradife. 3dly, 
We might have been fu^dentlj obliged to avoid what could 


176 Concerning Natural EwW. Chap. IV, 

It is not VI. Behold now how Evils fpring from and 

^°"?^'^n- "^"^"P^J upon ^2<^h other, while infinite Goodnefs 
line ^^^^ ""^g^^ ^^^ ^^^0' '^o do the very beft. This 

Goodnefs moved him to give ExijUnce to Creatures, which 
to permit cannot exift without Imperfe^ions and Iffeqnality» 
thefe In- This excited him to create Matter, and to put it 
convem- -^^ Motion, which is necefTarily attended with Se- 
fince they P^^'^tion and Diflblution, Generation and Corrup-. 
could not tion. This perfuaded him to couple Souls with 
beavoidad Bodies, and to give them mutual AfFedions, whence 
without pioceeded Pain and Sorrow, Hatred and Fear, with 
^r-j j.|^g j.g£^ q£ jj^g Paflions, yet all of them, as we havs 
feen, are necelfary. 


' NO T E S 

hurt us, if we had a perfeft Knowledge of its approach, an(J 
had been warned to avoid the Danger, not by the Pain or 
Fear which we now feel, but by withdrawing of the Senfe of 
Pleafure on the Approach of what might hurt or deftroy us. 
Laftly, that thefe Warnings are often in vain. 

To give this Argument its full Confideration, I will exa- 
mine it by Parts. And firft, as to what is alledged that the 
pleafant Senfations produced in us by external Motions on the 
Organs of our Senfes are from God, and the painful fro rat 
the evil Principle. I delire it may be confider'd, ill. whether 
any Motion caufes Pain in us that doth not tend to our Deftruc- 
tion, and whether the Pain do not ferve as a Means to pre- 
vent it.. And if the Preferving our Bemg be a greater Good 
to us than thefe Pains are a Mifchief, then it is plain 'tis bet- 
ter we ihould have than want them. But zdly. Pain feems 
to be nothing elfe but a Senfe that our Being is impairing^ 
andiffo, it feems impofEble whilil we love Being and are 
pleafed with it, that we fliould perceive it to decay, and not 
he difpleafed with the Senfe of it, and the Senfe of a thing 
difpleafmg to us is Pain. Either therefore in the prefent 
Cafe our Senfe muft be taken away, or Pain feems unavoid- 
able. For that a certain Motion caufed in our Organs fhou'd 
pleafe us, becaufe it contributes to fupport our Being, and 
the contrary which tends to deftroy us, fliould not difpleafc 
Tis when we feel it, feems a Contradidion. God there-; 
fore' in making' us feel the Senfe of Pleafure by the Firft hai,. 

Sedl. 4* Coticerning Natural Evil. lyj 

VII. For, as created Exijience necelTarily includes God 
the Evil of Imperfe6lion, fo every Species of it is ""'i-refore 
fubjed to its own peculiar Imperfeftions ; that is, ^^"q^^^j 
to Evih. All the Species of Creatures then muft in Thin-s 
either have been omitted, or their concomirantl Evils with the 
tolerated: the Divine Goodnefs therefore put the ^vHs 
iEvils in one Scale and the good in tlie other/ and ^^'^^^ "^" 
lince the Good preponderated, an infinitely good attend^ 
God would not omit that, becaule of the concomi- them; and 
tant Evils, for that very Omillion would have been tolerated 
attended with more and greater Evils, and lo would ^^'J'/^Evils 
have been lefs agreeable to infinite Goodnefs, 3,^"^ . r 

° TTTTT ^^^""^ mfe- 

VIII. parable 

^OTES. ^t 

fikewife made us of fuch a Nature, that we mult either not 
feel the Second at all (/. e. the Motion that hurts us) orbeuji- 
eafy at it; and let any one judge which of thefe two is moft 
for the Advantage of Animals. 

There needs not therefore, any ill Principle to introduce 
a Scnfe of Pain at the Prefencc of what tends to deftroy us, 
for giving us the Senfe of Fleafure at the Prcfence of what 
fupports us of Neceflity infers the other. 

And 'tis remarkable as the Author of the Book obferves,. 
that when the P^iin exceeds the Pleafure of Being, the Senfe 
pfbothceafe, that is when our Being ceafes to be a Benefit 
God takes it from us. , , 

As to the 2d Objeftion, that thefe Pains on the Prefencc 
of deflirudive Motions attacking us are unn'ecefTary ; be- 
caufe Jdam in Paradife was without them, I have already ac 
counted for it, and fhewed that it doth" not appear that lie 
was altogether without Pain or PafTion ; and that. he was on- 
ly fecured from fuch Pains as might caufe his Death, and that 
for a time, till removed to a better place.* 

As to the 3d Objeftion, that if we had a perfedV Knowledge 
of the Approach of every thing that could hurt us, and had 
only felt a withdrawing of Pleafure when any fuch thing was 
nigh, we might by this means have been obliged to avoid it as 
cfFediually as the Senfe of Pain could do it. I anfwer. 

ift. The withdrawing of pleafure or dimlnilhing it, is a 
greater Evil to us than the pains we feel on fuchOccafions ;^ 

N Which," 

f See Note H, and the Sermon snnexM, 

lyS Concer?jin^ Natural 'EwW. Chap. IV. 

The Ax- VIII. The kaft Evil, you'll fay, ought not to 
iom about j^g admitted for the fake of the greateft Good. (For 
FvU for ^^ affi'iTi that God does Evil that Good may come 
theiakeof of i^j is Blafphemy.) Neither does the Diftindion 
Good, between A-Ioralmd Natural Evil help any thing to- 
does not ^y^j-j ^h^ Solution of this Difficulty : For what we 

take place ^^jj 

whej-e t^ie 
]e.ift Evil 
is chofen. 


Which plainly appears from this, that we rather cjioofe to en- 
dure thefe pains tlian lofe the pleafure our Senfes afford us; 
which is manifeft in fo many Inftances, that I hardly need 
mention them. The Gout is one of the mofl tormenting 
Difeafes that attend us ; and yet who would not rather endure 
it, than lofe the Pleafure of Feeling? Mofl Men are fenfible 
that eating certain Meats, and indulging ourfelves in the ufe of 
feveral Drinks, will bring it; and yet we fee this doth not de- 
ter us from them, and we think it more tolerable to endure the 
Gout, than lofe the Pleafure that plentiful Eating and Drink- 
ing yields us. V/hat pains will not a Man endure rather than 
lofe a Limb, or the advantage that a plentiful Fortune yields ? 
This expedient therefore is very improper: 'for it would be an 
exchange for the worfe ; deprive us of a greater Good, to 
prevent a lefler Evil. 

But, 2dly, Either this Diminution of the Pleafure would be 
a more fenfible lofs to us than Pain is now, or otherwiie. If it 
were more uneafy to us than Pain, the exchange, as before, 
would be for the worfe. If it were not, it would not be luf- 
ficicnt: for we plainly fee that in many cafes the greateft pains 
and clearcll profpcft of them are not fufficient to divert us from 
what may be hurtful, when it comes in competition with a 
Pleafure. We have therefore no Reafon to complain of God, 
who has given us warning by Pain of what might deftroy us, 
fince a lefs eflctlual means could not have fecured us. In fliort, 
this is God's way : and for us to think we could have found a 
better, is pride and impudence ; and there needs no more to 
give us a fenfible proof of it, than to confider the folly of the 
expedient propofed by the Objedor. 

But then it is urg'd that here is a f-uther Degree of our 
Mifery, and an argument that an ill Principle had a hand in 
framing us, that we cannot avoid one Evil but by the fear of 
a worfe, and that we do not endure the pains and fears that 
accompany Life bi:t on account of the greater fear we have of 
Death ; and the imprinting in us fo great a Love of Life which 


S eel. 4 • Concerning Natural Evil. 170 

call Mord Evil, as fhali be fliewn below, is that 
which is forbidden; now nothing is forbidden 
by God but geneialIy,atleafl-,on account of the Incon^ 
'veniencies attending the forbidden Actions: Thefe 
Inconveniencies are Natural Evils; therefore Moral 
Evils are prohibited on account of the Natural 
N 2 ones 


lias (o little Good in it, and in truth much lefs than it has 
Evil, muft be the Work of a malignant and mifchievous Au- 
thor. Bilt I anfwer, I have fliewed* that it is the Good we 
feel in Life that makes us love it and afraid to lofe it, and we 
only apprehend the lofs of Life, and fice it, bccaufe wc fear 
the lofing fo good a thing. The love of I,ife is no otherwifc 
imprinted in us but by the fenfe we have of its Goodnefs, and 
then the Quarrel againft God is, that he has given us fo good 
a thing that we are unwilling to part with it, and chufe to 
endure fuch pains as tend to preferve it, and v/ithout which we 
could not long enjoy it. It is amoft wicked thought to ima- 
gine that God is like a Tyrant that delights to torture and tor- 
ment his Creatures. The contrary is plain by his fubjc£ling 
them to Pain in no cafes but where that fenfe is neceflary to 
preferve a Good to them that counterbalances it. 

But then, in the 4th Place, the Objedlion urges, that thefe 
Pains are in many cafes fruitlefs, and no way tend to help us. 
'Tis alledg'd that the Gout and Gravel, and many acute Pains, 
are of no ufe, nor do they any ways contribute to prolong our 
Lives. I reply, the Gout, Gravel, i^c. are diltempers of the 
Body, in which the Humours or folid Parts are out of order: 
The Qucllion then is, whether it would be better for us to be 
infenfiible of this Diforder, or to feel it. Let us fuppofe then a 
Man in a Fever ( z. e. that his Blood and Humours fliould be 
in fuch a Ferment as is obfervable in that Diilemper ) and 
that he fliould feel no Pain or Uneafinefs by it ; the confe- 
quence Vv'ould be that he would die before he were aware. He 
would not avoid thofe things that increafe it, or take thofe 
Remedies that allay it : He would not know how near he were 
to Death, or when he v/as to avoid the Air or Motion, either 
of which would delfroy him. There are Difeafcs that take 
away our Senfes and become, without giving us warn- 
ing : None arc more terrible than thcfc, and mgft would chufe 


* See the Note Z^' 


Concerning tsfaftiral Evil. Chap. IV. 

ones, and for that reafon only are Evils, becaufe 
they lead to A^.r/«r4/ Evils. But that which makes 


to die of themoft painful Difiemper rather than be thus fu?- 
prifcd : We may judge then how it would be with us if all 
Diftempers were of the like Nature. I doubt whether w^e 
could furvive one fit of the Gout, Gravel, or Fever, if the Pain 
we feel in them did not warn us and oblige us to give ourfelves 
that Quiet, Eafe, snd Abftinence that are neceffary to our Re- 
covery. Thus fooliflily they reafon that go about to mend 
the work of God. 

But, 2d]y, we find that Providence has join'd a certain train 
of Thoughts and Senfations with certain motions in our Body, 
and it is as impoflible that all motions fliould beget the fame 
Thoughts in us, as that the fame Letters fhould exprefs all 
Words, or the fame Words all Thoughts. If therefore only 
fome Motions in our Body occafion pleafing Thoughts and 
Senfations, then the Abfence of thefe Motions mull likewife 
deprive us of the Pleafure annex'd to them, which is (o great 
an Evil that we are ready to prevent it with a great deal of 
Pain. And the contrary Motions mufl: by the fame Rule oc- 
cafion contrary Senfations, that is unpleafant. 

If therefore, a Fever or Gout deprive us of thefe grateful 
Motions in the Body that give Pleafure, and be contrary to 
them, it is a clear Cafe, that uneafy Senfations on fuch an Oc- 
cafion cannot be avoided, except Man were fomcthing elfe 
than he is, i. e. no Man. Either therefore God mull not 
have made Man in his prefent Circumflances, nor given 
him a Body that is apt to be put out of order by the impulfe 
of thofe neighbouring Bodies that furround him, or elfe he 
mult fufier him to be fomctimes diilurbed by ihem, and let 
that Dillurbance be accompanied with Pain. 

If it fliould be alledged that God might have put Man into 
fuch Gircumllances that no impulfe of other Bodies fhould 
have caulcd fuch Motions in his as procure Pain. I anfwer, 
this might have done if the very Motion of his Joints and 
Mufcles, and the Recruiting of the Liquids of his Body did not 
continually wear and dellroy the Organs, and alter and cor- 
rupt the Blood and other Juices; and lallly, if there were no 
Bodies in his Vicinity that could hurt or alter thefe: But as the 
Frame of the World now is with folid and heterogeneous Bo- 
dies in it, and which the good of the whole required there 
fliould be, and whilll thefe arc all in Motion, and there is a 
contmuul Change of the Vicinity of thefe Bodies to the 


Sedt. 4* Concerning Natural Evil. ' 18 

any thing to be fuch, is itfelf much more fuzh : 
therefore the Natural, you'll fay, are greater Evils 
than the Moral, and cannot with lefs Blafphemy 
be attributed to God. 

N 5 Graqt- 


Bodies of Men: whilft there is variety of Bodies on the Earth 
and thefe necefTarily fend out different and contrary Effluvia, 
that mix with the Juices of our Bodies: Laltly, whilil not on- 
ly new Bodies move toward us, but we move from place to 
place, without which Power we fhould be very imperfedl, and 
uncapableof the greateft part of the Happinefs we now enjoy ; 
'tis inconceivable that we fiiould not meet with things that by 
the Laws of Matter neceffarily dilturb and diforder our Bodies f 
and therefore, either the Earth muft be void of Inhabitants, 
or they mull be content to fubmit to and fuffer thefe Dillur- 
bances ; and I have already fhewed that thefe mull neceffarily 
Occafion uneafy Senfations in us, which I take to be the De- 
iinition of Pain. 

To Sum up this Head. For ought I can fee, the Funda- 
mental Objedlion concerning natural Evils, is that God has 
given us mortal Bodies, lor which I think the Book fully ac- 
counts ; and if it once be confeffed that it is not contrary to the 
Goodncfs of God to make fome mortal Animals, 1 do not fee 
how we can imagine fuch Animals fliould apprehend tlie Ap- 
proach of Death and not fear it; or feel the Decay of their Bo- 
dies and not be uneafy at it ; efpccially when that Fear ferves 
to preferve them, and the Senfe of that Uneafinefs puts them 
on proper Methods to fupport themfelves. I do not deny but 
the Infinite Wifdom of God might have found other means, 
but I deny that there could be any better ; and he that under- 
takes to prove that there might be better, mull underlland all 
the Circumllances of thefe Animals as they are now, and all 
the Coniequences that muil happen in an infinite feries of times, 
in purfuance of the Method he propofes; but it is impolTiblc a- 
ny one fhould know thefe things, and therefore, as the Book con- 
cludes, no Man has any Right to make ufe of fuch an Objeftion. 

[ For a particular account of of all the Pajftons and their final 
Caufes, and the Neceffity of each, fee Mr. Hntchefon\ Effay 
on the Nature and ConduSl of them, §. 2. p. 48, 50, ^c. and 
^.6. p. 1 79. or Dr. Watts on i)\t U/e and jhn/eoi' them, ^. 13. 
or Cha7nbers's Cyclopaedia under the Word Paffion, or Scott's 
Chrillian Life, p, 2. C. i. §. 2. par. 23. or the Spectator, N". 
255, 408. or Dr y. Clarke on Natural Evil, p. 256, <^c. of 
Dr. More'^ Enchiridion Ethicum, B. i. C. 8, 9, 10, ii.] 

i82 Concerning Natural "^vA, Chap. IV. 

Granting all this to be true, yet though Evil is 
not to be done for the fak^ of Good, yet the k^$ 
Evil is to be chofen before the greater: And fince 
Evils neceflarily furround you whether you adt or 
nor, you ought to prefer that fide which is attend- 
ed with the leail. Since God was therefore com- 
pell'd by the necelTary Imperfedions of created 
Beings, either to abftain from creating them at all, 
or to bear with the Evils confequent upon them : 
and fince it is a lefs Evil to permit tho.'e, than to 
omit thefe, 'tis plain that God did not allow of 
Natural Evils for the fake of any Good; but chofe 
the lead out of feveral Evils, i» e, would rather 
have Creatures liable to Natural Evils, than no 
Creatures at all. The fame will be fhewn hereafter 
concerning Moral Evils. 


Of Hunger, Thirft, a7id Labour. 

The parts A Terreftrial Anim?l muft, as we have faid ne- 
of the Bo- Jl^\^ ceffarily confift of mix'd and heterogeneous 
■^1 •^/•" Parts: its Fluids are alfo in a perpetual Flux and 
need Ferment. Now tis plam that this cannot bs without 

therefore the Expence of thofe Fluids, and Attrition of the 
of Repara- Solids; and hence follows Death and DiJfolHtion, 
\°% '^T' except thofe be repair'd: a new AccelTion of Mat- 
ter is therefore neceflary to fupply what flies off 
Choice ^^'^ ^^ worn away, and much more fo for the 
Hiuft be Growth of Animals. 

had in II. But Animals have particular ConflitHtions, and 

Food, cannot be nouriflied by any fort of Matter: fome 
fmce^ali (;^^^-^^ therefore mufl: be made of it, to which they 
ijot equal- ^re to be urged by an Importunity ilrong enough 
iy projicr. " ' to 

Sed:. 5. Cmcerning Natural Evil. , 183 

to excite their endeavours after ir. Hence Hunger 
and Thirjl come to afFeft the Soul ; Affe(fl:ions that 
are foraetimes indeed troublefome, but yet neceflary, 
and which bring more Pleafure than Pam along with 

III. But why, fay you, are wc oblig'd to /^^o^r TheMate- 
in que(t of Food ? why are not the Elements them- ^'^^^ of 
felves fufEcient? I anfwer, they are fufficient for ,- '^ ^^^ 
fome Animals : but Mankind required fuch a Dif- runted •' 
pofition of Matter as was to be prepared by va- they can- 
rious Codions and Changes, and that daily, be- "ot there- 
caufe 'tis foon liable to Corruption, and if kept ^^f*^ ^^j 
long would be unfit for Nourilhment. Hence La- J^hoiu 
hour becomes neceflary to provide Viifluals in this Labour. 
prefent ftate of things : neither could Hunger, or 
Thirft, or Labour*, (which are reckon'd among 
Natural Evils) be prevented without greater In- 
conveniencies. The Divine Goodnefs therefore had 

the higheft Reafon for affixing thefe to Animals. Every A- 

IV. Now as Animals require different forts of "j'^^Vf 
Food, as was fhewn, according to their different ^^l ^^' 
Conftitutions, fo God has placed every one of them where it 
where it may find what is proper for it : on which may have 
account there is fcarce any thing in the Elcmeats ^^^ proper 
but what may be Food for fome. Every Herb j^°""!^' 
has its Infed which it fuppcrts. The Earth, the hence'al- 
Water, the very Stones, ferve for Aliment to liv- moft every 

ing Creatures t. herbmain- 

V. But fome ftand in need of more delicate '^'""^ '."^^ 
Food : Now God could have created an inanimate [nieVt. 
Machine, which might have fupplicd them with 

fuch Food; but one that is anirpated does it much SomeAni- 
better and with more eafe. A Being that has Life "^^'^'^^e 
is (uteris paribus) preferable to one that has not: foTpo^tj 
God therefore animated that Machine which fur- to others, 
nifhes out provifion for the more perfeft Ani- and would 
malsi which was both eracioufly and providently "of^^^ve 

XT J exifted on 

^ 4 done: any other 

? §ee Note 33, f Sec Notes 24, and 26. terms. 

Concenu?tg Natural Evil. Chap. IV. 

done : for by this means he gsiin'd fo much Life to 
the World as there is in rhofe Animals which are Food 
lor others : by this means they themfelves enjoy fome 
kind of Life, and are of fervice alfo to the reft. An 
Ox, for inflance, or a Calf, is bred, nouriftied, 
and protcdcd for fome time in order to become fit 
rood for Man. This certainly is better and more 
eligible, than if the Matter ol its Body had been 
converted into an inanimate Mafs, fuch as a Pom- 
pion, or continued in the ftate of unform'd Clay. 
Nor is it hardly dealt withal, by being made for 
the Food of a more noble Animal, fince it was 
on this Condition only that it had Life given, 
which it could not otherwife have enjoyed. Mat- 
ter which is fit for the Nourifliment of Man, is alfq 
capable of Life; if therefore God had denied ic 
Life, he had omitted a Degree of Good which 
might have been produced without any Impedi- 
inent to his principal Dcfign, which does not 
ieem very agreeable to infinite Goodnefs. 'Tis bet- 
ter therefore that it fhould be endow'd with Life 
for a time, the' it is to be devoured afterwards, than 
to continue totally flupid and unaftive. The com- 
mon Objection then is of no force, viz.. That inan- 
imate Matter might have been prepared for this Ufej 
ibr 'tis better that it lliould be animated; efpecially 
as fuch Animals are ignorant of Futurity, and are 
neither confciops nor folicitous about their being 
made for this Purpofe. So that fo long as they 
live, they enjoy themfelves without anxiety; at 
leaft they rejoyce in the prefent Good, and are- 
neirher tormented with the Remembrance of what is 
paft, nor the Fear of what is to come; and laftly, are 
killed with lefs Pain than they would be 'by a 
Diftemper or old Age. Let us not be furpris'd 
then at the Univerfal War as ic were among A- 
jiim^lsj or that the Stronger devoiir the Weaker j 

S€6t. 5- Concer?iing Natiwal Evil. J85 

for thefe are made on puipofe to afford Alimeht 
to the others. (50 ) 

VI. As for the Difficulty of procuring Food, and All parts 
the Want of it in fome Places, 'tis to be obferved o^ the 
that the ftate of the Earth depends upon the light ^^'^^ ^^^ 
and heat of the Sun; and tho' vte do not perfeftl)^ h^ve af- 
underfland the Strudure of it, yet we have reafon forded 
to conjedure that it is carried about its Axis by a Nourifii- 
JDiamal, and about the Sun by an Annual Motion : ^^"^ ^"'^ 
that its Figure is a Spheroid defcribed by the Re- ^^^^56°^ 
volution of a Semi-Ellipfe about a conjugate Axis ; ^vhatever 

and Situation 
they had 

JSf T E S, ^^^" pla- 

ced in, 

(30.) What is here laid down will upon Examination be 
found to be perfedly confiilcnt with oar Obfervation in Note 

23. ■ 

As the Point before ns is fet in a very good Light by Dr. 
J. Clarke*, I fhall not fcruple to tranlcribe the whole Para- 
graph. < If we confider the EtFed of Animal Creatures being 

* thus made Food for each other, we Ihall find that by this 

* means there is the more Godiwpon the whole : For under 
'■ the prefent Circumftances of the Creation, Animals living in 

* thi; manner pne upon another, could not have been prevent- 
' ed but a much greater Evil would have followed. For then 

* there could not hnve been fo great a Mumber, nor fo great a 
« Variety of Animals as there are at prefent, fome of which are 

* fo very minute, and the Qiiantity of tlu-m fuch, that mixing 

* themielves with Herbs and Plants, and Grain on which, 

* themfelves feed, and with the Water and Liquids which the/ 

* drink, they muil neccffarily be de scoured by larger Animals 

* who live upon the fame Food, without fo much as being feen 
«•• or9,ny way perceived by them. It is therefore much better 
« upon the whole, that they fhould live upon one another in 
'■ the manner they now do, than that they Ihould not live at all. 

* For if fuch Animal Life is to be elteemed fuperior to not 

* exifting at all, or to a vegetable Life s and the more there 
< is of fuch Animal Life, the more of Good there is in the 
« World ; it is evident that by this means there is Room for 
« more whole Species of Creatures, at leaft for many more in- 
« dividuals of each Species, than there would otherwife be ; 

' rtn4 

* Difcourfe concerning Natural Evil, p. 2b'9. 

i86 Concerning Natural 'E.s^A. Chap. IV. 

and that this proceeds from the Laws of Motion 
and Gravitation. Now in fuch a Situation, fome 
Parts of it muft necefTarily be unfit for fuch Tnha- 
; bitants as Men, fince the Parallelifm of its Axis is 
preferv'd in the annual Motion, and the Revolu- 
tion about the fame Axis in the diurnal. If thefe 
fhould undergo the very lead Alteration, the whole 
Fabric of the Earth would be diforder'd; the O- 
cean and Dry Land would change Places to the 
Detriment of the Animals. Since therefore nei- 
ther the annual nor diurnal Motion of the Earth 
could be alter'd without harm ; 'tis plain that fome 
parts of the Earth muft necefTarily be lefs conve- 
nient for the Habitation of Mankind, namely thofe 
about the Poles; and that others muft require 
much Labour to make them convenient, as we find 
by Experience in our own Climate j but it will evi- 


? and that the Variety of the Creation is hereby much enlarg- 

* ed, and tlie Goodnefs of its Author difphyed. For the Con- 

* ititution of Animal Bodies is fuch as requires that they fliould 

* be maintain'd by Food : Now if this Food can be made 
« capable of Animal Life alfo, it is a very great Improvement 
« of it. A certain Quantity of Food is neceffary for the Pre- 

* fervation of a determinate Number of Animals: Which Food, 

< were it mere vegetable, would perhaps fervc for that Piirpofe 

* only : But by being fo form'd as to become Animal, tho' it 

* be in a lower Degree, and the Enjoyment of Life in fuch 

* Creatures lefs, yet it is more perfect than unformed Clay, or 

* even than the moft curious Plant. Thus the Animal Part of 
<^ the Creation has its feveral Degrees of Life, and as much 

* Variety in it as is to be found in the inanimate and vegetable 

* Part ; fo that in this refpedt there is fo far from being any 

* juft ground of Complaint, that the Wifdom and Contriv- 

< ance of the Animal World is admirable, and plainly fliews 

* the Excellency of the whole, and Subfcrviency of all the 
' Particulars in order to obtain the greatcft Good that they are 
« capable of.' 

See alfo the Beginning of the Spe^atar, N^. 519. 

Se6l. 5. Concerning Natural Evil. 187 

dencly appear to any confidering Perfon rhat in what 
Situation or Motion foever you fuppofe the Earth 
to be, either thefe or worfe Evils muft be admit- 
ted; 'tis in vain therefore to complain of thefe 
Inconvenienciesj which cannot be avoided without 
greater. C31O 


(^i.) Thus if the Figure of the Earth were chang'd into ^ 
perfefl Sphere, the Equatorial Parts muft all lie under Water. 
If it were of a Cubic, Prifmatic, or any other Angular Figure, 
it would neither be fo capacious for Habitation, nor fo fit for 
Motion, nor fo commodious for the reception o^ Light and Heat, 
for the Circulation of the Wifids, and the Diftribution of the 
Waters', as is obvious to any one that is acquainted with the 
jfirft Elements of Natural Philofophy, and is at large demon- 
ftrated by Dr. Cheque, Derham, Ray, SiC. If its Situation were 
removed, its Conftitution muft be alter'd too, or elfe, if placed 
conliderably farther from the Sun, it would be frozen into Ice, 
if nearer, 'twould be burnt to a Coal. If either its annual or 
diurnal Motion were ftopp'dy retarded, or accelerated, the ufeful 
and agreeable Viciffitudes o^ S7immer and Winter, Day and 
Night, would ceafe, or at leaft ceafe to be fo ufeful and agree- 
able as i':hey now are. The immoderate Length or Shortnefs 
of the Seafons would prove pernicious to the Earth, and the 
ilated times of Bufmefs and Repofe v/ould be as incommodious 
to its Inhauitantc i asdifproportionate to the common Affairs 
of Life, and the various Exigences of Mankind*. If, in the 
Jaft' place, we alter the Inclination of the Earth'' s Axis, the like 
Inconvcniencies will attend the Polar Parts: Ifwedeftroy the 
P araUelifm of it, befides deftroying at the fame time the ufeful 
Arts of Navigation and Dialling, we bring upon us much 
worfe Confequences. A Defcription of fome few of them from 
Dr. Bejitlefs Sermon above cited may perhaps not be difagree- 
able. ' We all know, from the very Elements of Aftronomy, 

* that this inclin'd Pofition of the Axis, which keeps always 

* the fame Direftion, and a conftant Parallelifm to itfelf, is the 

* fole Caufe of thefe grateful and needful Viciffitudes of the 

* four Seafons of the Year and the Variation in Length of 

* Days. If we takeaway the Inclination, it would abfolutely 

* undo the Nothern Nations, the Sun would never come 

* nearer 

* See Dr. Bentlcy'; laji Sermcn, p. 315 . 5th Edit, 

i8B Concerning Natural "EvW, Chap. IV. 

O^ Earth' VII. Neither are Earth-quakes Storms, Thundery 

(quakes, J)elttges and Inundations any ftronger Arguments 

fnd 2^-" ^8^^"^ ^^^ Wifdom and Goodnefs of God. Thefe 

Iftges. ^^^ fometimes fent by a juft and gracious God for 

the Punilliment of Mankind j but often depend on 

other natural Caufcs, which are neceflary, and 

could not be removed without greater Damage to 

the whole. Thefe Concuffions of the Elements are 

indeed prejudicial, but more Prejudice would arife 

to the Univcrfal Syftem by the Abfence of them. 

What the genuine and immediate Caufes of them 

are I dare not determine : They feem in general 

to derive their Origin from the unequal heat of 



* nearer us than he doth now on the loth of March, or th« 

* 1 2th of September. But would we rather part with the 

* Parallelifm ? Let us fiippofe then that the Axis of the Earth 

* keeps always the fame Inclination towards the Body of the 

* Sun: This indeed would caufe a variety of Days, and Nights, 
« and Scafons, on the Earth ; but then every particular Coun- 

* try v^^ould have always the fame diverfity of Day and N'ghr, 

* and the fame Conllitution of Seafon, without any alteration. 
' Some would always have long Nights and fliort Days, others 

* again perpetually long Days and fhort Nights : One Cli- 

* mate would be fcorch'd and fwelter'd with everlafting Dog- 

* Days, while an eternal December blafled another. This 

* furely is not quite fo good as the prefent Order of Seafons. 

* But fliall the Axis rather obferve no conilant Inclination to 

* any thing, but vary and waver at uncertain times and pla- 

* ces ? This would be a happy Conftitiition indeed! There 

* would be no Health, no Life, nor Subfiflence in fuch an ir- 

* regular Syitem : By thofe furprizing Nods of the Pole, we 

* might be tofsM backward or forward, in a Moment, froni 

* January to June, nay poffibly from the January of Green- 
<■ land, to the June oi AbeJJi?iia. It is better therefore upon 

* all accounts that the Axis fiiould be continued in its prefent 
"-■ Pollure and Direftion ? fo that this alfo it a fignal Character 
' of the Divine Wifdom and Goodnefs.' 

See alfo CheynehPhil.?rinc, C. 3. j. 24., 25, 26, l^c. 


Se6t. 5. Concerning Natural Evil. 189 

the Sun, from the Fluidity, Mutability, and Con- 
trariety of things. To thefe we may add the 
Afperity and Inequality of the Earth's Surface, 
without which neverthelefs the whole Earth, or the 
greateft part of it, would be uninhabitable. For 
inftance, we complain of the Mountains as Rubbifh, 
as not only disfiguring the Face of the Earth, 
but alfo as ufelefs and inconvenient; and yet with- 
out thefe, neither Rivers nor Fountains, nor the 
Weather for producing and ripening Fruits could 
regularly be preferved*. In Mountanous Coun- 
tries we blame Providence for the Uncertainty of 
the Weather, for the frequency of the Showers and 
Storms, which yet proceed from the very Nature 
of the Climate, and without which all the Moifture 
would glide down the Declivity, and the Fruits 
wither away. The Earth then muft either not be 
created at all, or thefe things be permitted. (3 2.) 



(32.) The feveral Objeftions mention'd in this Paragraph, 
are iblidly refuted by Dr. J. Clarke in his Treacile on Natural 
Evil, part of which I fliall take the liberty to infert as ufual, 
and refer the Reader to the Book itlelf for the rcll. 

Having defcribed the Nature and Ufe of the Air's Elajiicityy 
and the add nitrous, vcv^fulphureous Particles with which it is 
impregnated, which are the Caufe oiFer?nentation, he proceeds 
to account for Earthquakes, ^c. p. 190. ' Thus the internal 

* Parts of the Earth being the only proper Place for containing 

* fo large a ftore of Sulphur and Nitre and Minerals, as is re- 
« quired for fo many thoufand Years as the Earth in its prefent 
« State has, and may yet continue ; it muft neceffarily be, 
« that when that Fermentation is made in fuch fubterraneous Ca- 

* verns as are not wide enough for the Particles to expand 

* themfelves in, or have no open PafTage to rufh out at, they 

* will, by the foremcntion'd Law, fhake the Earth to a con- 
« fiderable diftance, tear thofe Caverns to pieces; and accord- 
« ingto the depth of i'uch Caverns, or Quantity of Materials 

*' can- 

* See Note 33. 

IQO Concerning Natural Evil. Chap. IV. 

The VIII. The fame muft be faid of the Lakes 2xA 

Number Qqc^^ Por 'tis manifeft, that Fruits, Vegetables, 
mals to be ^^* which are the Food of Animals, depend upon 
proporti- Moifture, and that this is exhaled from the Sea, 
oned to and watry places, by the Sun ; and fince the Show- 
the Food gj.5 ^^^ Oe^ys thus elevated, are not more copious 
the Food ^^^ fuffice for the Vegetation of Plants, 'tis plain 
to the ^hat the Seas and Lakes do not exceed what is ne- 
Animals. cefTary, and could not be diminillied without De- 
triment to the whole. Vain therefore is the Com- 
plaint o\ Lucret'mst who arraigns all thefe 2.s faulty. 
Neither was the Earth too narrow nor needed it 
too much Labour to fuftain its Animals: For it 
was fufficient for thofe Animals which God had gi- 
ven it ■^. But when they multiply above the Pro* 
portion of their Food, 'tis impoffible that it jfhould 
be fufficient; it would not be enough if it were aU 
converted into Food, For a certain Proportion is 



* contain''d in them, remove large pieces of the Surface of the 

* Earth, from one place to another, in the fame manner, tho' 

* to a much higher degree than artificial Explofions made under 

* ground ; the eftccl of which is fenfiblc to a greater dillance. 

* If it happens that thofe Fermentations are in places under the 

* Sea, the Water mixing with thefe Materials increafes their 

* Force, and is thereby thrown back with great violence, fo 

* as to fcem to rife up into the Clouds, and fall down again 

* fometimes in very large drops, and fometimes in whole Spouts, 
' which are fufficient to drown all that is near them. If the 

* Termcntatmi be not fo violent, but fuch only as raifes large 
' Vapours or Steams, which can find their way through fmall 

* occult paffages of the Earth, thofe near its Surface, by their 

* continual Exfpirations, are atfirit the Caufe of gentle Winds; 

* and thofe afterwards by their continual Increafe, become per- 

* haps Storms, and Whirlwinds, and Tempefts which many 
*■ times dellroy the Fruits, tear up the Trees, and overthrow 

* the Houfcs : But if they be ilill mo*c gentle, there being- 

' always 

* See Derhanh Phyf; Th^ol. B. 4. C. i iv 

Sed. 5. Concerning Natural Evil. 19I 

to be obferv'd between the Provifion and the Eat- 
ers, which if the Number of Animals exceed, they 
muft at length neceffarily perifti with Hunger. 
Want of Provifion then ought not to be made an 
Objection : for if the Number of Creatures to be 
provided for be ^enlarged above this Proportion, 
the greateft Plenty would not fuffice ; if this Pro- 
portion betwixt the Food and Animals be kept up, 
the leaft would be fufficient. 'Tis our own fault 
therefore, not God's, if Provifions fail; for the 
Number of Men may be confined within the 
Bounds prefcribed by Nature, as might eafily be 
fhewn, if it were worth our while. 


« always fome fulphureous Exhalations, efpecially if the 
« Earth be dry, they then afcend along with the lighter Va- 
' pours, into the upper Regions of the Air, where, when a 

* large Quantity of them is gather'd together, they ferment 

* with the acid Nitre, and taking fire caufe Thunder and 

* Lightning, and other ivleteors. This, as far as can be ga- 

* ther'd from Experience and Obfervatioii of the Works of 

* Nature, is the Origin and Caufe of thofe Imperfeflions and 

* Evils, which the prefent Conftitution of the Air, and the 

* Laws of Motion obferved by thofe Particles mix'd with it, 
« unavoidably fubjeit it to. They are the natural and genuiu 
« cffedls of the Regulation it is under, and without altering 
« the primary laws of it (that is making it fomethino; elfe 

* than whit it is, or changing it into another Form: the Re- 

* fult of which would be only to render it liable to Evils of 
« another kind, againft which the fame Objeftions would e- 

* qually lie) or in a fiipernatural manner hindering it from 
< producing fuch EfFefts, it is impoflible to prevent them. 
« And if we add to this, that thefe Evils are the feweft that in 

* the Nature of things could be, without hindering a much 

* greater Good: That they are in tlie raofl: convenient Parts, 

* and the moft guarded againft doing Mifchief that could be; 

* and that there are alfo good Ufcs to be made of them ; we 

* fliall have no Reafon to complain of or find fault with them. 

* Were the Quantity of Sulphur and Nitre much diminifli'd, 

* there would not be fufficient to fill the Region of Air for 
5 the purpofes of Vegetation and Life ; but the Ground would- 

< erow 


The hun- 
part of 
live upon 

Cohcefn'mg "Natural Evil. Chap. IV*^ 

IX. But there's no need of Artifice on this oc- 
cafion; for by our fault things are come to this 
pafs, that even the hundredth pai't of thpfe Eat- 
ables which might be had, don't meet with any to 
confume them. The Divine Beneficence has there- 
, ^_ , fore dealt bountifully with Mankind in refped of 

the Earth, r> T 
does not PlOVlllonS. 

yet inha- X» 'Tis to be obferv'd in the lafl: place, that 
bit it: vain Animals are of fuch a Nature as to delight in Adion, 
therefore or the Exercife of their Faculties, nor can we 
^^^ . . have any other Notion of Happinefs even in God 
about ^ himfelf ■^. Since then the Faculties of both Body 
Seas and and Mind are to be exercifd in order to produce 
Defarts. Pleafure, where's the wonder if God deflin'd thac 
Exercife in part for procuring of Food, and con- 
neded this Pleafure with it. C53O The infinite 



'Tis ab- 
furd for ■ 
any one 

ro defire ; 
place or 
from that 
which is 
him ; 
iince he 
was made 

gtow barfen, and the Animals would wafleand die : And if 
there were a much greater Quantify, the contrary Effeft 
would happen, the Earth would be too fat, the Plants would 
grow too grofs, and the Animals would be fufFocatcd and 
choaked. The Temperature is therefore as exaft as it could 
be, all Circumrtances confider'd ; and the fmall Inconveni- 
encics are nothing compared with the general Good. ' See 
to fill that alfo the Word Eartb-quake in Chambcri'?, Cyclopedia. 
place, and (33-) Befide the Neceflity there is for Labour, in order to 
v/ould reftrain Man in his prefent State from an Excels of Folly and 

otherwife Wickednefs, (which our Author confiders in the two lall Para- 
have had graphs of this Chapter) the ufe and advantage of it appears 
none at alfo from the manifeil tendency it had to preferve and improve 
all. the Faculties of both Body and Mind. If ui'cd in a moderate 

degree, it preferves our Health, Vigour, and Adivity ; gives 
us a quick Senfe and Relifh of Pleafure, and prevents a great 
many Mifcries which attend Idlenefs. This is well dcfcrib'd 
by the Guardiav, N". 131. and the Spe^ator, N". 115. 'I con- 

* fidcr the Body as a Syllcm of Tubes and Glands, or, to ufe 
' a more rullic Phrafe, a bundle of Pipes and Strainers, fitted 

* to one anotlicr after fo v/onderful a manner, as to make, a" 

' proper* 

* SeeCli, I. §^. 3. par. 9. and Ch. 5 §. i. Sub. a.. 

Sed. 5. Concerning Natural Evil. 193 

Power of God was able to produce Animals of 
inch. Capacities; and lince the Creation of them 
was no Inconvenience to other Beings who might 
exercife themfelves in a more noble manner, may 
not the infinite Goodnefs of God be conceiv'd to 
have almoft compell'd him not to refufe or envy 
thofe the benefit of Life? Some of this kind were 
to be created, fince there was Room left for them 
in the Work of God, after fo many others were 
made as was convenient. But you may wilh that 
^me other Place and Condition had fallen to your 
Lot. Perhaps fo. But if you had taken up ano- 
ther's Place, that other, or fome elle, muft hive 
been put into yours, who being alike ungrateful to 
the Divine Providence, would wifli for the Place 
which you have now occupied. Know then that it; 
was neceflary that you fliould either be what you 
are, or not at all. : For fince every other Place 
and State which the Syflem or Nature of Things 
allow'd was occupied by fome others, you muft o^ 
neceflity either fill that which you are now in, or 
be banilli'd out of Nature. For do you expcft 
that any other fliouid be turn'd out of his Order, 
and you placed in his room? that is, that God; 


k or E s! 

^ proper Engine for the Soul to work with. This Defcriptioti) 
^> does not only comprehend the Bowels, Bones, Tendonsj' 

* Veins, Nerves, and Arteries, but every Mufcle, and every 

* Ligature, which is a Compofition of Fibred, that are fo ma-; 

* ny imperceptible Tubes or Pipes interwoven on all fides. 

* with invifible Glands or Strainers. This general Idea of a 

* human Body, without confidering it in the Niceties ofA-: 
' natoniy, lets us fee how abfolutely ncceil iry Labour is for the- 

* right Preiervation of it. There muft be frequent Motions- 
*• and Agitations, to mix, digeft, and feparate the Juices con- 
*' tain'd in it, as well as to ci^ar and cleanfe the Infinitude of- 
''Pipes and Strainers of which it is compofed ; and to give- 

* their folid Parts a more firm and lailing Tone. Labour or^ 

O Exercife 

194 Concerning Natural 'EvW. Chap. IV. 

fhould exhibit a peculiar and extraordinary IVliini- 
ficence toward you to the prejudice of others. You 
ouj^ht therefore not to cenfure, but adore the Di- 
vine Goodnefs for making you what you are. You 
could neither have been made otherwife, nor in a 
better manner; but to the Difadvantage of fome 
others, or of the whole. 


* Exercife ferments the Humours, calls them into their prope? 

* Channels, throws off Redundancies, and helps Nature ia 
' thofe fecret Diftributions, without which the Body cannot 
' fiibfift in its Vigour, nor the Soul adt with Chearfulnefs. I 
' might here mention the Effects which this has upon all the 

* Faculties of the Mind, by keeping the Underftanding clear, 

* the Imagination untroubled, and refining thofe Spirits that 

* are neceffary for the proper Exertion of our Intelledtual Fa- 
' culties, during the prefent Laws of Union between Soul 

* and Body. It is to a Negleft in this Particular that we muft 

* afcribe the Spleen which is fo frequent in Men of ftudious 

* and fedentary Tempers, as well as the Vapours to which 

* thofe of the other Sex are fo often fubject.' 

He proceeds to illullrate both the Wifdom and Goodnefs of 
God, from his having fitted and oblig'd us to this Labour and 
Exercife, which is fo neceffary to our well-being: which Ob- 
fervation will help us to account for the fecond and third Evil 
arifing from the F^// mention'd in § 9. par. 5. The Fitnefs 
of a State of Labour for fallen Man is Ihewn at large by Sherlock 
on Judgment, C, i. §, 8. p. 179. and D^Oylj in his Jirji 
DiJJertation, C. 9. p. 98, l^c. 2d Edit. 


Bed. 6. Concerning Natural Evil. in^ 


Cojicerniiig Propagation of the Species^ 
Childhood, a?td Old- Age. 

ROM what has been faid it appears, that A- Animals 
nimals which have folid Bodies are naturally maybeic- 
mortal; though the Earth therefore were at firll F^^^ 
fully ftock'd with them, yet their Number being vvay/ift. 
continually diminilh'd by Death, it would at length If Death 
be quite deftitute of Inhabitants. There migh;, were pre- 
it feems, have been a threefold Remedy for this ^^'^^P^ °y 
Evil: Firft, if God by his Omnipotence i"hould fence fzd- 
prevent the natural EfFeds of the mutual Percuffion ly by Cre- 
of Bodies, viz.. the Corruption and DifiTolurion of atioius'^- 
themfelves, and the Change or EfFu Hon of their l^'^^y.^'-' 
Fluids. For from thefe the Deftradion of Ani- ^^^'^ 
mals neceffarily arife?, as thefe do from the Com- 
pofition of Bodies, and their ailing on e;.ch othen 
Secondly, by leaving; Nature to itfelf, and letting 
it ad by univerfal Mechanic Laws; and when 
thefe brought on a diffolution of Animal Bodies, 
that others be fubftituted in their room by Crea- 
tion. Thirdly by ordering that an Animal fhould 
generate its like, and provide another to fupply its This thini 
Place when it declined. ^^^^hod is 

rr. Who does not fee that this lafl is the bed: V'l ,'. 
Method of prclerving a conftant Number of In- canbeef- 
liabicanrs upon the Earth? For 'tis the hm^ thing, fetled 
ceteris paril;us, with regard to the Syiflem, whe- without . 
tiher the Earth have thefe Inhabitants which it ]JJ^"f ^3°" 
naj at prefentj or others equal in Number and Perfec- the Laws 

O 2, tion : of Nature,' 

196 Concerning Natural "EvW* Chap. IV» 

tion : but it is not the fame thing whether the Laws 
of Nature be obferv'd or violated*. In the for- 
mer Methods God muft have interfered every Mo^ 
ment by his abfolute Power, he muft have done 
infinite violence to the Laws of Nature, and con- 
founded all the CorOiirutioris and Orders of things, 
and that without any Benefit; nay with extraord- 
nary detriment to the whole, For fince the uni- 
verlal Laws of Motion are the beft that could 
poffibly be eflabliili'd, they would feldom bt re- 
veis'd without damage to the whole. Neither 
does it become the Wiidom of God to have left 
his Work fo imperfeft as to want continual mend- 
ing even in the fmalleft aiticulars. 'Twas better 
therefore for it to be made in fuch a manner as 
we fee it is, viz,, that a new Offspring fhould be 
propagated out of the Animals themfelves, and by 
TheDi- HI. And herein we may admire the Divine 
Y!"^ Wifdom and Goodnefs, which hath fo prudently 

and Wh-^ and effeftually contrived this End. For it has im- 
dom ad- planted in all Creatures (as we fee) a ftrong and 
mirable in almofi: irrefiftible appetite of propagating their Kind, 
the con- gj^ J j-j^j render'd this aft of propagation fo ufeful 
of It'^^ ^^*^ agreeable to them who perform it, that Pofte- 
rity becomes dearer to many than Life itfelf; and 
if it were left to their choice, they would rather 
die than lofe their Offspring and the Rewards of 
Love: nay there is fcarce any one that is not 
ready to protedl its Young at the hazard of its 
Life. God has therefore by one fingle Law and a 
fort of Mechanifm, replenilli'd the Earth with liv- 
ing Creatures, and provided that a fufficient Num- 
ber fliould never be wanting, without the Inter- 
vention of a Power, which would be irregular 
and an Imputation on the Skill and Wifdcm of the 
Arvhited:. Who would not prefer fuch a piece 

* Sec Note 25. 

Sed. 6. Concerning Natural Evil. 197 

of Mechanifm, where one Machine generates ano- 
ther, and continually produces a new one in its 
turn, without any new and extraordinary Inter- 
vention of the Artificer, before one which would 
immediately and every Day require his Alliftance 
and Amendment \ 

IV. This Method, you'll fay, is fit enough for Why Men 
the Brutes, many of which mufl: n^sceffarily die ^^^ '^°'; 
not only by the Law of their Nature, but alfo J^j^^'J^^^^j^g 
for the fake of others, for whofe ufe they were creat- continual 
ed to ferve as Food. Neither is Death the greateft dread of 
of Evils to them, fince they live without being Death 
fenfible of their Mortality. But Man is ^^^^'cily gr^i'^^^ga^re 
dealt withal, who from his very Infancy is troubled ^^^^ ^^ ^\\ 
with Fear and Dread more bitter even than Death; concerned 
and who frequently foretaftes, and by ruminating about it. 
thoroughly digefts, whatever Bitternefs there is in 
Death itfelf. Neither does the Hope or Care of 
Offspring, nor the Enjoyment of the^e Pleafures, 
compenfate for fo many Miferies and Evils: The 
Divine Goodnefs might therefore have either con- 
cealed from Man his Mortality, or elfe removed 
that innate Terror arifing in our Minds from the 
profped of Death, which is always dreadful. (34O 

O 3 V, 


(34.) A fufficient anfwer to this Objeftlon may be found in 
the laft Chapter of Dr. Sherlock''^ admirable Treatife on Death. 
I fliall infert a little of it. ' There are great and wife Reafons 
f why God fhould imprint this Averllon to Death on human 

* Nature ; becaufe it obliges us to take care of ourfelves, an4 
' to avoid every thing which will deftroy or fliorten our Lives : 

* This in many Cafes is a great Principle of Virtue, as it pre- 

* ferves us from fual and deftru6tive Vices ; it is a great In- 

* ftrument of Government, and makes Men afraid of com- 

* mitting fuch Villanies as the Laws of their Country have 

* made capital : and therefore, fmce the natural Fear of Death 

* is of fuch great Advantage to us, we mufl; be contented with 
\ it, tho' it makes the Thoughts of Dying a little uneafy ; efpc- 

' cially: 

1 98 Concerning Natural Evil. Chap. I¥. 

This is a V. 'Tis ro be confefs'd indeed, that ihefe are In- 
fign that (jjcations that Man has fome Relation to In^mor- 
fcnE L?re ^^hty, and that the State in which he is placed at pre- 
is a pre- ^cnt IS not entirely natural to him, otherwife he 
ludetoa would not be uneafy in ir, nor afpire fo eagerly af- 
bctt:r. jgj. another. The prefent Life of Man is therefore 
either affign'd him for a time by way of Punifh- 
ment, as feme think, or by way of Prelude to or 
Preparation for a better, as our Religion teaches 
and our very Nature perfuades us to hope and exped:. 
This is prefumed you'll fay, and not proved. Be 
it fo. But if by the Suppofition of a future State 
this Difficulty may be folv'd, and Providence 
vindicated, when it is arraign'd as dealing hardly 
with Mankind, who is fo foolilli as to be will- 
ing to call in Queftion the Power and Goodnefs 
of God, rather then adm.ic of fo probable an Hy- 
pothefis ? To which we may add, and believed 
by almofl all Mankind. But if it were not fo, 
God^ lus bcuowcd other Benefits of Life upon 
us, which in cur own Judgments are not all in- 
ferior to the Prefervation of Life; and this ap- 
pears from hence, that we often prefer thefe Be- 
nefits to LiiC itfelf, which we ihould never do, 
if we did not rometimc«; efteem them dearer to us. 
To come to a Conciufion: Without an univerfal 
confuHon of Nature, without violence offer'd to 
the Laws and Order of it, the fame Animals could 



' cially if we confidcr, that when this natural Fear of Death 

• is not encreafed by other Caufes, it may be conquer'd or al- 

• lay'd by Reafon and wiie Confideration.' p. 329.4th Edit. 

For a farther Account of both the rational and irrational 
Ftar of Death, what it is, and what it ought to be : the E^ds 
and EfFcfts, and a^fo the Remedies of it. See iWW/s Dif- 
courfe on Ht^h. 2. 1/ *. 
'. ■ '. 

* P radical DifcoUrfeSy Vol. 4t]i. 

Se(fl. 6. Concerning Natural Evil. igg 

noc prolong their Life for any confiderable time, 

it remained therefore that fome fupply the Place 

of others fucceffively, and that the Species be per- ' 

petuared, fince the Individuals could not, left the 

whole Animal kind iliould prove a thing of but 

one Age's Duration. 

VI. From hence it appears that the Race of 'Tis expe- 
Mortals is to be perpetuated by the Propagation dientfor 
of their Species ; and fince every Animal is in a j '^j" ^^ 
perpetual Flux and may either increafe or decay , ^^^ !^^^ 
it was proper to proceed from lefs Beginnings to he Ipleis; 
greater J by this means the new Offspring hence the 
would be lefs burthenfome to the Parents, and ^°""5l'^": 
the Toung and Old agree better together. I con- afj"fe°"" 
fefs indeed Men are born defencelefs and unable to ^^.. 
proted themfelves, and lefs qualified to provide 
for themfelves than any other Animals : But God 
has affign'd .us Parents, Guardians, and Faithful 
Guides, fo that we are never more happy than 
when under their protedion. Hence Childhood, 
blefs'd with the fimple Enjoyment of good things 
and void of Care, becomes more pleafant to us than 
any other Age. Hence alio comes Reverence and ^ 
Relief to the Aged; hence proceeds Comfort to 
the Maturey and Support to the Decrepit. Nay 
the Seeds and principles of Social Life are all laid 
in this appetite of Generation. To this propen- 
fion we owe almoft all the Benefits of Society. No- 
thing therefore could be more defirable to Crea- 
tures mortal (as we are by the necelfary Condition 
of terreftrial Matter) and obnoxious to Miferies, 
than to be born after, fuch a manner as in the firft 
part of Life, while we are tender, unacquainted 
with things, and put under the Guardian fhip of 
others, to enjoy the Sweets without the Care; in 
the midAkt to pleafe ourfelves as much in taking 
care of others ; and in the Decrepit, feeble Age, to 
be allifted in our turn by others whom we have 

O 4. educated » 


The chief 
are thofc 
of Self- 
tion, and 
tion of 
the Spe- 

Concerning Natural Evil. Chap. IV. 

educated. This part of the Divine Oeconomy is fo 
far therefore from needing an Apology, that it 
is rather a Demonjlration of his Goodnefs. The 
Race of Men wa^ to be repaired, fince Death could 
not be prevented without a greater Evil ; and 
that Reparation is order 'd in fo wife and benefi'- 
cent a \v:y; that nothing can be more worthy of 
the Divine power and Goodnefs, nothing deferve 
greater Admirari n. 

VII. Now thefe tv/o Appetites, viz., o^ Self-prefer'^ 
vation, and the Propagation of our Species, are th^ 
primary, the original of all others. From thefe 
fpring Pleafure and an agreeable Enjoyment of 
things; fom thefe comes almoft every thing that 
is advantageous or defirable in Life. But all tbefe 
arc mingled with fome Evils, which could not be 
avoided without greater. 


Btd. 7. Concernifig Natural Evil. 


SECT, vir 

O/' Difeafes, Wild-Beafts, and Venomous 

WE muft obferve Cas before^) that our Bo- Bodies are 
dies confift of folid and fluid Parts, and liable to 
that thefe folid Members may be either cut or difloluti- 
broken to Pieces, disjointed, or otherwife render'd jiuJ^oi-g 
unfit for Motion : Whence Weaknefs, LanguiJJnng to corrupt 
and Torments', that the Fluids alfo are liable, not tion ; 
only to ConfumptioD, but Con uption to ; to E- j^^^^e 
bullition by too intenfe Heat, or Stagnation by j)^}"^^^" 
Cold : whence proceed various Maladies and Difeafes. 

II. Now there are certain Juices in the Earth The 
which we inhabit, from a mixture of which arife ^''^"gth 
Changes and Coagulations. There are other Bo- ^f^gj.^"! 
dies alfo which fly afunder with greater Violence from the 
when mix'd. Tluis Milk, by the infufion of a little contrarie- 
Acid, turns to Cheefe and Whey : Thus Spirits of ^y.of 
Wine and Gun-powder, when touch'd by the Fire, *^'"g^' 
run into Flame ; and there is nothing to hinder the (.oyjj j^^^ 
fame from corning to pafs in the hlood and Hu- be remov- 
mors of a human Body. Now thofe things which ed with- 
being mix'd with them fuddenly diflblve, coagu- p"^ ^^k- 
late, or render them unfit for Circulation, we call ]y[o^on7 
Poifonous. And if we conlider thofe contraries by 
which we are nourifli'd, and in the Struggle or Op- 
pofition of which Nature confifl:s, 'tis fcarce con- 
ceivable but that thefe things fliould often happen. 
Nor can all contrariety be taken away, except Mo- 

* Sea. 3. 

202 Concerning Natural Evil. Chap, IV. 

tion be taken away too, as we have fhewn; nor 
could all thefe things that are contrary to our Con- 
ftitution be removed, except fome Species of Crea- 
tures were extinft, or never created ', that is, our 
Security muft have been purchafed at too dear a 
rate. For if every thing that is in any refpeft re- 
pugnant to us were removed, it would cofi either 
the whole Syftem, or ourfelves more Evil than we 
receive from thence at prefent, as will fufficiently 
appear to any one that enumerates the Particulars. 
pfepide- ^^^ '^^^ ^^ ^^ ©bferv'd that the Parts of this 
mical mundane Syftem which are contiguous to us, viz.. 
JOifeafes. the Air, Waters, and the Earth itfelf, are liable 
to changes 5 nor could it pofTibly be otherwife if 
the whole Machine, of which thefe are but fmall 
Tarts, be thoroughly conlider'd : nor could thefe 
Changes, efpecially the fudden ones, always agree 
with the Temperature of the Humours of a human 
Eody. For they enter into the very conftitution 
of the Body, and infed; its Fluids according to the 
Laws of Nature : whence it is that the due Crafis 
of the Blood and Health of the Body depend upon 
the Temperature of the Air and Weatlier. Hence 
arife pejiilential aiid epidemical Difeafes ; nor could 
they be avoided, unlefs the Animals had been 
made of a quire different Frame and Conftitution. 
Nay, whatever State they had been placed in, they 
would have been fubjccr either to thefe or others no. 
lefs pernicious. For Marble, and the very hardefl; 
Bodies, are diffolv'd by the Viciffitude of 
Heat and Cold, Moid and Dry, and the other 
Changes which we are infcnfible of; how much 
more the Humors and animal Spirits of Man, on 
a right Temperature of which Life depends? God 
might indeed, by a Favour peculiar to us, have 
expeird all the Contagions arifing from thefe alte- 
rations, or provided that they fliould not hurt us. 
But what reafon have fuch Sinners as we now are, 


Sed. 7. Coiicern'uig Natural Evil. 203 

to expeft it ? 'Tis more agreeable to the Juflice 
of God to leave the Elements to themielves, to be 
carried according to the Laws of Motion for our 
Punifhmenr. ($5.) Neither ought we to wonder 
that God denies the Guilty a Favour, which even 
the Innocent have no right to : nay, we ought to 
think that he has inflided a very light penalty on 
reiiellious Men: For lince the natural Evils we are 
forc'd to ftruggle with are for the mod: part of 
fuch a nature as could not be warded off, but by 
the particular extraordinary favour of the Deity, 
God fhould feem rather to have refumed a free 
Gift, thaninflided a punillimenr, when he is pleaf- 
ed to permit them. 

IV. If the Earth had been made for the ufe of Rods and 
Man alone, we might have expeded that there Defertsare 
ihould be nothing in it that was prejudicial or ufe- ^'^5^ "*^' 
lefs to him ; but fince it was made, as v/e haveob- ^^^^ ^^1^^^. 
ferved '^t for the Benefit of the Univerfe, Man is Animals 

i placed 

for their 


(35.) Our Author's Argument here feemo to be framed rather 
in compliance with the common Method, than in ftridt con- 
formity to his own Scheme of the to fiixtiov, or abfolute Me- 
liority in things : which Syflem maintains that God is ftill in- 
finitely beneficent, or as kind as pofljble to all, or difpenfes 
every thing for the very bell in the main. Tho' what is here 
introduced by way of Punilhment, may, if rightly underftood, 
be defended as an Inftance of the greateft poffible Kindnefs ; 
fince the only End of all the Divine Judgments is either the 
Correction and Amendment of the Offenders themfelves or 
Admonition to others, or both : and confequently is a means 
of the greateft Good to Mankind in general, and the very belt 
difpenfation towards them in this degenerate corrupt Eftate, 
and the moft proper method of fitting them for or diredling 
and drawing them to a better. And if all this can be efFedled 
by the fame general Laws of Nature, v/hich alfo bring Plenty^ 
Health and Happincfs to the Word, here is a double demou^ 
Uration of the abfolute Wifdom and Gocdnefs of its Author. ■ 

* Chap. 3. Note zz. 

2C4 Coftcerning Natural Evil. Chap. IV. 

placed therein, not becaufe it was created for him 

only, but becaufe it could afford him a convenient 

Habitation: for Cod muft be fuppofcd in this cafe 

not to have adapted the Place to the Inhabitants, but 

the Inhabitants to the Place. If therefore Man 

can dwell commodioully enough in thefe Regions 

of the Earth which are fit for his pupof^, he muft 

allow God in his Coodnefs to give the Earth as 

many other Inhabitants as it can fuftain confiftent- 

ly with the Good of Men. Neither ought he to 

repine that the Rocks and Defarts, which are of 

no ufe to Men, fupply the Serpents and WiU-BeaJis 

with Coverts. But thefe, you'll fay, fometimes 

invade the Countries which are rnoft delightful, 

and befl ftored with conveniencies for human Life ; 

deftroy the Fruits and cultivated Fields, and kill 

the Men themfelves by Bites and Poifons. I graat 

it; but it may be queftion'd whether it has been 

always fo. 

Antient V. For in the firfl place, this Evil might have 

Hiftories had its Origin from Man himfelf ; viz.. Rage might 

'^^^^^^^! , be given to the Lion, and Venom to the Serpent, 

Eeafts and ^*^'' ^^""^ puniflimcnt of Mankind ; and this antient 

venomous Hiftories, both facred and prophane, declare. But 

Creatures fince this Qiieflion was fird moved by fuch as 

weremade either denied reveal'd Religion, or at leafl: were 

,i^fi,n-^^«^^' ienorant of it, I would not call that in to our 

of Man- afliltance, or make any other ufe of it than as a 

kind. bare Hypothefis. 

VI. We may affirm then in the fecond place, 
fault of^ that thofe thmgs happen through the fault of Men, 
Mankind who by Wars and Difcord make fruitful and rich 
that thefe Countries void of Inhabitants to till them, and 
multiply ; jgave them to the pofTefTion of Wild-Beafts and 
ki°d"waft^ venomous Infeds: Since therefore they neither 
by War, * cultivate them themfelve-', nor allow other perfons 
^(. to the to dq its what wonder is it if God, for the re- 
difgrace of proach of Men, give them up to be inhabited by 


feedt. 7. Concerning Natural Evil. 20^ 

Brutes, Wild-Beafts, and Infeds? Thofe Parts Man, of 
which we have defer ted belong by right to them, nor "g^"^ be- 
do they other wife multiply more than is proper. ^\^^^^ 

VII. Thirdly, 'Tis no more repugnant to the 
Divine Goodnels to have made an Animal by the We may 
Bite of which a Man might be deftroy'd, than a ^^"^^ fafi- 
Precipice. There's nothing in the whole Earth -^jy^'^ 
but what may hurt or kill a Man, if it be not ufed gg^^^g ^^^ 
with caution; Meat, Drink, Water, Fire. Mufl venomous 
thefe then not be created becaufe they may hurt a Creatures. 
Man? Nor is it more difficult to be aware of Poi- ^^^^ ^^^^^ 
fons and Wild-Beafts, than of thefe: Nay, fcarce niendes' 
one is killed by Foifon or torn by Wild-Beafts of of Life, 

a thoufand that die by the Sword ; and yet we about 
don't at all blame the Divine Goodnefs for this, which we 
It may be faid, that Iron, Earth, Water, Meats and "^^^[^2 
Drinks, are neceffary, and on that account the with Pro^ 
Evils attending them may be tolerated. And who vidence. 
will undertake to afiare us that venomous Animals 
and Wild-Beafts are not neceHary ? Muft we reckon 
them entirely ufelefs becaufe we do not know the 
ufe of them? Muft we fay that every Wheel in 
a Clock is made for no manner of purpofe which a 
Ruftic undcrftandsnot the DcHgn of? But fuppofe 
we grant that thefe are of no fervice to us, yet may 
they not pkafe and enjoy themfelves ^ ? 

VIII. You may urge that thefe are not worth ^''^f^^* 
the notice of the Divine Providence. Thus indeed ^^^jer the 
proud Mortals, admirers of themfelves alone, def- Divine 
pife the Works of God ; But 'ris not fo with the Care : tn 
Divine Goodnefs, which cliofe that fome Incon- 'Jj'"'^ .?' 
v^nience iiiould befal Mankind rather than a whole favours ^ 
Species be wanting to Nature. of Pride. 

IX. f you infift that a Lion might have been 

made without Teeth or Claws, a Viper without ^^^^^ ^^'^ 
Venom,- I grant it, as a Knife without an Edge: Creaulres^ 
But then they would have been of quite another are of ufe 
* See Note 2z. to Mei:. 


2o6 Concerning Natural Evil. Chap. IV. 

Species, and have had neither the nature, nor ufe, 
nor genius, which they now enjoy. In fhort, I fay 
once for all, they are not in vain. The very Ser- 
pents, though a Race hateful to us, have their ufes; 
among the reft they may ferve to gather Poifon out 
of the Earth. (56.) Nor is the Country lefs habi- 
table where they are than where they are not. 
Now, uteris -paribus^ Animals ought to multiply; 
for Life is a Perfedion: and fince it is as noble a 
one as Matter will admit of, 'tis preferable to none 
at all. 'Tis therefore the Work and Gift of Godl 
wherever he has beftow'd it, and does not ftand in 
need of an Elfil Principle for its Author. 


(36.) For an account of the various ends and ufes of thefe 
noxious Animals, poifonous Plants, ^c. fee Derhanis Anfwer 
to the abovemention'd Objection, in his Phyf. Theol. B. 2. Ch. 
6. with the References ; and Ray on the Creation, Part 2. 
p. 432, l^c. 4th Edit. Ok Chamber i^ CyclopAdia, under the 
Word Poifon. 


Sed. 8. Concerning Natural Evil, 207 


Concerning the Errors and Ignorance 
of Man, 

INCH Man ( nay every created Being ) is ne- Human 
ceflarily of a limited Nature"^, 'tis plain that Under- 
he cannot know every rhinq'. The moft perfecS; landing is 

J iD I ^ ticccli^nlv 

Creatures therefore are ignorant of many things: ignorant 
Nor can they attain to any other Knowledge than of many 
what is agreeable to their Nature and Condition, things. 
Innumerable Truths thcreibre lie hid from every 
created Underftanding : For perfed and infinite 
Knowledge belongs to God alone ; and it mull: be 
deterrain'd by his pleaiurc vhat degree every one 
is to be endow'd with : for he only knows the na- 
ture and neceility of each, and has given what is 
agreeable thereto. Ignorance is therefore an Evil of 
DefeHf and no more to be avoided than the other 
liind of Ifnperfe^ioH ; for an imperfeft Nature (as that 
of all Creatures is) underftands alfo imperfedly. We are 

II. As to human Knowledge, 'tis confelTed that we fo"ie"nie^ 
acquire it by the Senfes, and that certain Charaders j^a^eufe 
denote, not fo much the Nature^ as the VJes and ofconjec- 
D/^rf«ca of things. Now, fince things very difFe- tures, 
rent internally, have fometimes the fame external there- 
Marks, we muft of neceffity be often doubtful and ^^ ^J[^^ 
fometimes deceiv'd by the limilitude of the Marks, only be 

* See Note iS. _ but alfo 

Neither miftaken. 

2oQ toncerhi'ng Natural Evil. Chi^. IV," 

Neither is it fufficient to the avoiding of Error 
that we fufpend cur alTtnt in doubtful Cafes; for 
'tis often neceflary for us (elpecially if we have f6 
do with other Perfons) to ad upon conjedurc, and 
refolve upon adion, bemie we have thoroughly 
difcufs'd the Point or difcover'd the Truth: on 
which account it is impoflible that we fhold to- 
tally avoid Errors. God mufl: therefore either have 
made no fuch Animal as Man iy, or one th^t is 
liable to Errors. As Contrariety refults from Mo- 
tion, which is as it were the adion of Matter; fo 
a polTihility of Error is conlequent upon the Adion 
of a finite Being. 
Gpdcou'd III. ir any one reply, that God can immediater 
notalways ly reveal the Truth to us in luch Cafes: I anf- 
guard us ^^^^ j-^^ ^^y (q^ j-^qi- can it be denied that he has 

ro°"^with- ^^"^ ^^^ ^^^^ ^^ ^^ fomctimes: But that this 
out vio- fliould be done always, would be a violence repug- 
lencedone nant to the Nature and Condition of Man, and 
to Nature, could not poiTibly be done without more and greater 
Evils arifing from an Inrerruption of the Courfe 
of Natuf.. Now we mufl diftmguifli between 
thofe Errors which we fall into after out utmoft 
diligence and application, snd fuch as we are led 
Into by. carckfnef, Negligence, aiid a depraved 
Will. Errors of the former kind are to be reck- 
on'd among Natural Evils, and not imputable to 
us: For ihcy arife from the very State and Condi- 
tion of the Mind of Man, and are not to be avoid- 
ed, unles God would change the Species of Being?, 
and o.derthar different things lliould not affed thq 
Senfes in the fame manner,, that is, that there fliould 
be no more Species nor Individuals than there are 
Senfations in us: for if the Number of thefe ex- 
ceed the Difcrimination of our Senfations, variety 
of them mud necclfarily produce cither the very 
lanae Senfations in us or none at all, and a great 
»liany anfwer to the fame ScniAtion, fo that we mufl, 


Sed. 8. Concerning Natural Evil. 209 

certainly be fometimes impofed upon by the fimi* 
litude of things. Either then the Diftindiom of 
our Senfations muft be multipHed in infimtum^ or 
the infinite variety of fenfible Objeds taken away. 
But 'tis evident that neither could have been done 
in this prefent State. We muft therefore Lcar 
the Inconvenience not only of being ignorant of 
innumerable things, but alfo of ernng in many 

IV. To this it may be replied. That Error is a Ma" is no£ 
Defed in that part of Man in the perftclion oP^^^^^'^Jf 
which his Happinefs chiefly confifts; If therefore ^^g^g^jr-g 
he rhay naturally fall into Errors, it follows that expofed to 
Man may be naturally miferable without his fault. Errors. 
But I anfwer : Any particular Evil does not bring 
Mifery upon us; otherwife every Creature would 

be miferable, as of neceffity labouring under the 
Evils of Imperfe^ion. He only therefore is to be 
denominated miferable^ who is opprelTed with more 
and greater Evils than his Good can requite with 
Happinefs : So that upon balancing the Conveni- 
encies and Inconveniencies of Life, it were better 
for him not to be than to be. 

V. 'Tis to be obferv'd alfo jthat God has in his Thofe 
Wifdom and Goodnefs fo temper'd our prefent E"*^/^ 
State, that we very feldom, if ever, fall into erie- 7^ % ^"^ 
vous and pernicious Errors without our own fault, our fault 
But if this ever come to pafs, as foon as the Evil are reldors 
preponderates. Life is taken away together with pernici- 
the Benefits of Nature. Now 'tis to be efleem'd °'^^' 

an Happinefs, and an Argument of the Divine 
Goodnefs, that the Natural Benefits of Life can- 
not be taken from us, but Life is taken from us 
alfo. Life then cati be a burden to none; nor is 
it necelTary that any one fhould withdraw himfelf 
from natural Evils by voluntarily putting an end 
to his Life. For if thefe Evils be fuch as toke away 
the Benefits of Life, they alfo bring it to an end* 

2IO Concerning "Natural Yu\'A. Chap. IV. 

God produced all things out of nothing, and gave 

us Being without our Advice j he feems therefore 

oblig'd in juftice not to fufFer us to be reduced to 

a State that is worfe than Non-enity. (5 7.) When 

therefore atiy State is overwhelmed with Evils 

which outweigh the Good, 'tis reafonable that God 

fhould remit us to our former States that is, let us 

return to nothing. Neither ought we to accufe the 

Divine Power and Goodnefs which has beftow'd as 

many Bleffings and Benefits upon us, as either the 

whole Univerfe or our own Nature would admit 

of; and fince it was impolTible but that fome time 

or other, upon the increafe of Evils, his Gift 

iviz.. Life) muft become burdenfome, when this 

happens he breaks off its thread. 

O"^!" VI. But Man, you'll fay, is ignorant of thofe 

Know- things which it was his greateft Intereft to know, 

adapted namely, of Truths that are necelTary to the at- 

to our tainment of Felicity. It was convenient for our 

State. prefent State to underftand thefe; and who will 

affirm that God has not befiow'd upon us all the 

Knowledge that is agreeable to our State \ We 

ought therefore never to be deceiv'd about fuch 

Truths as thefe, while we apply all our diligence 



{37.) It would be {o indeed if this were our only State: 
but as it is at prefent, I fear many have nothing but the hopes 
and expeiEtations of another to fupport them under almoft com- 
plete Mifery ; to comfort and encourage them to undergo 
Evils infinitely greater than all the benefits of Life: Evils 
which make Life itfelf an Evil, and (as our Author fays) put 
them into a State worfe than nothing. Witncfs the long and 
acute Torments of numerous Martyrs, the Pains of Confcflbrs, 
the Labours of common Galley-Slaves, ^c. Put the leaft 
hint of this is fufficient, and the common Anfwers to it very 
fatisfiftory ; as will perhaps appear from the References to the 
lall Chapter of the Appendix, where this Queftion comes more 
properly under confideration. 

Sed. 8. Concerning Natural ^mW, ^u 

to the Search. I anfwer ; If this be underilood of 
the Happinefs due to us in this Life, 'tis very true , 
nor is our Underftanding ever fo far miftaken as 
not to inform us of the Truths necelTary to this 
kind of Happinefs, if proper care be not wantingo 
But fuch Happinefs ought to fuffice us, as may 
ferve to make Life a Bleffing, and better than the 
abfence of it. A greater indeed was promifed to 
the firft Man by 2. gratuitom Covenant, C58.) but 

P 2 whea 

" NO TE S 

(38.) Though the firfl: Man might have been created more 
jjerfeft in all his Facukies than any of his Fofterity (which, 
as fome thinic, csnnot be eafily proved from the account wc 
have of him in Gencjis * ) though his Knowledge might have 
been much clearer, as coming entire and adult from theimma- 
diate hand of his Creator ; yet it feems highly probable that 
this could not have been propagated in a natural Way, that is^ 
by any general pre eftablilh'd Laws, as our prefent Faculties 
are, but Mankind, as a fuccelTive Body, muft neceffarily have 
been left to the known Laws of Propagation, and the prefenC 
Method of improving their Intellefls, and deriving all their 
Notices from the common Sources of Senfation and Refle£tion, 
And ^o our bountiful Creator may be fuppofed to have 
deprived Mankind of no Bleffings he could, confident with 
his other Attributes and the Order of the Creation, poffibly 
have beftow'd. Nay, why may not he be thought to have 
converted even this neceffary, unavoidable Imperfettion in us, 
compared with the firft Adam, into a greater Perfedtion arifing 
both from our Notions of his Fall, and the conlequences of it,-, 
and of the wonderful Remedy prepared for it and promifed 
in the fecond Ada7n ? Wc feem to be made more highly fezi- 
fible of the infinite Wifdom and Goodnefs of God, and more 
ihankful for our Condition, from our knowledge of his juft 
permiffion of fo deferv'd a Fall, and his gracious undelerv'd 
Exaltation of us again to a fuperior State, than if we had con- 
ceiv'd the Mifery attending human Nature to be (as perhaps 


^ee Eaylc under the Word Ada m, Remark D. And Curceltei 
Infiit. Relig. Chri/l. L- 3. C. 8. p. 108, i^c. And Di/ert. dc 
Pecc. On'g. §. 1 1 . Or Epifcop. Injiif. Jheol. L. 4, C. 6, 7. p," 
3 5 ^» 359' O^ ^'*^ Author'' s SermQ?} on th? FalL 

^12 CoJiceniitJg Natural Evil. Chap. IV. 

when that was once broken by Sin, he and his Pofte- 
rity were remanded to thofeimperfeft Notices which 
could be had from an imperfed Underftanding, 
and the Information of the Senfes ; which yet are 
not in the leaft to be defpifed; neither had Man 
a Right, nor could he naturally attain to a greater 
Peifedion. For wlicn the Faculties of our Souls 
ivere injur'd, and the Health and Vigour of our 
Bodies impair'd by our own Vices, as well as thofe 
of our Parents, our natural Perfedions muft ne- 
cefTarily be impaired alfo. For fince our Know- 
ledge is to be acquired by Care, Induftry, and In- 
flru(5lion, if Mankind had continued innocent, and 
with diligent care communicated true Notions of 



mofl: of it was) a neceffary confequence of our being created 
in this inferior Clafs. But whether this Notion be allow'd 
or not, the Scheme of Providence relating to Paradife, &c. as 
deliver'd in Holy Scripture, if taken altogether, can be no 
jull Obje<5lion againft the moral Attributes of God. He crea- 
ted Man entirely innocent, and abfolutely free, which Free- 
dom was abfolutely neceflary to his Happinefs (as will appear 
under the Head of Moral Evil ) He gave him the Means 
and Abilities to complete his Happinefs, and placed him in a 
World eveiy way fuited to his Condition. This liberty made 
it pofPible for him to lofe that Innocence, though he had but 
one lingle opportunity of doing it*, and it was highly reafon- 
able and neceffary that he fliould have thatf . This one Op- 
portunity he embraced (which it does not feem poffible for 
God himfelf, though he forefaw it, to have prevented, con- 

* See Nichols's Conference avith a Theijiy p. 220, 221. 
ijl. Edition. 

•f See Dr. J. Clarke on Moral Evil, p. 211, &c. and 
Limborch 'Tkeol. Chriji. L. 3. C. 2. §. 2. and Jenkins's 
Reafon. of the Chriji. Reli^, Vol. 2. C. 13. p. 253. 5/A. 

Sed. 8. Concerning Natural Evil. 213 

things to their Pofterityj and had not infe<51:ed 
their Offspring by Example, In{h-a<5lion, or any 
Contagion attending Propagation, we lliould have 
been lef^ liable to Errors; nay free from pernicious 
one"?; and have enjoy'd a more perfecl Knowledge 
of thing"?. For our native intelledual Faculty 
would have been ftronger, and being better fur- 
niilied both with the means and principles of Sci- 
ence than we now are, we fhould more eafily have 
prevented the Occafions of Error. All pernicious 
Errors therefore, at lead in Matters of Neceffity, 
are to be imputed to our own Guilt, or that of 
our Parents^. 

p 5 vir. 


fjftently with that Freedom he had for good Rcafons given 
him and determined thus to exercife) and fo alter'd his Na- 
ture and Circumftances, and confequently made it neceflary 
for God alfo to change his Place and Condition, and to with- 
draw luch extraordinary favours as his infinite Wifdom and 
Goodnefs might otherwife liave thought proper to beitow. 
Thus with his Innocence Man loft all Title to a Continuance 
inParadife, and of confequence became naturally liable to the 
common Evils and Calamities of a tranfitory Life, and the 
Pains attending its Conclufion. Thofe that defcended from 
him and partook of the fame Nature, muil neceflarily partake 
of the fame Infirmities ; in particular, they muft inherit Cor- 
ruption and Mortality. Which Evils, though vye now lament 
them as the chief parts of our Fore-father's Punifhment, yet 
could they not in the prefent Circumftances of things be pre- 
vented; nor indeed, were fuch a Prevention polfible, would 
it be in the rnain defirable, as will appear from the following 
Seflion, par. 6, 7. Nay thefe, by a moft wonderful Scheme 
of Providence, are infinitely outweigh'd, and made the means 
of bringing us to much greater Happinefs, by Faith in him 
who was promifed from the Beginning, and hath in thefe lat- 
ter Pays brought Life and Incorruptibility to light. See more 
on this Subjedt in Note (X,] and Note 81. 

* For niohat relates to the DoBrine of Original Sin, &C. 
fee the latter End of the next Seilion, and Note 4P. 


We prefer 

Life, with 

all its in- 





Some put 
to Death, 
not on ac- 
count of 
tut vo- 

Concerning Natural EviL Chap. IV. 

VII. If any be fo ungrateful |as to murmur ftill, 
and affirm that he would not accept of Life on 
thefe Conditions, if he might have his Choice; 
and that himfelf is the beft Judge of his own Iti- 
tereft, and he no Benefador that obtrudes a Gifn 
upon a Man againft his Will ; that confequently 
he owes no thanks to God on account of a Life 
which he would willingly refufe: We mufl: reply, 
that thus indeed impious Men and Fools ar? uled 
to prate ; but this does not come from their Hearts 
and Confciences, For none are more afraid of 
Death, none more tenacious of Life than they that 
talk thus idly. A great many of them profefs that 
they don't believe a future Life; and if fo, they 
may reduce themfelves to the wifh'd-for ftate of 
Annihilation as foon as they pleafc, and caft off 
that Exifience which is fo dilagreeable, No Perfon 
therefore, except he be corrupted in his Judgment 
and indulge himfelf in Error, can ferioufly pre- 
fer Non-exiftence to the piefent Life. (59.) 

VIII. But if any one think fo from his Heart, he 
is not fallen into this Opinion from any natural Evil, 
but from others which he brought upon himfelf by 
7i>rong EleUions, We fee many Peribns weary of 



(39.) ' Self-Murder is fo unnatural a Sin, that 'tis now-a- 

* days thought reafon enough to prove a Man diftracled. We 

* have too many fad examples what a difturbed Imagination 

* will do, if that muft pafs for natural Diilracflion j but we 

* feldom or never hear that mere external Sufferings, how 

* fevere foever, tempt Men to kill themfelves. The Stoics 

* themfelves, whofe Principle it was to break their Prifon 

* when they found themfelves uneafy, very rarely put it into 

* practice : Nature was too Ilrong for their Philoibphy. And 

* though ihcir Philofophy allovv'd them to die when they 
? pleafed, yet Nature taught them to live as long as they could ; 

* and we fee that they feldom thought themfelves miferable 

* enough to die. Sherlock on ProvidencCy C^ 7. p. 249, 252. 
3d Edit. See alfo Note (Z.) 

Se(fl. 8. Concerning Natural Evil. 215 

Life, but 'tis becaufe of their bad Management, left 
they fhouid be ridiculous for miffing of Honour, of 
Riches, or fome empty End which they have un- 
reafonably propofed to themfelves. But very few- 
have been excited to Self-murder by any natural 
and abfolutely unavoidable Evil or Error. Life 
therefore, of what kind foever it is, mufl: be look'd 
upon as a benefit in the judgment of Mankind, and 
we ought to pay our g ateful acknowledgments to 
God, as the powerful and beneficent Author ofir. 
Nor will it be any prejudice to the Divine Good- 
nefs, if one or two throw Life away in defpair. 
For it is to be fuppofed that this proceeds noc 
from the greatnefs of any natural Evil, but from 
Impatience arifing from fome depraved Eledion; 
of which more hereafter. For none of the Brutes 
which are deftitute of Free-will, ever quitted its 
Life fpontaneoufly, thro' the uneafines of Grief, 
or a Diftemper. If any Man therefore has killed 
himfelf voluntarily, we mufl: conclude that he did 
this, as all other wicked Adions, by a depraved 

IX. As tothefecond fort of Errors into which Thofe Ei-- 
we are led, not by nature, but carelefsners, negli- ^^g^^^^^. 
gence, curiofity, or a depr?ved will, the number ^^ ^y our 
ofthefe is greater and their effeds more pernicious: own fault, 
nay 'tis thefe only which load and infeft Life with are to be 
intolerable Evils, fo as to make us wifh that we had ^^^^^^"^ 
never been. But fince they come upon us thro* ^^^^^ 
our own fault, they are not to be reckoned among Evils, 
Natmd Evils, but belong to the third kind, viz.. 
the Moral, to which we haften : But mufl: firfl: fum 
up what has been deliver'd in this Chapter. 

P 4 SECT, 


Co7icernmg Natural Evil. 

Chap. IV. 


Containing the Sum of what has been /aid 
en Natural Evils. 


one Sy- 
flem, of 
which e- 



Reader a better 


N order to give the Keader a better view 
what has been faid we muit conceive this whole 
World as one Syllem, whereof all particular things 
are the parts and Members, and every one has its 
place and office, as the Members have in our own 
very thing Body, or the Beams in a Houfe ; the Doors Win- 
is a part, ^q^j^ Chambers .uid Clofets : Neither is there any- 
thing ufelefs or fuperfluous in the whole: and in 
order to unite all more clofely together, nothing 
is felf-fufficient, but as it is qualified to help o- 
thers, fo it ftands in need of the help of others, 
for its more commodious Subfiftencc. And tho* 
in fo immenfe a Machine, we do not fo clearly 
perceive the connexion or mutual dependence of 
the parts in every refped, yet we are certain that 
the thing is fo. In many Cafes 'tis fo evident 
that he will be efteem'd a Mad-man who denies it. 
Since therefore the World is to be look'd upon as 
one Building, we rauft recoiled: how many different 
parts, and now various, fo grand, fo magnificent 
an Edifice fliould confifl; of. We may defign a 
Houfe divided into Halls, Parlours and Clofets i 
but unlefs there be a Kitchen too, and places fet a- 
part for more ignoble, more uncomely Offices, 
*twill not be fit for Habitation. The fame maybe 
affirm'd of the Woild and the frame of it. Gbd 
could have filled it all with Suns : but who will en- 
gage that fuch a Syflem would be capable of living 
Creatures, or proper to preferve Motion ? He 


Seft. 9. Concerning Natural Evil, 217 

could have made the Earth of Gold or Gems: But 
in the mean while dejiitme of Inhabitants, He that 
has lived a Day or tv/o without Food, would pre- 
fer a Danghill to fuch an Earth. God could have 
created Man immortal, without Paffions, without a 
Senfe of Pleafure or Pain ; but he muft have been 
without a folid Body" alfo, and an inhabitant of fome 
other Region, not the Earth. He could have 
made the whole human Body an Eje^ but then it 
would have been unfit for Motion, Nutrition, and 
all the other fundions of Life. He could have 
taken away the contrariety of appetites, but the 
contrariety of Motions (nay Motion itfelf) muft 
have been taken away with it. He could have pre- 
vented the fruftrating of Appetites, but that muft 
have been by making them not oppofitei for 'tis im- 
pofliblethat contrary Appetites, or fuch as defire what 
is at the fame time occupied by others (hould all at 
once be fitisfied. He could, in the laft place, have 
framed 'b/\2Ln. free from Errors, but then he muft not 
have made ufe of Matter for an Organ of Senfa- 
tion, which the very Nature of our Soul requires. 

II In fliort, if the mundane Syftem be taken to- ,r , 
gether, if all the Parts and Periods of it be com- whole and 
pared with one another, v/e muft believe that it allitspam 
could not polTibly be better: if any part could be betaken 
changed for the better, another would be worfej '^^S^^^^^* 
if one abounded with greater Conveniencies, ano- ^^^^^^ j^^ 
ther would be expofed to greater Evils; and that changed 
neceffarily from the Imperfedion of all Creatures, but for 
A Creature is defcended from God, a moft perfeB ^'^^ ^vorfe. 
Father I but from nothing, ^shsAiother, which is 
Imperfedion itfelf. All finite things therefore par- 
take of nothing, and are nothing beyond their 
Bounds. When therefore we are come to the 
bounds which nature has fet, whoever perceives 
any thing, muft neceffarily perceive alfo that he is 
deficients and feek for lomething without himfelf 

2i8 Concerning Natural Evil. Chap. IV. 

to Tiipporr him. Hence come Evils, hence oppo- 
fitjon ot things, and as it were a mutilation in the 
Work of God. Hence for the moft part Men fear 
and defire, grieve and rcjoyce. Hence Errors and 
Darknelsof the Mind. Hence Troops of Miferies 
marching thro' human Life: whether thefe grow 
for the punifhment of Mortals, or attend Life by 
the necejjity oi Nature j that is, whether they pro- 
ceed from the conftitution of Nature itlelf, or are 
external and acquired by our Choice. Nor need 
we the bloody Battle oi the Ancient s^ nor the ma- 
licious God of the Manichees for Authors of them. 
Nor is it any Argument againftthe Divine Omni- 
potence, that he rould not free a Creature in its own 
Nature necelTanly imperfeft, from that native Im- 
perfeftion, and the Evils confequent upon it. He 
might as we have often faid, have not created mortal 
Inhabitants, and fuch as were liable to Fears and 
Griefs : nor, as will be declared below ; fuch as by 
their depraved Elecflions might deferve Punifliment : 
but with regard to the Syftem of the whole 'twas ne- 
ceflary that he fliould create thefe or none at all : eirher 
the Earth mufl: be replenifli'd with thefe, or left defti- 
tute of Inhabitants. Nor could any of the foregoing 
particulars be omitted, but that very Omiflion 
would bring along with it much greater Evils. 
Hence the III. From hence fprang the Error of the Epicti" 
Error of reans, who pretended that this World was unwor- 
the Epi- |.]^y Qf 3 good and powerful God. Thev, we may 
who knew believe, knew only the leait part, and as it were the 
only the Sink of the World, viz.^ our Earth, They never 
leaftand confidered the good and beautiful part of Nature, 
Forft part, but only contemplated the Griefs, Difcafes, Death 
and Delh-U'ffion of Mortals, when they denied 
that God was the Author of fo many Evils: In 
the interim they forgot that the Earth is in a 
manner the Filth and Offscouring of the Mundane 
Syjlemi and that the Workmanfhip of God is no 


Sed: 9. Concerning Natural Evil. 219 

more ro be condemn'd for it, than a Judgment is 
to be form'd of the beauty of an Houfe from the 
Sink or Jakes. They were ignorant alfo that the 
Earth was made in the manner it now is not for 
itfelf alone, but in order to be fubfervient to the 
good of the whole; and that it is filled withfuch 
Animals as it is capable of, with a due Subordinati- 
on to the good of the Univerfe, and the Felicity 
of Souls that inhabit the purer and brighter Parts 
of this Fabric, viz,, the zy£ther and the Heavens » 
Thefe are as it were the Gardens, Parks, and Palaces 
of the World; this Earth the Dunghill, or (as 
fome will have it) the Work-houfe. Nor is it a 
greater wonder that God fhould make thefe, than 
the Jntefiines, and lefs comely, but yet neceffary 
Parts of a human Body. Laftly, they are unmind- 
ful that more and greater Good is to be found 
here than Evil, otherwife they themfelves would 
rejed; Life : and he that has more good than E- 
vil is not miferable except he will. If therefore 
we could compare the Good things with the E- 
vil; if we could view the whole Workmanlliip of 
God; if we thoro'ly underftood the Connetlionj 
Subdornations, and mutual Relation of things, the rj 
mutual affiftance which they afford each other; and j-eply to 
laftly, the whole feries and order of them; it v/ould the Dif- 
appear that the World is as well as it could pofFibly ficuky, 
be; and that no Evil in it could be avoided, which '^^-'^'"^^ 

,1 r- 1 • t (- comes 

would not occafion a greater by its abfence. EojU? 

IV. We have endeavour'd to clear up thefe Since it a- 
Points, and I hope effedually, as to this kind of nks from 
Evil. For upon the fuppofltion of our Principles, the very 
( which by tlie way, are confimonly acknowledg'd, ) "re^j-eji 
fome natural Evils muft inevitably be admitted; Beings, 
and if even one could arife in the Work of an in- and could 
finitely wi(e and good God, there's no occafion for "°5,^j^" 
the Bad Principle as the Origin of Evil, for Evil J'^/thout a 
might have exifted n^twithflanding the Divine contradic- 

Omni- lion. 


This re- 
with the 
4oes not 
all kinds 
of natural 
Evil to the 
fall of the 
iirfl: Man. 

Concerning Natural Evil. Chap. IV. 

Omnipotence and infinite Goodnefs. The difficult 
Qtielbon then. Whence comes Evil? is not unnn- 
fwcnibic. For it arifes from the very nature and 
confHrurion of created Beings, and could not be 
avoideo without a contradidion. And tho' we be 
nor able co apply thefe Principles to all particular 
cafes Lind circumftanceTj yet we are rare enough 
that they may be applied. Nor fhould we be coq- 
cern'd ar our being at a lofs to account for fome 
parricu'ar'-.j fince this is common in the Solution of 
almoil all natural Phenomena, 'and yet we acquiefce. 
For preiuppofing fome Principles, fuch as IVlarter, 
Motion, c^c. tho' we are ignorant what M:itter 
and Motion are in any particular Body, yet 
from the variety of thefe we take it for granted 
that various Compofirions and Qualities proceed. 
In like manner we are perfuaded, th.u from, the 
various kinds of Imperfedion neceffarily inherent 
in things, various Species of Evils arife, tho' in fome 
the manner in which this comes to pafs does not 
appear; agreeably to what we experience in Light 
and Colours. We are certain that Colours arife from 
the different difpofition, refradion and refledion of 
Light ; but yet none can certainly tell how it is re- 
ceded or refraded when it forms a blew, a green, or 
any other Colour : So that I dare affirm that the Ori- 
gin of natural Evil is more eafily affign'd, and more 
clearly and particularly folv'd, than that of Colours, 
Tafles, or any fcnfible Quality whatfoever. 

V. I confefs, that according to this Hypothefis, 
Natural Evils proceed from the original Condition 
of things, and are not permitted by God, but in or- 
der to prevent greater; which fome perhaps may 
think repugnant to facred Hiftory and the Dodrine 
of Mofes. For they will have it, that the abufe of 
Free-will was the Caufe of all natural Evils, and 
that when God created every thing good and per- 
fed in its kind, it was afterwards corrupted by 


Sed:, 9- Concerning Natural ^s^A, 221 

Sin, and fubjeded to natural Evils : But this is aflert- 
ed without Proof. For the Scripture no where 
teaches that there would have been no manner of 
natural Evil, if Man had not finned. God indeed 
made all things good and perfed in their kind, 
that is, he created and ftill preferves every thing 
in a ftate and condition fuitable to the whole Syftem 
of Beings and which it need have no Reafon to re- 
pent of except it will. But neither the Goodnefs 
of God, nor the Perfcdion that belongs to the 
Nature of things, required that all natural Evils 
Hiould be removed: fome created Beings have E- 
vils inherent in their very Natures, which .God 
muft of neceCfity either tolerate or not create thofe 
things in which they do inhere. If therefore the 
facred Hifto:y be carefully examined, it will ap- 
pear that fome kinds of Evil are attributed to the 
Sin of the firft Man, but others not. Of the form- 
er kind are, firfly the Mortality of Man, who 
would otherwife have been immortal by Grace, Se- 
condly t the Barrennefs qf the Earth, and growth of 
mxioiii and improfitable Plants in the Room offuch 
as were fit for Food, for the puniiliment of Man- 
kind. Thirdlji that hard Labour necefifary for 
providing Food, which is a confequence of the 
former. Fonrthlyy that impotent ^jfeHian and Ne- 
ceflity of Obedience whereby Women are made fub- 
jed to Men, Fifthly^ the pains of Child-birth, 
Sixthly^ the Enmity between Man and the Serpen- 
tine kind. Seventhly t Banifhment out of Paradife^. 
i. e. as appears to me, an Expulfion out of that State 
of Grace, in which the Favour of God had placed 
Man above what was due to his Nature Thefe> 
and fome others, are exprefly enumerated as punifh- 
ments of the Firfl Fall, l^o.) But befides thefe 


(40.) For an account of the Scripture Hiftory relating to 
^e Fall of Adam, and the confe^uences of it, both upon himfelf 


222 Concerning Natural Evil. Chap. IV. 

there are many confequent upon the neceffity of Mat- 
ter, and concerning which the Scripture has nothing 
to induce us to believe that they arofe from Sin. 
The Evils VI. 'Tis to be oblerv'd farther, that thefe are 
which a- j^Q,. pei-niitted by God to no purpofe, but for the 
thenceTre ?,^^^ ^^ ^^^ UniverfC) and at the fame time of 
permitted Mail himfelf. For as to Mortality, it was by no 
for the means expedient for the Syftem, that a finful 
g°°'^ °^. Creature Ihould enjoy Immortahty, which was not 
V rfe " "d ^'^^'^g ^^ ^^^ nature, but granted by an extraordi- 
alfooV nary favour of the Deiry. Nay, God feems to 
Alan him- have forbidden our firft Parents theufeof the Tree 
felf. of Life out of mere Compaffion, left if their Life 

ihould by virtue of it be prolonged, they fliould 
live for ever miferable. Even this Puniiliment, as 
all others, contributes to the reftraint of bad Elec- 
tions, and the preparation of a new v/ay to Hap- 
pinefs. For when Man tranfgrefled, and a per- 
verfe abufe of his Free- Will was once introduced, 
there would have been no end of Madnefs if the 
Divine Goodnefs had continued to preferve Life, 
Underftanding, an eafy Food, and other Gifts of 
the Primeval State, to the abufers thereof, as well 
as to the Innocent. 'Tis notorious how exorbi- 
tant bad Eled:ions are even amongfl: the Cares and 
Labours which Mortals undergo in providing the 
Neceflaries of Life ; and hov/ pernicious ftrcngth 
of Parts becomes, when upon a corruption of the 



and his Poftcrity, fee Ihbot"^ Boyle's LeSi. Serm. cj. 2d. Set. 
Rymer^ General Reprefentat'ion of re'veaVd Religion, Part i. 
C. 4. and Dr. J . Clarke on Moral E-vil, p. 224, ^c. or 
D'Oylyi four DilTcrtations, C. 2. p. 3. Note b. and C. 9. p. 
97, t^c. or Bp. Taylors Polemical Difcourfes, p. 614, 615, 
623. See alfo Limhorchh Thcol. Chrijl. L. 3. C. 3, 4, 5. or 
Epifcopius de Libera Arbitrio., ^c. or Ciircelhi Rel. Chrift, 
Inflit. L. 3. C. 14, 15, 16. and his DiJJert, ds Fac. Originif, 
©r our Author's Sermon on the Fall 

ScO.. 9. Concerning Natural Evil. 221; 

Will it degenerates into Cunning. How much 
more intolerable then V/^ould it be if the Fear of 
Death were away ; if the fame facility of procur- 
ing Food, the fame vigour ofintelled, which our 
Firft Parents enjoy'd were continued to their cor- 
rupt Pofterity ? (*.) 

VII. Nay, to confefs the truth, it could not Mortality 
poffibly continue; for let their be never fo great Sl"^'^' 
plenty of Provifion, it might be corrupted by Difilfes 
the voluntary Ad of one Man. When our Firft y^. are* 
Parent had therefore once tranfgrefTed, what hopes for the 
could he conceive of his Pofterity? Or, by what 2°°^^°^ 
Right could they claim the fupernatural Gifts of ii/this^"^ 
God ? certainly by none. All then are made mor- corrupt 
tal, not only thro' the Jujliccy but the Goodnefs of Eibte. 
God. For while Men are oblig'd to ftruggle with 
Hunger, Thirft, Difeafes and Troubles, few of 
them are at leifure to run quite mad, and leap 
over all the bounds of Nature by their depraved 
EIed:ions. 'Tis better therefore for us to undergo 
all thefe Inconveniences, than to be left to ourfelves 
without reftraint in this corrupt Eflate. For by 
that means we fhould bring upon ourfelves fliil 
greater Evils. But thefe things belong to reveal'd 
Religion, and this is not a proper Place to treat on 
them at large. (41.) 


(41.) Thus our Author has, I think, fufHciently accounted 
for all forts of Natural Evil, and demonftrated the rl /SiAnfli-, 
or Meliority of things in the Univerfe, taking the whole (ax 
we always ought) together : at leaft, he has laid down fuch 
Principles as may eafily and effeftually be applied to that End. 
He has clearly proved, and clofely purfued this one fingle Pro- 


(*.) See Sherlock upon Death, C. 2. §. i. and C. 3- §. 3^ 
As to the Vigour 0^ our firft Parent's Intelleft, fee the Au- 
thors referred to in the beginning of Note 38, particularly 
Mr. D'Oylf^ firft Diflertation. C 9. 


Concerning Natural Evil. Chap. IV^ 


pofition thro' all the abovemcntlonM Particulars, njiz. that mt 
one of thofe Evils or Incon'veniences in our Syjlem could poj/ibly 
have been prevented vnthout a greater: which is an ample 
Vindication, an evident Proof ol" all the Divine Attributes, 
in the original Frame and Government thereof. And indeed 
this feems to be the bell andmoft convincing, if not the only- 
proper Method of handling the Argument and examining the 
Works of God, fo as to attain a due fcnfe of, and regard for 
the Author of them. Which Maxim therefore, we conclude 
from the numberlefs inftances of its apparent Validity, ought 
to be allow'd, and may be fafely infilled on, tho' by reafon of 
our great ignorance of Nature, ic cannot always be fo clearly 
applied. However it has been applied fuccefsfully to the So- 
lution of the moil material Difficulties in the prefent Queflion, 
as may appear more fully from the Authors referr'd to in the 
foregoing Chapter. 

Chap. Vo 2:2^5 

Of Moral Evil 

Infroduciion^ containing the Suhftance oj 
the Chapter, 

A V I N G given fome Account o£ N'atti-^ 
ral Evils, the Moral come next under 
confideration: we are now to trace out 
the Origin of thefe and fee of what kind ic 
is, whether they flow from the fame 
Source with the Natural, viz.. the neceffary Imper- 
fe^ion of created Beings ; or we are to feek for fome 
other entirely different from it. 

By Moral Evils) as we fafd before, are under- 
flood thofe Inconveniencies of Life and Condition 
which befall ourfclves or others thro* wrong Ekdi- 
ons. For it is plain rh^t fome inconveniencies 
happen without our knowledge, or againft our 
Wills, by the very Order of natural CaufeSj- 
whereas others come upon us knowingly ? and in a 
manner with our Confent (when we choofe either 
thefe themfelves, or fuch as are neceffarily con- 
neded with them.) The Moral are to be reckon'd 
among the latter kind of Incoveniencies; and he 
mufl be efleem'd the Caufe of them, who knov/-= 
ingly, and of his own accord, brings them either 
' " '" Q^ " upon' 

226 Of Moral Evil. Chap. V, 

upon himfelf or others by a depraved or foolifli 

But in order to make this whole Matter con- 
cerning Moral Evils n^.ore fully underftood, we 
muft confider in the 

I ft Place, What the future of EleUiom is. 

idly. That our JF-L^^jfinefs chiefly depends upon 

3d!y> What ki^d of Ele^,oKS may heja'td to be 
made amifSf or foolilhly. 

^thly, Hoiu ire come to fall into depraved, or 
wicked EieBions. 

5thlyj How fnch ElcUions can he reconciled 
with the Poder and Goodnejs of God, 


Co7Ke7'7iing the Natu7^e of EleEiiom, 
S U B S E C T. I. 

A View of their Opiiiion who adtnif ofFree^ 
dom from Compul/ion only, but not from 

That it is !• T F there be any thing obfcure and difficult 
liotcafyto jI^ in Philofophy, we are furc to find it in that 
tr.der- p^j.j. >^v j^ J ^;l^ treats of Eledions and Liberty. There 
give a true is no point about which the Learned are lefs con- 

lepielcn- - — .^- - - - - - ^^^j^^ 

Se<5l. I- Sub. I. Of Moral Evil, 227 

iiilent with themfclves, or more divided from each tation of 

other. Nor is it an eafy Matter to under llaad tlicm, ^^.'^ ^?^- 

i ,- - r 1 • mon!', Con- 

or to give a certain and true rep'ef^nration o\ tneir ^ernino- 

Opinions. I think they m?y be dirtinguilli'd into ivberry. 

two Sect:-, both adiiiitiing of Liberty, the one from Some ac- 

exreinc.l Co^t^Hlfion^ but not from internal Nicejfitj\ ^"'^,^^"_ 

the other from both. LiU;rty 


II As far as I can underfland the Opinion of Co'TipuIfi- 

ihe former, it is this: Firft, rhey obferve tiiat on oaiy, 

there are certain Appetites impir.nted in us by Na- ^-^.^^^ -^^^ 

ture, which arc not to be eiteem'd ule'lefs, but con- ceffiry 

tributing toward our PrefcTvation, as was fnewn be- alfo. 

fore; and that fome thmgs are naturally agreca- "IJ^cAu- 

ble, Tome contrary to thefe Appetites : that the .i^^'^r^^.^,^ 
, J f.i , J V 1 the rormer 

former, when prefent, pleafe and rmpreis a dehght- Or,in:on 

ful Senfe of themfelves; the latter dirpleafe and fuppofe 

create uneafincfs. Thcfe therefore are called in- Appetites 

commodious, troublefome and Evil; and thofe V"P^^!^'^^'^ 
,. . J ^ I 111 us by 

commodious, convenient and Good. Nature • 

what i? a- 

III. Second'y-, That Nature has given us Reafon, greable to 

a Mind or /ntelletj, to dirtinfjuiili Conveniencies tl^ff^is 

from Inconveniencies, Good from Evil. And lince ^'^^^ . 

this may be confidered by the Mind in a threefold ?he con- 

Refpe6t, hence alfo arife three kinds of Good and trary,EviL 

Hvil ; namely Pleafaat, Profitable and Honefi. Things 

•!■'•> arc agree- 

?h 'G ^O t '1'* 

IV. For if Good be confidered as pr'/enr with Apoctites 
regird only to the Appetite which is delighted with in a three 
the Enjoyment of it, and acquiefces in it, 'tis cal-ed Bid re- 


V. If it be not agreeable to the Apoetire of kinJs oi 
itfelf, bus only '•(j^^^f^^i with fomething d'j which good. 
is of itfelf agreeable, or pre dut,; Pl'^ilure, and on J^?^, . 
that account only defirable; then ti;. called Profi- ^'^^^^^■^^ 
table. For tho' the Appetite cannot come at the agreeable 

Q^z imme- 

228 Of Moral Evil. Chap. V. 

js called immediate Enjoyment of it, yet the Mind makes 
; 'f •^"^' life of It in order to procure thofe things which 
which is ^^ ^^" ^"j^^y* ^nd from thence it is efteem'd con» 
conncdkd vefiicnt, i. e. Good. 

with VI. But fince thbt v/hich is agreeable to one 

fornethmg Appetite, may be repuenant or lels agreeable to 

which IS ', f ■',•', 1 • I 1 r ^ 1 

ofitfelfa- <^^her3j and ihat which pleafes now, may have 
greeablc, feme things connefted with it which may be dif- 
i; cdlgd ple.ifing afterwards, there is need of enquiry and 
I-roiitable. deliberation, to procure an nblolute Good, /. e. one 
V hich is ^^'"'i^^h, all Appetites and Times confider'd, will afford 
iudged by ^s great, as certain and durable a Pleafure or De- 
thcUn- light as pofTible. For this End therefore was the 
derHand- ]\;ind or Unclerflanding given us, that we might 
thebel!'^ be able to determine what appears fittefl to be 
all things ^one upon aviev/ofall fuch things as create pleafure 
confidet'd, or uneafinefs for the prefenc or the future. And 
is abfo- wh^x is thus judg'd by the Underflanding to be 

-ood d ^'^^ ^^^' ^^ ^^^^^^ ^^ "^ Error in the Cafe, muft 
called be look'd upon as Hajcjl. For that is Hcncji 
Honcil. which i> agreeable to a rational Agent j but it is 
agreeable to a rational Agenr, and Reafon itfelf 
dire^f^S that, all things confider'd, we fhould pre- 
fer that which brings the greater, the more cer- 
tain and more durable advantages. 
\Tllc7\X ^^^^' '^^"^ DefcTiders of this Opinion reckon thefe 
Medicmcs' kinds of Good to be Moral fo far as they refpe6t 
and fuch Man, bccaule they fall under the Government of 
thing? as Reafon. But finceall things cannot be always had 
are agree- ^Qpetj^gj- ^ comparifon mufl be made between 

able to the , '- , , ' , j i • i i i 

Rational ^"cm, and tnat embraced whkh appears to be the 
Appetite, beft. Now the kinds may be compared together, 
as well as the particulars of each kind. For inflance, 
Heahh is a thing pleaiant in it (elf, and dtlirable above 
all things that relate to the Body; but for the 
prefervaiion of it Medicines mull: be fcmeiimes 
taken, which of themlelx cs arc far from being a- 
grecuble to the Appetite, but as they are means to 


Sea. I. Sub. J. Of Moral Evil. 229 

an End which in itfHf is delightful, they are faid 
to be profitable, and on that account fit to be 
chofen. Now the Goods of the Mind are greater, 
more certain and more durable than thofe of the 
Body ; if therefore they cannot be had without the 
lofs of Health, or even Life, right Reafon dilates, 
that Health, or even Life bedefpifed in regard to 
thefe. For this appears to be the mod: convenient, 
all things confider'd, and on that account is honefl : 
and as Goods of a different kind may be compared 
together, fo may alfo particulars of the fame kind, 
as any one will find th:it confiders it. 

VIII. As to Liberty, the Men of this Sed will He thai: 
haye it to confift in this, that all thofe ^'!^- '^^ ^^ 
Goods an Agent can embrace that which pleafes T|^dame„(. 
him beft, and exert thofe Anions which his own direfls, is 
Reafon approves : For, according to thefe Men, free ac- 
he that can follow his own Judgment in Matters is carding to 
free. For Example, he that is found in Body, and J^^^^ 

has his Faculties and Limbs entire, if all external 
Impediments be removed, is at Liberty to walk : 
for he can if he vnll, and nothing but his will is 
wanting to exert that Adion? 

IX. But as to the Anions of the Will itfelf, ^^^^fj^^^-e 
namely, to ivilli ox to fafpend the A61 of Volition, ni^in-j to 
they think that it is determined to thefe, not by it- choofe ei- 
felf, for that is impoffible, but from without. If ther from 
you ask from whence? They anfwer, from the thegood- 
Fleafare or Vncajinefs perceiv'd by the Underfiand- ^^J'^'^. 
ing or the Senfes; but rather,' as they imagine, ablenefsof 
from the prefent or mpft urgent Vrjeajmefs: Iince objeds 
therefore thefe are produced in us ab extra, not fi'om perceiv'd 
the Will itfelf, and are not in its power, bat arife ^V^^ ^"' 
from the very things, 'tis manifeft, according to thefe Senfes;^ 
INjen, that we are not free ( at leaft from Nccejfitj ) and there- 
on 5 to fore not 

230 Of Mcral Evil. . Cliap. V. 

free as to to 'ivill Of not Will, that is v/irh regard to the imme- 
theAds (jiafe ^^o.^ of the Will. Some of them therefore 
f/ri^i^^u . expicllv dciiv that Liberty belongs to Man with 

Will, but r , ^ 1 -■ » n ^\ 1-1 n- 1 

on]vofthc I'Pf^ard to tneie Aas, or that an Jblcction can be 
inferior faid to be free, or Man himfelf in that refped: 
Faculties, They will have it therefore, that Liberty belongs 
fK'^^Ji^^^ to us properly with refpeft to the wfirior Faculties, 
its d^eter'i' which are fubje<5l to the Government of the Will, 
mination. and difcharge their Fundions when the Man him- 
felf ha'^ willed : that is, a Man is free to walk who 
can walk if he pieafcs; but not to willj for he re- 
ceives the Will to walk from elfewhere: neverthe- 
lefs, he that can £io what he v/ills, according to 
them, is free, even tho' he be neceffariiy determiji'd 
to will. C41O 



(/i2.) The niofl reiTiavkable Defenders of this Opinion, a- 
inong the Moderns, fcem to be Hohbs, Locke, (it he be con- 
fificntwithhimrclf*) Leibnitz, Bayle, Norris, the Juthvrs of 
the Philofiphlcal Enquiry concerning human Liberty, and of Ca- 
tos tetters. But in order to have a more diilindi; Notion of 
the different Schemes of Authors all profcffing to treat of Hu- 
fmn Liberty, Frce-n.v:Il, Sec. Let us in the firll Place recite 
the feverarPowers or Modifications of the Mind, and ob "crve 
to which of them Liberty is or may be apply'd — Thefe are 
commonly diftinguifli'd into Perception, Judgment, Volition 
and Jaion. The two former are generally necejjary, at IcalL 
alw.'ys pijp.'ve: For I cannot help feeing a light when m/ 
Eyes are open, nor avoid judging that two and two make 
f;ur, whenever 1 think of that Fropofition; tho' I may hinder 
that Perception by fliutting my Eyes, as well as prevent that 
Judgment bv refufing 10 think of the Propofition' The Will 
then may properly enough be faid to influence or impede 
thefe f, but this doth not make them \e.h fnj/i've in them- 
fclves ; nay, the more it does influence them, the more evi- 
dently they are io. The third will appear to be the cxer- 
cife of a Self-mo'vivg Privcipk, and as fuch cannot properly be 
moved or influenced by any thing clle. The Lift is the Ex- 


* Sec Note 45. t Sec Note 58. 

Sea. I. Sub. I. Of Moral Evil. 231 

X. If it be granted that this is the Nature of If this be 
our Eledtions, there is no doubt but all our Adi- ^' ^}^ "^""^ 
ons are really and truly necefTary. For as to the ^^.^ ^^JJJ_ 
proper Aftions of die Will, ro will or fufpend the lately ne- 
A(5t of Volition, the Men whom we are (peaking of, ceflliry. 
give up Liberty with relpecl to thefe, v/hile they 
alfert that it does not belong to them. For they 
Q^4 are 


ercife of the inferior Poivers, the aftual Produiflion of Thought 
or Motion : this is generaily diredled by, and an immediate 
confequence of Volition, on which account leveral Authors 
have confounded them together; but tho' they be properly 
both Acts of tiie Mind, yet thev are certainly diitincl ones ; 
the PFi// is an ability of chooftng feme particular Thoughts 
or Motions, Agenq is a power of producing thefe Thoughts or 
Motions purfuant to the aft of choice, or of putting that choice 
in execution. A careful diftintlion between theie will lielp us 
to judge of all fuch Authors as have either ufed them promifcu- 
oully or been content to treat of the lail only, as moll of thofe 
Pcrfons have that are cited in the 14th and following Pages of 
the Phll'jfophical Enquiry. 

Thefe two lafl: tken being the only aSIi've Pozvcrs, or rather 
the only Potvers at all, are the only proper fubjedls of Liber- 
ty : to which again it is varioufly apply'd. With regard to the 
JVill, fome content themfelves witli afferting its Freedom from 
external Compiiljion only, from being forced contrary to its own 
bent and inclination. And indeed it would be very Ilrange to 
fuppofe it otherwife: For to fay that it may be drawn a con- 
trary way to that which the Mind prefers and direcl.^, is to fay, 
that it may tend two contrary ways at once, that a Man may 
will a thing againll his Will, or be oblig'd to will what at the 
fame time he does not will : but then fuch a Freedom as this 
equally belongs to the two former Powers, which cannot be 
forced to perceive or judge otherwife than they do perceive or 
judge, othci wife than as Objefls appear, and their own Na- 
tures require ; it may be applyM to any thing the moll necefl:.- 
ry, nay the more neceflary the better. Otliers therefore have 
contended for an abfolute exemption of the Will from all im- 
perceptible Byafs or Phyfical Inclination, from all internal ne- 
ceffity, arifmg either from its own frame and conftitution, the 
impulfe of fuperior Beings, or the operation of Qbjeds, Pvca- 


232 OJ Moral Evil. Chap. V. 

arc cf Opinion that when any thing is propofed by 
the Under/landing to be done, we either will ir. 
or fufpend the Aft of Volition concerning it, ac- 
cording to the profped of Hsppinefs or importunifo 
tyof the Uneafinefs which appears to the Mind, in 
the prcfent State and Circumftancesi by thefe 
therefoje our Ekftion. according to thern, is de- 



fons. Motives, l^c. wliich appear'd to them the very effeiice cf 
humnn Liberty, the fole Foundation of Morality. And in- 
deed thefe fcem to be the only Perfons that fpeak out, and to 
the Point, as fliall be fl-.ewn Jn the following Notes. 

Laftly, a great many will confine their Idea of Liberty to 
A8'ion only, and define it to be a power of either aflually ta- 
king up or laying down a Thought, of beginning Motion or 
flopping it according to the preference of the Mind or Will. 
Rut if this be all the Liberty we have, 'tis of fmall confe- 
quence, fince we are confcious that \w fail all fuch Adtions, 
iuppofing the Organs to be rightly difpofed, follow the deter 
mination of the Will ; and alfo, that in renfon they are no far- 
ther moral, nor we accountable for them than as they do fo j 
we muft therefore go up higher than this before we come at 
any valuable Liberty; and the main QuelHon will be, Whe- 
ther Man is free to think or refolve upon ; to will or choofc 
any thing propofed, as well as to exert his other Faculties in 
confcquence of fuch Refolution, Will, or Choice. This is tha 
only Point worth difputing, and wherein all Moral Liberty 
mull confifl ; and indeed if it be not here 'tis ro where. Fo^ 
if the Mind be abfolutely dctcrmin'd to choofe in a certain 
manner in any given Circumftances, its -rather fubordinate Fa- 
culties will immediately operate, and the feveral Aftions which 
depend thereon all follow by ncceflary confcquence. Nay, up- 
on this Hypothefis there is properly no fuch thing as Choice 
or Aclion in Man; but all are Paifions propagated in a chain 
t)f neceflary Caufes and Eftefts. And indeed all who fuppofe 
any external Determination of the Will (meaning always a 
neceffary and irrefiftible one) whether they place it in the De- 
fire of Good, Jliixiety for the abfence of it, or the laf Determi- 
nation of the Judgment^ are involv'd in the fame conCequence, 
how many Steps foever they may take to remove the Diffi- 
culty. For it is equal to me, if*vhat I call my Choice or 


Sea. X. Sub. I. Of Moral Evil. 233 

XI. But when the Eledion is made, if we can That hu- 
efFeft what we will, then they fay we are free in "^^" ^^^' 
refped of fuch Acftions, not from Neceffity, but fjee^^not 
only from Compulfion; for it is plain that no- from Ne- 
thing but our will is wanting to the exertion of ceffity, but 
them, and fuppofing us to will them, they necef- ^o^ip^il- 
farily follow. For infliance, when nothing hinders 
a Man from walking but hi*^ own Will, luppofing 
this Volition, it cannot be conceiv'd but that he 
muft walk, nor can he reft while this continues. 
If therefore, according to them, all ads of the 
Will are necelfary (as being determin'd from with- 
out, viz,, by the convenience or inconvenience of 
things or circumftances) the adions of the inferior 
faculties will be no lefs neceffary, for they will de- 
pend on the fame circumftances and ads of the 
Will, which, as they are neceflary, thcfe anions 



A^darx be neceflary, wherever that Neceffity be plircJ. 'Tj^ 
the ftme thing whether I be a£led upon and over-ruled by one 
immediate Caufe, or drawn on by feveral fucceffively. Sup- 
pofe, V. g that I am neccffitated to obey the laft rcfult of my 
own yudgjnent. From the Exijtence of tkings follow certain 
Appearances.^ thofe Appearances caufe certain Perceptiom, thefe 
Perrcptions form a "Judgment, this yndgment determines the 
Will, and this Will produces ASIion. All this is lix'd anti 
inevitable, every Link of the Chain is equally neceffary, and 
*t:s all one to me on which my Determinations hang: 'Tis as 
good to take them from the firft as laft, from the Exigence 
of ourward Objects as from my own Will ; fince the fuppofed 
choice or aftion is in reality as much out of my power, or as 
incapable of being alter'd or prevented by me, as the exig- 
ence of external things. 'Tis eafy to obferve hov>^ deftrudive 
this and the like Schemes muft prove, as well of Morality as 
Liberty, both which muft fi,ind and fall together, and can, I 
think, only be fccurcd efteAually upon the Principles laid 
down by our Author ; of which in their proper place. 

Sec alfo Mr. ChubPs Reflections on Natural Liberty, CoU 
ieffion of Travis, p. y^cj, ^^c. or Notes 45-, 48, 58. 

(43.) Tg 


to their 
there is no 
in thing', 
nor could 
any thing 
be dane 
than it is. 

Of Moral Evil Chap. V. 

wifl be necefTary alfo. (43.) Tho', according to 
them, therefore, there be no CompH'fion of the Will, 
yet there is NecejJ].ty, from which Neceflity nothing 
in the World will be free; nay a great many of 
them openly profefs to believe that this is the 

XII. Now, from this Hypothefis, which they 
extend to the Divine a? well as Human Will, the 
following Corollaries feem deducible. Firft, that 
nothing in Nature could be done otherwife than ic 
is. For, the whole Series of things being as ic 
were conneded together by Fare, there's no Room 
for Chance or Liberty, properly fo call'd : Cc^-* 
tigency then is removed out of Nature. 




{43.) To call an Aflion necejfary, is properly fpealdng to 
affirm that it is no Adtion. For by the Word Jciion we mc:i.n 
an immediate effeifl of what is metaphorically ftlled a Sdf-rno- 
'ving P Oliver : or the exercifc ofan ability which a Being has to 
begm or determine a particular train of Thought or Motic?;. 
Now the Idea of this Power in any Being, and of fnch exer- 
cife of it, is direclly repugnant to t\^2it oi NeceJJtty, which lup- 
pofes the Thought or Motion to be already begun or dettrmin- 
^d, and to be obtruded on this Being by fomtthing elfe, and 
confequently implies a Negation of any fuch Self moving Pow- 
er in this Being, or of its exercife by this Bein^^; in the Cafes 
abovementioncd. ' To be an Jgcnt (fays Dr. Clarke^,) figni- 

* fies to have a Pouuer of beginning Motion, and Motioti c?nnot 

* begin necejfarily, becauie Nerejjity of Motion fuppofes an Ef- 

* ficiency fuperior to, and irreiillible by the thing moved, and 

* conlequently the hegiwdng of MLotion cannot be in that which 

* is moved necefi^irily, but in the fuperior Caul^e, or in the 

* eihciency of fome other Caufe Hill fuperior to that, till at 
« length we arrive at Ibme Prce Agent? Where, tho' the 
Doctor's Definition of Agency feems to be imperrcd, that 
Word generally including the power of beginning reflex 
Thought as well as Motion (wiiich are two diftincl Species of 
jAdion, and proceed from different Bowers, tho' they be of- 


Re.Tiafh on the Philofophical Enquiry, p. 6. 

Sea. I. Sub. I. Of Moral Evil. 235 

XIIT. Secondly, That nothing more can be un- By Evil 
derliood by wicked or wrong made Ele(5ti,ons, than "^-^^7 i^n- 
that they are prejudicial to the Eledor or fome o- '^'^^1^^"'^ 
thers ; which Scnfe is very remote from the vulgar moi'^e'^tha 
one; for in that Evil Eleaions are blamed, not for hurtful. 
being hurtful, but for being hurtful without Neceih- 
ty, and becaufe they are made otherwife than they 
ought to have been: lathis Hypothelis then there 



ten confounded together and comprehended under the fame 
general term) yet it fhews us an evident contradiftion in thefe 
two Words necejjary Agent, in either Senfe : Unlefs he ufes 
the Word Agent in both Senfes together, and then his Rea- 
foning will be falfc, fmce what is afted on and determin'd by 
another in regard to its Will, or thought, and in that Senfe 
mo'v'd by a fuperinr Efi.dc.ncy, may yet have a power of be- 
ginning real corporeal Motion (which is a quite different fort 
of Aftion) in confcquence of fuch predetermin'd Will, or 
Thought, and in that fenfe be an Agc7it, tho' not a moral one. 
But whatever the Doftov might mean by the Word Agetit, his 
Argument will hold in either of thefe two Senfes feparate, i'/k. 
that nothing can be fiid to ail either in thinking or moving, 
Vv^hich does not properly begin the train of Thought or Motion, 
but is put into Thought or Motion by fomething elfe; and al- 
fc, that &\txj thing cannot be fo put either into Thought or 
Motion ; and therefore that there muft be fome firft Caufe of 

And will not the liime Argument hold equally for fome firll: 
Caufe oi Exifieme P If the Dodlor can fuppofe a iini Caufe of 
^1 Thought and Motion (as he does here, and we think very 
reafonably) why may he not alfo fuppofe a firll Caufe of all 
ExiJJence; and fo entirely exclude that antecedent Nerejpty 
which he has often Recourfe to as a kind of fupport of the exi- 
llence of the firft Caufe, but is obliged to exclude from its 
Will and Aflions ? Is it harder to conceive how an Eternal 
Independent Being, or Firft Caufe, may cxiji without any an- 
tecedent NecefTity, than how it can <^miII or nB without any ? 

But to return to the chief Defign of this Note. We fee hov/ 
rcceffary it is to fix the precile meaning of the Word Ailion in a 
Controverfy of this kind, and if the Signification of it as lafd 
dov.'u above be allow'd, then necelTary Aftion is the fame aS 


236 Of Moral Evil. Chap. V. 

is no Election made amifs. (44.) Nor can any 
thing be (aid to be done otherwile than it ought to 
be : for what could not polTibly be dooe otherwife, 
is certainly done as it ought ; lince it is done ac- 
cording to the exigence and neceflfary order of 
Villanies XIV. Thirdly, By the fame Principle all Evil 
are to be wou'd be in theftrideft fenfe Natural, for it would 
th^ac- ° derive its Origin from natural and neceflary Caufes. 
count of The diftindion then would be loft between natural 
human and moral Evil, a;- commonly ucdcrftood. There 
Mifcry, would be no Moral Evil at all. For that only is 
look'd°* > ^^^^^'^'^^ Moral by the common confent of Man- 
on as kind, of which the Man himfelf is properly the 
Crimes, Caufe : but no body looks upon himfelf as proper- 
properly Jy the Caufe of a thing v/hich he could not avoid, 
io call d. Qj, ^Q which he was neceffitated by natural Caufes, 
and fuch as were antecedent to the Will. For e- 
very one blames himfelf only on this account, be- 
caufe he was of himlelf neceifarily the Caufe of 
Evil to himfelf or others. Thofe Inconveniencies 
which come by Necellity, he looks upon as Mi- 
feries, as Misfortunes, but never as a Crime. 
Thefts therefore. Adulteries, Perjuries, my the 
Elatred of God himfelf, and whatever we efteem 
bafe in Villanies (as well as the difgrace and punifh- 
irjent attending them) rnuft be placed to the ac- 
count of human Mifery and Unhappinels, but by 



paffive A£tion, or beginning a thine: and net beginning it at 
the fame time, and m the fame refped ; in wliich terms every 
one perceives it to be a contradi6tion. 

(44.) Leibnitz declares it to be his fettled Opinion *, * That 
* whenever we refolve or will cont/arv to an evident Rcafon, 
< wc are carried by fome other Rcafon llronger in appearance.'* 

* Remarque s fur h Livre deTOngine du Mai. p. 483. 

Sed. I. Sub. I. Of Moral Evil. 237 

no means reckon'd criminal, nor any more repug- 
nant to the Will of Godj to his JulHce, Purity 
or Goodnefs, than Heat or Cold. 

XV. Fourth'y, When therefore we blame a ^^^r ,7 
Thief, Adulterer, Murderer, or perjured Pcrfon, reprov'd 
when thofe Crimes are arraign'd as fcandalousi this not be- 
is not done becaufe they have defer v'd ir, or be- ^^"^e he 
caufe rhefe things are in rhemfelves really fhameful ^^ 'T.^'l 
or culpable; but becaufe that Infamy may he a ^aufe re- " 
means of detening the guiky Perfons or others proof may 
from the like Eledions. And this is the only Rea- dnvc him 
fon why v/e reproach a Thief, ^c, and not a fick °"^ ^^'^^* 
Perfon, with Infamy ; becaufe Reproach may cure 
a Thief, ^c, but can do no Good to a fick Per.- 

XVI. Fifthly, Malefadcrs are punifh'd not be- Punifli- 
caufe they defcrve Punifliment, but becaufe it is "^^"^^^^^^ 
expedient, and Laws arc ufed to reflrain Vices, a> ^IqJ\ 


Phyfic to remove Difejfes; Men lin therefore after to the Sick, 
the fame manner as they die, vi^, becaufe an elfedu- neither 
al Fveraedy was not apply'd. And ycc Laws are ^'jp ^^^* 
ftoc entirely ufclcf?, fince they prevent fome Vices, ^^ ^ ^ \ ^ 
as Medicines protrad the Deaths of feme difeaftd prevent 
Perfons : and a Ferfop. infe>^ed with the Plague Vice, 
may be as juftly cut off by ilie Law, as a Witch, 
when by that means there's hope of avoiding the 
Contagion. (^^ 


If this be always the Cafe, we certainly can never will amift 
or unreafonably, iincc tliat Reafon which appears to be the 
llrongcft mull and ought always to determine us. 

(*) All this, and a great deal mere to the fame purpofe, is 
exprcfly afibrted (as indeed 'tis, a ncceflary confequence of their 
Hypothefis) by Hobbs * and by the Author of the Philofophl- 
cdl Enqidry\, and much the fime by BaylcX- The bare re-- 
cital of fuch Principles is a fuliicient refutation of them. 

* See his Treat if.' an Human Libertv, or Bp. ^''amhaM's 
Works, p. 678. t P 91, es^f.' 

X Crit. Diil. p. 2605^ ^\. 


238 Of Moral Evil. Chap. V. 

We are XVII. Sixthly, We are nblig'd to repay good 

obliged to ofiices, fince by being thanlifai we may excite tlie 

onlv in ^ Benefaftor to continue or increase his Benevolence, 

pro'fpedt and alfo induce others to do us Service. And hence 

of a feature it comes to pafs, that we are oblig'd to be grateful 

Benefit, towards Gcd and Men, but not to the Sun or 

a Hor(e, becaufe God ar.d Men may be excited 

by thanks to feme farther Beneficence, whereas 

the Sun or a Horfe cannot. Thus no regard is 

to be had to a Benefit rcceiv'd, but onlv to one 

that may be received j nor are we oblig'd to be 

grateful to the moft generous Benefavfi:or for what 

IS paft, biit only for the profpeft of what is to 

come. All fen:e of giatitude then, as commonly 

underftocd, is deftrov'd : lor the Vulvar reckon 

him a cunnings not a grateful Perfon, who returns 

one favour merely out of hopes of another. 

Accord. XVIII. Seventhly, If this Opinion be true, we 

ing to thi: j^^rj. defpair of human Felicity, which will not in 

limna'r "' ^^^^' ^"'^^ ''"' ^" ^^^ ^^'^ Power, but entirely depend up- 
Happinefs on external Objfrds. Our Happinefs (if there be any) 
is impofli- muft, according to them, be conceiv'd to arife 
ble, fince fj-Qm the perfed enjoyment oi thofe things which 
n de;en s ^^^ agreeable to the Appetites. Where the ccn- 
things trary to thele are prelent, or the agreeauie ones ab- 
which are fent, we muft necelfarily be unealy, and while we 
not in our ftrijggle With Anxieties we cannot be happy. Ac- 
Power, cording to this Hypothefis therefore it follows shat 
our Happinefi neccffarily requires fuch an Enjoy- 
ment as we have fpoken of, and vhit this is at the 
fame time impofiTible. For who can hope that all 
external things (with v/hirh he has to do) fhould be 
fo tempered as in every relpedt to anfwer his Wilhes, 
fo as never to v/ant what he delires, or to be for*, cd to 
endure any thing contrary ro his naiural Appetites? 
If Happinefs arifcs from the Fnjoyment of thofe 
things which are agreeable to the Faculties and Ap- 
petites, and which can move Defire by their in- 

Sed. I. Sub. I. Of Moral Evil. 239 

ftate, or at leafl: apparent Goodnefs; if alfo the 
Will is necefTarily determin'd to thefe, according 
to the Judgment of the Underftanding, or Impor- 
tunity of Appetiies, every Man muft neceffarily 
want a great many things which he has chofen, and 
bear a great many which he wou'd nor, than which 
nothing is more inconfiftcnt with FeUcity. For we 
cannot pofli'oly conceive any State of Life where- 
in all things anfwer to the natural Appetites. In 
vain then do we hope for Happinefs, if it depend 
upon external OSjeds. (N,) 



(N.) Againft the Argument: here urged 'tis objefled that it 
is lame in all its Feet ; iji, there is no confequence in it. zJ/y, 
the Conclufion may le granted ; and ^d/y, the Argument may 
be retorted againli the Author. 

To begin with the lail ; It is allcdged that Men are never 
the happier, or more independent of the accidents of Fortune, 
by having a po-iver to choofc 'vjithout Peafon. 

To which 1 reply, that the Author has no occafion to afTert 
any fach power ; all that he pleads for, is that the will ought 
not to be dctermin'd by the Judgment of the Underllanding 
concerning things antecedeiitly agreeable or difagreeable to our 
natural Appetites, becaufe all the good of a Man does not lie 
in them: li it did, there would be no need of a will at all, 
bi.'t we ought to be abfolutely deterrain'd by them. Bat the 
will is a f ■culty that by chooiing a thing can make it agreeable, 
tho' it had no Agreement with any natural Appetite, nay, 
were contrary to them all ; and for the will to choofe a thing 
in order to pleafe itfelf in the choice, is no more to choofe 
without reafon, than to build a Hoafe in order to preferve one 
fron^i the inclemency of the Weather, is to act without reafon. 

But 2dly, 'Tis afk'd, will Men be any happier, or lefs de- 
pendent on the accidents of Fortune by having fuch a Faculty ? 
Yes, fure a great deal ; for no accident of Fortune can take 
this Liberty from them, or hinder their being pleafed with 
their choice; and in the midil of ficknefs, pain and torment, 
if they have this faculty, they will find pleasure and fatisfac- 
tion in it, and m.ake the moll adverfe Fortune eafy to them ; 
as we fee wife Men frequently do, at leaft, more eafy than 
fuch circumftances would be without it, 


240 Of Moral Evil. Chap. V. 

Its conre- XIX. This, and a greac deal more that might 
quenccs j,g abided, mufl fcem hard and rc-pumiant to the 

i):ird, and * «-^ 

tho' the common 

Argument NOTES. 

from cou- 

b 0- e S'^'y* "^^^ objcfled, that it rhuft be impoflible to give ap;ree- 

11 U.A -blenefs to a thing which has none antecedently to the Will. 
J ^ For to do fo we muii have a power either to change our 
f h 7 h ■ p- tsfte of things, or the things themfelves j but that wou'd al- 
r ° moll be the fame as to fay to a piece of Lead be thou Geld, or 

• j; '' to a Flint bd thou a Diamond, or at lealf produce the fame ef- 
P -r feft on mc. To which the anfvver is ealy ; Good is not an al>- 

O i ■ • fol'it^ thing, but relnti-je, and confitls in the agreeablcnefs of 
xvh' } ' ^"'^ thing to another, as fuppofe between tne Appetite and Ob- 
/- " ^ jcft; if then thefe be difagreeable to one another, the one is 
tended '^ ^^'^^ ^^ ^^ other, and to make them agreeable, one of them 
with the ™"^'^ ^^ neceffity be changed, and the change of either will 
cfreci 11 <^3ufe it. Altho' therefore I cannot change Lead into Gold by 
if the h ^^^' ^^ of my Free-will, yet I can contemn Gold as much as 
acknow '^^ ''' ^"^^^^ Lead, and be as well content with a leaden Cup as 
if it were Gold. Thoufmds makes this ufc of Free-will, and 
arife to this pitch of Happinefs by the help of it : It is an old 
Rule Si res hahcri non poteji, deme aliquid de cupiditatlbus. If 
you can't have Wealth or Honour refolve, that is choofe, to 
be fatisfied without it, and experience will tesch you that fuch 
a Choice is m.uch to your Eafc and Happineis. To fay that 
this is impofiible, is to give the Lie to all who treat of Morals 
and Divinity : Of fo great m.oment is fuch a power of making 
things good by choice, that in truth all moral Advices fup- 
pofe us to have it, or elfe they are not fen!e. 

But 4th]y, 'Tis objected, That if the will can make athing 
agreeable by choofmg, fuch a power would be hrfinite, and 
might make a Man happy in all circumilances, even in Hell. 
For if it can give fix degrees of Pleafure to an Objeft, it may 
as well give infinite; fince it is without reafon that it gives 
thefe Six. I anfwer, all created Powers and Pieafures are li- 
mited, and no fubjcdt is capable of more than fuch a certain 
Degree, therefore there is likewife a limitation of the pleafure 
arifing from the ufe of Free-will, as well as from the ufe of 
feeing or hearing, or any other Faculty or Appetite ; and as 
the VVill is an Appetite, fo the Pleafure of it bears fomc pro- 
portion to the Pleafure arifmg from the fatisfaftion of other 
Appetites ; but in what degree we cannot precifely determine,' 
any more than we can fettle the proportion between the Plea- 
fure* of feeing and hearing ; which yet we know arc neither 



Sea. I. Sub I, Of Mora/ Evil. 241 

common Notions of Men, and cannot be believ'd 
without extraordinary Prejudice to Mankind. I 
confefs indeed that, for the moft part, one cannot 
argue well againft an opinion from its confcquenccs, 


N T E S» 

of them infinite. Tho' therefore Vv'C cannot precifely deter- 
mine the Proportion, yet we are certain that we frequently 
crofs all oar natural Appetites to maintain our choice, and by 
means of it bear up againft the flrokes of adverfe Fortune, and 
a flood of natural Evils. 

But i^thly, 'Tis objected, that if we had this Power of ma- 
king things agreeable or dilagreeable by choice, we need not 
trouble ourfelves how our other Appetites were fatisfied, for 
We might be abfolutely happy in fpite of all the accidents of 

He that obje£ls this, affurcdly did not confider the defcrip- 
tion given by the Author of this Faculty, nor that the having 
it doth not deftroy our other Appetites, and that when it 
choofes things contrary to them, it neceflarily creates a great 
deal of pain, uneafinels and torment, which aha.tes /o far the 
pleafure we take in our Eleflions, that the pleafure we obtain 
by fuch a choice is little or nothing in refpeft of what it might 
be if we did not choofe amifs. Thefe things are fo plainly and 
frequently repeated in the Book, thatitfeems ftrange how any 
One could imagine that becaufe we have a Faculty to pleafe our 
felves by choofmg, that therefore we may be abfolutely happy 
in fpite of all the Accidents of Fortune. 

If by Happinefs be meant a ftate more eligible than nothing, 
I believe by means of this Faculty we may generally fpeaking 
be fo far happy, and fhat is fufficient to jullify God's putting 
us into our prefent Circumftances. But if by Happinefs be 
meant, as it ought to be, a ftate wherein we have a iull and 
free exercife of all our Faculties, then in as much as our power 
of choofmg is but one Faculty, tho' fuperior to all the relt, the 
exercife of it alone can never make us abfolutely and compleat- 
ly happy, tho' it may in fuch a degree as is very defireable. 

6thly, The Conclufion of the Argument is granted, and it 
is look'd on as no inconvenience that our Happinefs ihould in 
fome cafes depend on things without us, and not in our own 
Power. But the conclufion is quite another thing. The words 
arc, If this Opinion be true, <vje mtiji defpair of human Happinefs^ 
for it ivill not be in the leajl in our oxfsn pQ'Vjer, but entirely de- 
fend upon external Obje^s, 

R The 

242 Of Moral Evil. Chap. V* 

fince a great many things are true which have con-' 
fequences hard enough : not to mention how eafily 
we miftake in deducing confequences. But yet 
when thefe are acknowledged oy the Authors them- 
fclves ; and, if bcliev'd, would prove detrimental 
to Morality, they bring no fmall prejudice againft 
an Opinion which is attended with them, and re- 
commend us to fonie other as more probable, tho* 
it be not fupported by any ftrongcr Reafons. 



The accidents of Fortune, fuch as an Earthquake may fink 3 
Man and all his concerns, and tho' in that extraordinary cafe, 
as it is put, my choice be not able to prevent my death, yet 
my Happinefs in the general management of Life may be very 
much in my own power, and not altogether in the power of 
foreign Accidents. And even in the cafe of an Earthquake, a^ 
good Man that had fixed his Eleflion to fubmit to fuch a death 
and circumftances as it flioulJ pleafe Providence to aflign him, 
wou'd not be without fonie pleafure, even in fuch an accident: 
at leafl not fo unhappy as another that had made no fuch Refo- 
lution or Eleftion. But if fuch an Election can make him no 
eafier or do him no good, it were to no purpofe to make it* 
He can have no profpeft or defign in making it, if the Good 
or Evil relulting from the Agreement or Difagreement of what 
happens to his natural Apj ctites be the only Confiderations that 
can determine his will. It it plain that in fuch a cafe he muil 
be miferable, if outward things happen crofs to his Appetites; 
whereas if he can make them agreeable or difagreeable in any 
meafure by his own choice, he is ftill matter of his Happinefs, 
and the confideration that he can make them fo is a good rea- 
fon for choofmg. So far is he from choofing ifjithout Re a/on , 
as is fallly objedled. 

But 7thly, 'Tis urg'd, that if the will were not moved but 
by the Reprefentation of antecedent Good and Evil in the 
things that happen, it would not indeed be in our power to be 
happy, fuppofing there were no God, and that all things 
were govern'd by Matter and Motion ; But God has fo or- 
der'd it, that to be virtuous is fufticient to make a Man happy. 
If therefore the Soul follows Rcafon and the Orders God has 
given her, fhe is fure to be happy, altho' fllC cannot find c- 
nough to make her fo in this Life, 


Sea:; I Sub. i. Of Moral Evil. 243 

XX. 'Tis to be obferv'd alfo, that among the All thofe 
foregoing Authors I leckon thofe who declare that ^^^° ^^" 
the Will is determin'd by the laft Judgment of tlie thc'^v/iU 
tJnderfianding *, which has taken with a great jg p^iffive 
many Philofophers; and in (liorr, all who main- in its Ope- 
tain that the Will is pajfive in Eleftions. For thefe rations 
muft be efteem'dto have the fame Sentiments of J]J^^^^g° 
Liberty with the former, which way foever they Opinion 
explain their Opinion; as may appear from hence? with the 
that mofi: of them exprefly deny that Indifference former, 
belongs to the Nature of Freedoms To that their ^"^ PJ^^" 

o ^< • • edwith 

R 2 Opmionj-^j^e^on- 


" NO T E S 

. To which I anfwer, ift, That this is giving up the Happi- 
nefs of this Life, and acknowledging that God has not provid- 
ed any Natural means to make us happy here, which is a Con- 
feffion that one who is zealous to defend the Wifdom and 
Goodnefs of God will not eaiily grant. 

, 2dly, I have no other Notion o^ Virtue than that of an, 
EletVion within the limits prefcribed by God and Nature ; I 
think the definition of it is Habitus cum ratione eleflivus iti jne- 
diocritate conjijlens ; if then to be virtuous is enough to make us 
happy, it is plain that our Happinefs confifts in our EleSlio?!^ 
which is the very thing I plead for: but if our Eledlion make 
the things elefled neither better nor worfe, neither more nor 
lefs agreeable, it is inconceivable how our Happinefs fliould 
confift at all in Virtue. If the meaning be that God will re- 
ward us hereafter, that is to confefs we are miferable for the 
prefent, but fliall be happy fome other time. I own indeed 
that Hope is a great caufe of Pleafure, but except we choofe the 
crolFmg our natunil Appetites for the prefent out of prolpe^t 
to the future, it vvill no ways render our prefent fuffering to- 
lerable. Nor will fuch a profpecl, how clearly foever oftcr'd 
by our Underftanding, yield us this Pleafure, except the will 
confent. For then it wou'd do fo to all to whom the offer is 
ipade ; whereas we fee one perfeveres by means of it, and ano- 
ther in much more advantageous Circumflances yields to the 
prefent Tem.ptation, and knowingly lofes the Reward. 

(45') A3 

* Jgainjl this Notion /eg S^Ct. 5. Subfedl. z, par. tj". 

244 Of ^oral Evil. Chap. V. 

Opinion is attended with the fame confequences as 
the former. (45.) 



(45 ) As Mr. Lochh-3.s particularly laboiir'd the point before 
us, and feems to defend by turns the fevcral Principles which 
our Author attacks here and in the following Section, we fhall 
examine a little into his Method of treating the Subje£t. Hav- 
ing firft of all defin'd Liberty to be * A Power in any Agent 

* to door forbear any particular Adtion, according to the Dc- 

* termination or Thought of the Mind, whereby either of them 

* is preferr'd to the other*.' He takes a great deal of Pains to 
prove that fuch Liberty does not belong to the Will ; which is 
very certain, granting his fenfe of Liberty to be the only one, 
fince by his Definition it is evidently fubfequent to the choice 
or prefcretice of the Mind, and only relates to the execution of 
fuch choice by an inferior faculty f . But then, befide this Idea 
of Liberty, which is nothing to the prefent Queflion, there is 
another previous and equally proper one, which regards the 
very determination, preference or dire£lion of the Mind itfelf; 
and may be called its Vovjqx oi determining to do or forbear any 
particular Adtion, or o^ preferring one to another; and if Free- 
dom can with any propriety of Speech be attributed to one of 
thefe PcfjersX as he has conflantly attributed it, why may 
it not with equal propriety be appled to the other? He pro- 
ceeds therefore to ftate the Quellion concerning the latter, 
which he would not have put, whether the Will be free ? but 
whether the Mind or Man be free to will ? both which I think 
amount to the fame thing with common Undcrftandings, fince 
in the firft place we only afk, Whether this Will be properly 
an aSii^e poiver of the Mind (z. e. as oppofed to Mr. Locke's 
■pajjive Power) and in the fecond. Whether the Mind be aSlinje 
or indifferent in exerting this Power call'd Will t and both 
which will be equally improper Quellions with regard to his 
former lenfe of the Word Free, i. e. as only applicable to the 
^t7/»«j fubfequent on Volition. However, he goes on in the 
fecond place to enquire, whether in general a Man be free 
♦ To Will or not to Will, when any Adlion is once propofed 
' to his Thoughts, as prefently to be done.' In which refpedt 
he determines that a Man is not at liberty, becaufe he cannot 
jorbear Willing or preferring the one to the other || i which 


* C. OfFoivny %. 8. t See Note 42. 

$ §. 16. II §. 23, 24. 

Sea. I. Sub. 2. Of Moral Evil. 245 

S U B S E C T. II. 

An Opinion is propofed in general^ affert- 
ing a Freedom from NeceJJity as well as 

THIS Opinion determines almofl the fame This a- 
with the former concerning the Goodnefs g/'^es'^^'^h 
or Agreeablenefs of Objefts to the Appetites, nor i„ mofl"" 
is there much difference in what relates to the di- cafes ef- 
R 5 ftindion pecially- 

in thofe 
NOTES, relating to 

the Appe- 
tites to 
the' it be fcirce confiftent with his other Notion o{ Sufpc7ifion, Good 

whereby a Man either avoids a particular determination in the plgoAnt 
cafe, and continues in the fame ftate he is in [not by virtue of a Pj-ofitabfe 
prefent Determination of his Will, but of fome precedent one] ^^^ Hon-- 
or elfe wills fomething different from either the exiitence or ^^ . j^ ^ 
non exiftence of the Aflion propofed*, and tho' it fliould u^akes this 
comprehend, as he fays it does, moft cafes in Life, yet ilill it jg j^^ ju 
is not of the leaft Importance. For what does it fignify to me difference 
that I muft necefTarily take one fide or the other, right or between a 
wrong, fo long as I can choofe either of them indifferently ? ]^^j^ „ j 
If I can will or choofe either of the t^vo, here's full room for 'Q^nts 
the exercife of.Liberty ; and whether I can or no, ought to ^/^ dnt 
have been Mr. Locke'' i next Queftion. The Anfwer to which the one is 
feems pretty eafy, tho' perhaps not fo reconcileable with his Jeter- 
Hypothefis. However, inftead of meddling witii it, he flips mj^'d bv 
this abfurd Query into its Room, ws. Whether a Man be at \^^ bodilv 
Liberty to will nxhich of the tavo he pleafes ? or which is the Appetite 
fome, Whether he can Will what he Wills? Sed. 25. f and rhe other 
then, inftead of {hewing whether the Will be naturally deter- \^y ]^jjj^_ 
min'd to one fide, in any or all cafes, or whether the Man be fgjf 
always ix^t to ivill this way or that : (as might have been ex- 
pected ) 

* See Note 48. 
f See Strtitfi Remarks on Locke\ Chapt&r of Power, Do 
38, ^c. 

246 Of Moral Evil. Chap. V. 

ftinftion of Good into pleafant, Profirable, and 
Honeft : Except that it refers Honeft to the Duty 
which a ^Man ov/es to God, himfelf, and other 
Men, as a Member of an intelligent Society, rather 
than to the natural Appetites j and thinks that we 



pefted) he tells us fomething very different, 'y/z, that we can't 
always aSI in that Manner, or that Liberty of aB'ing does not 
require that a Man fhou'd be a-ble to do any Aftion or its con^ 
trary : th^n he goes onto give us another Explanation of the 
word Liberty, which is ftill confined to Aflion, and confe- 
qucntly v;reign to the prefent Quellion. 

In the next place he defines the Will over again *. ♦ Which 

* (lays he) is nothing but a power in the Aiind to dired thi? 

* operative Faculties of a Man to Motion or Reft, as far as they 

* depend on fach diredion'. By which Words if hq mean, 
that this Power of directing the operative Faculties, is proper* 
]y aSiive (in the fenfe abovemention'd) or Phyfically indiffe- 
rent to any particular manner of diredling them, /. e. is an abi- 
lity to direft them either to Motion or Reft, without any fta- 
tural Byafs to determine it (or to determine the mind to de- 
termine it) toward one fide always rather than the other : Ifi 
I fay, he intends to imply thus much in this definition of 
Will, then may Frecdo:n be juftly predicated of that fame 
Will, (or of the Mind in the exercife of it,) not indeed his 
kind of Freedom, i. e. \!i\iX. o'i aSiivg, which belongs to ano- 
ther Faculty ; but Freedom in our fenfe of the Word, /. e, 
a certain Jndifrerence, or Indeterminatcnefs in its own exercife j 
wiiich is what mofl Men underftand hy Liberum Arhitriumi 
and whether there be fuch a Liberty as this in human Nature> 
would here have be?n a proper Queftion. For if there be, 
then vi'e have got an abfolutely fclf-moving Principle, which 
docs not wantany thing out of itfelf to determine it; which has 
n') phylical conneilion with, and of confequence, no necefiary 
occafion for that grand Determiner Anxiety, which he has 
afterwards taken fo much pains to fettle and explain, and which 
fhall be confider'd by and by. But here he flies off again, and 
inftead of determining this, which is the main point of the 
controverfy, and wherein Liberty muft be found or no where, 
(^3 we obferv'd in Note 42.) 1 fay, inilead oi- ftating and de- 

* § 29. 

Seft. I. Sub. 2. Of Moral Evil. 247 

are to judge of the Agreeablenefs of things from 
that, rather than from thefe. As to the Eleilion 
which the Will makes on account of thefe, it aflerts 
that this proceeds from the Will itfelf, and that 
a free Agent cannot be determin'd like natural 

R 4 Bodies 


termining this great Queftion, Whether the Will or Mind be 
abfolutely independent upon, and phyfically indifferent to all 
particular A£ls, Objeds, Motions, iS'c. or neceffarily require 
feme foreign Mover; he feems to take the latter for granted, 
and immediately proceeds to the following Queftion, IVhat 
determines the Will ? The Meaning of which, fays he *, is this, 

* What moves the Mind in every particular inrtance to deter- 

* mine its general power of direfting to this or that particular 
^ Motion or Reft ' ? This Mr. Locke calls, for fhortnefs fake, 
determining the Will; and declares that what thus determines 
it either firft to continue in the fame ftate or action, is only 
the prefent Satisfaiiion in it : or fecondly to change, is always 
fome U?ieaJinefs-\-. By which Words if he only meant that 
thefe Perceptions are the common Moti'ves, Inducements, or 
Ckcajions whereupon the Mind in faft exerts its power of wil' 
ling in this or that particular Manner; tho' in reality it always 
can, and often docs the contrary (as he feems to intimate by 
fpeaking of a Will contrary to Defire J of raifing Defires by 
due Confideration II znd. forfning Appetites §, of a Power to 

fufpend any Deftres, to moderate and reftrain the Paftions, and 
hinder either of them from determing the Will and engaging 
us in Aclion: ** Then, as we faid before, he is only talking 
pf another Queftion, and what he has advanc'd on this head 
may readily be granted, at leaft without any prejudice to hu- 
man Liberty. For in this fenfe to affirm that the Will or 
Mind is determin'd by fomething without it, is only faying 
that it generally has fome Mrti'ves from without, according to 
which it determines the abovemention'd Powers, which no 
}Axn in his Senfes can difpute. 

But if he intended that thefe Motives fhou'd be underftood 
to rule and diredl the Will abfolutely and irrefiitibly in certain 
Cafes: — That they have fuch a neceiliiry influence on the 
|ylind, that it can never be determin'd without or againft them; 

— in 

. _ II §. 46. 


f Ibid. X §. 30, 


*! §• 47» 50' 53- 

248 0/ Moral Evil. Chap. V. 

Bodies by external Impulfes, or like Brutes by 
Objefts. For this is the very difference betwixt 
Man and the Brutes, that thefe are determin'd ac- 
cording to their bodily Appetites, whence all their 
Anions are neceflaty, but Man has a different 



— in fhort, that the Soul of Man has not a fhyfical Pcujer of 
willing independent of, and confequently indifferent to all 
Perceptions, Reafons and Motives whatfoever ; — which the 
general drift of his Difcourfe feems to aflert, particularly §. 47, 
48, 4.9, 50. where he confounds the Determination of the 
Judgment with the exertion of the fclf moving Power through- 
out. As alfo §. 52. where he alTerts, That all the Liberty 
we have or are capable of lies in this, ' that we can fujpend 
' our Defires, and hold our Wills undetermin'd, till we have 

* examined the Good and Evil of what we defire ; what fol- 
' lows after that follows in a Chain of Confequcnces link'd 

* one to another, all depending on the kft Determination ot 

* the Judgment.' And when he fpeaks o^i Caufes not in our 
Power, operating for the moll part forcibly on the Will, 
§. 57, yc. 

If from thcfe and the like Expreffions, I fay, we may con- 
clude this to have been his Opinion, t'iz. that all the Liberty 
of the Mind confifts iblely in direfting the Determination of 
the Judgment, (tho' if the Mind be always determin'd from 
without we muft have a Motive alfo for this direSiion, and 
confequently fhall find no more freedom here than any where 
elfc) after which Determination all our Adions (if they can 
be called fuch *) follow neceflarily : then I believe it will 
. appear, that at the fame time that he oppofcd the true Notion 
of Free- Will, he contradiftcd common Senfe and Experience, 
as well as himfelf For in the firfl, place, is it not felf-cvident, 
that we often do not follow our own prefcnt Judgment, but 
run counter to the clear conviflion of our Underflandings ; 
which A£lions accordingly appear vicious, and fill us imme- 
diately with regret and the iHngs of Confcience? This he al- 
lows, [§. 35, 3S.] to make Room for his Anxiety. But, ap- 
on the foregoing Hypothefis, How can any Adion appear 
to be irregular ? How can any thing that is confequent upon 
the final Refuk o'i J udgment , (it this Word be ufed in its pro- 

* See Note 42. 

Sedl. I. Sub. 2. Of Moral Evil 24^ 

Principle in him, and determines himfelf to That the 
Adion. ^^^f . 

ir. This Principle whereby Man excells the ne^e^ri- 
Brutes is thus explained by the Defenders of the lydefir'd, 
following Opinion, if I take their Meaning right: but others 
In the hrft place, they declare that there is feme ^re not, 

J they may 

1. >r> .-r- 7- <^ ^^ repre- 

NOTES. fented by 

the Un- 
per Senfe) be againft Confcience, which is nothing elfe but derftand 
that final Judgment * ? Nay, upon the fuppofition of our be- ing in 
ing inviolably determin'd in willing by our Judgment (and, different 
according to Mr. Locke, our Conftitution puts us under a ne- refpeds. 
ceffity of being fo, §. 48.) it would be really impoffible for us 
to will amifs or immorally, let our Judgments be ever fo er- 
roneous ; ' The Caufes of which (as he alfo obferves, §. 64.) 
' proceed from the weak and narrow conftitution of our Minds, 
• and are moft of them out of our Power.' Either therefore 
we can will without and againft a prefent Judgment, and 
therefore are not neceflarily [i. e. phyfically) determin'd by it; 
or we cannot be guilty of a wrong Volition : whatever proves 
the one, by neceffary confequence eftabliflies the other. Far- 
ther, there are innumerjble indifferent Aftions which occur 
daily, both with refpedl to abfolute choofmg or refuftng, or 
to choofing among things abfolutely equal, equal both in them- 
felves, aid to the Mind, on which we evidently pafs no 
manner of Judgment, and confequently cannot be faid to fol- 
low its Determination in them. To will the eating or not 
eating of an Egg is a Proof of the former ; to choofe one out 
of two or more Eggs apparently alike, is a proverbial Inllance 
of the latter; both which are demonftrations of an aftive or 
felf-moving Power ; either way we determine and ad when 
the Motives are entirely equal, which is the fame as to aft 
vvithout any Motive at all. In the former Cafe I perceive no 
previous Inclination to direft my Will in general, in the lat- 
ter no Motive to influence its Determination in particular; 
and in the prefent Cafe, not to perceive a A^otive is to have 
none ; (except we could be faid to have an Idea without be- 
ing confcious of it, to be anxious and yet infenfible of that 
Anxiety, or fway'd by a Reafon which we do not at all ap- 

* See Limborch. Theol. Chrijl. L. 2. C. 23. Seft. 16. and 
for an Anfyjer to the latter part of Locke's 48th Seil, fee the 
fame Chap. Sedl. the la ft. 

250 Of Moral Evil. Chap. V. 

Chief Good, the Enjoyment of which would make 
a Man completely happy ; this he naturally and 
necelTarily defires, and cannot rejed it when duly 
reprefented by the Underftanding. That other 
things which offer themfelves have a Relation to 
this Good, or fome Connection with it, and are to 
be efteem'd Good or Evil, as they help or hinder our 
obtaining it; and fince there is nothing in Nature but 
what in fome refped or other, either promotes this 
End, or prevents iti from this Indifference they 



prehend.) Neither is it neceflary to a true Equality or Indif- 
ference here, that I be fuppofed to have no Will to ufe any 
Eggs at all (as the Author of the Philofophical Enquiry abfurdly 
puts the Cafe) for granting in the firlt Place, that I have not 
a will to ufe any Eggs at all, 'tis indeed nonfenfe to fuppofe 
afterwards that I fhould choofe any one ; but let me have ne- 
ver fo great an Inclination to eat Eggs in general, yet that 
general Inclination will not in the kail oblige me to choofe 
or prefer one Egg in particular *, which is the only point in 
Queftion. Numberlefs Inftances might eafily be given -f-, 
where we often approve, prefer, defire and choofe ; and all 
we know not why : where we either choole fuch things as 
have no manner of Good or Evil in them, excepting what 
arifes purely from that Choice; or prefer fome to others, 
when both are equal Means to the fame End : in which Cafes 
the Judgment is not in the leall concern'd ; and he that un- 
dertakes to oppofe the Principle by which our Author accounts 
for them, mull either deny all fuch Equality and Indifference, 
or grant the Queflion. Not that this Principle is confined to 
fuch Cafes as thefe ; nor are they produced as the moll impor- 
tant, but as the moll evident Inilances of its exertion ; where 
no Motives can be fuppofed to determine the Will, becaufe 
there are none. To urge, that fuch Eleclions as thefe are 
mad^ on purpofe to try my Liberty, which End, fay fome 
becomes the Motive; is in efiedl granting the very thmg we 
contend for, <z;/«. that the Pleafure attending the exercife of 
the Will is often the fole rcafon of Volition. Befides, that 


* See Leibnitz's_y^/^ Paper to Dr. Clarke, N*. 17. and 66-, 
•f See Dr. Cheyne's Pkil. Principlest Chap. z. Sc6t. 13. 

Sea. J. Sub. 2. Of Moral Evil. 25 1 

declare, thac we have an Opportunity of rejefting 
'or receiving any thing. For tho' we can choofe 
nothing but under the Appearance of Good, /. e, 
unlefs it be in fome manner connefted with the 
Chief Good, as a Means or Appendage; yet this 
does not determine the Choice, becaufe every Ob- 
jed may be varied, and reprefented by the Un- 
derftandine under very different Appearances. 

^ ^ III, 


Motive is one of the Mind's own making ; and to be able to 
produce the Motive for Aftion, is the fame thing, with re- 
gard to Liberty, as to be able to aft without one. If by try- 
ing our Liberty be meant an Experiment to affure us that we 
Have really fuch a Power ; there can be no reafon for trying it 
in this fenfe, becaufe we are fufHciently confcious of it before 
any fuch Trial. 

* The Mind (fays the Author of the Efay on Ccnfcioufnefs, 

* p. 208.) before ever it exerts its Will or Power of choofing, 

* is confcious, and knows within itfelf, that it hath a Power of 
« Choice or Preference ; and this is a neceffary Condition of 

< willing at all, infomuch that the very firft time I had occa- 
' Hon to exert my Will, or make ufe of my eleftive Power, I 
« could not poOibly exercife it, or do any voluntary Aft, 
« without knowing and being confcious to myfelf [before 

* hand] that I have fuch a Faculty or Power in myfelf A thing 

< that feems at tirlt fight very ftrange and wonderful; to know 
« I have a power of adling before ever I have adted, or had any 

* trial or experience of it : But a little Refleaion will quickfy 
« fatisfie any one that in the nature of the thing it muft be fo, 

* and cannot poffibly be otherwife ; and which is peculiar to 

* this Faculty: For we know nothing of our Powers of Per- 
' ceiving, Underftanding, Remembring, ^c. but by experi- 

* menting their Afts, it being neceffary firft to perceive ox 
« think, before we can know that we have a Power of preceiv- 
f ing or thinking.' The Author proceeds to (hew, that this 
'pore-confcioufnefs of a power of nvilling or choofing, does moll 
clearly demonllrate that the Mind in all its Volitions hegim the 
Motion, or aclcth/ro;^ itfelf*. 


* EffayonConfcioufnefs, p. 209, 2IQ, 


252 Of Moral Evil. Chap. V. 

Though III. Secondly, When therefoie any Good is pro- 
*h^ W°n P^^^'^ ^^^^^ is not the Chief, the Will cznfufpend*. 
follows ^^^ Adion, and command the Underftanding to 
feme purpofe fome other thing, or the fame in fome 
Judgment different view : which may be always done, fince 
oftheUn- every thing except the chief Good is of fuch a 
derftand- jy^^juj-g^ that the underlknding may apprehend 
it is not ^o"^6 refpecS or relation wherein it is incommodious. 
necefTarily Notwithftanding therefore that the Will always does 
deter- follow fome Judgment of the Underftanding, 
mm'd by which is made about the fubfequent A6lions, yet 
it is not neceffanly determin'd by any, for it can fuf- 
pend its Ad and order fome other Judgment, 
which it may follow. Since therefore it can either 
exert or fufpend its Ad, it is not only free from 
Compulfion, but alfo indifferent in icfelf, with 
regard to its Adions, and determines itfelf with- 
out neceflity. 



To argue ftill that fome minute impreceptible Caufes, fome 
particular Circumftances in our own Bodies, or thofe about us 
mull determine even thele fecmingly indifferent Adions, is 
either running into the former abllirdity of making us aft upon 
Motives which we don't apprehend ; or faying, that we aft me- 
chanically, /. e. do not aft at all: and in the laft place, to fay 
that we are determin'd to choofc any of thefe trifles juft as we 
happen to fix our Thoughts upon it in particular, at the very 
inllant of Aftion, is either attributing all to the felf moving 
Power of the Mind, which is granting the Quellion : or re- 
ferring us tp the minute and impreceptible Caufes above 
mcntion'd; or obtruding upon us that idle unmeaning Word 
Chance inllead of a Phyfical Caufc, which is faying nothing at 
all. How hard mult Men be prefs'd under an Hypothefis 
when they fly to fuch evafive fliifts as thefc ! How much, 
eafier and better would it be to give up all fuch blind, un- 
known, and unaccountable Impulfes, and own, what common 
Senfe and Experience diftate, an Independent, Free, Self- 

* See Note 4S. 

Seca. I. Sub. 2. Of Mm-al Evil. 253 

IV. It mufl: be confefs'd that this opinion does ThlsOpi- 
eflablifh Liberty, and on that account is more agreea- J^J°!J ^^^: 
ble to reafon, experience, and the common fenfe bJi-t " ^ut 
of Mankind, yet fome things in it feem to be yet there 
prefum'd upon and not fufficiently explained. are fome 

V. For in the firft place, 'tis faid that the Will things not 
determines itfelf^ but we are not inform'd how that j" ^'^^^i^'^- 
is poffible, nor what ufe fuch a Power would be of, plained 
were it admitted : nay, it feems rather prejudical in it. 
than advantageous to Mankind. For that Goodnefs Such a 
which it is fuppofed to purfue, is in the things them- Liberty as 
felves, and arifes from their connexion with the , ^*^^^"^ 
chief Good ; it is not therefore to be form'd, but ^^^^ ^^^ 
difcovered by the Underftanding. If then the Un- judice 
derftanding performs its Duty right, it will difcover than bene- 
what is bed:: but it is our Advantage to be deter- ^^^°,. 
mined to that which is bell : it had therefore been ^^ ^" 
better for Man if Nature had given him up abfo- 
lutely to the determination of his own Judgment 



moving Principle, the true, the obvious, and only fource of 
both 'Volition and Adion ! 

With rcgird to Mr. iurZ-Zs Inconfiftencies, I fhall only add 
one Obfervation more, 'viz, tliat he 'eems to place the Oaufe 
(Motive, or whatever he means by it) of his Determination of 
the Will after the EfFedl, The Caufe of that Determination is, 
according to him, Anxiety ; this he fometimes makes concomi- 
tant, fometimes confequent upon Defire; and Sedl. 31. he 
fays tlie one is fcarce diilinguifliable from the other. 

But this fame Dcfire appears to me to be the very Determina- 
tion of the Will itfelf; what we abfolutely defire we always 
will, and 'vice njcrfa ; whether it be in our Power to purfue that 
Will, and produce it into Ad, or not : and indeed Defire 
feems to be no otherwifc dilUnguifhable from Volition, than as 
the latter is generally attended with the Power oi A(f!lion, 
which the former is confider'd without. This I think is all the 
Diftindlion that they are capable of, which yet is only nominal: 
Nor do his Inftances in §, 30 prove that there is any Differ- 
ence between 'em. Thus when I am obliged to ufe perfua- 


i^S4 Of ^^^^^ Evil. Chap. V. 

and Underftanding, and not allow'd that Judg- 
ment to be {ufpended by the power of the Will. 
For by that means he would have obtained 
his End wi h greater certainty and eafe, [ grantj 
that if a Man were abfolutely determin'd in his 
Actions to the beft, there would be no room for 
virtue, properly io call'd; for virtue, as it is com- 
monly underftoodj requires a free Aft, and this 
Liberty is the very thing that is valuable in vir- 
tue; and with good reafon, if a free Choice be, 
the very thing which pleafes; (For thus it would 
be impolfible to attain the end of chooflng, i. e, 
to pleafe ourfelves, without Liberty, fince that ve- 
ry thing which pleafes in Adion, viz,. Libertys 
is^'ould be wanting.) But yet, if any thing which 



fions with another, which T wifh may not prevail upon him : 
or fufFer one Pain to prevent a greater : here are two oppofite 
Wills, or a weak imperfeft Volition conquer'd by, and giving 
way to a ftronger : and we might as well fay Defire is oppofite 
to Defire, as to Volition. I will, or defire that this Man may 
not be prevailed upon, but yet I will, or defire more power- 
fully and effedually to ufe thefe perfuafions with him: Or ra- 
ther, here is but one adual Defire or Will in the Cafe, and the 
other is only hypothetical. Thus I fliould will to be cured of 
the Gout, if that cure would not throw me into greater Pain: 
but in the prefent circumftances I do not really will it, nor 
exert any one adt which may ferve to remove it : nay, in 
this Cafe, I will or defire to bear the Gout rather than a worfe 
Evil that would attend the removal of it. His Axiom there- 
fore that wherever there is pain, there is a defire to be rid of 
it, is not abfolutely true. 

Again, I fhould refufe a painful Remedy or difagreeable Po- 
tion, if I could enjoy perfeft Health without them; but as I 
manifeftly cannot, I choofe the lead Evil of the two. Nor can 
I indeed be properly faid to choofe or defire both in the prefent 
Circumllances, or to will one and defire the contrary; fince I 
know that only one of them is poiTible: which therefore I now 
certainly will or defire, tho' I fliould certainly have will'd. 
the contrary iiad it been ec[ually poflible. Thefc then, and the, 


Sed. I. Sub. 2. Of Moral Evil. 2^^ 

the UnderOanding can difcover, be the very beft 
before or independent of our Choice, it were pro- 
per for us to be necelTarily determin'd to it; for 
the fruition of it, howfoever obtain'd, would 
make us happy, and be fo much the more valua- 
ble, as ic would be certain, and not depend upon 
Chance, as all the Aftions of Free-will are in a 
manner fuppoied to do : nor need we much re- 
gard the Glory arifing from a well made Choice; 
fince the fruition of rhe greateft Good would give 
us Happinefs without it; nay fuch Glory would be 
empty and defpicable in competition with the great- 
eft Good. Hence it appears, that the Free-will, ac- 
cording to this Hypothefis, cannot be reckon'd 
afty Advantage. 



like Inftances are not fufficient to prove any oppofitlon betweea 
Will and Dellre ; except the latter be only taken for a mere paf- 
Jive Appetite; in which fenfe the Words f^Of?/^, prefer, i^c. 
inufi: then be very improperly apply 'd to it. But, in reality, I 
believe Mr. Locke here fets the Word Dejire to lignify what we 
commonly mean by the Will, as he does in Seft. 48. where 'tis 
call'd the Poiver of preferring: and puts Volition into the place 
oi ASiion; as Teems probable from his defcription of Willing in 
the 1 6th, 28th and 30th Seel, as alfo, C. zi- Se£l. 18. where 
he defines the Will to be a Po-tver of putting Body into Motion by 
Thought. And the fame Notion, I think, runs thro' all his 
Letters to Litnborch. 

Upon a review of this Chapter of Mr. Locke's Effay, and 
comparing the firft Edition of it with the reft, I find a 
remarkable Paffage omitted in all the following ones, which 
rhay ferve to Ihew lis upon what Ground he at iirft fup- 
pofed the Will to be determin'd from <vjiihoiit, and why upon' 
altering part of- hia Scheme and leaving the reft, he was 
obliged to take that for grunted, and let his former luppofttion 
ftand without its Reafon. It begins at Sedt. 28. " V^e muft 
" remember xXy^^x Volition ox Willing, regarding only what is 
*' in our power, is nothing but preferring the doing of any 
** thing to the not doing of it -, Action to reft, and contra. 
•*■ Well, but what is this preferring ? It is nothiiag but the be- 

" ing 

256 Of Moral Evil. Chap. V. 

It only VI. Secondly, Ifitbefaid, that the Underftand- 

takes place \^^ j^ dubious in many Cafes, and ignorant of what 
fulmat-' ^^ ^^^ ^^^' ^"'^ ^" ^^^^^^ Liberty takes place; nei- 
ters, and ther does this clear the Matter. For if the things 
then 'tis to be done be Good or Evil in themfelvc^ bur un- 
ofno ufc known to the Intelkd, there's no help in the Will; 

orimpor- ' ^^^^ 



*' iug pleafed more aiith one thjjig than another. Is then a Alan 
*' indifferent to be pleafed or not pleafed more with one thing' 
" than another? Is it in his Choice, whether he will or will 
*' not be better pleafed with one thing than another? 

" And to this I think every one's Experience is ready to 
•' make anfwer, No. From whence it follows, that the Will 
*' or Preference is determin'd by fornething without itfelf ; 
*' let us fee then what it is determm'd by. If willing be but 
*' the being httitx pleafed, as hps been fhewn, it is ealy to know 
*' what 'tis determines the Will, what 'tis pleafes befl ; every 
*• one knows 'tis Happinefs, or that which makes any part of 
*' Happinefs, or contributes to it, and that is it we call Good. 
*' — — Good then, the greater Good^ is that alone n,vhich deter- 
" mbies the Wilir 

From hence we may obferve that as he here makes the Will 
a mere paffi^-e JffeSlion of the Mind, a power of being pleafed 
with fome things more than others, (which Definition will 
with equal propriety take in all the Set?fes too) he was natu- 
rally led to enquire after the Ground of thefe its different Plea- 
fures, which cou'd only be the different Natures of external 
Objefts afting differently upon it ; (as they do alfo on the 
Senfes) For what is only aifed upon, muft have fornething 
ivithout itfelf to ad upon it ; and to be pleafed in a different 
manner by the Aftion of different Objeils is only, in other 
Words, to receive different Degrees of Happinefs from them. 
Upon this Scheme we muH always be unavoidably determin'd 
by the greatell apparent Good, or neceflarily prefer what 
feems produftivc of the higheil Degree of HappineG ; which 
is indeed fufficiently intelligible, and he purfued it through- 
out coniiflently. But upon fecond Thoughts, finding this 
not very reconcileable with matter of Fad, (as he obfervcd in 
Sed. 35, 38, 43, 44, 69, l^c. of the following Editions, 
where he has fully fliewn that we do not always prefer or 
choofc the greater apparent Good) and ftill fuppofing the Will 
to be paffi've or determin'd from without, he alters his former 


&a. t: Sub. 2I Of Mora! Evil. ^7 

nor does its Liberty aiTift us in difcoveringbr ob- 
raining the better Side; if they be indifferent, k 
is no rrtgtter what we do, fince the Conveniencies 
and Inconveniencies are equnl on both Sides. If 
then we admit of Liberty in thefe Cafes, it will be 
of nd ufe 6r importance to Life or Happinefs: 


k T E S, 

tdfypothefis fo far as to make the Will be determin'd, not hy 
the greater Goot/ immediately, but by x\\3Xl}neafinefs, which 
is founded in the Dejire wluch arifes from the profpefl of fome 
Good. But it being likcwiic evident that all things .do not 
taife our Defife in proportion to their apparent Goodnefs ; He 
endeavours to account for this,' by faying that " We do not 
" look on them to make a part of that Happinefs wherewith. 
" we in our prefent Thoughts can fatisfy o'urfelves,. Sedl. 43.'' 
i. e. Wc can "be content without them ; or in our Author's 
Language, they do not abfolutely pleafe us, becauTe we do 
not nvill them, He proceeds therefore to mend his Hypothe- 
lis farther by making the Mind in f6me fort aSii've in con- 
templating, in embl-acfng or rejefting any kinds of apparent 
Good, by giving it a power oi raijtng, improving or fufpend- 
ing any of its Dejtres, of governing and moderating the Pal- 
Jions, and forming to itfclf an Appeilte or R'difh of things ; 
Sedt. 45, and 53. All which' is exaftly agreeable to our Au- 
thor's Principles, as well a:s Truth, and 'tis a 'vl^onder one 
that fo attentively confidcr'd the Operations of the" Afind fliou'd 
2^ot be led on to that other part of its Libe'tty which is equally 
coniirm'd by Experience, <u/z. of choofmg arbitrarily among 
different kinds and degrees, of Pain, of over-ruling any ordi- 
nary Defire of obtaining Good, or avoiding Evil, and by cori- 
fequence of its Will being propeHy afli-je ox phyficaliy indiffe- 
re7it with regard to either. But tho' he has inferted feveral 
Paffages in the fubfequent Editions, which come near to Li- 
berty, yet he takes in the greateft part ,of his ftrft paflive 
Scheme, and generally mi.tes bot"h together. This has ot- 
cafioned that great confufion in the Chapter abovemention'd 
which cannot but be obferv'd by every Reader 
. Dr. Clarke's i^frgumcnt for abfo!ute FreedonT, becaufc all 
Motives or Senfations are mere abftraft Notions, and have na 
jphyfical tiower * fc^ms not conclufive,' or at lealt not clear. 

S ?»S 

* Rmarks tfi the Phiiofoj, Enquiry, p. 10, 

258 0/ Moral Evil. Chap. V. 

Nay, it muft be efteem'd an Imperfedion, as de- 
riving its Origin from the Imperfeftion of the Un- 
derftanding. For if the Underftanding could cer- 
tainly determine what were the beft to be done, there 
would be no room for Liberty. (4(5'.) 
We are VII. Thirdly, Thefe men are not well agreed 
Jeft in what this Chief Good is, from the connexion with 
doubt which the Underftanding muft judge of the Good- 
i^e'thr" "^^^ ^^ ^^^^^ things, as may appear from their va- 

Wayto "01^5 


nefs, aftd NOTES, 

can have 

Tio help pof ^},Q knows, fay the Fatalifts, how far rcafons, motives, 

from Li- icf^ jjjgy aiFed a Spirit? Why may not one immaterial Sub- 

berty. ftance determine another by means of Thought, as well as a ma- 

terial one can move another by means of Impulfe? Nay, his 
adherent Mr. Jack/on grants* " That abftrad Notions will 
*' by a forcible and irrefiftible impulfe, compel the Mind to 
** move the Body whether it will or no." Which impulfe 
if it were conftant, would fufficiently acquit the Maintainerj 
of Neceffity. But that there can be no fuch forcible impulfe, 
will, I hope, appear below, where it will be fliewn to be both 
agreeable toieafon to fuppofe that there are aftive or Self-mo- 
ving Beings, which, as fuch, muft have a phyfical power of 
refifting what we call the nioft cogent Motives : and to be con- 
£rm'd by Experience, that our own Minds exert fuch a Pow- 
er ; which is fufEcient for our purpofe. For an Explanation 
of the true Notion of Liberty, fee the following Subfeftions of 
this Chapter, and Note 58. 

(46.) Thcfe with fome of the following confequences at- 
tending fuch a confufcd Hypothefis of Liberty, are well urg'd 
by Mr. Locke (tlio' I think they return upon himfelf ) in his 
Chapter of Povjer, Se6l. 4.8, 49, 50. and in the PhilcJ'oph. En- 
quiry, p. 63, iJc. and feeni to be unavoidable in any other 
Scheme but that of our Author; who fuppofes that in moll 
Cafes the Goodnefs of an Aft or Objedl entirely depends upon, 
and is produced merely by our choofmgit; and of confe- 
tjuence Liberty, or a power of choofing, is according to his 
Principles, fo far from bemg unneccflary, or an Imperfedion, 
that it is our nobleft Perfeftion, and conftitutcs the greatclt 
part of our Happinefs : For an Explanation of this, fee Sedt. 
•. 2. of this Chapter. 

* Defence of human Liberty, p. 19S. 

Sed. r. Sub. 2. Of Moral Evil. 259 

rious and contradidlory Opinions about ir. C47.) 
We mufl: neceiTarily therefore be wavering and 
folicitous, and even rebel againft Nature itfelf, which 
has neither iixt a certain End nor granted any certain 
Means to attain it, but left us in anxiety and doubt 
about the way which leads to Happinels^ neither is 
there any help here in our Liberty, fince it is blind, 
and can do nothing towards bringing us back into 
the right way. 

VIII. Fourthly, 'Tis confefs'd by all, that Good Since that 
in general is what is univerfally agreeable, and what ^^?°°^. 
all defire. Every Good therefore anfv/ers to fome garecable. 
Appetite, and according to thefe Authors, Objeds and this is 
are good on account of a natural and neceflary fuirable- tobejudg- 
nefs which they hive to our Appetites. The Un- ^^ ^^^^ 
derftanding therefore does not make good, but ^gj-fland- 
finds it in the things themfelves: and when it ing, if the 

S 2 judges Will fol- 

low this 


free, if ic 
(47.} This uncertainty about the Summnm Bonttm is owi/d does not, 
and well accounted for by Mr, Locke, B. 2. C. 21. Scdl. 55. it adts 
'* Hence it was that the Philofophers of old did in vain en- againft 
*' quire whether Summum Bonum confiiftcd in Riches or Bcdi- reafon. 
** ly Delights, or Virtue, or Contemplation. And they might We had 
«* have as reafonably difputed whether the beft relifh were to better 
" be found in Apples, Plumbs, or Nutts, and have divided therefore 
** themfelves into Sefts upon it. For as pleafant Taftcs depend be vvith- 
*' not on the xKxn^i themfelves, but their agrecablenefs to this outfuch 
*' or that particular Palate, wherein there is great variety ; Liberty, 
*' fo the greateft happinefs confifls in the having thofe things 
*' which produce the greateft: Pleafure, and in the abfence of 
" thofe which caufe any dillurbance, any pain. Now thefe 
*' to different Men are very different things." To the fame 
purpofe are the 3d and 4th obfcrvations in the Religion of Na- 
ture delineated, p. 33. which may ferve to confirm the No- 
tion which our Author propofes in the next Subfedion, miz. 
that moft of the Good or Agrecablenefs in things arifes not 
from their own Natures, but our choice of them ; or that Ob- 
jeds are not chofen becaufe they are good, but are generally 
good only becaufe ckofett. 

26o Of Moral Evil. Chap. V". 

judges any thing in Nature to be agreeable, that, 
according to rhem, muft necefTarily be in refpeft 
of fome natural Appetite. All the Good then 
which is in things will be the Objed of fome Fa- 
culty or Appetite, ^ e. of the Underftanding, 
Senfe, ^c. But all thefe are determin'd by Na- 
ture in regard to the Appetite or Faculty to which 
they relate, i, e, in regard to their Pleafantnefs, or 
Agreeablenefs; and as to the relation which they 
bear to each other, /. e. as to their Profit ablenefi 
and Homfiy, they are to be judg'd of by the Un- 
derftanding, and direded when and in what man- 
ner they muft give place to each other, or afford 
their mutual afliftance. Free-will then appears to 
be of no manner of ufe ', for if it certainly follow 
the decree of reafon, it is not free, at leaft from ne- 
ceflTity, fince that very reafon which it follows is 
not free : if it does not necefTarily follow that, we 
had better be without it, fince it preverts every 
Will could ^^^^ng' 3nd confounds the Order of Reafon, which 
fufpendits is beft; fucha Liberty as this w^ould therefore be 
aft con- prejudicial to Mankind; it would make them liable 
^ff^V^ todoamifs, and produce no kind ofGoodto eom- 
T^L^ ^^' penfate for fo great an Evil. 

mentor r .„,,o . r i i » v i /• 

theUn- IX. Fifthly, It is fuppoledthat the Judgment of 

derlland- the Underflanding concerning the (joodnefs of any 
mg. It thhig, is a condition without which the Will is not 
direaV"" dire<5led to the Object, but yet that it can either 
into Evil ; ^^^rt OX fufpend its ad: about any Good whatfoever, 
it fc|ms Let us fuppofe then that the Underflanding has 
faerefore determin'd it to be good to exert fome certain Ac- 
iieccfTary ^j^^^ ^^^ ^^jj ^^ fufpend it y while this Judgment 
aft at the continues, if the Will can fufpend its Ad, it chcofes 
time and Evil; if it cannot, it is not free. You'll fay, it 
in the can command the Underflanding to change its 
^j^P" Judgment: be it fo. But it is evident, that the 
Under- ^^- ^^'^ iufpends his Aftion before he can command 
ftanding thc L^nderflanding to change its Judgment, r. e. he 
dircils. fufpends 

Sed. I Sub. 2. Of Moral Evil. 26 r 

fufpends the Adion while the Judgment deter- 
mines that it is Evil to fufpendj and of confe- 
cjuence choofes that diredly which his Reafon judges 
to be Evil ; which feems to overthrow their whole 
Hypothefis. C48.) 

S 5 X. 


.(48.) Farther, if the Mind can fufpend the Satisfaction of 
any urgent defire (which Mr. Locke allows * and therein 
places all its Liberty) then it can as eafily quite ftop, or run 
cpunter to any natural Appetite ; fince no greater Power feems 
to be requifite for the one than for the other. If we can hin- 
der the Will from being determin'd by any defire of abfent 
Good without any appearance of greater Good on the other 
Side, which might raife aaoppofite deiire able to counterbal- 
lance it, as our Author has fliewn that we can ; then we fhall 
be equally able to prevent its following the ultimate determi- 
nation of the Judgment, even without any reafon for fo do- 
ing ; after any Determination of the Judgment, it will be ftill 
as undetermin'd, and indifferent towards Volition, as Mr. 
Locke fuppofes the operative Powers to be in regard to A8ion\ 
and confequently Good, whether abfolute or comparative, is 
neither the adequate efficient Caufe, nor a necellary Means to 
the determination of the Will. This ad: oi Sufpenfmi therefore 
muft either be folely founded in the felf moving Power of the 
Mind, and of confequence be naturally independent on all 
Motives, Reafons, is'c. and an inftance of the Mind's abfolute 
Freedom from any excernal Determination ; which is a con- 
tradiftion to Mr. Locke''s general Hypothefis ; or elfe itfelf 
muft be determin'd by fome Motive or external Caufe ; and 
then it will be difficult to make it free in any fenfe. Let us 
obferve how Mr. Locke endeavours to reconcile thefe two No- 
tions together. Our Liberty, according to him, is founded 
in a general abfolute Inclination of the Mind to Happinefs, 
which obliges us to fufpend the Gratification of our Defire in 
particular cafes, till we fee whether it be not inconfiftent with 
the general Good. "The ftrongcr Ties, fays he, Soft 5-1. 
" we have to an unalterable purfuit of Happinefs in general, 
" which is our greateft Good, and which, as fuch, our Defires 
'•' always follow, the more are wc free from any neccffary dc- 

" termination 

* Book 2. C. 2 J, Seil. 47- and 50. 
t Sec Note 49. 

262 Of Moral Evil. Chap. V. 

There are X. I coiifefs, they offer fome Solutions here, 
''^ff-^'T^ bi^t fuch as are fo (ubtle, fo obfcure, and (o much 
thele di*^ above the compichenfion of the Vulgar, that moft 
ficukies, Perfons have taken a diflafle to them, given up the 
but they caufe of Liberty as dcrperate, and gone over to the 
are far former Sed: but if any one will undertake either 
■ ^, ^' to give a more clear and full Explication of the 
On this common Opinion, or brmg Solutions of thofe Dif- 
account ficulcies which occur in it, he will find me fo far 
many f,-om being his Adverfary, that he may exped my 
have gone ^ffg^t, encouragement and alTiftance. This indeed 

over to ^, , • n . J I • I 

the former ^^^^ very much to be wim d, but m the mean 
Opinion. time 


*' termination of our Will to any particular A6lion, and from 
" a necefiary compliance with our Defirc let upon any parti- 
*• cular, and then appearing preferable good, till we have du- 
♦' ly examin'd whether it has a tendency to, or be inconfiflent 
*' with our real Happinefs." And again, Seft. 52. " What- 
*' ever NecelTity determines to the purfuit of real Blifs, the 
*' fame neceffity, with the fame force, eftablithes Sufpenfe, 
^' Deliberation and Scrutiny of each fucceffive dcfue, whether 
" the fatisfadion oi it does not interfere with our true Hap- 
" and miflead us from it." If by the Word Necejfity he means 
*' abfolute phyfical Necejfity (which it muft be, if it be any 
tiling to the prefent purpofe) he has difcover'd a pretty odd 
f:)undation for his Liberty. Nay, if this force which draws 
us towards Happinefs in general, be abfolute and irrefiftible, 
as his Words import, it will draw us equally towards all par- 
ticular appearances of it, and conicquently prove as bad a 
ground for Sufpenjton as for Liberty. But in truth this Sufpen- 
Jion is neither founded in any NecelTity of purfuing Happi- 
nefs in general, nor is itfelf an original Power of the Mind 
diftinft from that of Volition, but only one particular exercife 
or Modification of it. " 'Tis willing (as the Author of the 
" Philofophkal Enquiry rightly oblerves) to defer willing a- 
*' bout the matter propofed," and is no way different from 
jthc common cafes of willing and chonfmg, except that it ia 
^he moft evident demonftration of the Mind^s perfefl Liberty 
in willing, and fo obvious that Mr. Locke could not get over 
it, and therefore ftiles i; the fource of all cur Libe'rty, and 


Sed. I. Sub. 2. Of Moral Evil. 

time I ihall endeavour to fee whether thefe things 

cannot be explain'd more clearly in another manner. 


that wherein confifts FrerwHL Seft. 47. Tho' he foon ex- 
plains it away again, by endeavouring to force it into his Sy- 
ftem. That this Power of Sufpenfion is not fufficient to deuo^ 
minate a Man/w, Sec Impartial Erquiry, p. 44, 


S 4 


2^4 Of Moral Evil Chap.V. 

S U B S E C T. III. 

Another NQtion of Liberty <md EleSlion 

The Ap- y ]sj order to make my meaning better under-' 

Power^^*^ X frood, we mufi: obferve, in the firfi place, 

attain^ ^^at there are certain Powers, Faculties and Ap« 

their pro- petites implanted in us by Nature, which are de- 

P''p"'^' fign'd for Aftion j and when thefe exert their pro- 

cffe '^* ^^^ Acflions about Objects they produce a grateful 

which is ?"d agreeable Senfation in us. The exercife of them 

the grea- therefore pleafcs us ; and from hence probably al! 

teft per- our Pleafure and Delight arifesj confecjuently our 

t'l^** J Happinefs, if we have any, feems to ' confift in 

them, and , ^' -r r i r"' x, ■ i -r. , • 

their beft ^"^ proper excrcile ot thpie Powers and Faculties 
F.ilate. which Nature has befiow'd upon us : for they ap- 
pear to be implanted in us for no other end, but 
that by the ufe and exercife of them thofe things 
inay be efFefted which are agreeable. Nor can 
they be at reft, or enjoy themfelves any otherwife 
than as thofe things are produced by or in thems 
for the produ(flion or reception of which they are 
Hefign'd by Nature. Now every Power or Facul-^ 
ty is djrefted to the profecution of its proper Ad:s, 
They Pttain their End therefore by Exercife-, which 
muft be efteem'd the grcateft Perfcdionj and mofi 
happy State of any Being*. For that is a State of 
Happinefs, if any fuch can be copceiy'd, wherein 
^very thing is done which pleafe?, and every thing 
Removed which is difpleafing: neither does it feeru 
poffible to imagine a more happy one, 

f Sec ScBtth Chrifiian Lifd Vol t. pag. 8, c^, 

Sed. I. Sub. 3. Of Moral Evil. 265 

II. Secondly, It is to be obferv'd, that among There is a 
our Appetites, Faculties and Powers, feme are de- ^'^'"tai" a- 
termin'd to their Operations by objeds peculiar to ^xTby Na- 
themfelves. For upon the prefence of their Objedls ture be- 
they neceflarily exert their Adions, if rightly difpos'd, tween 
and ceafe from Operation upon their abfence, and ^°"]^ ^P- 
have no tendency towards any other Objeds but ^^^^^^j 
their own. Thus the Sight perceives nothing but their Ob- 
Light, Colours, crc. and, upon the Removal of jefts, 
thele, its Adion * ceafes. The Underftanding whereby 
itfelf diftinguifhes thofe Objeds which are com- ^ J ^9- 
municated to it by the Senfes, or perceiv'd by re- prefence 
fledion, from one another, difpofes and repofits ofthem, 
them in the Memory ; but yet has certain bounds and ceafe 
which it cannot exceed: andfo of the reft. There . "^ ^^' 
is therefore a certain natural Fitnefs, a fixt con- their Re^ 
formity between thefe Powers and their Objeds, moval. 
on which account they exert their Adions upon 
the prefence of the Objeds, and delight themfelves 
in Exercife: but are uneafy at the prefence of 
thpfe things which hinder it. If then there be any 
natural force in any Objed to promote or hinder 
the exercife of any Power or Faculty, that Objed 
in regard to it is to be efteem'd Good or Evil. 

HI. Thofe Objeds which thus promote or im- Liberty 
pede the Adion, are fufficiently difiinguifli'd from ^^°"j'^ b« 
each other by the Power or Faculty itfelf; thofe vice'to^' 
that are abfent or future, are judg'd of by the Un- Agent en- 
derftanding, and what the Mind determines to be dow'd 
jhe befl in them, that we are oblie'd to purfue* He Y"^^ ^'^^'^ 

thac ^ppetites, 
•^c. as 

NOTES. ly. 

* It may be obferv'd here once for all, that our Author 
feldom ufes this Word ASiton in a ftrifl PhiJofophical Senfe 
(according to which thefe fliould rather be call'd PaJJions) but 
generally takes the vulgar cxprcfTions, when they will ferve 

to e}i:|)|aifj his mcanir.g. ■ \ 


We may 
a Power 
and any 
there is 
no other 
Kefs but 
what may 
^rife from 
the Deter- 
of the 
Power it- 

Of Moral Evil. Chap. V. 

that does otherwife difobeys the Law of Reafon. 
If therefore all our Powers and Faculties were thus 
determin'd to their proper Objecfls, it would feem 
an Imperfeftion for Man to be free, and he would 
have been much more happy without fuch a Liber- 
ty; for he receives no Benefit from it, but one of 
the greateft Evils, viz,, a Power of doing amif . 

IV. It feems not impoflible to conceive a Power 
of a quite different Nature from thefe which may 
be more indifferent in refped of the Objeds about 
■which it exercifes itfelf *. To which no one thing 
is naturally more agreeable than another, but that 
will be the fitteft to which it lliall happen f to be 
apply'd: Between which and the Objeft, to which 
is is determin'd, by it felf or by fomething elfe, 
there fhould naturally be no more fuitablenefs or 
connexion than between it and any other thing ; but 
all the Suitablenefs there is, (hould arife from the ^- 
flication or Determination itlelf. For as the Earth 
is no Man's Right by nature, but belongs to the 
prime Occupant, and the Right arifes from that 
very Occupation; fo there may polTibly be a 
Power to whch no Objed is by Nature peculiarly 
adapted, but any thing may become fuitable to ir, 
if it happen to be apply'd; fince its Suitablenefs pro- 
ceeds from the Application, as we laid before. 
Now it does not feem any more abfurd for a Power 
to create an Agreeablenefs between itfelf ard an 
Objed, by applying itfelf to that Objed, or that 
to itfelf, than for a Man to acquire a Right to a 
thing by occupying it. For, as in Civil Laws, 
fome things are forbidden becaufe they are incon- 
venient, others are inconvenient and Evil becaule 
forbidden; fq it may be in Powers, Facuhies and 


* See Se£t. 5. Subfeft. 2, par. 12 and 15. 

Tp That this Word ij not intendiid to imply 'vjbat ive comi/ion/y 
mean hy Chance, fee par. 18. 

Sedt. I. Sub. 3. Of Moral Evil. 267 

Appetites; viz,, fome may be determin'd by th^ 
natural Suitablenefs of the Objeds, and in others, 
the Suitablenels to the Objeds may arife from the 
Determination. For this Faculty may be naturally 
inclin'd to exercife, and one Exercife be more a- 
greeable than another, not from any natural fitnefs 
cf one more than another, but from the Application 
of the Faculty itfelf; for another would often be no 
lefs agreeable, if it had happen'd to be determin'd to 
that. Nothing therefore feems to hinder but that 
there may be fuch a Power or Faculty, at leaft 
with refpcd to vtry many Objeds. (4^. 



(49.) Our Author's Notion o^ Indifference has been grofly 
mifunderllood by all his Adverfaries, who have accordingly 
rais'd terrible Outcries againft it, as deftroying the eflential 
and immutable diltindlion between Goed and Evil ; fubvert- 
ing Appetites, making Reafon and Judgment ufelefs, and con- 
founding every thing. We fhall juft obferve here, that it can- 
not be apply'd to the nxjhole Man, nor was defign'd by our Au- 
thor to include all manner of external Objefts, Anions, and 
Relations of things, as they feem to have underftood it. For 
every Man in his Wits mull be fufficiently fenlible that all 
things don't afFe<fl him in the fame manner, even before he has 
will'd any of them. I cannot be indifferent to Meat, or Drink, 
or. Reft, when I am hungry, thirlly, or weary. Some na- 
tural Objedrs are agreeable, aud produce pleafure in me, and 
others the contrary, whether I will or no ; and the fame may 
be faid of the moral Sejife- Nay our Author every where al- 
lows their full force to what he calls the Appetites ; and aflerts 
that whatever contradi(£ls them muft be attended withUneafi- 
nefs. *Tis not an abfolute indifference therefore of the Man or 
Mind in general, nor of the Senfes, Perception or Judgment, 
which he contends for ; but it relates wholly to that particu- 
lar Po^,ver of the Mind which we call Willing, and which 
will appear to be in its own Nature, or phyfically, indifferent 
to afling or not afting in any particular manner, notwithlland- 
ing all thefe different Affeftions or Paffions of the Mind rais'd 
by the different Objeds. Let a thing feem never fo pleafant 
and agreeable, never fo rcafonable, fit and eligible to U5» 
yet there is ilill a natural pollibility for us to will the con- 
trary i 

268 Of Moral Evil. Chap. V. 

Such a V. Fourthly, if then we fuppofe fuch a Power 

Power as jj jj^jj .^j^ l^jj^^ ^ j^^j. ^j^g Agent endow'd with it 
this can- . j • . j ■ • .--r • i 

not be de- """o^^ D^ determin d in its Operations by any pre- 

termjn'd cxiftent Goodnefs in the Oojed,- for fince the a- 
by Good- greeablenefs between it and the Objeds, at leaft in 
nefsinOh- jj,q{^ ^f them, is fuppofed to arife from the Deter- 
^^gQjJ"^^ mination, the agreeablenefs cannot poffi jly be the 
nefsof Caufe of that Determination on which itfelf de- 
them de- pends. But the congruity of the Qbjed with the 
pends up FacuUy is all the Goodnefs in it, therefore there is 
tennina-^ nothing Good in regard to this Power, at leaft in 
tion. * thofe 


trary; and confequently the bare Power of 'willing is in itfelf 
indifferent to either Side ; which is all the indifference that 
our Author contends for. Now fuch an Indifference as this 
Mr. Zofif allows to be in the operati've Powers of Man, tho* 
lie confines it, I thini, improperly to them alone * " I have 
" the ability, fays he, to move my hand, or to let it reft ; 
'• that operative Power is indifferent to move or not to move 
*' my hand : I am then in that refpefl perfeflly free. My Will 
*' determines that operative Power to reft ; I am yet free, be- 
" caufe the Indifferency of that my operative Power to acl or 
*' not to aft ftill remains ; the Power of moving my hand is 
*' not at all impaired by the Determination of my Will, which 
" at prefent orders reft ; the Indifferency of that Power to 
*' adl is juft as it was before, as will appear, if the Will puts 
" it to the trial, by ordering the contrary." The fame, I 
think, may be. apply'd to the Will itfelf in regard to Motives, 
^c. with much more Juftice than to thefe operative Powers- 
IVay thefe can fcarce be call'd indifferent to Aclion after the 
determination of the Will ; but follow inftantly (as we ob- 
ferv'd in Note 42.) in moft Cafes when they are in their 
right State. What I will or refolve to do, that I certainly 
effedt if I have Power to do it, and continue in the fame Will 
or Refolution. However, this Indifference of the operative 
Powers is what can never conftitute Morality (as was ob- 
fcrv'd in the fame place) fmcc their Operations arc no farther 
moral than as they are confeq^uent upon, and under the direc- 
tion of the Will. 


* B. 2. C. 21. Sedt. 71/ 

Sea. I. Sub. 3. Of Moral Ev41. 269 

thofe Objefts to which it is indifFererit, till it has 
cmbrac'd it, nor Evil till it has rejeded it: Since 
then the Determination of the Power to the Obje(i 
is prior to the Goodnefs and the Caule of it, this 
Power cannot be determined by that Goodnefs in its 

VI. Fifthly, Such a Power as this, if it be grant- Nor by 
cd to exift, cannot be determin'd by any Vneaft' ^"L^" 
nefi arifing from the things about which it is con- ^J""''^' 
verfant. For it is fuppofed to be indifferent, not 
only in refped of external Objeds, but alfo of its 
own Operations, and will pleafe itfelf, whether it 
accepts the thing or rejeds it ; whether it exerts 
this Ad or another. Thefe Objeds then will nei- 

N OT IE. S. 

There muft then be another Indifference prior to them, in 
order to make the exertion of them free in any tolerable fenfe. 
Concerning this antecedent indifference Mr. Locke enqiltres whe- 
ther it be antecedent to the Thought and Judgment of the Vn- 
derjlanding as well as to the Decree of the Will * ? We an- 
ftver 'tis antecedent to and independent on any particular 
Thought or Judgment, and continues equally independent af- 
ter them ; it remains after the Determination of the Judgment 
in the very fame ftate as he fuppofes that of the operative Pow- 
ers to be after the Determination of the Will. Its Liberty is 
placed, as he fays, in a ^tute of Ddrknefs; and fo is that of 
the operative Powers, which he allows : 'Tis indeed in itfelf 
(as it is commonly ftiled) a blind Principle, and fo is every 
Principle in Nature but the Under jlanding: and tho' the Exer- 
cife of the Will, as well as of the operatinje Po-voers, be gene- 
rally accompanied with Intelligence, without which there can 
be no Moral laberty ; yet thefe are, 1 think, very different 
Faculties and often exercifed fcparately, aud therefore fhould 
always be confidercd diftir.ftly ; Freedom is one thing, Intel- 
ligence another ; a Moral or accountable Being confifts of both. 

For a more complete View of this Queltion, fee Epi/cop. 
InJlit.Theol. L. 4. C. 6. and TraB. de Lihero Arhitrio. There's 
alfo a good defence of our Author's Notion of Indifference in 
Limhanh, Theol. Chrijl. L. z. C, 23 Sedt. 20, ^c. 

* Ibid, * Obferve- 

270 Of Moral Evil, Chap. V. 

ther pleafe nor difpleafe till this indifference be re- 
moved; but it is luppos'd to be removed by the 
Application or Determination of the Power itfelf; 
therefore Anxiety does not produce but pre-fup- 
pofe its DeterminatioHc Let us fuppofe this Power 
to be already determin'd ( it matters not how ) to 
embrace a certain Objed, or to exert the proper 
Adions relating to it, Defire manifeftly follows this 
Determination, and Defire is follow'd by an En- 
deavour to obtain and enjoy the Objcd purfuant 
to the Application of the Power. But if any thing 
fhould hinder or flop this endeavour, and prevent 
the Power from exerting thofe Operations which it 
lindertook to difcharge in relation to the Objed", 
then indeed Uneafinefs v/ould arife from the hin- 
drance of the Power. Anxiety would therefore be 
the EffeB^ of the Determination of this Power> but 
by no means the Caujc of it *. 
Not by VII. Sixthly, Suppofing fuch an Agent as this 

tVtUnder- to be endow'd alfo with Undcrftanding, he might 
ftandhig. life it to propofe Matters fit to be done, but not to 
determine whether he fhould do them or not. 
For the Underflanding or Reafon, if it fpeak 
Truth, reprefents what is in the Objeds, and does 


k OT E S. 

* Obferve what follows from Mr. Locke, " There is 3 
" CaCe wherein a Man is at Liberty in refpeft o{ 'uoilling, and 
" that is the chufing a remote Good as an End to be purfued. 
" Here a Man may fufpend the aft of his Choice from being 
" determin'd for or againft the thing propofed, 'till he has ex- 
" amin'd whether it be really of a Nature in itfelf, and Con- 
" fequences to mai*,? him happy or no. For when he has once 
*' chofen it, ^n^ithcreh^'\'i is become a part of his Happinefs, it 
•' raifes Dejire, and that proportionably gives him Uneafinefs^ 
*' which determines his Will, and lets him at work in purfiiit 
" of his Choice on all occafioiis tli:u otfcr. B. 2. C. 21, 

Sea. 56, 

Scd. I. Sub. 3. Of Moral Evil. zyi 

not feign what it finds not in them : Since there- 
fore, before the Determination of this Power, 
things are fuppofed to be indifferent to it, and no 
one better or worfe than another; the Underfland- 
ing, if it performs its Duty right, will reprefent this 
Indifference, and not pronounce one to be more 
eligible thAn another; For the Underftanding di- 
reds a thing to be done no otherwife than by deter- 
mining that it is better; as therefore the Goodnefs 
of things, with refped to this Power, depends up- 
on its Determination, and they are for the moft 
part good if it embrace, and evil if it rejed: them, 
'tis manifeft that the Judgment of the Underftand- 
ing concerning things depends upon the fame, and 
that it cannot pronounce upon the Goodnefs or Bad- 
nefs of them, till it perceives whether the Power 
has embraced or rejefted them. The Underftand-* 
ing therefore mufl: wait for the Determination of 
this Power, before it can pafs a Judgment, inftead 
of the Power's waiting for the Judgment of that 
Underftanding before it can be determin'd. 

VIII. Seventhly, But tho' this Power cannot be Yet fucli 
determin'd in its Operations by any Judgment of^^-^S^'^^ 
the Underftanding, yet the Underftanding is ne-^^^^j^*^ 
cefTary, in order to propofe Matters of Adion, and ftanding 
to diftinguifti poffible ones from thofe that are im- in order to 
poffible, For tho' the Goodnefs of things with re- diftinguiih 
fped to the Agent, proceeds from the Determina- P^.^'*^^^ 
tion, yet the Poffibility or Impoflibility is in the from^^-ixj- 
things themfelves, and there is need of the Un- pofGble. 
(landing to diftinguifn between Objefts, left this 
agent falling upon Abfurdities, procure to itfelf 
Uneafinefs. Not that an Objed is therefore Good 
becaufe 'tis poffible; for if it be rejeded it will be 
Evil; nor will it be immediately difagreeable be- 
caufe impoffible, for attempting an Impoflibihty 
may be pleaiing to us, as we may prefer the exer- 
cife of this Power, (wliich is the thing that pleafes 


needs no 
other Li 

272 Of Moftil EviL Chap: V. 

us, as we faid before ) biit he that makes this At* 
tempt, muft neceflarily be unhappy in the Event; 
for (incc the thing which the Power undertakes is 
impoflibk to be donej Uneafinefs muft necelTarily^ 
If the A- ^'^^^°w ^^ hindi^ance of its Exercife, and the final 
gent be of I^ifappointment of its End. 

infinite IX, This then muft be affign'd as the flrfl Limi^ 

Power, he tation oi^Mch. a Power, viz.. that it confine itfelf to' 
PoffibiUties, and there needs no other, if the A- 
gent be of infinite Power, in order to the obtain- 
ing of its End. 
But an A- X. Eightlj, But if the Agent's Power be finite,' 
gent of jj. j^^g ^^^^ ^j^Q J.Q confult its Abihties,' and not de- 
Power termine itfelf to any thing which may exceed them,' 
muft alfo otherwife it will be as much difappointed in its En-' 
confult his deavQur as if it had attempted abfolute Impo{ribili-»' 
Abilities, ^jgj^ j^^^ jj-j-j J5 ^YiQ fecond Limitation of this Pow- 
er. It is impoffiSle, you'll fay, for an Appetite to' 
purfue fuch things as the Underftandirrg evidently 
declares not to be in the Power of the Agent. I 
anfwer, the Senfes and natural Appetites are gra- 
tify'd with their Objefts, and pleafe themfelves, 
tho* Reafon remonftrate againft them, and con- 
demn that pleafure as pernicious. Hov/ mucit 
more eafily then may this faUitious j^ppetitcy which 
arifes in the Agent from Application only, be con-' 
ceiv'd to delight in its good, tho* the Underftand- 
rng oppofe it, and condemn that D. light as foolifli 
and ofihort Duration. Why Nature granted fuch 
a Liberty to this Power, and how it conduces to the 
Good of the whole, will be fliewn afterwards. 
Such an XI. Hitherto we have either confider'd this P'ow-' 
-Agent er alone in the Agent, or as join'd with the Un- 
cannotbe dcrftandin^. But the Acr-nt endow'd with it, may 

detcrmin- ,^1 '^i -r^ ^ja • i-i 

edbyhis ^Ifo have Other Powers and Appetites which arc 

other Ap- determin'd to their Obj'-fls by a natural Congruiry; 

petites. yet neither can it be d termin'd in its Operations 

by them. We muft diftinguilh between the Open:- 



^cOii t. Sub. 3. Of Moral Evil. 273 

tioKS of thefe Appetites, and the Pleafure which a- 
rifes from the Exercife of them. Thefe, when 
rightly difpos'd, muft necefTarily exert their Ope- 
rations upon the prefence of their Objefts; but it 
is not at all neceflary they fhould delight and 
pleafe tthemfelves in thefe Operations. For in- 
ilance, a bitter and naufeous favour is ciifagrecable 
to the Tafte : but tho' this be felt, yet urgent 
Hunger makes it pleafant, the craving of the Appe- 
tite overcoming the Di'agrreablenefs of the Taft. 
This Pkafure indeed is not pure, but mix'd and di- 
luted proportionably to the Excefs of the prevailing; 
Appetite. For, fuppofe that there are three De- 
grees of Uneafinefs from the Hunger, and two frorri 
thejBitternefs; the Agent, to avoid three, muft 
neceffarily bear two; which being deduiScd, there 
remains only one Degree of folia Pleafure; where- 
as if he had met with fuitable and fweet Food, there 
would have been three* 

XII. Since therefore tlie Pkafure which arifes Thii 
from the Satisfaction of thefe natural Appetites may Power is 
be overcome by a ftronger Appetite, there's no %erior to 
Reafon to doubt but this Power which is indifferent \^^^^ ^^"- 
to Objeds may overcome all the other Powers and and fub- 
Appetites. For all thefe are limited by their Ob- dued by 
je-fts, and therefore have certain Bounds but this "O'^^- 
Power has no Bounds *i nor is there any thing 
wherein it cannot pleafe itfelfs- if it does but 
happen to be determin'd to it. Now fince the 
natural Appetites themfelves may be contrary 
to each otjher (as we have fhewn) and one of them 
be o-vercome by the Excefs of another, how much 
more eafily may this pow;er be conceiv'd to go a- 
Igainft tbele Appetites, and fince it is of a very dif- 

T feren: 

^ t, c. /« »V; Obje^j, fie the ^egit Nott, 


It feems 
to be gi- 
ven for 
this End, 
that the 
ihing to 
in when 
the natu- 
ral Appe- 
tites muft 
ly be fru- 

This Pow- 
er, by its 
the plea- 
fure of 
the other 
by oppofi- 
tion re- 
moves, or 
at Icali al- 
the pain. 

Of Moral Evil. Chap. V. 

ferent and fuperior kind, *tis probable that it can 
conquer all others, and be itfelf fubdued by none. 

XIIL Nay we may imagine it to be given for 
this very End, that the Agent might have wherein 
to pleafe itfelf) when thofe things which are agree- 
able to the natural Appetites cannot be had, as it 
very often happens. As the natural Powers, and 
Appetites receive Pleafure and Pain from Objeds, 
they muft neceffarily be deprived of Pleafure and 
undergo Pain, according to i the Laws of Motion, 
and the order of external things. Since then they 
are often fruftrated, they muft render the Agents 
poflefs'd of them liable to Mifery, as well as make 
them capable of Happinefs; But the Agent can 
have this always to delight itfelf in; and 'tis an ad- 
vantage to it to be able to quit the other Appetites^ 
and pleafe itfelf in reftrainmg them, or ading con- 
trary to them. For fmce every Faculty is fatisfied 
in its exercife, the Strength of this cannot be more 
fignally difplay'd in any thing, than in running 
counter fometimes to all the Appetites. For this 
muft either be fometimes done, or the Agent muft 
be deftitute of all manner of Good, and remain en- 
tirely miferable; fmce by the Laws of Nature, 
things contrary to the Appetites ^ muft be endured. 

XIV. And from hence it is very evident how 
defirable fuch a Power as this would be : for if it 
happen to be determin'd to fuch things as are a- 
greeable to the Appetites, it augments, it multi- 
plies the Enjoyment ; but if it fhould be deter- 
min'd to undergo thofe things which are repugnant 
to the Appetites, and which muft neccflarily be 
born fometimes, it might diminifh, nay quite re- 

* viz. in painful R(midkS)di/agr€{ahlePotmS}kc. fee %m^ 
fedt. 5 . par. 9, 

Sed. I. Sub 3. Of Moral Evil. 275 

move the Uneafinefs, or convert it into Pleafure. 


XV. It muft be confefs'd that fome kind of drug- The reft 
gle will be hereby excited in this Agent,- but a °^ "i^*^ -^P- 
ftruggle attended with fome Pleafure, tho* it be ^^^^^^ ^^ 
qualifi'd and not perfedly pure, is better than to baulked 
be under abfolute Mifery. Nay, the confciouf- unnecefla- 
nefs of a Power to pleafe itfelf againft the bent and ^^^Z* . 
Inclination of the natural Appetites, may caufe a 
greater Pleafure than could arife from the fruition 
of thofe things which would, if prefent, gratify 
T 2 thefe 


(50.) This is not much more than what Mr. Locke afierts * 
3n anfwer to the Enquiry, " Whether it be in a Man's power 
to change the Pleafantnefs and Unealinefs that accompanies 
any fort of Aftion ? And to that, fays he, 'tis plain in many 
cafes he can. Men may and fhould corre£l their Palates, and 
give a relifh to what either has, or they fuppofe has none. 
The relilh of the Mind is as various as that of the Body ; and 
like that too may be alter'd ; and 'tis a miftake to think that 
Men cannot change the difpleafingnefs or indiiference that is 
in Actions into Pleafure and Delire, if they will but do 
what is in their Power.' But it is objected by Leibnitz, a- 
gainll our Author's Notion, that if it could create Pleafure by 
an arbitrary Determination and bare Eledlion, it might for the 
fame reafon produce Happinefs in infinitum \ and then how 
could we be ever miferable except we chofe to. be fo ? Which 
Argument feems to be founded on a miftake of our Author's 
meaning, as if he had intended to affert that all the good and 
agreeablenefs in every thing or aftion, proceeds abfolutely and 
entirely from our Will: and alfo, that this will is as unlimited 
in its Exercife as in its Obje^s, and confequently that we might 
have any way, and at any time, as much Happinefs as we 
pleafed, purely by willing it; all which Propofitions are a3 
falfe as they are foreign to the Intention of our Author, who 
infifts only upon this, that the ad of willing, like the exercife 
of all our other Faculties, is in itfelf delightful to a certain 
Degree : This, when apply'd to an Objeil which is itfelf agree- 


* B. 2. C. 21. Sea. 69. 

i EjaiifhThtodii-^, p. 466, 467, 


276 Of Moral Evil. Ghap. V: 

thefe Appetites. Yet this Agent is oblig'd to have 

fome regard to the Appetites, and not to difturb 

them unneceflarily, nor reftrain them from a due 

enjoyment of their proper Objeds. He that does 

this will bring upon himfelf uneafinefs, and a need- 

lefs conteft. Tho* therefore it be not at all proper 

that fuch a Power fhould be abfolutely detcrmin'd 

by the natural Appetites, yet it is fit that they 

fhould 'per fuade it, and that fome regard be had to 

them in its Determinations, And this may be 

reckon'd its third Limitation. 

Such an XVI. Ninthly, An Agent pofTefs'd of fuch a 

Agent as Principle as this would be Self-a^iive, and capable 

this is of being determin'd in its Operations by itfelf alone. 

^^l^" Now there is fometimes an abfolute necefliry for it 

to be determin'd; for when any thing is propofed 



able, mufl: add to the Pleafure arifing from it ; when deterniin'(!' 
to a contrary one (both which kinds of Objeds he always fup- 
pofes) muft dedud from the Pain ; when to an indifferent one 
it muft make that pofiti^^ely agreeable, by conferring fo much 
abfolute and folid Happinefs. 

But ftill this exercife of the Will, and of confequence the 
Pleafure attending it, muft in all finite Creatures be elfentially 
and neccffarily_/f«//f, as well as the exercife of all their other 
Powers : and tho' it has no bounds as to the number and kind. 
of its Objects, yet it muft be limited as to its own Nature and 
the degree of its exercife. This appears to me eafily conceit-' 
able, and Matter of experience. We find ourfelves generally- 
able to turn our Thoughts to any Objeft indifferently, but 
does any Perfon from hence imagine that he can fix his 
thoughts upon any particular Objefl with an unlimited In- 
tenfenefs, or think infimtely? granting the Word Intenfenefs 
to be applicable here in any tolerable fenfe : which will per- 
haps, upon Examination, appear very doubtful. However, it 
is evidently no good confequence to infer, that becaufe I can. 
will or choofe a thing abfolutely and /rr/^/v, therefore 1 caT\ 
^vill it in infinitum. May I not as juftly be faid to perceive or 
undcrftand a thing in infinitum, becauic I perceive or under- 
iland it at all ? See Note N, 

Sea. I. Sub. 3. Of Moral E^ll 2^7 

to be done immediately, it muft neceflarily either 
aft orfufpend itsadion; one of them muft necelTa- 
rily be; but when either of them is done, the 
Power is determined by that very aft ; and no lels 
force is requifite to fufpend than to exert the a6l, as 
common Senfe and Experience may inform any- 
one *. A determination then about a thmg once 
propos'd to be done, is unavoidable; and Imce ic 
can neither be determin'd by any Good or Evil 
pre-exiftent in the Objefts, nor by the natural 
Powers or Appetites, nor by their Objeds ; it 
muft of neceflity either continue undetermined, or 
elfe determine itfelf. But tho' it be naturally free 
from any determination, yet the Nature of the thing 
requires that it ihould be determin'd on every par- 
ticular occafion ; and fince there is nothing exter- 
nal to do this, it remains that it determine itfelf. 
We ftiall call this Determination an Ele^ion; for 
as it is naturally indifferent to many things, it will 
pleafe itfelf in elefting one before another. 

XVII. Nor is it a proper Queftion toasic, What Isdeter= 
determines it to an Eledion? For if any fuch thing ^^^^Jf 
were fuppos'd, it would not be indifferent ; i. e. 'tis ^^^ \^{^^^ 
contrary to the Nature of this Agent that there are not 
fhould be any thing at all to determine it. In re- chofen be- 
lation to a paffive Power "^y which has a natural caufe they 
and neceffary connexion with the Qbjea, the Q'|,',^X 
prefence of which determines it to aft, we may hiq, be- 
reafonably enquire what that Good is which may caufe they 
determine it to exert any particular aftion ; but it are cho- 
is not fo in an aaive Power, the very Nature of *^"- 
which is to make an Objeft agreeable to itfelf, /. e. 
good, by its own proper ad. For here the Good- 
nefs of the Objed does not precede the ad of E- 
Jedion, fo as to excite it, but Eledioi) makes the 

X 5 Good" 

* See Note 48. 

t S^e Lscke, Chap. 21. Sea, s; 

27B Of Moral Evil. Chap. V. 

Goodnefsin the Objed; that is, the thing is agree- 
able becaufe chofen, and not chofen becaufe agree- 
able: We cannot therefore juftly enquire after any 
other caufe of Eledion than the Power itfelf. 
Yet he is XVIII. If thefe things be true, you'll fay, this 
"°^ vf K '^' Agent will be determin'd by Chanccy and not by 
Chance."^ ^^^fi^ » ^^^ ^n reality here's no room for Chance, 
if by Chance be underftood that which happens 
befide the Intention of the Agent : for this very 
Eleftion is the Intention of the Agent, and it is 
jmpoffible that a Man Ihould intend belide his In-? 
tention. As for Reafon, he that prefers a lefs Good 
to a greater, muft be judg'd to ad unreafonablyj 
but he that makes that a greater Good by choofing 
it, which before his choice had either no Good at 
all in it, or a lefs, he certainly choofes with rea- 
fon. You may urge that Contingency at leaft is to 
be admitted 5 if by this you mean that this Agent 
does forae things which are not at all necelTary, I 
readily own fuch a Contingency, for that is the very 
Liberty I would eftablifli. 
Is the true XIX. Tenthly, 'Tis evident that fuch an Agent 
Cauie of gj j.j^-j^ j£ -J. i^g allow'd that there is fuch an one, 
^,jj5^ ' is the true Caufe of his Adions, and that whatever 
he does may juftly be imputed to him. A Power 
which is not Maflier of itfelf, but determin'd to ad 
by fome other, is in reality not the efficient Caufe 
of its adions, but only the infirumental or occafi" 
end, (if we may ufe the term of fome Philofo- 
phers) for it may be faid that the thing is done in 
it, or by it, rather than that it does the thing it- 
felf. No Perfon therefore imputes to himfelf, or 
efteems himfelf the Caufe of thofe adions to which 
he believes himfelf to be neceffarily determin'd : If 
then any inconvenience arife from them, he will 
look upon it as a Misfortune, but not as a Crime; 
and whatever it be^ he will refer it to the Deter- 
miner, Nor will he be angry with himfelf, un- 


Sea. I. Sub. 3. Of Moral Evil. 279 

lefs he be confcious that it was in his power not 
to have done them: but he cannot be confcious 
of this (except thro' ignorance and error) who is 
determin'd by another. For no others ought to be 
iook'd upon as true Caufes, but fuch as are free, 
Thofe that operate neceffarily, are to be conceiv'd 
QiS -pajjive, and we muft recur to fome other which 
impofes that neceflity on them, till we arrive at one 
that is free, where we muft ftop. Since then the 
Agent endow'd with this power, is determin'd by 
himfelf and no other, and is free in his Operati- 
ons, we muft acquiefce in him as a real Caule, and 
he ought to be efteem'd the Author of whatever 
Redoes, well or ill. (0,) 

T 4 XX. 


(0) Againft this 'tis objeded that the quite contrary fol- 
lows. For to hit on a good aftion by a Motion abfolutely in- 
different and not in confequence of fome antecedent Good or 
Evil Qualities in the Agent is to fall on it blindly, by mere 
Chance, and fo Fortune not the Agent is to be thanked or 
blamed. He rather is to be blamed or praifed that owes his 
good or ill Aftions to his antecedent good or ill Qualities. 

To which I anfwer, that this is to deny and difpute againft 
ihe Conclufion, without anfwering one word of the Premifes, 
which arc fo plain and evident that I can't reckon the Argu- 
ment other than a Demonftration ; whereas that which is op- 
pofed to it is againft the common Senle of Mankind. 

For thofe good or bad Qualities that oblige him to do a good 
or bad Action are either from himfelf, that is his choice ; or 
pr^iceed from outward Agents that produced them in him : if 
from his own Choice, then it agrees with the Author's Opini- 
on ; but if from fome outward Agent, then it is plain the good 
or Evil is to be imputed to that Agent only, ^tad eji caufa 
Cauja eji etiam Caufa Caufati. 

I can't better explain this than by an Example. Suppofe I 
am in diftrefs, aud there is one Man that by the Commands of 
his Prince, by his own Intereft, and Politic Confiderations is 
obliged to relieve me, and is in fuch Circumftances that he 
cannot pofTibly avoid doing it; the other is under no manner 
of Obligation, may do it or kt it alone, yet feeing my Mif- 



280 Of Moral Evil. Chap. V. 

Is capable XX. Elevcnthly, 'Tis manifefl: that fuch an A- 
ofHapp;- ggpj. 35 jj^js is capable of Happinefs. For that Per- 
^^^' fon muft be happy whq can always pleafe him- 

felf, and this Agent can evidently' do To. For 
iince things are fuppos'd to pleafe him, not by a- 
ny neceihty of Nature, but by mere Eledlion, 
and there is nothing which can compel him to 
choofe this rather than another,- 'tis plain that the 
Agent endow'd with this Power may always choofe 
luch things as it can enjoy, and refufe, /. e. not 
dcfire, or not choofe ihofe things which are im- 
)o{rible to be had. And from hence it appears of 
low great Importance it is, whether that agreeable- 
»efs by which things pleafe the Appetites, be efhb- 
Hlhed by Narure, or effefted by the Agent him- 
self. For if Good and Lvil proceed from Nature 



fortune he choofes and pleafes himfelf in doing me a good 
Office. Let any one of Scnie judge to which of thefe I owe 
the greateil Obligation ; or if the World wou'd with Patience 
hear me excufe ray Ingrntitude by faying. Sir, there was no 
Obligation on you to help me, you might have done it, or let 
it alone, therefore it was mere Chance, that determin'd you. 
Would not the Reply be naturally, the Icfs Obligation was oa 
him that relieved you, the greater your Obligation is to him 
for his kindnefs. If it be faid that the Relief proceeded from 
Companion and good Nature, which were antecedently in the: 
Benefactor, and therefore it was valuable : Suppofe the Perfon 
that did this Office had always before been remarkable for 
cruelty and ill nature, ought the obliged Perfon to value the 
Kindnefs lefs for that ? Quite contrary ; it was rather a greater 
Favour to him that it was lingular. But fuppofc it proceeded 
from a general Compaffion and good Nature, that had nothing 
of Choice in them, fo that the Perfon cou'd not help doing it ; 
ought I not to thank him for ir, and give him the Praifes due 
to the Aftion r 1 ought to praifeand commend him for his ufe- 
ful Qualities, as I do the Sun : but if I Were fure that there was 
nothing of choice in them, I had no more reafon to thank him 
than the Tvrant whofe impoithume was cured by the W^ouncJ 
(defigued to kill him, had reafon to rhank the AfTailant. 

Sea I. Sub. 3. Of Moral Evil 281 

and be inherent in Objeds, fo as ro render them a- 
greeable or difagreeable, antecedent to the Eledi- 
on, the Happinefs of rhis Agent will al(o depend 
upon them ; and unlefs the whole Series of thmgs 
be fo order'd, that nothing can happen contrary 
to his Appetites, he muft fall Ihort of Happinefs. 
For his Appetites will be difappointed, which is 
the very thing we call Unhappinefs. But if Ob- 
jeds derive their agreeablenefs or difagreeablenefs 
from the Choice, 'tis clear that he who has his 
Choice may alway enjoy the thing chofen, ( un- 
lefs he choofe Impoffibilities, &c.) and never have 
his Appetite fruftrated, /. e. be always happy. Not 
thit all things are indifferent with refped to this 
Power, for it admits of fome Limitations, as was 
obferv'd, by choofmg beyond which it muft ne- 
cefTarily fail of Happinefs, 

XXI. Twelfthly, It is to be obferv'd that A- Animper^ 
gents, whofe Felicity depends upon the agreement f^a un-^ 
of external Objeds to their Appetites, Ifand in ;„g J3 f-^f. 
need of a perfed and almoft infinite Knowledge ^^^^^^ for 
to comprehend diftindly all the relations, habi- hishappi- 
tudes, natures and confequences of things,- if they nefs ifhe 
come ihort of it, it is impoffible but that they ""^^^^ 
muft often fall into pernicious Errors, and be dif- between 
appointed of their Defires, that is be often mifer- poffibili- 
able: Hence anxiety and difquiet of Mind muft ties, and 
neceffarily arife, and they would be agitated with f^Pf'^" 
continual doubts and uncertainty, left what they ^^^^^^ 
choofe fhould not prove the beft. Thefe Agents agreeable 
then were either to be created without a profped and difa- 
of Futurity, or to be endow'd with a perfed greeable 
Underftanding; if neither were done, they muft J°^f^^ 
of neceility be very miferable; for we can Scarce .^j con- 
conceive a greater Mifery than to be held in fuf- fult his 
penfe about Happinefs, and compell'd to choofe Abilities. 
among ODJeds not fufEciently known, in which 
■^ never- 

282 Of Moral Evil. Chap. V. 

neverthelefs a Miftake would be attended with 
unavoidable Mifery. There's none but is fufficiently 
apprehenfive how anxious, how folicitous, how mi- 
ferable it muft be to hang in fuch a doubt as this ; but 
if the agreeablenefs of things be fuppofed to depend 
upon EleEHon, a very imperfeft underftanding will 
ferve to direft this Agent, nor need he to com- 
prehend all the natures and habitudes of things: 
tor if he do but dillinguifh poffible things from 
impoflible, thofe things which are pleafant to the 
Senfes from them that are unpleafant, that which 
is agreeable to the Faculties from what is difagree- 
able, and confult his own Abilities. viz.» how far 
his Power reaches; (all which are eafily difcover'd) 
he will know enough to make him happy. Nor 
is there need of long deliberation, whether any 
thing to be done be the very beft; for if the 
EletStion be but made within thefe bounds, thac 
will become beft which is chofen. 

Tho' Li- XXII. He that enjoys the Principle of pleafing 

berty himfelf in his Choice cannot reafonably complain 

woul^ be pf Nature, tho' he have but a very imperfe6l Un- 

1^0 0- derflanding ; for there will always be Objeds e- 

iherA- nough ready to oifer themlelves within thefe 

gents, yet bounds. Upon which he may exercife his choice, 

itisafure gj^^^ pleafe himfelf: that is, he may always enjoy 

SHa' ^T Happinefs, Tho* Free-will then be of no ufe, as 

nefstothis was faid before, to an Agent capable of being de- 

v/hofe termin'd only by ithc convenience of external things, 

conveni- ftgy, tho* it be pernicious, as only tending to pervert 

encede- j^g^lon and produce Sin; yet to an Agent whofe 
pends not . ' . , ■' , i i • ■ 

on Ob- convenience does not depend upon the thing?, but 
]eas, but the choice, it is of the greatell: Importance, and 
Eledlion- ag we have feen, the fure and only Foundation of 
Felicity, And from hence it appears how valua- 
ble and how defirable fuch an an adive Principle 
as this would be. 

Sed. I. Sub. 3. Of Moral Evil. 283 

XXIII. All this feems to be coherent enough, Thefe 

clear enough, and eafy to be underftood, tho* fome ^^'"S^ are 

may look upon it as a little too fubtle. It remains gjf ^'^j^ 

that we enquire whether this be a mere Hypothefis tWthey 

without any Foundation in faft, or there is really mayap- 

fuch a Principle to be found in Nature. ( 5 1.) ^^^} to be 

, a little too 

NOTES. '""'• 

(51.) For an Explanation of our Author's Principle of In- 
difference, above what has been faid in Note 49. and will be 
enlarged on in Note 58. we Ihall only obferve here, that molt 
of the obje£lions brought by the Author of the Philofophical En- 
quiry, p. 69, ^c. are built upon the old blunder of confound- 
ing this Indifference as apply'd to the Mind, in refpeftofits 
Self determining Powers o? 'willing or aSiing, with another, 
which is falfly referr'd to the paffive Powers o^ Perception and 
Judgment. With refpe£t to the former Faculties all things are 
phyfically indifferent or alike, that is, no one can properly af- 
fcik, incline or move them more than another ; with regard to 
the latter, moft things are not indifferent, but neceffarily pro- 
duce Pleafure or Pain, are agreeable or difagreeable, whether 
we choofe them or not: Our Author is to be underftood only 
in relation to the former, in this and the following Sections^ 
tho' he often ufes general terms. 


284 Of Moral Evil. Chap. V. 

S U B S E C T. ly, 

^hat there is an Agent who is pleas' d with \ 
OhjeBs only becaiife he choofes theni 

Grd is W/^ h^"^^ ^^^ ^^ ^^^ former Subfediion, tlias 

fuch an \y fome things are adapted to the Appetites 

^r"^*^ by the conftiturion of Nature rtfelf, and on that 

* "* account arc good and agreeable to them; but that 

we may conceive a Power which can produc-e 

Goodnefs or Agreeablenefs in the things, by con^ 

forming itfelf to them, or adapting them to it : 

hence things pleafe this Agent, nor becaufe they 

are good in themfelves, but become good becaule 

they are chofen. We have demonftrated before, 

how great a Perfedion, and of what ufe fuch a 

Power would be, and that there is fuch a Power in 

Nature appears from hence, viz^. we muft neceila- 

rily believe that God is inverted with it. 

B^canfe J I, For in the firft place, nothing in the Crea- 

nothing yQj^ J5 either Good or Bad to him before his Elec- 

ehher^ ^^ "°"* ^^^ ^^^^ ^^ Appetite to gratify with the En- 

"ood or joyment of things without him. He is therefore 

bad to abfolutely ^different to all external things, and can 

him be- neither receive benefit nor harm from anv of them. 

fe'lbn ^^^'^^^ ^^^^ ^°^^^ determine his Will to ad? 
Certainly nothing uithout him,' therefore he de- 
termines himfelf, and creates to himfclf a kind of 
Appetite by choofing. For when the Choice is 
made, he will have as great attention and regard 
to the effedlual procuring of that which he has 


Sea. I. Sub. 4. Of Moral Evil. 285 

chofen, as if lie were excited to this Endeavour by 
a natural and neceffary Appetite. And he will e* 
fteem (uch thin gs as tend to accomplifh thefe Eledi- 
ons, Good ; luch as obftrud them. Evil. 

III. Secondly, the Divine Will is the Caufe of Bccaufe 
Good in the Creatures, and upon it they depend, disown 
as almoft every one acknowledges. For created ^.j^ l,^^ >-^ 
Beings have all that they have from the Will of of Good- 
God ,- nor can they be any thing elfe than what nefs in the 
he willed. 'Tis plain then that all thefe agree and Creatures. 
are conformable to his Will, either efficient or per- 
miffive, and that their original Goodnefs is found- 
ed in this Conformity. And fince all things pro- 
ceed from one and the fame Will, which cannot 
be contrary to itfelf, as it is rellrain'd withia its 
proper bounds by infinite Wifdom, 'tis aifo cer- 
tain that all things <are confident with each otlaer» 
that every thing contributes as much as poflTible 
to the prefervation of itfelf and the whole Sy- 
f!em ; which we muft reckon their fecondary Good- 
nefs. All the Goodnefs then of the Creatures is 
owing to the Divine Will, and dependent on it; 
for we cannot apprehend how they could be eithef 
Good or Evil in themielves, fince they were no- 
thing at all antecedent to the ad: of the Divine 
Will : and they were as far from being good with 
regard to God himfelf, till upon Willing their Exift- 
ence he by that aft of Eleftion both conflituted' 
them Good in relation to him," and by an unity of 
Will made them agreeable to one another. *Tis 
evident that the Divine Will was accompanied in 
this, as in all other Cafes, by his Goodnefs and 
Wifdom; but it proceeds immediately from his 
Will that things pleafe God, i. e. are Good. For 
many things are not agreeable to his Goodnefs and 
Wi(dom purely becaufe he did not will them, and 
.while he does not will any thing it cannot be good. 


a86 Of Moral Evil Chap. V. 

From whence it appears undeniably that his 
Will could not be determin'd to Eledion by any 
Goodnefs in the Creatures. For before that E- 
leftion, which is declared to be the Caufe of Good- 
nefs in created Beings, nothing could be either 
Good or Badj but when the Eledion is made, 
that only is Evil which obftruds the execution of 
it, and that Good which promotes it. The Good- 
nefs of things is therefore to be determin'd by their 
agreeabknefs to the Divine Will, and not that by 
the agreeableftefs or goodnefs of things. (P.) 



(P) The Objections here are ift, that if this be tfuc, before 
Cod determin'd to create the World he cou'd fee nothing bet- 
ter in Virtue than in Vice. 

It were a fufficient anfvver to this Objeftion to fay there is 
210 harm in it, if it were true ; for we muft confider that God 
from all Eternity determin'd to create the World, and there- 
fore there neither was any thing, nor can any thing be con- 
ceived before that Determination ; and therefore he might al- 
ways fee fomething better in Virtue than Vice. 

But zdly. We ought to remember that Virtue and Vice a- 
ifife from the Congruity of Things created by Godj what is 
agreeable to a reafonable Nature is Virtue, what is contrary 
Vice, and that there is no other Caufe why one Nature is rea- 
fonable and another without Reafon, but the Will of God, and 
therefore Vice and Virtue muft entirely depend on that Will. 
The plain Reafon of Mens miftake in the Cafe is this : They 
firft fuppofe God has willed that a Nature fhould be reafonable 
and then forgetting that this depends entirely on his Will, 
they fuppofe this Nature to be of itfelf, and then argue that 
the Congruity or Incongruity of things to it, cannot depend 
on the Will of God, becaufe he can't make what is congruous 
to it incongruous ; that is in reality his Will can't be contrary 
to itfelf 

But 2dly, 'Ti$ objefted, that this Opinion leaves no dif- 
ference between natural and pofitive Laws : for a pofitive 
Law is what depends on the Will of God ; and according to 
this pofition Natural Laws depend on the fame, and fo the 
diflinilion between them is taken away. 

Scd. i. Sub 4. Of Moral Evil. 2S7 

IV. Thirdly, We muft not therefore attend to They are 

fuch as declare that God choofes things becaufe "°^ ^° ^® 

*l,=,r minded 

'^ey who de- 
TV o 7 £ .y* Clare th at 

this Good- 

But the anfwer to this Is fo cafy, that ^tis a wonder any fliou'd • , " 
ftumble at it. For it is plain that the Natures of things have -^-i, c 
their Being from the Will of God, and whilft that Will con- y-> j 
tinues none can deftroy them, and the Congruity of things to 
thefe Natures refults from the Natures themfelves, and is in- 
cluded in the fame adl of Will, that gave the things a Being: 
fo that as long as it pleafes God to continue their Beings fuch 
as he has made them, the Congruity and Incongruity of things 
jieceffarily remain and refult from that aft of Will, which made 
them what they are ; infomuch that the Divine Will muft. be 
contrary to itfelf, if it went about to feparate them (/. e. the 
Nature from the Congruity) and therefore thefe are join'd to- 
gether by a Natural Law. But when God by a new adt of 
Will fubfequent to the Being of any thing requires fomcthing 
to be done by it which was not included in that firft aft of 
Will which gave it a Being, then that is faid to be enjoin'd by 
^poJiti<ve Law; and as this was requir'd by an aft fubfequent 
to the Being, fo it may be again removed by another without 
(deftroying the Being itfelf on which it is impofed, or without 
any contrariety in God's Will. Hence Natural Laws are in- 
difpenfible, and can*t be abrogated, whilft the Natures to 
which they belong continue ; whereas the pofitive Laws are 
difpenfible and may be repealed. 

But 3dly, 'Tis urg'd that this opinion leads us ftraight to 
Pyrrhonifm, and makes God not only free as to Virtue, fo 
that he may make it either good or bad; but likewife to the 
truth or fallhood of Things, fo that he may change their Na* 
til re and make three and three not to be fix. 

'Twere a fufficient anfwer to this, to fay the Cafe is not 
parallel ; for the Goodnefs of Things is fuppofed to arife from 
the Will of God, which is free; but the truth of them from 
his Intelled^, which is a neceflary Faculty ; and therefore tho' 
the one might be arbitrary, yet the other cannot. But the 
Truth is, Goodnefs is a conformity to the Will of God, and 
the reafon that God can't will Evil is becaufe it is always con- 
trary to feme other aft of his Will, and his Will can't be con- 
trary to itfelf: and at the fame rate, Truth is a conformity to 
his Intelleft, and the Reafon that a Propofition is true, is be- 
caufe it is fo conformable ; and fmce it is io, to fuppofe it not 
conforma^ble is to fuppofe a contradiftion. God in- making or 

288 Of Moral Evil. Chap. V. 

they are Good, as if Coodnefs and the greater 
Good which he perceives in Objeds, could deter- 


conceiving fix, made and conceived threi? and three? and 
therefore t^ fuppofe that three and three do not make fix, h 
to fuppofe a Contradiction. In effect it is to fay God conceives 
it wrong ; and to fay that his Power can make it othervvifc, is 
to fay that his Power can falfify his Underftanding. 

Thefe things are fo eafy that there can be no doubt about 
fhem, if Men will not be perverfe. 

But 4thly, Is not this to make the EJfence of things arhilra- 
ry, and fo fall in with' fome Cartejians ? I anfwer the Author 
is not concern'd with the opinions of Cartejians, or any other,- 
farther than he thinks them true. If by making the Eflence of 
things arbitrary, be meant that God inftead of making a Man, 
might have made a Stone, or planted the World with Mulh- 
rooms inftead of Herbs and Trees ; he verily believes he might. 
If you mean that when God has made a Man and planted the 
World with variet)' of vegetables, that the Man continuing 
what he is fhou'd yet be a Stone, or the feveral Plants con- 
tinuing in their variety fhou'd all be Mufhrooms, this he thinks- 
impoffible. For a Man is a Creature that is not a Stone, and 
therefore to fay he is a Stone, or to make him one, is to make 
him no Man. Six is a Number confifting of three and three,- 
and to fay tkat a Number doth not confiil: of three and three is 
to fay that it is not fix, Man iy a Creature obliged to be juft* 
^c. by the very Conllifution of his Nature, and to f\y that 
he is not obliged to be fo, is to fay that he is not a Man. If 
it be afk'd, can't God will him to do fuch things as we 
reckon unjuft, If^c ? I anfwer he may, but it muft be by mak- 
ing him fomething elfe, by caufing him to ceafe to be a Man ; 
in fhort by taking av/ay his Nature from him, and then nei- 
ther the notion of Manhood, nor Injultice will belong to him. 
The material adts that we call unjuft might ftilF be perform'd 
by him, but the formal Reafon ofinjuilice would ceafe, be- 
caufe that arifes fro.m the afts, not as confider'd in themfelves, 
but as they proceed from a Nature to \vhich they are unfuitable. 

Thus a Klan that owes me no Money may give me lOOoL 
but can't be faid to pay me a Debt, becaufe the paying a Debt 
fuppofes that he owes it; and therefore tho' a Debtor, and one 
that owes nothing may each give me looo/. yet they differ m 
this, that the one is Payment of a Debt, the other a free Gift. 
And fo it i.s jn all thofe Actions that we call uniuft, ^c.wheii 

Sea. I. Sub. 4. 0/ Momi Evil. 289 

mine his Will"^. If the Matter had flood thus, 
it does not fecm poflible for the World to have 



riiey are done by a Man, they are Crimes, becaufe againft his' 
Nature ; but when another Creatura that has not Pveafon does 
them, they can't be call'd unjuft, ts'c. For Example, if a 
Man kills one that no ways injures him, and rofls and eats him, 
he commits MurdCr, and is guilty or an horid Immorality ; hwi 
if a Lyon unprovoked kill and eat a Man it is no Crime or Wick- 
ednefs in him. But in as much as Men in their way of think- 
ing reprefent to themfclvcs a Nature with all its Parts and Pro- 
perties, and find that they can't remove any of them from that 
Nature, they conclude that the Natures of created Beings are 
what they are independently on th6 Will of God ; forgetting 
in the mean time that it is only the Divine Will that gave or 
can give a Being to any Creature with certain Parts and Pro- 
perties, and that inftead of that Creature he cou'd make ano- 
ther without them all, that fliould have quite different parts andE 
attributes. 'Tis therefore merely from his Will that Creatures 
are what they are ; but that Will having given them a Being, 
or being conceived to have given it, no part or property be- 
Jonging to them can even in thought be taken from them: and 
this fcems to me a full account of the certainty of thofe things^ 
we call Eternal Truths ■[. 

I have infilled the longer on this Point becaufe I fee fome 
indifferent Perfons as to the main Difpute have thought the 
Author miftaken in his affertiiig the Goodnefs of things to de- 
pend immediately on the Will of God. Let me add farther, 
that the Author does not fay that the Goodnefs of Things de- 
pends yo/f/y on God's Will; but that his Wifdom and Power 
are Hkewife concern'd in them: we mull not feparate God's 
Will from thefe attributes ; on the contrary his Will is limi- 
ted by the one and executed by the other. 

U But 

* This Notion is advanc'd by Dr. Clarh in his Demonjira- 
tio7i of the DH'ine Attributes, Prop. 1 2. and afterwards explain- 
ed, as far as it feems capable of Explanation, in his E'vidences 
nf li at ur aland Ren.'eaVd Religion, Prop, i . I'he fame is infilled 
on by Leibnitz, Grotius, Rujl, Mr. Chubb, and many others. 
We have enquired a little into it already in R i. See more \vi 
Note 52. 

+ See the Impartial Enquiry, p. jQy'i'. 

290 Of Moral Evil. Chap. V. 

been .nade at all. For they who acknowledge God 
be the Author of it, confefs alfo, that he is 



But laflly it is urged that according to thefe Principles Vir- 
tues are not good antecedently to God's Choice, and would 
not be good if God did not choofe them, nay if he chofe Vices 
in their ftead, they would be good both morally and phyfical- 
ly. For Obedience to God is Good, and if God had com- 
manded Vice it would have been Man's Duty to obey him;' 
and perhaps Goodncfs might this way have been as cU'eftually 
brought into the World, as by thofe Virtues that arife from 
the exigence of our Nature, as God has now framed it. And 
from hence they infer that God is as free to make his Jecond 
Choice, as we conceive hirA to be in making \i\% firfl. 

But to all this I anfwer, ift, lacknowledge that antecedent- 
ly to God's Choice there can be nothing good or bad, becaufe 
there can't be any thing at all: the very mom.ent we conceive a 
thing to be, we mufl: conceive nnd fuppofe that God v. ills it 
to be what it is, and that he wills it fliould by its Nature and 
ConHitution have certain parts and properties, and that as long 
as the thing continues what it is, God's Will continues alfo to 
preferve it fo : to ilippole therefore that he Wills at the fam,e 
time it iiiou'd be without thofe parts and properties, is plainly 
to fuppofe two contradidory Wills in God. Now an Obliga- 
tion to Virtue is a Property nccellarily lefulting from the Na- 
ture of Man, and therefore to fuppole God to command him 
not to be virtuous when he has given him fuch a Nature, is a. 

V\ :-y\iy would in earncfi; fhew that the Goodnefj of Things 
doth not depend upon the Will of God, the true way of do- 
ing it is to gi\e an inftance offomething that is good, which 
doth iiot fuppofe an aci of God's Will, or an Example of 
fomething Evil, that is not manifellly contrary to fome adl 
of it. 

In fliort, the Coi'.gruity of things is their Goodncfs, and. 
that Congruity arifes from their Natures, and they have thofe 
Natures from the Will of God, and thole Natures nuift have a 
Congruity becaufe they proceed from one Will, which cannot 
be contrary to itfelf,, becaufe it is condudcd by infinite Wifdom. 
All this is fufricientiy laid down in the Book, and for any one 
to urge ihele Confequcnces, and take no Notice of the Soluti- 
ons given them iiii.fl: cither proceed from not having read the 
Book, or a w orle Reafon, a\ hich Ism unwilling to believe. 

Sea I. Sub. 4= Of Moral Evil. 291 

abfoluteiy and completely lii^iTty in himfclf, and 
does noc Hand in the kail need of other things. 
Now ic is inconceivable hov/ external things can 
be of life to God, who comprehends in hiniielf all 
things which tend ro perfect Hippinef. He mud 
of neceffity therefore be indifferent to all cxrernal 
Objeds, nor can any rcafon be illlign'd, with 
regard to the ihmgs thcmfelves, why he iliould 
prefer one to Another. 'Tis plain that things are 
made by God with Goodnefs, that is, with a cer- 
tain congruity to his own Nature; but they are 
fo far from being made on account of any agree- 
ablenefs antecedent to the Divine Will, that, on 
the contrary, they are neceffarily agreeable and 
pleafant becaufe they are made by his free Choice; 
For (ince they are nothing in themfelve?, they 
muft of neceffity have both their Exiftence and 
their agreeablenels from that Will, from which 
they folely proceed ; and it is impoffible but than 
they (liould be conformable to the Will which ef- 
fefted them : For God? by willing, makes thofe 
things pleafing to him which were before indif- 

V. Unlefs therefore vv'e attribute to him fuch a If he had 
Power as has been defcribed (namely, an ability "ot^po^'^'- 
to pleafe himfelf, by determining himfelf to adion, filiCThfu^l^' 
without any other regard had to the Quality of felf in 
the Objeft, than that it is poffible) it ieem^im- Eleftion, 
poffible that ever he lliould begin to effect any ^^'^ '^^"^'^ 
tbing without himfelf. For, as far as we can ap- }|j^e\^j(^g, 
prehend, there can be no reafon affign'd why he ^ny thing, 
fhould create any thing at all "^j why a World, 
why theprefent, why at that particular time when 
it was created, why not before or after, v/hy in 
this and no other Form : he receiv'd no advan- 

U z tage 

* i e. "No reafon dra^j^n froin the Naturs of the thing to h? 
created. See the tn):o foUo<vjbig Note', 

292 Of Moral Evil. Chap. V. 

tage or difadvantage from thefe, no benefit or harm ; 
in fliort, nothing that could move him to choofe 
one before another. Except therefore we attri- 
bute to God an adivc power of determining him 
lelf in indifferent Matter*?, upon every particu- 
lar Occafion, and of pkafing himfelf in that De- 
termination according to his Choice; he would do 
nothing at all, he would be for ever indolent in 
regard to all external things, and the World could 
not poiTibly have been made, fince no reafon 
could be imagin'd, why a God abfolutely perfe(5t; 
in himfelf, and abfolutely happy, fliould create any 
thing without himfelf. {O.) 

~^ VI. 


(^) '^° ^^'^ '^^ '^^ ohie£led, that the Undcrftanding of God 
contains Ideas of all Things pofiible, by means whereof al-1 
Things are eminently in him. That thefe Ideas reprefent all 
the Good and Evil, the Perfections, Imperfe6lions, Order and 
Difordcr, the Agreements and Difagreements that are pofliblCj 
and his fupcrabundant Goodnefs makes him choofe the moH 
advantageous : Now thefe Ideas are independent of the Wiil 
of God, and therefore the Perfedion or Imperleclion that they 
Teprefent in Things is antecedent to any act of his Will, at kail 
in Ordine NaturA, tho' not of time : v. g. Is it not rather from 
the Nature of Numbers than the Will of God, that one Num- 
ber is capable of receiving more Divifions than another? And 
can any think that the Pains and Inconveniencics that attend 
fenfiiive Creatures, elpecially the Happinels or Mifery of in- 
telligent Beings, are indifierent to God? And yet 'tis pretend- 
ed that the Hypothefis of God's Will being the caufe of Good- 
nefs in the Creature muft infer all thefe Abfurdities. 

adly, 'Tis urged that God ads for nn end, that it is true, 
he has no need ot the Creatures, but yet his Goodnefs induced 
liim tacreate them, and therefore there was a reaibn prior 10 
his Will : that it is neither by accident nor without a caufc that 
he produced them, hor was it of necellity, but he was induced 
to it by Inclination, and his Inclination always leads him to 
the belt. He was not indifFcrent therefore to create or not 
create the World, and yet Creation is a free a£t, 


Sed. I. Sub. 4. Of Moral Evil. 293 

VI. Fourthly, If we fiippofe that there was a If he were 

reafon, and that God was moved by it to produce [51°^^^^^^/ 

U 3 external „^^ J° ' 

things to 
NOTES. create ths 

World, he 

I.aftly that God is infinitely wife, good ^nd powerful, and would be 
as his Wifdom fhcwed him what was befi, fo his Goodnels ob- ^ "|*^^' ^" 
iiged him to chocfe, and his Power enabled him to execute ^Y ^S'^"-' 
his Will : and in as much as infinite Worlds are poffible, a- 
mong!l all thefe his Wifdom ditcovered to him which was beft, 
and his Goodnefs muft oblige him to will it. 

Thefe are the Objeftions that feem of greatell force, and I 
have given them all the Advantage with which I find them 
propofed. In anfwcr to them I obferve, 

I ft, as to what is faid of the Underltanding of God, that 
Ideas of all things poffible are in it, 'tis plain that all Argu- 
ments drawn from the Manner of God's Undcrftanding things 
muft be inconclulive, becaufe we are utterly ignorant whether 
he Underrtands by Ideas or not. adly, becaufe our conceiv- 
ing God to ad this way is only taken from our way of ading, 
which we afcribe to the Deity by Analogy and Proportion, as 
we do our Virtues and Paffions, becaufe we have no better 
way of conceiving the Principles of his ailing: which method 
neverthelefs will run us into many Difficulties and Miftakes. 
But of this I have fpoke more fully in the Sermon anncx'd. 

2dly, the whole ftrength of the Argument depends on this 
that God's Underftanding reprefents to him among infinite 
ways in which things may done, which is the beft, and his 
Goodnefs obliges him to what is fo. Now if this reafoning 
hold, and amongft infinite Schemes there is only one beft, I dp 
not fee how it is poffible to avoid making God a necelTary A- 
gent. For in a chain of Caufes, where every Link is necefla- 
rily and infallibly connefted, the whole muft likewife be ne- 
cefery. If then there be but one beft in Nature?, and if God 
nccelTarily and infallibly knows that beft, and his goodnefs 
obliges him neceifarily to choofe it, I think the Cafe is plain, 
ail his Actions are link'd and tyed together by a fatal and in- 
fallible neceffity. 

^gainft this therefore I lay down the following Pofitions, 
I ft. That tbere is no Creature or Syftem of Creatures fo good 
but that a better is poffible, and consequently there is none ab- 
folutely beft. There is indeed a beft of Beings, viz. God j 
but there can be no beft of Creatures. To prove this, we nee^ 
only confider that there is an infinite diftance between God and 
his Creatures, and how perfect foever we conceive any Crea- 
; ture 

294 Of Moral Evil. Chap. V 

exferhal things, 'tis m^nifcft, tliat according to 
this all th/ngs will pjoceed horn hini ncceflarily. 


.V T E S. 

tore or Syftcm of Crcatiivcs, yet the diflance between tliat 
and God is not kflcn'd, hut llill continues infinite; and there- 
fore except we can imngine a lalt in infinity, there neither is 
jior cm be any ilcp. Hence it follows that the Nature of God 
and his Omnipotence is fuch that whatever Number of Crea- 
tures he has made he may ftill make more, and howfoever 
good or perfeci:, he may ilill make others better and more per- 
iedt. And fince in this Caic whatever he was pleafed to create 
was flill infinitely fliort in goodnefs and perfcftion of what he 
could create, 'tis plain his Underftanding couM put no limits 
to his Power, nor dire£t h"-m whether he fhouM create this 
Syftem or another, whatever he chofe being ^infinitely fhort 
of what hernight have done ; he cou'd never have pleafed him- 
iclf in this method or determin'd what World he fhou'd have 
jnade, and confequently there cou'd never have been any 
World at all. For if only the beft determine him, and there 
be no beft, as appears j then 'tis impoffible he fhou'd ever be 

This was in cfFeft the Argument made ufe of in the Book * 
to prove that there was properly Free-will in God, that is a 
Power to pleafe himfelf by choofmg one thing before another, 
where the things were perfeftly indiflerent to him. Accord- 
ing to which Principle, if it be allow'd, tho' there be no beii 
in Nature antecedent to the Will of God, yet by choofing one 
thing before another he will make that the beft to him, becaufe 
his own choice will pleafe him beft. 

But here I muft obfcrve that moO; of this Difpute, and the 
Embarafment of Men's Underitandings about it, feems to pro- 
ceed from their taking thefe words, gioa, better and brfi fur 
abfolute Qualities inherent in the nature of Things; whereas 
in Truth they are only P.elations arifmg from certain Appetites. 
They have indeed a foundation, as all Relations have, in fome- 
thing abfolute, and denote the thing ii^ which they are found- 
ed; but yet they thcmfelves imply nothing more than a Rela- 
tion of Congruity between fome App^^'^^ ^nd its Obje(ft3, as 
appears from hence, that the fame Objei^'t when applied to an 
Appetite to which it has a Congruity is good, ;;nd 'vice '--enn, 
bad. The Earth and Air to terrcltiiai Animals arc good El 


? C. 3. Par. 3. 

Seel. I Sab. 4. Of Moral Evil. 295 

For he that is determin'd ah extra to do any thing, 

ads by^eceffityj he is pafiive, and muft necefTa- 

U 4 lily 


ments, and necefHiry to their Prcfervation ; the Witer is, 
wliich yet affords the beft receptable for Filhes. The nature 
of the Earth, Air and Water continue the fame ; and fnall 
God be faid, to have made fomething ill, when he made the 
Water pernicious to Men, the Air to Fiflies? And this alfo 
lh?ws the natural and unavoidable necelHty of Evil in the 
V/orld ; becaufe all Creatures being imperfeft and limited, 
they mufl: likewKc have limited and different Appetites, and 
confequently proper and peculiar Oojedts fuited to their feve- 
ral Appetites: when therefore the Objeft proper to one Ap- 
petite happens to be apply'd to the contrary, It is impoifiblfc 
but it fhould be incongruous to it, that is Evil. Nor is it 
polTible in a World, v.-here all Things are and mull necelTa- 
rily be in a continual flux, and every Animal changing its 
Situation as it is in the material World, but fuch mifappiica- 
tion of Objefts to Appetites fliould happen ; and therefore E- 
vils are ncceffary in it, and either God muft have made no 
fuch World, or permitted fome fuch Evils in it. There is no 
way of conceiving how the prefent World cou'd have been 
bettcr'd, but either by making more Creatures, or zdly, more 
variety, or 3dly, giving tiie Creatures that are made more and 
ftronger Appetites : for the good and fatisfaftion of a Creature 
is always proportionable to the llrength of the Appetite, with 
which it enjoys its Object. But it plainly appears that in any 
of thefe three ways as tliere may be more good, fo there will 
be more Evil in the World : For Creatures being multiplied, 
the necelTity of clafhing of Appetites, and the hazard of Mil- 
application ofObje£is will be the greater; and the greater va- 
riety, ftill the greater Danger and Difficulty to avoid difagree- 
able Objefts, and the harder ahvays to find agreeable: as the 
greater the Crowd, the harder it is to meet one's Friends : 
And laflly, the encreafmg the Appetites cou'd no ways contri- 
bute to the fure difcovery of proper Objedls ; the DifappoinJ- 
ment would be the more intolerable, the more vigorous wc 
conceive the Appetite; and the greater number of Appetites, 
the more liable would they be to continual Difappointment. 
But to return, As there is no hsft in Nature, or in the Divine 
Intelled antecedent to the Divine Will, which can be fuppof- 
cd to determine tliat Will r0;'create one World rather than a- 
jiother : fo in. the fecond Place, there is no World fo good, 


296 Of Moral Evil. Chap. V. 

■^ rily both do and fufFer, not what he himfelf, but 
v/hat the determining Cau(e has elfcded In him: 



but infinite Worlds may be conceived poffiblc in all rcfpccls as 
good as it. Good then being relative to Appetite, thai: is to be 
reckon'd the bsfl; Creature by us, which has the flrongeft Appe- 
tites and the fureft means of fatisfying them. And tho' the 
iiibihnce in Creatures is chiefly to be regarded as contributing 
to their Perfeftlon, yet we have no way of meafuring the Per- 
feftion of the i'evcral Subflances but by their Qualities, that is 
by their Appetites, whereby they become fenfibleof Good and 
Evil, and by their Powers, whereby they are able to procure 
thofe Objefts whence they receive that Scnfe of things which 
makes them happy. 

'Tis plain therefore that whatever Syftem we fappofe in Na- 
ture, God might have made another equal to it, his infinite 
Wifdom and Power being able to make other Creatures equal 
in every refpecl to any we knoiv, and to give them equal or 
ftronger Appetites, and as certain or more certain ways of fa- 
tisfying them. We fee in many Cafes that very different means 
will aniwer the fame End. For Example, a certain Number 
of regular Pyramids will fill a Space, and yet irregular ones 
will do it as well, if what we take from the one be added to 
another; and the fame thing may be done by Bodies of the 
moft irregular and different Figures in the fame manner : and 
therefore we may very well conceive that the anfwering of 
Appetites, which is all the natural Good that is in the World, 
.may as well be obtained in another Syftem as in this, if wc do 
but fuppofe that where their Appetites arc chang'd, the Ob- 
jedts are alfo fuited to them, and an equal Agreeablencfs a- 
mong the Parts of the whole introduced ; and in an infinite 
Number of poffible Worlds I do not fee why this may not he 
done in infinite Ways by infinite Power and Wifdom. 

If then it be acknowledged that there might have been in- 
iinite other Worlds, or even but one, equal to this in all re- 
ipefts as to goodnefs, there cou'd be no Obligation in Nature 
on G(xl to create one rather than the other, and therefore no- 
thing cou'd make one more agreeable to him, that is better, 
than another but his Choice. We muft eirherown that there 
. cou'd be no fuch World at all, or that God muft forever de- 
liberate which of the poffible Worlds he fhould choofe ; or eife 
his Determination m\ift proceed from .his own arbitrary choice, 


Sea, I. Sub. 4. Of Moral Evil. 297 

But this Goodnefs (which is fuppofed to be in 
things antecedent to the Divine Eledion, and to 



and he mult be allow 'd the Liberty to plcafc himfelf by 

\n fhort, it is eafy to fee that Men who propofe fuch Schemes 
wou'd drive all Liberty out of the World, and pin down God 
in all his Adions to a fatal neceffity. They allow no Caufc 
but what is necefTarily either Agent or Patient, which if it be 
to allow a God, 'tis fuch an one as is a mere Machine, and 
can neither help himfelf nor his Adorers. 'Tis plain if this 
were fo there could be no fuch thing as moral Good or Evil 
in the World, the very Effence and Idea of it is lolt, and we 
iliould be no more obliged to a God that afts neceflarily for the 
good wc receive from him, than vvc are to the Sun for the be- 
nefit of its Light and Heat. 

I know 'tis urged that where there is no external motive to 
determine the Will, there only Chance mud do it, which is to 
admit an effect without a Caufe. I anfvver, that it is the Natare 
of a free Agent to be the Caufe of its own Aftions, without 
being impell'd by any thing without itfelf. The choofing a 
thing gives it the goodnefs to this Bei'ig, and it choofes a 
thing, not becaufe it was antecedently an Obje6i: apt to pleafe 
it, but becaufe it intends to tnake it fo. When it is obje6ted 
that fuch an Agent choofes without reafon, I anfwer, itfelf is 
the reifon to itfelf of its ading ; that is, it ads to cxercife its 
Faculties, the exercife of which caufes the fenfe of Plcafure ; 
and where there are fcveral ways of exercifing its Faculties 
and all indifierent, to fhow the Dominion over its own Adions, 
that is its Liberty, it takes the way it choofes ; nor is it rea- 
fonahlc to cxped it fhould lie idle till it find a Reafon why it 
ftiould :\ti one way rather than another, when in truth there is 
no fuch Reafon, the Objeds being to the Agent abfolutely in- 
different i and therefore amongll infinite poffible Worlds, theiG 
wa.-. no Reafon polfible or imaginable to determine God to 
make this rather than any other, befide his Will ; he chofe it. 
and therefore it pleaies him, and he may deftroy it when he 
will, and that will likewife pleafe him. 

If it be afc'd, is there then nothing Good or Evil in refpeft 
of God.? I anhver there is, njiz,. the ads of his own W^ili; 
they pleafe him, and whilll that Will continues, every thing 
which crolTes it, or tends that way, is Evil or difpleafing to 
him. Thus it i;. his Will that we fhould have Freedom ot 


298 CJ Moral Evil. Chap. V. 

determjne it) is fomewhat External, with regard 
to the V/ill of Gcd ; if therefore that be the Caiife 
which determines the Eledicn, it follows that 
the aft of Election and every thing that depends 
upon it is neceffary. 
But if VII. But if things be good and agreeable to 

things are God for this only reafon becaufe he has chofcn to 
^•°°^ij'^' make them fo, he himfelf will be at liberty, his 
>.as chofcn "^^'^^-o'^ Work will be free. The World will be 
to make made not of neceflity, but choice ; nor will it be 
tliem, his impoffible to be efFcfted, tho' it be in itfelf un- 
ivhole profitable to the Deity, for he will have a com- 
^jj'^ ^ placency in his own Choice. And from hence it 
£-ee. fufficiently appears of how great Importance it is, 

that all the Goodnefs of the Creatures fhould de- 
pend on the Divine Ekftion, and not that upon 
the Goodnefs of them j for fo we may conceive 
Fate to be taken away and Liberty eflablifli'd. 
Extenial VIII. Fifthly, If he expedea no advantage, 
things are you'll fay, from the O. jefts of his Choice, why 
in them- ihould he choofe them ? Is it not more probable 
leives ab- ^j^^^ j^^ fliould do nothing? at all, than bufy him- 
indifFcrcTc »'^^^^ ^^ things that arc like to be of no benefit \ I 
to God, anfwer, 

but he h:is 

3 cbmph- NOTES, 

cency in 

Af . choice in many things; and he has fet certain limits to our 

' "'' ■ Choice to prevent our hurting ourfelvcs or others by choofmg 
amifs. Therefore it would be contrary to our Nature to take 
away the ufe of Free-will from us ; and fince it is his will to 
give us fuch a Nature, 'tis likevvife his will to continue the 
ufe of our Freedom : It would likewifc he contrary to the Will 
of God for us to ufe our Freedom to mifrhieve ourfelves oro- 
thcrs, and therefore wc conceive that every one who thus mif- 
ufes his Fredom incurs the difple.'fure of God. 

But then 'tis plain that in all ads which we conceive to be 

plcaling or difpleafmg to the Deity, we derive the Reafon of 

their being fo from the Confideration of their agreeablcnels or 

oppofition to his Will : and wc derive the Knowledge of that 

■ will from nothing but the Manifcftation God has made of it, 


Sed:. I. Sub 4. Of Moral Evil. 299 

I anfwer, Tha: it is no more trouble to him to 
will things than nor to will them; and hence it 
comes to pafs that when he wills them, they exift; 
when he retracls that Will, they drop into nothint^. 
Which reafon, as it luppofes an indifference of 
things in refped of God, To it aflerts his Liberty 
ro produce or not produce them, and proves that 
that will be agreeable to him which he fl^^allchoofe. 
But we have a better yet at hand, viz. that God 
chofe to create external things that there might 
be fomething for him to delight in without him- 
felf. For every one receives Satisfadion from the 
Exercife of his Powers and Faculties. (52-.) Now 


either by the Nature that he has been pleafed to give the Crea- 
tures, or elle by Revelation. So that after all, we have no 
meafuj-e of Good or Evil, but the Will of God. 

(tj2 ) This reafon is very confillent with what our Author 
had deliver'd in C. i. §. 3. par. 9, 10. where he afferted that 
the end and intent of God in creating the World, was to exer- 
cife his feveral Attributes, or (which is the fame thing) to 
communicate his Pcrfe6lions to fome other Beings : whicii 
Exercife or Communication could proceed from no other Caufe 
befide his own free Choice ', and therefore he muil be abfolutely 
and phyhcally indifferent to it, in the fame refpeft as Man was 
Hiewn to be indifl'erent towards any Aftion * only with this 
difparity, tlut Man, as a weak imperfeft Agent, may eafily be 
imagin'd to will abfurdities or Contradiftions, but God cannot 
be fuppofed to v/ill or a£l: either inconfiftently with his Nature 
and Perfections, or with anv former Volition (as our Author 
pbferves in the 12th and following Paragraphs) and confe- 
quently cannot be faid to be indifferent to fuch things (as fome 
have mifunderifood our Author) any more than he is indif- 
ferent towards being what he is. Leibnitz, urges farther ■\- 
that it could not be in any i'enfe indifferent to God whether he 
created external things or not, fince his Goodnefs was the Caufe 
(according to our Author himfelf in the place above cited) 
which determined him to the Creation. But what do we mean 


* See Note 4.5, and 49, and Ode. 'Theol. Nat. p. Z\^- 
■\ Remar.jues, p. 473. 

;oo Of Moral Evil. Cliap. V. 

God is invefted with infinite Power, which he can 
CYercife innumerable Ways; not all at once indeed, 



hy his Gocdnefs here ? Is it any thing more than an intent to 
exercife his Attributes, or an Inclination to communicate His 
Happinefs or Perfedion ? And is not this the very Determina- 
tion or Eledion we are fpcalcing of? To fay then that God 
is determined by his G'jodnefs, is faying that he determines 
himfelf ; that he does a thing bccaufe he is inclined to do it; 
'tis affigning his bare Will and Inclination for a Caiife of his 
Aftion ; which is no more than wc contend for. Whereas 
they that would oppofe us fliould affign a Caufe for that Will 
or Inclination itfelf, and flievv a natural neceflity for the opera- 
tion of the Divine Attributes (for a moral owt is nothing to tlic 
prefent Queftion) a ftrid phyfical connexion between the Ex- 
jllence of certain natural Perfections in the Deity and their Ex- 
ercife on outward Objeds. But if God had no other reafon 
for the creation of any thing befidc his own Goodncfs, he was 
perfe<ftly free and naturally indifferent, to create or not create 
that thing; and if he wiird, or was inclinM to exert his Per- 
fedions thus freely, he muit be as frzt and indifferent ftill in 
the adual Exercife of them. Nor will it from hence follow (as 
Leibnitz objeds) that there is fuch an abfolute Indifference in 
the Deity as muft make him regardlcfs whether the World were 
well or ill made; Mankind happy or miferable, ^c For if 
the Communication of Happ'nefs be the fole end of his acting, 
whenever he does ad he muft propofe that End, and the Exer- 
cife of his feveral Attributes will lead diredly to it. Know- 
ledge, Power and Freedom zrtPerfcBions, i> e. the Foundation 
oi Happinefs to the Being poUcfs'd of them, and therefore when 
communicated to other Beings they muit produce that Happi- 
nefs, which is four.dcd in and n.iiurally reUilts from them : to 
fuppofe the contrary, is the fame abfurdity as to fuppofe that 
Knowledge may produce Ignorance, Power, Weaknefs or 

Freedom, Neceflicy.- The Communication of thefe At- 

iributes then, or the Exercife of thcle Pcrfcdions united, will 
conltitute a wile, good and holy Providence purfuing a good 
end by fit and proper Means. All which is included (as our 
Author fays) in the very firj} yld of the Deity, or rather in 
his Will to ad at all ; and to fuppofe him to will or ad in any 
refpedt contrary to this, is fuppofmg him to will and ad againll 
his own Nature, and in contradidion to himlelf; or, which 
is the fame, imagirijig an Effed to be quite different from, 


Sea. I. Sub. 4. Of Moral Evil. 301 

(for all are not confiftent with each other) but 
fuch as are confiftent are for the mofl part indiiFe- 



or contrary to its Caufe, The Moral Pcrfc6lion3 of the Deity 
are therefore immediate confequences, or rather the genuine 
Exercife, of his natural ones. And thus, I think, it may be 
fhewn how all the aftions of the Deity mud certainly be Good, 
Wife, ^c. without recurring to any (xich. Fitnejes or Relations 
of things as are by forae unaccountably fuppoled to be antece- 
dent and abfolutely itccejfary to the determination of the Will 
of God himfelf 

But don''t we, when we fpeak of God's choofing fit and pro- 
per means, evidently fuppofe that fome things are in them- 
felves good and eligible, and 'vice nierfa, even before any deter- 
mination of the Deity about them ? Where is the room for 
Wifdom and Preference in God, if all things be alike and in- 
different to him? 1 anfu-er, firft. If by things being in them- 
felvcs Evil, i^c. be only meant, that fome particular ways of 
afting may be conceived, v^^hich would, if the Deity could be 
fuppoied \o will them, oe necclTarily and effentially oppofite, 
and have a tendency dtredtly contrary, to his prefent method 
ofafting: we grant that fome fuch things may be imagined : 
but then it will be an abfurd and impolTible fuppofition that 
God fhould ever will them, as he has already will'd the con- 
trary ; and therefore, in regard to him, they mull ftill be only 
imaginary. Nay, they would be 'io far from being indepen- 
dent of, or antecedent to the \VilI of God in any fenfe, that 
the very Eltence and Idea of them would proceed entirely 
from, and pre-fuppofe its Determination; fince we can only 
conceive any Relations or Confequences of things to be Good 
or Evil, fo far as they are confiftent with, or contrary to the 
prefent Syftem pre elhblifh\i by the Will of God. I anfwer 
in the fecond place, that the primary Intent of the Creator be- 
ing, as was fhewn above, to communicate his Perfcftions to 
vnrioiTs Creatures (to which communication he was neverthe- 
lefs abfolutely free and indifTerent, and therefore could be de- 
termin'd to it by no external Caufc) while that Intent conti- 
nues, the necell-uy confequcncc of it is, that Creatures be fo 
made and conltituted as to attain that End, and endow'd with: 
fuch Powers as will make them refemble him as much as pof- 
fible in their fcveral States and On.lcrs. All this is only pro- 
fecuting the fimc Volition, or continuing to communicate him- 
felf; auid~ what we mean by choofing fit and proper Tnetiv^ for 


ib2 Of Moral Evil. Chap. V. 

rent, nor is there any reafon why he fliould prefer 
one before another**, it muft therefore be his 



this, is only, that lie is not a blind and unintelligent Agents 
but confcious of his own Nature and Operations, and there- 
fore able to a£i: in a certain deter7mnate manner. Now fuch 
determinate Aftion mufl: produce a regular Syflefn, tlie feveral 
Parts whereof ■will be related to r.nd connected witli c.-,th o- 
ther, and by a mutual dependency render'd fubfervient to the 
Good and Perfedlion of tae whole. Tho' this whole Syftcni 
might at firft perhaps be indifferent to the Agent in regard to 
feveral other Syllenris equally poffibfej and which might have 
been made equally perfeft in its Head *. It is not then as 
Leibnitz, argues f the natural and nccelTary goodnefs of forrie 
particular things reprefented hy the Di'~jine Ideas which deter- 
.'nines God to prefer them to all others, if underflood of his 
Ji'Ji aft of producing them ; but 'tis his own free arbitrary 
Choice,, which among many equal poffibilities, makes fome 
things aSIuaUy good, and determines them into Exiftence. 
When thefe ?.re once fuppofcd to cxift, every thing or adion 
becomes _g-W which tends to their Happinefs and Prefarvation. 
Kence alfo in refpeft to us certain confequences and relations 
arife, which, by the very frame of our Nature and Conllitu- 
tion, we are dircfted to approve, and obliged to purfue, if 
we expedl to be happy. And thus all moral Obligation is ul- 
timately referr'd to the Will of Gcd, which feems to be the 
only fure and adequate foundation of it, and from which I 
think it may be deduced with much more clcarnefs and con- 
liflency than from that H)pcthetic'zl NeceJ/ity of the Relatione 
of things, which evidently prc-fuppofes, as was obferv'd be- 
fore, and is itfclf only founded on the Will of God J. 

Give me leave to add here, that their Argument feems to be 
of very little force ag.iiafl: our Author, who urge, that if ail 
Good and Evil depend upon the Arbitrary Will of God, then 


*^ lujlances rjf this Indifftroice may be feen in our Author's 
Note E, and the ^th precedent Paragraph, 

* See Note ^ 

\ Remarcjues, p. 447. 

% Sec thcPrdimi'^n}y DiJfcrtAfit,):-, and R. i. or Pufendorfo/" 
the Lanjj of Nature and Nation', B. i. C. I. '^.4. Note 7. avd 
B.2, e. 3. §. 20. 

Sea. I. Sub. 4. Of Moral Evil. -O"^ 

own Choice which makes one more agreeable than 3- 
nothcr; nor is it otherwife conceivable how a thinjr 



li would not te impoffible for God to will that Vice be Vir- 
tue, that two and two make five, <3\. For allou'ing that 
God at firft made all things v>:;at they are, and ftill continues 
to them the fame Exiftence, (tho' perhaps no reafon a priori 
can be affignM why he made them at all, or in this rather 
than fome other manner) Vice, muft be Vice, &V. that i?, 
while things are as they are, the fame Confcquences and Re- 
lations will refulc from them; and to fuppofe the contrary, is 
to fuppofe th:^t things may be different, or have dill"ercnt con- 
fequenccs, while they continue the fune; or that thev mav be 
what they ars and Vv-hat they arc not at the fime tim.e. TJius 
all the prefent Relations are cvidsviily fuhfequent to the prefcnt 
Order of Nature, and mufl continue v.ith it; and this con- 
fequential Neceffity is all the Fitnejs that I know of. 

To iHle this Eter?:al and Immtitable can therefore only mean 
£hus much, ws. fuppofe things to be at any time what thev 
now are, and at the iame time the very lame confeauences 
wou'd flow from them which we now find. Suppofe a Set of 
Beings conllituted like ourfclvcs, and framed with the like Ca- 
pacities for Happinefs, and the fame relative Duties mufl be 
incumbent on them in order to attain that Happinefs. If they 
be imperfeft, dependent Creatures, and perpetually Handing 
in need of each others aHiftancc ; if alfo they have fuch Paflioss, 
Jnfiinds and Inclinations as tend to unite them to each other, 
and oblige them to aft in concert : if they be thus framed, I fay, 
they will of confequence be thus related, and fubjecb to al'- 
the moral Obligations whirh now are. But ftill this ne- 
ceifity is only hypothetical, and like the necellity of any cer- 
tain Confequence refulling from certain Premifes ; which Prc- 
mifes being alter'd, a different, a quite contrary one will be 
equally ncccfl-ary. Thus in the former Inftance, if any ratio- 
nal Creatures be conllitutcd focial Beings, they will indeed be 
obliged to ucl as fuch ; but let fome be made independent of 
each other, and unfociable ; endowed with, or lo made a* 
neceffaril)' \o acquire, Paffions, Inilincls and Inclinations quite 
oppoiite to the tormer, and their Duties will be quite the re- 
verfe. Tlie great Virtue oi Selfjhnefs will then occupy the 
place of Vni-uerfai Bcne'XJoknce, and that Method of Lite per- 
haps produce the greateit Sum of Happinefs to each indi\idua!; 
and confequently be the molt eligible t« every one, which ha> 


304 ^f Moral Evil Chap. V. 

that is in ftfelf indifferent to the Eleclor, fhould 
prove more pleating than any thing elfe. 



now tlie clircft contrary ElFeft. If fuch a fuppofition be con- 
ceivable, 'tis lufficient to flicw that thcfe Relations arc not ah- 
foluteh necejfary in theiiiftl'vcs, "but only conditionally and con- 
fcqncittially to the prefcnt Order nf the Creation *. 

Upon a farther enquiry into the Doflrine oiahjirail Fiinejfes 
and eternal Rcafons of things, I find a great many Pcrfons very 
much perplexM about them, who cannot apprehend but that 
they mult neccfTarily determine the Deity in all Cafes, as well 
as abfolutely oblige Aiankino., nay are the only ground of 
moral Obligation. I Ihall therefore endeavour to explain my 
felf more fully ori this Subjcft, which appears to mc in the 
follovi/ing I>ight. 

From all Eternity God had in his Mind the Ideas of alf 
things, which cou'd pofTibly exifb either feparatcly or all toge- 
ther. He faw that fcveral Syflems of Beings might be created, 
the refult of which woa'd be feveral Kinds and Degrees of 
Happinefs or Mifery to thefe Beings (tho' 'tis impoHible to 
fuppofe any abfolutely higheft degree, fince that wou'd be a 
Limitation of infinite Power.) As thefe various poffible Sy- 
flems were at once prefent to his view, he faw the ieverat 
Relations, which the Beings in them wou'd have ro each other, 
or to themfelves in difFerent Circumihinces, fuppofing them fo 
be form'd in any given manner i he knew alfo hov/ to luit the 
Condition of thefe Beings to tiicir Relations, fo as to produce 
a certain fum of Happinefs or Mifery from the Compofition. 
If we enquire whether of thefe two kinds of Creatures he fliall 
choofe, we can find no natural neceiTity to determine him, 
fince he is abfolutely independent and completely hap]')y in 
himlelf without any Creation at all, nor can his Happinefs be 
increas'd or impair'd by the Happinefs or Mifery of his Cre.i- 
tures. We muft therefore have recourfe to his own free Plea- 
fure, dircfted by his other Attributes, for the only caufe, 
ground, or reafon of his Works. If he be a benerolcnt Being, 
and have perfed Knowledge and Power, he will frame the 
World in fuch a manner and fuit every Circumibnce to each 


* Sec Pufetidorf, B. 1. C. 2. f. 6. and the N;jtc. 2. p. 
20. or B. 2. C. 3. §. 4, 5. and the Notes ^ R. See a!^ 
fo Dr. Fdtoii's Preface to his L. Moyer''i Letturc, p. 18^ 
%l^^> p. 34 — ^I, iSC: 

gea. I. Sub. 4. Of Moral Evil. 3^05 

IX. Neither ought we to enquire for any reafibh And de- 
of the Eledion, i. e., why he choofes this rather [ei-mines 


Condition foas to produce univerfal Good, if malevolent, tne 

But from a view of the prefent Syftem wc find that Happi- 
nefs, Beauty, Order, are prepollent ; and that no good has been 
omitted, which cou'd have been beftow'd confillent with the 
Happincfs of the whole. Hence we gather that he muft be 
abfolutely good, or that he will aft upon fuch Reafons, and 
produce Beings which have fuch Relations to each other, that 
the reililt of all fliall be Happinefs in the main. Theie Rea- 
fons and Relations we czW good, which have this beneficial 
tendency to the whole Syllem, and what we mean by his be- 
ing determine by them, is that his Goodnefs always inclines 
him to promote the Happinefs o\ his Creatures, and his Know- 
ledge reprefents to him the moft proper means of efteding it. 
Why he is good, or inclined to afl in this manner, we knov; 
not, any more than why he is intelligent ; nor do v/e think a 
reafon a priori can be given, Or ought to be expeded for either 
of thefe Attributes. 

Bat thus much feems evident, that unlefs he was previoufl^ 
fo inclin'd, a profpeft of thefe Reafons and Relations could 
never determine him; fmce, as was oblervd above, he is abib- 
Jutely independent, and incapable ol- being aftedted by them : 
all the Goodnefs which relults from them can be no good ot 
benefit to him, and confequently he cannot be obliged to pur- 
fae them by any other necelfity than a Moral or Hvpothetitaf. 
one /. e. one that is founded on the previous fuppofition of what 
we call his Goodnefs. It is their being agreeable to this Divina 
Attribute, or rather the v/ajrs in which it is exerted ; their be- 
ijig the moil proper means to the bell end, or produdlive of 
the greateft univerfal Happinefs, which denominates ihcmjit^ 
right, t^c. and what we muft either mean by thefe words, or 
we can, I think, have no ditlinft Ideas to them. 

Thus much concerning thefe Relations with regard to the 
Deity, But tho' we may not comprehend the Nature of a felf- 
exiftent Being, or the manner of his adling, nor fee in what, 
fenfe lie is determined, obliged, or under a neceffity to aft 
Agreeably to all fuch Relations as a Syftem of things will have 
to one another's Happinefs (nor indeed is it of any ufe, nor 
can it have any meaning, farther than knowing that he is per- 
manently ^W) vet with refpeft to their conllfitating a La-iv cf. 

himfelf to 

3o6 Of Moral Evil. Chap. V. 

than that,- for upon luppofition that there is a 
reafon the indifference would be deftroy'd, and the 



t^alure, and our deducing moral Obligation from them, I 
think the Cafe is very clear. As we are made fenfible Beings, 
or capable of Happincfs and Mifery, nothing can be a Law to 
our Nature but what produces the one and prevents the other : 
and as we are endow'd with freedom of Will we can never be 
under any other fort of Obligation. To find out the tendency 
of things to this great End, is the Province of Reafon, and all 
that we can mean by terming one thing more reafonable than 
another is its luperior tendency to Happinefs on the whole, 
which is, and ought to be, the ultimate end of all truly rati- 
onal dependent Beings. 

Can Man, for Inflance, have any reafon to purfue that which 
dees not at all relate to him ? and docs any thing relate to him 
or concern him, which has no Relation to his Happinefs? As 
therefore we have our Happineis to feek in a great Meafure 
from without, and have no innate Inftin£l or implanted Appe- 
tite, to dirccl us in the fearch ; no truly natural Paffion or Af- 
fcdiion in wliich it coniifts, (as may be eafily gather'd from 
Mr. Locke's excellent HiRory of the human Mind) it will be 
the part of pure Reafon to difcover the means of obtaining it, 
and thcfe means will be the doing fuch Adfions, and acquiring 
fuch Habits of mind as are fuitable to our dependent State, /'. e, 
iuch as tend to oblige all thofe other rational Beings on whom 
we are dependent ; fuch as engage the good Will and Affeftions 
of all thofe who have it in their power to promote or impede 
our Happinefs ; and m.ore efpecially that Being on whom we 
depend abfolutely, and who is able to make us happy or mife- 
rabie to all Eternity. And as the only means of engaging the 
good will of all our fellow Creatures with whom we are or may 
be concern'd, is the manifelHng a Difpofuion to promote their 
Happinefs; which is at the fame time complying with the 
Will of our Creator, who intends nothing but the common 
good of us all; and requires that we Ihou'd co-operate with 
him by cur joint endeavours to promote it; fo 'tis evident that 
all fuch Adions and Difpcfuions of Mind as have this tenden- 
cy and diredion, are Duties to us, the Difcharge of which 
will cither be attended with Happinefs by natural ConfcquencC 
in this Life, or by the pofitive Reward of God in another.— — 
From this fenfc of tho Realbn or Relation of things (which, 
as was oi^fci\''d bctwe., is all that can give ihcm an>' Relation 


Sedl. I. Sub. 4. Of Moral Evil. 307 

Eledion would not be free. If we fuppofe that there 

is inch a thing as better and worle in the Objeds 

X 2 themfelves, 


to us, or afford any Reafon for our obfercing them) we mav 
cafily deduce a compleat Scheme of Duty which muft be «/- 
nvays obligatory, and will appear fo to all Beings of the like 
Nature with ourfelves. This, if we pleafe, may be term'd 
abfolutely^yf/, right and reafonahle ; provided that we keep the 
trite Reafon and End of all in view, I'z'z. our own Happinr/s ; 
and do it in Obedience to the Deity, who alone can fecure this 
main End to us, and who can only be engaged to this by our 
performing every thing on his Account. If on the other hand 
we follow Virtue for its own fake, its native Beauty or intrin- 
fic Goodnefs, we lofe the true Idea of it, we miilake the means 
for the End ; and tho' we may indeed qnalific ourfelves foraa 
extraordinary Reward from God for fuch a ftate of Mind, yet 
we do really nothing to r/;^/7/^ our feUes to it: it" we attain 
the good Effefts of every Virtue in this IJfe, weba-oe our Re- 
nvard; if we do not, what claim have we to any amends from 
God, whom we have never thought of in it, and confequently 
wliofe Ser-vattts we cannot be faid to be ? The only Principle 
which can in Reafon recommend us to his Favour, muft be the 
doing all things to his Glory, in Obedience to his Will, or in 
order to pleafe him. Obedience to God is the Principle, the 
good of Mankind the Matter, our own Happinefs the End, of 
all that is properly term'd Moral Virtue. 

Since the Conchifion of this I have met with a Pamphlet 
entitled Calumny no Con'viSlion, ^"c. which contains fome Ar- 
guments againll our Author's Dodlrine, and alfo does me the 
honour to take notice of what I had advanced in favour of it. 
Tho' I cannot but think moft of this celebrated Writer's Re- 
marks already obviated in the Additional Fartof the foregoing 
Note, and thofeof our Author ; yet I will incur the Cenluic 
of being tedious rather than wholly omit them. He begins 
With an Exception againft the Fourth Paragraph ; the Deiign 
of which was to fliew that God was perfectly free in creating 
the World, and cou'd not be determined by any thing external. 
Firlt, Becaufe he could receive no benefit from any thing 
without him. zdly, Eecaufe he could have no P.eafon to 
prefer one thing to another in every refre.51 equal, as the Au- 
thor explains himfelf in the following Paragraph. 

He concludes that when things are mad?, they muft be made 
in conforxTiity to the Divine Nature ; but as there are fevcral 


3o8 Of Moral Evil. Chap. V. 

themfelves, who would affirm that the Goodnefs and 
Wifdomof God will not necefTarily determine him 



poffible ways of making them, in which there will be the fame 
conformity, nothing cou'd render one way more agreeable to 
the Deity than another, but his free Choice ; this agreeable- 
nefs therefore of any one before another is not antecedent, but 
coHJequent to fuch free Choice. In fupport of this Notion I 
afferted that notvvithllanding this twofold Indifference, 'viz.. 
both to adling in general or not afting, and to any particular 
manner ofafting among equals, yet ftill it might be fhewu 
that whenever he does zQi, all his Works will be nx:ife, goody 
ISc. The Reafon given for it was to this purpofe, <viz. that 
the fole End of his afting being to communicate his Happinefs, 
and every one of his Perfedions being naturally produftive of 
Happinefs, it follows that he is both willing and able to pro- 
duce it, and confequently muft produce it whenever he pro- 
- duces any thing. Now the voluntary communication or pro- 
duction of Happinels feems to comprehend all moral Goodnefs, 
i^c. but this voluntary Communication is nothing more than 
the exercife of his natural Perfections as above ; it follows that 
the Exercife of his natural Perfeftions muil conftitute the 
Moral ones, or that thcfe Moral Qualities in God which we 
llile Good, Wife, Juft, tf^c. are only confequences of the Ex- 
ertion of his feveral natural Perfections of Knowledge, Power, 
Freedom, in purfuanceof the abovementioned End. 

This brief Hate of the Qucllion may be in a good meafure 
fufficient to dire6t the Reader in forming a Judgment of what 
this Writer has objected Firft, He fays, the Archhijhop ought 
to hai'e concluded that the Con^ruity of things to the Rectitude 
or Ferfeilion of the Diiine Nature ivas the Ground {^and not the 
Tncre Will of God) of their being good or Perfcd in their kind^ 
viz. hythis refemhlance of them to it. *Anfwer, 'Tis allow'd 
that where one way of afting is more congruous to the Divine 
Nature than another, that congruity is a fufficient Reafon for 
its being preferr'd by the Deity, but that Realbn will never 
hold where many ways are equally congruous, which is the 
Cafe the Archbifliop argues upon ; in which Cafe there is no 
room for any thing but mere Will to determine, and in which 
Cafe alone the Will of God is confider'd feparately from his 
other- Attributes. Wherever the nature of the thing allows 

P -7? 


Seel. I Sub. 4. Of Moral Evil. 309 

to choofe the better ? For who can honeftly poftpofie 

th^ better and prefer the worfe ? As then in indif- 

X 3 ferenc 


fuperlor Wifdom and Goodnefs, there the Archbifliop fuppo- 
fes the Divine Will to be always accompanied with them, as 
he has told us twice in his third Paragraph. I Ihould be glad 
to know the precife meaning of the Words ReBltude and Per- 
feBioriy which this Author makes the Ground of the Divine 
A£ts ; if they fignify no more than Goodnefs, as I think they 
hardly can, if they are to be rank'd among his moral Qiialities; 
they coincide with our Notion of mere Will ; fmce we can ne- 
ver fhow why he is good, or ailign a Caufe for that particular 
Determination of his Will, which we ftile Goodnefs, as was 
obferv'd in the beginning of this Note. If they include only 
his natural Perfeflions, and imply that all fuffiaency which re- 
fults from the Union of them, I fear there will be no more 
conneflion between this and moral Perfeftion, than bctv/eeu 
that and free Choce: * /. e. no Reafon can be given why an all 
fufficicnt Being fhould communicate his Happinefs rather than 
not, (except we knew more fully wherein that Happinefs con- 
fifts,) or immediate connexion fhewn between the Exiftence 
of perfecft Knowledge and Power in God, and their being ex- 
erted in the Produftion of any thing without him. But when 
fuch a Being is determin'd to make any thing, it is reafonable 
to fuppofe that he will make it like himfelf rather than the con- 
trary ; that one perfeflly happy will communicate his Happi- 
nefs rather than produce Mifery, as was faid above. 

This is all the account that I can give of the Moral Perfec- 
tions of the Deity, or why he fhould propofe that end in all 
his Works, which we attribute to him when we ftile hira 
Good. But this goes no farther than probability : and I fhould 
be obliged to this Author for a ftricl Proof of the moral Attri- 
butes of God from any property in the Divine Nature, which 
is itfelf previoufly demonitrable. To return, 'Tis not there- 
fore the bare exercife of his Knonxsledge and Vonjoer which by 
necejjity [ i. e. a Phyjical one) conftitutes his A'loral Qualities : 
but the voluntary Exercife of them (or the difpofition to exer- 
cife them) in purfuancc of this £77^/, which mufl ncceffarily 
(meaning a Moral Neceffity, or fuppofmg this End) include al} 
ttioral Perfedtipn, tho' there be feveral ways that equally lead 
to it. In this fcnfe Qnly, and with this reftri6tion, I wou'4 

3IO Of Moral "EvW. Chap. V. 

fercnt Matters there can be no reafon why one is cho- 
fen before another, fo there is no need of any : for 


be underftood whenever I afl'ert that perfeft Knowledge and 
Power can produce nothing but is wife and juft i tlio' 
it may not have been always mention'd. 

This I apprehend to be far from fubverting the ground of 
Morality, or making it ever equally agreeable to the Deity to 
have adicd for no End at all, or for a bad one: * Since it 
fuppofes that he was always detcrmiii'd to purfue the very bcft 
End, and by the bcft means, (wherever there was room 
for better and ivorfc) tho' <u';6>' he was fo determin''d I cannot 
pretend to fhew ; and in what fcnfe this was better ^rA Jitter 
for him \ who cou'd receive no addition of Happinefs from it, 
I muit confefs I do not underftand. I think the Archbifliop 
was not fo weak as to be dcceiv'd by that erroneous Inference 
which this Author charges him with, p. 77. -viz. that God's 
Will coii'd not he determind by the greater good in Obje^fs, 

becaufe thefe Ohjefis -zvere not aSiually produc'd-. but rather 

argued from the equality and indifference in Objefts, which 
muft appear to the Divine Mind before his determining to cre- 
ate them (as he fliews in his Note ^.) that his Will could not be 
determin'd by them to produce one Syflcm rather than ano- 
ther : which is the beft proof of his perfect Liberty in produ- 
cing them, to eftablifii which was the Defign of the Archbifhop 
Li this place. I readily own that God who fees all PoiTibilities 
rjuiiihave a previous Reprefentation of things in his Mind, which 
tilings therefore are hypothetically antecedent to the deter- 
mination of his V/ill. To affert thus much is only faying that 
he knew what he was about when he made the World, whicli 
none I hope will doubt: But this Reprefentation will never 
come up to what is affirm'd of thefc Relations abfolutely, an^ 
at all times, determining him to one particular ; except there 
always were one abfolutely beft, which I think defcrves to be 
a little confider'd. That he fhould produce Happinefs in ge- 
neral rather than Mifery, fecms to me very agreeable to his 
.Nature, who is perfcdly Happy; but what particular fort or 
degree of it he Ihall choofc, is perhaps not very eafily deter- 
min'd, except by fuch as will, with Leibnitz, deny any per- 
fedl equality or indifference in nature, and imagine they can 
always find a beji, to whom. I would recommend our Author's 
Note abovemcntion'd, 

*P.76, f p. 74. 75. 76. 

Sed. r. Sub.4. Of Moral EvM, 311 

lince the Divine Will is felf-aflive, and mufl necefla- 

rily be derermin'd to one of the indiflFerent things, it 

X 4 is 


By this time 'tis hoped, I have explaln'd myfelf fufficlently, 
I fhall difpatch the reft of the Jppendix in as few Words as 

From what has been faid it appears that I don't maintain 
that the Moral Attributes of God proceed from the mere cxer- 
cife of his natural ones, without any end or aim; much lefs 
that thefe were exerted necejfarily; as this Author feems to un- 
derftand me, p. 78, but only that the voluntary Communica- 
tion of the Divine Happinefs by the free exercife of every fuch 
Perfedlion as is productive of it, will conftitute all thofe which 
we call moral Attributes : a voluntary, defigncd Produftion of 
Happinefs or Mifery being all that to me feems requifite to 
make any aftion Moral in God or Man. And that an abfo- 
lutely powerful, intelligent, free and happy Being, intending 
to communicate fome degree of thefe Perfeftions, needs no 
other ObjeSli-ve Rule than what is contnin'd in thefe Perfedi- 
ons themfelves; that fo long as he is pleafcd to exercife thenj 
in purfuance of this general intent, he can never do amifs or 
go wrong in the exercife of them, tho' there be ten thoufand 
equal ways of exercifing them, and confeqaently no objective 
Rule to direft which he fhall adlually choofe : Becaufe per- 
k&. Knowledge, Power and Happinefs cati never produce anf 
thing in the main repugnant to Kno^vledge, Power and Happi- 
nefs, i. e. to themfel'ues. 

To this purpofe * was the foregoing Obfervation made, 
which I find to be much the fame with that of Dr. Clarke. 
Demonjir. Prop. 12. Par. i, how confufedly foever it might 
be exprefs'd. I meant therefore Powoer and Kno%vledge exercife J 
'Voluntarily in congruity to the Re&itude of the Di'jifte Natnre. 
p. 79. in one (txik of thefe Words, /. e. in conformity to his 
general intent of communicating Happinefs (and if that be all 
the meaning of ReSiitude, I readily admit it) but not in fo 
large a fenfe as to make the prefent method of communicating' 
it, the only right, ft, and reafonable one, and immutably pre- 
ferable to all other Methods conceivable ; fiacc many others 
may be fuppofed, any of which would have led to the fame 
End, and as fuch been equally agreeable to the Deity if he had 
chofen it. This Author feems afraid of qur placing the Obli- 


* fage 79. 

5 12 Qf Moral EwW. Chap. ¥, 

is its own reafon of Aclion, and determines itfelf 
freely. Nay fo great is the Pov/cr of God, that 
whatever he lliall choofe cut of infinite PolTibiHties, 
that will be the bcft ; 'tis all one therefore which he 
The dif- X. Sixthly, But you urge that you are Oill iin- 

ficulty of fatjsfy'd' how a Power can determine itfelf, to e. 
concei- ... . .• • 

ving how ? ~ 

a power N" T E S. 

call deter- 

^aijon to Virtue on the mere Will o^Gcd; as if his Will were 
feparated from his other Attributes: which would indeed of 
itl;::lf be no ground of Obligation at all, fince upon fuch a blind 
Principle we could never be fecure of Happinefs from any 
Being how faithfully foever we obev'd him, or how much 
foever we refcmbled hini in Perfection. This Notion there- 
fore of mere arbitrary \VilI we muft exclude from both out 
Schemes of Morality in every cafe but that of indi^'eroice fq 
often mentioned ?.bovc. 

I grant the tiatural Corifequence of Virtue is Happitiefs p. 8i- 
(at kail would be fo, if univerfally praftifed) and as fuch it 
carries a partial Cbligaticn in itfelf, or is fo far its own Re- 
ward ; but what will become of the Obligation (according to 
my fenfe of that Word) when this Confequence does not fol- 
low ? As this Author very reafonably grants it camjot in the 
]nefent (late, p. 82. To deduce one from the profpcfl of 
Reward in a future ftate (tho' I think the certainty of it equal 
on cither of the two Scheme?) is having rccqurfe to the Will o^ 
God to fupply defecVs and conipleat the Obligation, inflcad of 
founding it on thcie Relatiovs as fuch, as ahfolutcly fit and rights 
r.nd to be follow'd for their tn.vv fakes without regard to any 
farther End. 'Tis owning that the Obligation fuppofed to arifa 
from them is not in itielf adequate and indifpenfible, and 
fcemsto be quite giving up ih^i full obligatory Povjer of theirs 
antecedent to atiy Renvard or P laiijhmetit anf?e\''d either by natu- 
ral confequence or fofiti've Appointment to the Ohfer'vance or neg- 
leSi of than * which the Authors df that Language have fo 
eagerly contended for, and to oppofe the ill Confequences of 
which is the only Delign of air that has. been advanc'd on this 
Head. If any Miftakcs appeir in it (as probably there may) 
j ihall be obliged to this judicious Author for pointing theiA 
out and promife freely to give up them or any. others in the 
Book as foon as I can be made ffJnfiblc of them-' 

* .Evidences of .^W. and Rev. Rel. p, 21?. 5 th Ed, 

Sea. I. Sub. 4. Of Moral Evil. 313 

you are Ignorant of the Modus ; but a thing muft mine itfelf 
not be deny'd becaufe we do not know the manner ^° ^^^on 
hov/ it is done : we are entirely ignorant how the °o^i^der' 
Rays of the Sun produce the Idea of Light in the our ailent 
Mind by moving the optic Nerves ; nor is jt bet- to the 
ter underftood how the Members of the Body cap ^^^^^ of 
be moved by a Thought of the Mind, and at the ^^tfQP'°P°'' 
Dire<5lion of the Will. Yet no body denies thefe 
things, becaufe he knows not the manner in which 
they are perform'd. If therefore it be manifeft 
that the divine Will does determine itfelf, we fhall 
not trouble ourfelves much in enquiring how it can 
be done. 

XL But to confefs the truth, 'tis no lefs difficult 'tIs as 
to conceive a thing to be moved or determined by difficult to 
another, than by itfelf ; but as we are accuftom'd conceive 
to material Agents *, all which are paHivein their ,°.^^ ^ 

^^- ^ -riT-o 1 thing an 

Operations, we are certain or the ract, and not at i^^. moved 
all felicitous about the manner of it : whereas if by ano- 
we confider the thing thoroughly, we fliall find ther, as by 
ourfelves as far from apprehending how Motion is ^^^^^^'- .^® 
communicated from one Body to another, as how ^^^^j j^ 
the Will can move itfelf: but there feems to be being ac- 
nothing wonderful in the one, becaufe it is ob- cuftomed 
ferv'd to happen at all times, and in every Ac- ^^ materi- 
tion ; whereas the other is look'd upon as incrc- 'J/\ 
dible, fince it is feldom perform'd, viz,, by the Will aents. 
alone. And tho' both Reafon and Experience prove 
that it is done, yet we fufped ourfelves to be im- 
pofed upon, becaufe we know not the manner of 
it. The ground of the miftake is this, that fince 
the Will is the only adive Power which we are ac- 
quainted with, the reft being all pailive, we are not 
eafily induced to believe it to be really fuch, buc 
form our Judgment of it from a Comparifon with 
lather Agent", v/hich (ince they don't move but as 


Stc Note 4], 


What is 
laid about 
with re- 
fpedt to 
the Will 
takes place 
in his pri- 
mary Elec- 

Of Moral Evil. Chap. V. 

they are moved, we require a Mover alfo in the 
Will of God : which is very abfur'd ; fince it is evi- 
dent that if there were no aUive Power in Nature, 
there could not be d^pajfive one; and if nothing could 
move without a Mover, there would have been no 
Motion or Adion at all t. For we cannot conceive 
how it fhould begin. Now it is much harder to 
conceive how Motion can be without a Beginning, 
than how an Agent can move itfelf. Since then here 
are Difficulties on both Sides, neither ought to be 
deny'd becaufe the manner of it is above human 

XII. It is to be obferv'd, that what we have 
faid concerning this Indifference of things in re- 
gard to the Divine Will, takes place chiefly in 
thofe Eleftions which we apprehend to be the 
Primaryt but not always in the fubfequent ones. 
For fuppofing God to will any thing, while that 
Eledion continues, he cannot rejeft either the fame 
or any thing neceflarily conned-ed with it, for that 
would be to contradid: himfelf. In order to ap- 
prehend my Meaning the better, we muft remem- 
ber that the Divine Power can effed innumerable 
things equal in Nature and Perfedions. For in- 
flance, we may conceive numberlefs Men equal 
to one another in all refpefts ; and alfo number- 
lefs Species of rational Beings equally perfed : no- 
thing 'but the Will of God could determine which 
of thefe he ihould create firft. But when it was 
detcrmin'd to create Man ,fuch as he now is, /. e. 
with the Faculties, Appetites and integral Parts 
which he confifts of at prefent, it is impoflible 
that God fhould will or choofe any thing repug- 
nant to human Nature, v/hile that Eledion cofH' 



t otff Dr. Clarkes Demonjirat. of the D. Attributes, f.%? 
87, tff. or S. Fancourt'i Ejfay concerning Liberty, is'c. p. z^, 
39, or Note 43 . 

Sedt. I. Sub. 3. Of Moral Evil. 31^ 

XIII. For when we conceive any thing propo- God may 

fed to the Knowledge of God as fit to be done, ^"y^ -^'^ 

he mufl: alfo neceffarily have under his Eye, as ic ^^'"^- \- 
I r .r-M ^ 11 I , 1 • ''1 once in his 

were at the fame Glance, all thole things that are view 
neceflarily conneded with it, or confequent there- which are 

upon to all Eternity i and muft will or rejed them cannefted 
all by one fimple Ad. If therefore he derermin'd ^'jn^^^^ 
to create Man, he muft alio be fuppofed to will that choln. 

he ihould confift of a Soul and Body, that he Ihould and either 
be furnifh'd with Reafon and Senfes, and that his ^^'^ ^^ ^^- 
Body fhould be fubjea: to the general Laws of Mat- ''^^^ ^^^"^ 
ter : for all thefe things pre evidently included in ftmnk 
the Choice to create Man. Aft. 

XIV. Nay this primary Ad of Volition muft As he is 
be fuppofed to contain not only thofe things which ^ infinite 
have a necclfary connexion with what is chofen, he°airr 
but fuch things alfo as tend to promote its benefit wills the 
and happinefs, as far as they can be made confiftent good of all 
with the benefit of the whole. For fince God is ^^•'^gs 
infinitely Good, 'tis certain that he wills that his h^'^tter- 
Creatures ftiould exift commodioufly as much as mTn'd^to^' 
that they ftiould exift at all. He therefore will'd create, as 
fuch things as are agreeable to the Natures, and ^^^ ^^ is 
tend to preferve the Conftitutions of bis Creatures P°^^^^^^' 
in the fame Eledion whereby he determin'd to cre- 
ate them. 

XV. We have faid before, that there is a dou- "^^"^^ ^^« 
ble Goodnefi in things, the firft and principal is ^^^^^r 
that which renders them well-pieafing to God, as L once'^ 
they are conformable to his Will: the other is made, it is 
that whereby they agree with one another, where- impoffible' 
by they afford each other mutual Affiftance, where- f^at thofe 
by they promote the Convenience, Prefcrvation fj^"f^ 
and Perfedion of the whole : but both thefe pro- pieafe him 
ceed from the Choice and Will of God. For which 
when the Deity had once determin'd to pieafe tend to 
himfelf in the Creation and Prefervation of the ?^ ^r/'""- 

World, of his 

3 16 Of Moral Evil. Chap. V. 

World, he muft be fuppofed at the fame time to 
have willed all fuch things as contribute to the 
Benefit and Perfeftion of his Work, otherwife he 
would have contradidcd himfelf, and thereby been 
the caufe of fruftrating his own Election. For 
he is now fuppofed to hare chofen that there 
fhould be a World, that it lliould continue as long 
as he himfelf had determin'd, that every Being 
fhould attain the End affign'd to it, and all things 
aft according to the Nature he had given them, 
and confpire together to preferve and perfed: the 
whole. It is impoflible therefore that he fhould 
will the reverfe of all this, or that fuch things 
Ihould pleafe him as tend to the difordering, maim- 
ing or deftrudion of his Work. For 'tis impof- 
fible to conceive that he fhould choofe the Exif- 
flence of things, and yet refufe the Means necef- 
When jary thereto. 

Man IS XVI. when therefore Man was made what he 

flch\ na- i^) by ^'^'^ '^'^^y ^^- °^ conflituting him of fuch 
tare as re- a Nature and Condition, 'tis plain, that God alfo 
quires him •viT'iiled that he fhould be pious, fober, jufl: and 
tobejuft, ^hafte. (/?.) Thefeand the like Laws of Nature 

Icber, l3c. r\^^ 

Gcdisnot ^h«^ 

at Liberty 

rot to will NOTES. 



[R] Againft this 'tis objeded, Firfl, That it rnaUs God 
require thofe Virtues from Men, not bccaufe they are morally 
good, but becaufe of the Advantages which they bring by 
preventing fuch things as may trouble civil Society or hurt a 
Man's felR To this I anfwer that the Author has fliew'd in 
his Book that Moral Evil is founded on Natural, and that in 
the flatc of Nature before Revelation Men had no way to know 
what free adls were good or pleafing to God, but by obferving 
what was advantageous to particular Men, or to Society. Ob- 
ferve all the Laws of Nature, and you will find them difco- 
vcrVl and proved from this foie Principle : As is manifefl from 
all the Books that treat of them. To pctcnd therefore that 
the natural Mifchiefs arifing from Vice do not prove them to 


Sed:. I. Sub. 4. Of Moral Evil. 3 17 

then are immutable, z//2;. conformable to the Will 
of God, and contain'd m the very firft Ad of Elec- 

be morally Evil ^ is aft uncommon way of thinking ; fince the 
very Argument whereby we prove them morally Evil is be- 
caufe they are pernicious. 

But 2dly, From hence, fay fome, it follows that the Tur- 
pitude of Vices is not to be eftimated from their own Nature, 
but from the Evils which attend them : as if efFefts did not 
flow from their Caufe, and thofe things which lead us into 
fuch Evils as miglit have been avoided by abftaining from them 
were not properly Evil ; or that we ought to judge of the na- 
ture of any thing otherwife then from the Properties and ope- 
rations that necelfariiy attend it. 

As to the TurpitHde of things, we give that Appellation to 
fuch as feem contrary to the Dignity and Honour of a rational 
Nature, which cannot be feen or heard without feme naufe- 
Ous abhorrence and reluftance of the Scnfes. 

We attribute it to Vices by a kind oi Analogy, fince they 
proceed from fuch Principles as are unworthy of human Na- 
ture, as lefTen the value and efteem of him who has imbibed 
them, and make him as it were unclean and fordid, and the 
averfion of all good and modefl Perfons. 

But fuch Turpitude as this does not arifefrom the Nature of 
the Things themfelves, but from fome fordid Qualities that ad- 
here to them and offend the Senfes. In like manner the Turpi- 
tude of Vices does not arife from the fimple Nature of Adions, 
but from fome adventitious Circumftances, wliich bring Evil 
on them, and as they are undue and heterogeneous, they as 
it were defile thofe Adions to which they adhere. 

'Tis to be obferv'd farther, that God can difpenfe with fom<i 
Afiions which feem contrary to the Law of Nature, but not 
with others. 

For Inftance, he commands Abraham to kill his innoceiit 
Son, who prepares to obey, and if he had executed che Divine 
Command he had done nothing amifs. And yet It feems con- 
trary to the Law of Nature for a Father to kill his innocent 
Son. But as God is the Giver and Lord of Life, Reafon tells 
us that he may take it away by whom he pleafes. 

But no Man in his Wits can believe that God may require 
any reafonable Creature to hate him or difobey his Commands, 
to be rebellious or perjur'd, or that any fhould take thefe for 
Duties owing to God, tho' an Angel from Heaven fhould de- 
clare them to be f(?. What is the Reafon therefore why God 


3 18 Of Moral Evil. Chap. V. 

tion wherein he determin'd to create Man. Nor is 
God at liberty not to will thefe during his purpofe 


commanded the firft of thefe, and the Father of the Faithful 
was obedknt; Avhen we believe that neither God can com- 
mand the latter, nor we be obliged to pay Obedience to any 
who fhall pretend fuch a Command ? 

1 think no other account is to be given of this difference than 
that the flaying a Son is of fuch a Nature as may be feparated 
from all thofe Evil Confequences th?t attend wilful Murder, 
whereas Hatred of God, i^c. are fuch as cannot ; but natural- 
ly and neceffarily lead thofe who are guilty of them into Natu- 
ral Evils, and are prejudicial both to the Authors themfelves 
and others: They undermine the Principles of all Goodnefs, 
and diffolve the Union between God and human Society, 
which from the very Nature he has given Mankind is neceffary 
to human Happinefs : nor need we mention other Natural 
Evils, which would flow as certainly from the Allowance or 
CommilCon of the like Crimes by natural Confequence. 

But 3dly, 'tis urg'd that this is to confound natural and 
moral Evils, which all Divines have hitherto diflinguifh'd. 
Anfw. If the Objcftor had but obfcrved the Diflinftion which 
the Author Gives of Moral Evil, Chap. v. Introdudl. he might 
have found a full Anfvver to this Objedlion. There he might 
fee that all Evil is inconveniency, but that fone inconvenien- 
cies arife from the feries of natural Caufes without our Confent 
* and foraetimes our Knowledge ; thef-e we call natural Evils ; 
but others happen from the abufe of ElccStions, when an un- 
due Choice occafions them, and in this cafe belides the Natu- 
ral Evil that arifes from them, there is likcwife an Obligation 
on the Perfbn that makes the Choice to anfwer for the hurt 
he has done by it. Now thefe Choices that bring inconve- 
niencics, are called moral Evils, and the difference between 
natural and moral Evil is not but that they both bring incon- 
vcnicncies, and hurt ourfelvcs or others (for therein confills 
the nature of their Evil) but that the ill EfFefts of the one 
proceed from the Choice, thofe of the other from natural 
Caufes, and hence the Author of that Choice is anfwerable for 
the one, but no body for the other. Moral Evil therefore is 
Natural Evil with Choice fuperaddcd. 

But 4thly, It is allcdged that Moral Evil is predominant in 
the World, and yet the Work of God is not d.flurb'd by it » 
Vice has quite overwhelm'd Mankind, and yet they flill fub- 
filt ; which ihcws that God may very well command Men to 


Sed. I. Sub. 4. Of Moral Evil. 3 19 

to continue Man fuch as he is : For by this means 
the fame thing would pleafe him, as being agreeable 



be impious, dcbauch'd unjuft, l^c. without deftroying the 
World, and therefore the Author ought to hold that God is 
free as to his fecond Elections as well as to the firft. 

If this Objeflion prove any thing it proves that before Reve- 
lation what we now call vices were not fo, fince at that 
time there was no way to diflinguifh vicious from virtuous Ac- 
tions, but by obferving which hurt, or help'd Mankind, one 
of which Nature taujht them to cultivate, and to avoid the 
other. But if the Actions we call vicious (fuch as murther, 
luft, injultice, /rontempt of God and Irreligion) did no hurt, 
there was no reafon Men fhould be debarr'd from them or God 
be imagin'd to forbid them, before he declar'd his Will to that 
purpofe. But adly, it is a plain cafe that thefe and all other 
wicked and irreligious Adions do mifchief to mankind, and 
have a deftruftive influence according to their number, and if 
all Men fhould give themfelves up to them without reftraint. 
Mankind could not fubfift. Vi felf murder were univerfal, 
there were an end of human race : If none wou'd take care of 
Children, one Age would put a period to the Species. If all 
were falfe, treacherous and cruel. Life would be fliort and 
comfortlefs ; if there were no amity, fociety and juflice, it 
would have the fame EfFed. If Luft and unnatural Mixtures 
were pradtifed as oft as Opportunity offer'd ; if drunkennefs, 
intemperance and excefs were indulg'd to the utmoft, mofl 
would Itarve, and the reft live a fhort and uneafy Lite. This 
plainly fhews that thefe Vices are contrary to the Nature of 
Mankind, and therefore God who gave that Nature has clear- 
ly enough fignified that they arc contrary to his Will. It mult 
be confefs'd indeed that there is much vice and wickednefs in 
the World, and it is proportionably miferable ; but yet take the 
Actions of the worlt of Men, and you will find ten innocent, 
for one that is criminal or mifchievous. For the truth of 
this J appeal to common Experience. Let any reckon the 
Afts of any one Man from Morning to Night, and he will 
find the Proportion hold ; and this is much more obfervablc if 
we take the whole Life of a Man together; the proportion of 
innocent adts to the vicious will appear much greater; Child- 
hood and old Age being much freer from mifchievous ads 
than the middle part of Life, 


i2b Of Moral Evil. Chap: f. 

to his firfl: Choice of creating Man, which is fup- 
pofed to ftand yet, and dilpleafe him, as being re- 
pugnant to another, which rejects the very fame 
things that are contained in the firfl; ; that is, he 
would at the fame time will and not will the fame 
thing, which cannot be attributed to God> 

XVII. Yet he is neverthelefs free, becaufe he can- 
TKis is no "°'- ^^^^ ^^^^^ a Man be perjur'd, a Murtherer, ^c, 
bar to the for he is no otherwife determin'd than by his own 
Divine Choice ; nor does a thing pleafe or difpleafe hird on 
A^ibertv. ^^^y qj-j^^^ account than becaufe it is agreeable or con- 
trary to his Will. For While that Eleclion of the 
Deity which conflitures me a Man, (/. e. an Animal 
that is obliged ro be pious, juft and fober) remains 
'tis impolTible that he fliould will me to be perjur'd, 
or a Murtherer j nor can the latter Choice take place 
in God fo long as the former flands, fince it is re- 
pugnant ro the former. When therefore we acknow- 
ledge that things arc good, and aflcrt that fome Ac- 
tions are grateful to God, and others odious,- this is 
not becaufe we believe the Divine Elections to be 
determined by them, but becaufe we fuppofe them 
to be comprehended in the very firfl: Aft of his 



Butlaflly, It is iirg'd that if thcfe things be contrary to the 
Will of God, he ought not only to have forbid them, but 
taken effedlual Care that they fliould not be praftifed. 

[ anfwer, God has taken effectual Care to prelerve Men 
from thefe in fuch a Degree, that our Lives arc fccured as far 
as is expedient for the good of the whole. The Frame of 
our Natures is fach, and the Laws of God have fo great Ef- 
fe£t upon us, that as I have already Hiew'd, a thoiihmd afts of 
Jufti'cc, Temperance, Truth, Charity and Piety are done for 
one of the contrary Vices. 'Tis the pradife ot thefe Virtues 
that fupports the World, and tho' many Vices are permitted,' 
yet, as Ihall be ihewn in due time, there is none that could be 
prevented even by Omnipotence without g;-eater Inconveni- 

Sedl. t. Sub. 4. Of Moral Evil. 321 

Will of creating things, and to be pleafing or difplca- 
fing to him fo far as they are agreeable or oppofite to 
that Eledion. Nor is the Liberty of God deftroy'd 
becaiife lie muft neceffarily will thefe things while 
he does will them : For every thing, while it is, ne- 
cefTanly is ; but thii Neceffity is confequent upon, 
and not antecedent to the Divine Will. The Di- 
vine Eledion therefore is not determined by the 
Goodnefs of things, but the Goodnefs and Fitnefs 
of them arifes from thnt Eledion, and that is beft 
for them which is moft agreeable to that Choice of 
the Deity whereby he will'd them to be what they 
are. From hence, I think> it appears fufficiently 
that God is fuch an Agent as dehghts in things 
merely becaufe they are chofen. 

XVIII. Yet it is to be remark'd, that this felf- A Being 
determining Power is not of fuch a Nature as to im- e".'^^^ /f 
J)iy infinite Perfedion j for it may be confident pg^^er is 
with an impcrfed underflanding, and other Appe- moreper- 
tites, as we have (hewn before : 'Tis not therefore fetl than 
peculiar to God, or incommunicable; there is no °"^ ^^^^_ 
reafon therefore for us to doubt whether a Creature ^"^^^"J^^jg*- 
may partake of it : if God were pleafed to ccmmu- joes not 
picate it, there Teems to be no contradidion in the imply in- 
thing for a Creature to be capable of it. Now that fi"ife Per- 
Being which has this gift beftow'd upon it, will ^^'^^°"' 
manifeftly be more noble than the reft, and a more j^ j^ ^^j,^, 
perfect refemblance of the Deity : fmce therefore munica- 
God has created the lefs pcrfedt Beings, we may, ble. 
without any abfurdity, believe that he has not 
omitted the more perfeft. Let us fee then whether 
t!iere be any Tokens of this Power among the Di- 
vine Works *. 


* For the poffiblllty of fuch a Po^ver, and its being commu- 
nicated, fee Dr. ClaikeV Demonfr. of the Being and Jttributes 
ff God, p. 82 fl«i85. ;th Edit. For the Peno^ion of it, fs 
Ncie 81 and §, 2. ofthi> Ch after. 

322 Of Moral Evil. Chap. V^ 

fhew this. 

S U B S E C T. V. 

'^hat Man partakes of the principle of plea- 
fing himfelf by EleSfion, 

Some rea- I. T T appears, I think, from what has been faid 
fons are J|[_ j}^at; jj-^^j-g jj fuch a Principle in Nature, and 

n,_^!. .u?„ that it is alfo communicable. We are now to en- 
quire whether Nature has conferred it upon us : If 
we confult our own Minds, we may pollibly enter-' 
tain a doubt whether we ai'e always paflive in our 
voluntary A6ls : namely, whether the Goodnefs of 
Objeds determines our Ekftions according to the 
Degrees of it, which are, or 'Are believed to be in 
them; or to fpeak more plainly, whether we al- 
ways choofe things becaufe they plcafe us or feem 
convenient; or whether they (bmetimes appear in- 
different in themfelves, or mconvenient before the 
Choice, and acquire their Goodnefs from it, and 
are for this reafon only agreeable becaufe they are 
chofen. We have feen that there is in Nature fuch 
a Power as this, which can produce a Convenience 
or Goodnefs in things by willing them ; but whe- 
ther we partake of it or no is the doubt. Now 
that we do partake of it may I think be evinced 
from the following Reafons. Firfl-, If we be con- 
fcious of an inherent Liberty. Secondly, If we ex- 
perience in ourfelves thofe Signs and Properties which 
have been declared to attend this Principle. Third- 
ly, If the Caufes which are fuppofcd to determine 
the Will be evidently infufficientj or arifc from Elec- 
tion inftead of producing- ic. 

11. As 

Sed. 1. Sub. S' Of Moral Evil. 323 

II. As to the firft; We experience in ourfdves a Firft, Ex 
Principle of thi<; kind, (i. e. a free one,) to fuch a perience. 
degree of certainty, that if our Minds be confuked 

we can hiirdly doubt of it ; and from hence it is 
that all Men of all Nations, v/hile they follow'd the 
Guidance of Nature, and attended to the Percepti" 
ens of their own Minds, have conftantly affertecl 
their Liberty, at kaft in fome particular Adions : 
Nor has any one, unlefs he v/ere forc'd to it, and as 
it were circumvented by Philofophical Subtikies^ 
ever deny'd either that he was free, or that he could 
pleafe himfelf in chooling one or other out of ma- 
ny ObjeLts prefented to him, tho' that which was 
preferred were no Ways preferable to others in refpe6l 
of any intrinfic worth. 

III. In this therefore, as in many other Cafes, the The vul- 
Vulgnr feem to be much wifer, and to reafon S^^ ^^^^^ 
more juftly than Philofophers. For the Vulgar ge- ^^^^^ ^'' 
nerally follow the natural Senfe of the Mind; and matters of 
tho' they be dull enough in forming long Dedudi- Faft than 
ens, yet in fiich things as are the immediate Ob- Ph-loio- 
jefts of Senfe and Experience, they are often more P'''^"' 
acute than Pholofophers themfelves : who either 

pufiF'd up with the Vanity of appearing wife above 
the Vulgar, or impos'd upon by their own Subtilty, 
often frame Monfters of their own, and deny thing? 
that are the rnoft mjuifeu: : while they are llriving 
to purfue Truth thro' Coverts impervious and in- 
acceilible to human V/it, they leave her behind their 
Backs, and are blind in broad Day. Hence fome 
have deny'd Motion, and othe'-s Pveft, others Space, 
others all S?nre in Brutes, others the being of a Cr?^, 
and others all manner of Truth : and on the fame ac- 
count, fome have deny'd Liberty, viz,. becauPe they 
were not able to unravel the Ditficukies in which 
they themfelves had involv'd it by their Subtil° 
tie^^' The ignorant and unlearned do much better 

324 Of Moral Evil. Chap. V. 

in flighting all fuch Arguments, and judging of 
things ingenuoufly according to the didate of their 
Senfes and Experience,- and if their Judgments be 
taken, we have clearly gain'd the Caufe : for all 
thefe declare that they are confcious of this free 
Principle within them, which yet cannot, as we 
have Ihewn, be well explain'd otherwife thsn we 
have done : The Senfe of our unprejudic'd Mind 
agrees with thefe, nor is the common Teftimony of 
IVIankind to be eileem'd of little importance in a 
matter of Fad:. (5$0 

IV. Secondly? 


(53.) The Subftance of what Leibnitz. objefVs againfl this 
Argument* amounts to thus much, i^/z That it is no proof 
of thenon-exillence ofa thing becaufe the Vulgar don't per- 
ceive it; they are no Judges of any thing but what is per- 
ceiv'd by the Senfes ; tliey believe the Air to be nothing when 
it is not mov'd ; they know nothing of the fubtle Fluid which 
caufes Gravity, or of the magrietic Matter; much lefs of im- 
jnatcrial Subftanccs : and therefore the fcveral Caufes of Ac- 
tion, the fecret Springs, the Reafons and Inclinations, may 
be all unknown to them, and yet we be abfolutcly determined 
(as he believes we always arc) either by the conftitution of our 
own Bodies, or of thofe about us, or by a thoufand little things 
which, upon due attention and refleftion, we might be able to 
difcover.. We reply, that tho' in many Cafes our not per- 
ceiving a thing be no Argument that it does not really cxift, 
yet in fomc Cafes, in this particularly, it is. To feel no Pain, 
to be confcious of no Idea, is to have none: and in like man- to perceive no motive or reafon of Adion, is the fame as 
not to adl upon any, or to perceive that we ad without one. 
If any one (whether Philofophcr or Peafant) be thinking npon' 
a Subjeft, he muft, at that inlhnt, know the SubjeA that he- 
is thinking on, or however, that he does think on fomething : 
'tis likewifc fclf evident, that every reafonable Man, when he 
refolves upon fome >'iew, or follows an Inclination, muft be 
confcious of that View, or at leaft be fenfible that his Refo- 
lution was form'd upon fome Viev/ or other, In thefe Cafes 
therefore, and in all the modifications of Thought, not to be,- 
and not to hz fercei'v d, is the very fame thing. 

• Rmarquts, p, 477, 

Seft. I. Sub 5. Of Moral ^w\\. 325 

IV. Secondly, If we experience in ourfelves the 'Tis pro- 
Signs and Properties which belong to this Power, ^^^ '^^'^ 
it cannot be queftioned but we have the Power it- t^^eoTthis 
felf : Now thefe are a Self-confcioufnefs that we Power, bc- 
are the true Caufe of our Ad:ions j an Ability to caufc we 
ad and pleafe ourfelves in contraditfling our natu- '^'^'^°75"", 
ral Appetites, our Senfes and Reafon. If it be ^^^^ ^^^[^ 
evident from Experience that vy.e can do thefe things, pertles of 

Y 5 it it in our- 


■But befide the abfurdity of being influenc'd by a Motive 
which wc know nothing of; bc(ide the ImpofTibility of recon- 
ciHng thefe imperceptible Movers with any kind of Liberty, 
(for which fee Note 45.) wc reply, fecondly, that our Author 
does not conclude againft the Exiltence of a thing becaufe the 
Vulgar do not perceive and take notice of it, but on the con- 
trary, argues, that there muft be fuch a thing as Liberty of 
Indifference, becaufe they do continually perceive and acknow- 
ledge it ; becaufe they clearly perceive and experience it in 
themfelves, or at leaft imagine that they do fo ; nay, becauCe 
they have as great Evidence of fuch a felf determining Power, 
as tliey have of any thing, even of their own Exiftence; and 
confequently they muft either be deceiv'd in every thuig, or 
not deceiv'd in this * The prefent Argument is therefore 
built on matter of Fa£t, and will be conclufive here, tho' our 
Ignorance be ever fo great in other Cafes. Our affurance of 
a Truth which we do clearly perceive, is not the lefs for there 
being a great many other Truths v/hich we do not perceive : 
and tho' our not perceiving a thing were no Argument that it 
docs not exift, yet our aflual perception of it is a Demonftra- 
tion that it does. It is not, therefore, becaufe ive do ?iot con^ 
Jider the Caufes that commimkate Motion to the Soul, or are mt 
able to delineate the precife manner of that Communication, that 
•voe affert the Soul to be felfmotive (as the Author of the late 
Dijfertation on Liberty and Necejfity argues, p. 1 5-) But we af- 
fert that it is felfmotive, becaufe wcfeelit to be fo, and have 
as great Evidence of it as we could expeft or conceive ourfelves 
to have, were it really fo. And that Author unreafonably begs 
the Queftion, in fuppofing that there are fuch Caufes and Com- 
municators in a Cafe where he has, where he can have, na 
Evidence at all of them. But this Dijfertation is fully CQnfut;€4 
by Mr, Jackfon, to whofe Anfwcr I refer the Header, 

* See Not? 58 , 

326 Of Moral Evil. Chap. V 

it will be but too certain that we have fuch a Powe^ 
as is able to pleafe itfelf barely by Elcdion. 
Jnthefiift V. Inthefiril: p'ace then, we have declared that 
place, we g Being endow'd with this Principle is the only true 
our^A6ti- ^ffi^^i^i'''^ Caul'e of its Adions, and that whatever it 
nr.s to our <iofS can be imputed to it only. Now all Men im- 
felves, pute the Ad-ions of their own Will to thenifelves 
whereby gnJ efteem them truly snd properly theirs whe- 
weown ther they be good or bad; which is a certain Sign 

ourlelves ii-'j^ -in ij 

to be the ^"^^ ^'"'^7 do not perceive themlelves to oe deter- 
tnie Cau- min'd from tlfcwhere to the Choice or Exertion of 
fes of them, oiherwiie they v;oald not look upon ihem- 
^^^^' . felves as the Caufe, but the Determiner. It can- 
i? that we "°^ ^^ othcrv.'jfc than from a confciou'nefs and firm 
diftingiiifh perfualion of this Truth, that wrong Elections give 
Misfor- us more trouble than fuch things as proceed from 
nines Ignorance and inevitable Error. *Tis on this ac- 
Crin:es. count only that a light Evil occafion'd by our 
own Choice grieves and afflids us more than a very 
great one from the Adion of another. If we 
expofe ourfelves to Poverty, Di'grace, or an uniimc- 
ly End, by an Ad: of Choice, our Confcience re- 
monftrates againfl it. Remembrance ftings us, and 
^ve cannot forgive ourfelves, tho' we were fecure 
both from human Punifliment and the Wrarh of 
God. But when the fame Evils befal us by exrer- 
v\\ Force or the Neceffity of Nature, we bewail 
our Condi.! 'c^n indeed, and complain of Fortune, 
but have none of that wounding Anxioufnefs, and 
vindidive Reproach of Confcience, which fcourges 
thofe that become miferable by their own fault. 
As therefore lie that enjoys this Principle mufl: ne- 
ceffarily blame himfelf if lie bring any Inconveni- 
ence upon himfelf by his own Choice; fo he that 
does blame himfelf, demonftrates that he has this 
Principle, For as it is imroiTible but that he fhould 
iccufe himfelf, who believes that he is the true 


Sed. I. Sub. 5. Of Moral Evil. 327 

caufe of his own Mlfery, fo on the other hand, 'tis 
certain that he who does accufe himfelf, thinks that 
he himfelf is the true caufe of his Mifery : other- 
wife he would grieve, complain, and be angry with 
the Perfon that compeird him to commit fuch 
things as he finds make him uneafy, but would ne- 
ver condemn himfelf as the Caufe and Author of 
them, uniefs he were confcious that he could have 
hinder'd them. If the grief arifing from a Crime 
be diftind from that which is occafion'd by a Mif- 
fortune, 'ris plain that this can be on no other ac- 
count, than becaufe the Crime proceeds from a free 
Agent, /. e. one who determines himfelf to Adion, 
but the Misfortune from a neceffary one. 

VI. 'Tis plain then from our Confcicme of Good This Is a 
and Evil Adions, that we have this aflive Principle moftcer- 
in fome refpeft within us. For we not only re- ^^'" ^'^^ 
Joyce in fuch things as are done well, and grieve "(,0^. 
at the contrary ; but alfo impute them to ourfelves, fcious of 
and either blame or applaud ourfelves as the Authors our liber- 
and true Caufes of them : which is the firfl and fur* ^/' 
efl: Sign that our Minds are fenfible of their Liberty, 
and that they could have pleas'dthemfelves in doing 
Dtherwife than they have done. C54.) 

VII. The 


(54.) 'Tis pleafant to obferve how the Autlnor of the Phila- 
fophical Enquiry endeavours to anfwcr this Argument, by con- 
founding the two Ideas of Sorrow and Self-a<pcufation ; of a 
Misfortune and a Crime, as Hobbs had done before him. 
'* Confcience (fays he) being a Man's own Opinion of his 
" Actions, with relation to fome rule, he may at the time 
'-^ of doing an Action contrary to that rule, know that he 
" breaks that Rule, and confequently a6l with reliiflancc, tho' 
■*' not fufficient to hinder the Adlion. Eut after the Adion is 
" over, he may not only judge his Adlion to be contrary ta 
'' that rule, but by the abfcnce of the pleafurq of the Sin, and 
'^' by finding iunsfelf obnoxious t<i> Shame, or by believing 

^' himfelf 

328 Of Moral "EvW. Chap. Y. 

The fe- VII. The fecond Sign or Property of this Power 

cond tok- jj ^j^jj. jj J5 ^j^j^ ^q oppofe the natural Appetites 

that it can 

go againft NOTES. 

the Appe- 
tites, ^f, 

*' himfelf liable to Punifhment, he may really accufe himfelfi 
*« that is, he may condemn himfelf for having done it, be 
" forry he has done it, and wifh it undone, becaufe of the 
♦' confequences that attend it*". Where, not to infift upon 
the perpetual abufe of the Words, do, aB, is'c. which upon 
this Hypothefis muft have a Signification direftly oppofite to 
that which they now commonly bear ; what can we mean by 
a Man's accufing or condemning himfelf, when he is fenfible 
that he has done nothing which he could have altered or avoid- 
ed; or rather done nothing at all, but only /ujer''d all the 
while from fome other? He may indeed perceive and judg^ 
himfelf to be miferable, and be forry that he is fo, and wifh 
himfelf otherwife ; but what is all this to a Criminal Shame, 
Remorfe, and Self-conviftion ? Is this all that we underftand 
bv a Guilty Confcience ? Can he blame, reproach, or be angry 
with himfelf for being only what another made him, and what 
he knows he could not poffibly help ? 

As this is matter of Facl and Experience, we appeal to the 
common Sen(e of Mankind, whether the Ideas of Gailt, Re- 
morfe, ^f. be not entirely different, and evidently diftinguifh- 
able from thefe. The iame holds with regard to our blame or 
accufation of another, as has been fhcwn at large by Bifhop 
Bramhall, to whofe Cajiigatlovs of -7. Hobbs I muft refer this 
Author. " I ask'd (fays the Biiliop f ) why do we blame free 
«' Agents? fmce no ]\Ian blameth Fire for burning Cities, 
" nor accufeth Poifon for deftroying Men, Firft, he rcturn- 
" cth an Anfwer, VVe blame them kecaufe they do ?iot ^leafe us. 
"' Why ? May a Man blame every thing that doth not pleafe 
" his Humour ? Then I do not wonder that 'T, Hobbs is io 
" apt to blame others without Caufe. So the Scholar may 
«' blame his Mafter for correfling him defervedly fo? his Good. 
»' So he who hath a villous Stomach may blame healthful 
«* Food. So a Lethargical Perfon may blame his beft Friend 
«' for endeavouring to fave his Life. And now, having fhot 
" his bolt, he begins to examine the Cafe, Whethei- blaming 
*' be any thing more than faying the thing blamed is ill or imper- 


* Philofophical Enquiry cencernitjg human Liberty,'^, 105,106. 
f Pag. 762. 

Eedl. I. Sub. 5. Of Moral Evil. 329 

Senfes and Reafon, and can pleafe itfelf in the Op- 
pofition. If we experience this AbiUty in our- 
felves, we may be certain that we partake of fuch a 

VIII. With refped to the natural Appetites, we 'Tisfliewn 
have faid before '"'j that this Principle, when it hap- J.jn*^dQ j^jg 
pens to be joined with natural Appetites in the 5^ j-egard 
fame Perfon, [often runs counter to them, and to our Ap- 
pleafes itfelf in reftraining them; if we find that petitcs. 
we can do this, 'tis a Sign that we have it. But 
who has nof experienc'd this in himfelf? who has 



*' feSl, Yes, moral blame is much more, 'tis an Imputatiot^ 
« of a Fault. If a Man be born blind, or with one Eye, we 
*' do not blame him for it : but if a Man has lofl: his Sight by 
" his Intemperance, we blame him juftly. He enquireth, 
" May ive not fay a Iztne Horfe is lame? Yes, but you cannot 
" blame the Horfe for it, if he was lamed by another, with- 
^' out his own Fault. May not a Man fay one is a Fool or a 
" Knave (faith he) if he he fo, tho" he could not help it ? If he 
*' made himfelf a Sot, we may blame him ; tho', if he be a 
" ftarlc Sot, we lofe our Labour. But if he were born a natu- 
*• ral Idiot, it were both injurious and ridiculous to blame 
** him for it. Where did he learn that a Man may he a Knai<e 
<* and cannot help it ? or, that Knavery is impofed inevitably 
** upon a Man without his own fault ? If a Man put fire to his 
" Neighbour's Houfe, it is the fault of the Man, not of the 
" Fire. He hath confefs'd formerly, that a Man ought not 
" to he punifF d hut for Crimes, the reafon is the very fame, 
f* that he fhould not be blamed for doing that which he could 
" not pollibly leave undone ; no more than a Servant whom 
•' his Mafter hadchain'd to a Pillar, ought to be blamed for 
** not waiting at his Elbov/, No Chain is ftronger than the 
" Chain of Fatal Defiiny is fuppofcd to be". 

See the fame Author's Definitions of Liberty, Neceffity, tsTr. 
with his Defence of them, p. 756, ^c. and his reply to ail 
T. Hobbs\ Evafions (fmce tranicrib'd by the Author of the 
Philofophical Encfttiry, p. 91, ^f.) in his Fifidication, p, 679, 
tfc. ■' - ■ 

* Siibfed. 3. par. 11, 12. 

33C^ Of Moral Evil. Chap. V. 

notTometimes voluntarily fufFer'd fuch things as are 
hard, incommodious, and painful to the natural Ap- 
petites, and taken delight in fuch Sufferance, as a 
Good fuperior to the Gratification of the Appe- 
tites ? (5 5.) Nay the Pain itfclf arifing from the 
Violence offer'd to thefe natural Appetites, if we do 
but choofe to bear it, becomes in a manner agreeable, 
which would otherwife be very irkfome. From 
whence it is rnofl apparent that this Pleafure depends 
upon the Choices for while that continues it con- 
tinues too ; when that is chang'd, 'tis gone. Now 
fuch Eled:ions as thefe are made every Day, and 
none can be fo much a Stranger to himfelf, as not to 
be confcious of them. (56^.) 
Thatwe ^^' ^^ '^ ^° ^^ obferv'd farther, that we do nor 
can do it Only embrace with pleafure fuch things as the Ap- 


alfo in our 
and in a 
change the 

nature of (5?-) To this Leibnitz anfwers, " That it is only oppofing 

things by *' or ballancing one Appetite with another. We fonietimes 

^an obfti *' bear Inconveniencies, and we do it with pleafure, but this 

jaatc EIcc- *' is only by rcalon of fome hope, or feme iatisfacflion which 

tion. " is join'd to the Evil, and which furpafiey it". We reply, 

if by hope be meant an expedlation of fonic future Good, 

'tis plain that we can oppofe and refifi: any natuial Appetite 

without any fuch Expectation, as may be expericnc'd when 

we pleafe, in Hunger, Thiri}, i5'c. The profpcdt of the 

bare pleafure of willing to do {o cannot be the Good hoped 

for, fince th<<t is a fure attendant on every fuch Volition; all 

the fatisfidion then which appears to be join'd with the Evil, 

and to counterballance it in any fuch Cafes, can only be the 

pleafure arifing from the aftual Exertion of the feli-moving 

Power, which is the thing our Author contends for. See the 

latter part of Note 45. 

(156.) 'Tis a common and juft Obfervation, that Men jo 
well as Children bear any Labour or Fatigue which they u.i 
dertake voluntarily, with half the Uneafinefs and Grief whicl 
£he very fame thing would give them, if they were forc'd 10 
undergo it ; which cannot, I think, be accounted for, but un- 
on our Author's Principle. 

Sea. I. Sub. 5. Of Moral Evil. 331 

petites refufe, and rejed fuch things as they defire, 
but aher, as it were. Nature itfelF by an obllinate 
Eledion, and make thefe Appetites purfue what 
they naturally avoid, and fiy what by Nature they 
dehre. And this takes place not only in Appetites, 
but alfo in the Obicds of the Senfe^. Some things 
are naturally unpleafant to them, fome bitter, nau- 
feous, deform'di yet thefe are made tolerable by 
the force of Eleftion, and by a change of the na-? 
tural Propenfity, at length become Delights*. On 
the contrary, what was fweet, beautiful, ^r. being 
reje(5i:ed by the Will, becomes at length difagree- 
able. We could not poffibly do this, if we had 
not a Power of „plea(ing ourfelves by other Means 
than the agreement of Objeds to the Appetites 
and Senfes. For whence comes it that fuch things 
as are fweet, comely, eiccellent, commodious ; nay, 
all that are grateful to the Appetites and Senfes fliould 
become irkfome and cffcniive ? On the contrary, 
whence is it that Griefs, Pains, Torments, nay 
Death itfelf fhould be agreeable when voluntarily 
undergone, unlefs from this Principle which pleafes 
itfelf m its Eledicn ? If it be granted that we have 
fuch 1 Principle, thefe things may eafily be ac- 
counted for ,• fince natural Good may, by the Pow- 
er of it, be chang'd into Evil, and Evil into Good: 
for it has a Good in itfelf fuperior to thefe, by 
meaas of which it can overcome and alter the Na- 
ture of them : but that this cannot admit of any 
other explanation will be (hewn below !• 

X. Thefe things are generally fuppofed to be "^^^^ '''^'^^ 
done by the Power and Prefcription of Rea/on; ^^^J'^l 
and 'tis thought, that the Will under its guidance only our 
embraces things difagreeable to the natural Appe- Appetites 

; tites aJriSenieSi 
but alfo 

* See Mr. Locke'; Chapter of Power, §. 69. TV a/I this fonby tha 
fnay be effe^ed by the file Power of Ek^ion^ av4 nxithout ^he t^^^^^ Qf 
^eafom which he there a/pgns for it. Eleftiou. 

■J- See the fillo'imvg ^e8ion^ ' 

332 Of Mcral Evil. Chap. V. 

tites and Senfes : I confefs this fometimes is, and 
always ought to be done according to reafon ; for 
we have hinted above, that feme regard fhould be 
had to thefe in Eledions ; but very often the Cafe 
is far otherwife. We have fliewn before, that a 
Power which is capable of pleafing itfelf in Elcclion, 
cannot be determin'd by reafon j for the Underftand- 
ing depends upon it, rather than it upon the Un= 
derftanding. 'Tis therefore the third Mark -and 
Property of this Power, that it can run counter, 
not only to appetites and Senfes, but alfo to Reafort, 
If we can do this, we muft own to our Sorrow, 
that we partake of it. But that we can, by the 
force of Election, conquer not only the Appetites 
and Senfes, but the Underftanding too, (S.) daily 
Experience teaches, and we have reafon to lament 
that it can be prov'd by fo many inftances that 
we pleafe ourfelves in Eledions contrary to the na- 


(S.) 'Tis objeftcd that the Will doth not indeed always 
follow the Judgment of the underftanding, becaufe there arc 
other Motives that come from infenfible Perceptions and fe- 
cret Inclinations which determine it : but that it always fol- 
lows the mod advantageous reprefentation of Good and Evil, 
which refults from Reafons, Pafiions and Inclinations whether 
diftinct or confufed : and yet it is alledged that this is not 
contrary fo Liberty or Contingency. For there are two kinds 
of Neceffity, one founded on a Contradiflion, /. e. the Pro- 
pofition affirming a thing to be includes fuch a NaceiTity that 
it fhould be, as to make it a Contradidlion to fay it might not 
be, the Caufes th:.t produce it being neceflary. The other 
kind is when there arp fufficicnt Caufes to produce the Eftecl, 
and fuch as will infallibly produce it, but there is no Contra- 
diction in fiying they may not produce it. Tho' therefore he 
that underftands pcrfcdly all the Caufes and Motives that 
concur to an Event, mull know the Reafons how it comes to 
p.ifs i and that thofe Reafons were fo fufEcieut that they pre- 


Sedl. I. Sub. 5' Of Moral Evil, ^33 

tural propensity of our Senfes and Appetites, and at 
the fame time s^ainfl: th^ didate of Reafon. 

xr. We 

2^ O T E S. 

vail'd certainly and inflillibly ; and the Man that had luch a re- 

prcfentation of the prevailing Good or Evil ofwh'aC he was to 

choofe, was carried certainly and infallibly to the Refolution 

he took ; yet this is not necelTarily, becaufe it doth not imply a 

Contradiction that he fliould have determin'd himfelfofherwife. 

Licei enim nunqnam qutcquam e-vcniat quin ejus ratio reddi pof- 

jtt, neque ulla unc^uam detur indifferentia Aquilihrij, cum potius 

Jemper fint cutt&datn pr&pnrntiones in caufa, agente concurrentibufq; 

qnas aliqui pr ^determittatioms "vocant : dicendum tamen ejl has 

determinationes effe tantum incllnantes, non necejjlt antes ; Ita ut 

femper aliqtta indiff'erentiafinic continge7itia Jit fal'va ; nee tantus 

unquam iti nobis p.ppetitus ejl ut ex eo aSlus necejfario feojuatur. 

Nam quamdiu home rfientis compos eft, etiamji <vehementijijime ab 

ira, Jiti, vel Jimili caufi Jiimulatur, femper tamen aliqua ratio 

Jijiendi impetum reperiri potefl ilf aliquando 'vel fc!a fujjidt Cogi- 

tatio exercends. libertatis Cs' in affeSiti! Dominij. 

In anfwer to this, which fcems the ftrength of what is ob- 
jedled againft the Autlwr's Notion of Liberty, I defire thefe 
ftw things nviy be conlider'd : 

Firft, thit it is not cafy to comprehend this neceffity of Con- 
tradidtion, which is inconfiftent with Liberty, or to diltinguifh 
it from that Necellity which is only foanded on Conveniency, 
and yet never fails to fucceed, becaufe there is always a fuffi- 
cicnt Reafon or Caufc to produce the effect. I wifh there had 
been an Example given of the one and t'other that we might 
have been able to pafs a better Judgment of them. For to me 
it feems that at this rate all the A<ftions cf Bcafts are as free as 
thofe of Men. If a Beaft be never fo hungry, and turn'd out 
into never fo tempting a Paftiirej yet there is no Contraditflion 
in faying that he may abftain from eating. Nor dc I fee how 
his Appetites being determin'd any more oblige him to eat, 
than a Man's, when all Circumftances, Motives, Predifppliti- 
ons and Qualifications incline him to it. 

adly. At this rate the effefts of all natural Caufes would be 
free. For it is no contradiction to fay the Sun will not rife 
to morrow, but his rifmg is no more free on that account. 
And in truth I do not find that any Propofitions but thofe that 
concern metaphyfical and abftra(5t Verities, are in this Senfe 
receffary. All the eftedts of natural Caufes have only zpofttiTje 
or hypothetical n?c?0ity, thst depends on th? Will of God, 


334 Of Moral Ew\h Chap. V. 

This ap- Xl. We have feen an Atheift fupported by the 
fXncT ^^^i"^<^y of a perverfc Mind, enduring Torments, 


K O T E S. 

Yet if we confider only the Sun, and the part he has in nifing 
himfelf, he cannot be faid in any tolerable fcnfc to be free in 
tifing. And (o if we confider all things given v/hich are ne- 
ceffary to an Aftion, either a Man can in thele Circumftances 
forbear his Adtion, or he cannot ; if he can he is indifferent, 
ior pofitis omnibus ad agf. ndiim requrjitis potefl agere vel non agere, 
which is the very definition ot an indifferent, free Agent: If 
he can't fufpend the acl, then is the neceffity as great on him 
ill thefe Circumftances a; on the Sun to rife. 

. If it be faid' the cafe is diiferent, becaufc a Man has Undet- 
flanding which is always ready to fuggeft to him new Confide- 
r,ations to flop his Adlions. I anfwer, whence come thefe new 
Gonfiderations that alter the Man's Circumfbnces ? If from 
the Will, then it determines itfelf after all, and h not deter- 
min'd by any difpolition, motive or reafon from without : But 
if thofe Gonfiderations that change th^ Will are independent 
of it, and arife from any external difpofition, reafon, or incli- 
nation, he is no more free that is detennin'd to his Choice by 
thefe, than the Sun is free to move when natural Caufes deter- 
mine him to that Motion. 

Every one may not fee all the Chains and Movements that 
lead him to his Choice, but if the will be prjffive in its Deter- 
mination, they areas certain and infallibJ" as if he were drawn 
with Chains of Adamant. And whereas it is faid that the mere 
thought of exercifmg our Freedom is fometimcs l"u flic lent to 
ftay the importunity of all our Pafficns and Inclinations: I 
anfwer, if the Will can crofs all external Caufes v.hich in-; 
cline it to a determination purely on this account, that it will 
cxercifc its Liberty, then it is a clear c:s{q, the exercife of its 
.T>iberty is a greater good to it than all other Conflderations, 
which is the very thing I plead for. 

. But 3dly, I ask ho vv comes this Confideration of exercifing' 
its Liberty in its way ? The Underftauding, you fay, ofl^'ers it. 
But is if Avithout Caufe that it offers it, or cou'd it not have 
offer'd it ? ]i the Cauie be in the Undcrflanding, that is necef- 
lary, and could no more forbear offering it than the Sun could 
forbear riiing. But luppofe this Confideration oll^er'd, no mat- 
ter how, can the Will llill rcjeift it? If it can, wears as far, 
from a determination as ever. For that rejcrting mull be 
citha- from die Will UreU', or fome other C.iufs, concerning, 


Sea. I. Sub. 5. Of Moral Evil. 33^ 

Confinement, and Death itfelf, rather than abjure 
his beloved Impiety : We have feen a great many 



xvhich the fame Queftions recur ; and fo on till we come at 
ihs firlt Caufe, God. In all which Cham every link is ne- 
ceffarily conne£led with the next beforS it, and fo according 
to the Reprefentatidn in Poets, the f^tal Chain is tied to the 
Chair oi Jupiter. He, and he alone is accountable for all the 
Good and 111 of all Sorts in the World. Nor doth it in the 
leaft help Liberty or Contingence that there is no contradifti- 
on in the Propofitions that relate to^ the being or not being of 
Things; for as long as there is a Chain of natural or moral 
Caufes that certainly and infallibly produce the efFefl, in which 
the Will is abfolutely paffive, there is no more room for Li- 
berty in intelligent Caufes than in natural. 

I know very well Men do many things willingly, as Beafts 
eat their Food, and that fome call this Liberty and Contin- 
gence ; but they might as well call it an Elephant or a Horfe, 
For if this were the Queftion, whether Men did things volun- 
tarily and with a full inclination, no body cou'd queftion but 
they did: but it is plain v/hen we ask whether a Man be free 
or no, our meaning. is whether he has a fall power to do or 
nofdoany thing notwithftanding all previous Conditions and 
Circumfances, in which providence has placed him. Not 
that a Man is always abfoluicly indifferent : for he may have 
Reafons and Inclinations that may byafs him greatly one way i. 
yet notwithftanding that byafs he has itiil a power to adlagainii 
them all, and plcafe hirnfelf in fo doing. 

'Tis plain to me that they Vv'ho arc againft this true Freedom. 
muft be prepoffelVd witl\ an opinion that all things in Nature 
are paffive and adted on by others; which was expreffly Mr. 
Hohbs\ Dodrine : and tho' they endeavour to diftinguifh them- 
felves from his Difciples, 'tis in vain ; their fentiments come 
to the fame thing as to ncceffity, and the fame caufes, reafons 
and arguments are produced by both i the conclufion alfo is the 
fame, only the one calh that an abfolute neceffity, which the 
other calls neceffity of convenience, that is of a thing's being, 
becaufe there is fufficient reafon to produce it. For the very 
reafon by which he proves his neceffity, is this of zfujictent 
Caufe. If the caufe, fays he, be fufficient, and all Predifpoli- 
tions. Conditions and Qualiiications requifite be prefent, the 
effect will certainly follov.' ; wfiich is true.. If then the con- 
fcnt of the Will be cawfed by fomething without itfelf, thofc 


336 Of Moral Evil. Chap. V, 

Pcrfons voluntarily throwing away their Fortunes, 
Life and Soul, left they fliould be difappointed in 

a foolilli 


conditions being prefent, it will neceflarily follow. If it be 
not fo caus'd, it it has a power in itfelf to aft and make a 
thing good or bad, agreeable ordifagreeable by its choice, 'tis 
plain that nothing external can determine it. This proves 
Liberty, a priori. For if there be fuch a poucr 'tis evident 
that pojitis omnihus extra ft udagfndum requijitis, poteji agere, 
aut non agere. All that is pretended to determine it is the an- 
tecedent confiderations of Good or Evil ; but where the chief 
good expefted arifes from the deterniination itre!f, and is con- 
fequent to it, there 'tis impoflible it (hou'd be determin'd by 
fiich Confiderations. 

And this feems to me the true reafon, why fome are fo angry 
at this new Notion, as they call it, of things pleafmg us becaufe 
tve choofe them, fince it utterly deftroys their Notion of a 
paffive Will determin'd only by antecedent views of Good and 
Evil, and demonftrativcly eltabliflies Freedom, therefore they 
treat it as a Chimera, a Fairy and Romance. 

But zdly, 'Tis urg'd that this is a power to choofe without 
any Motive, without any final or impulfive Caufe, which is a 
great impetfeflion. Anfwer, I deny that this is to choofe 
without any motive or final Caufe 'Tis choofing indeed with- 
out any motive or caufe which is foreign to the Will; fo that 
it does not depend in its Operations on any external Objeft?, 
but the Caufe, motive and end of its adions in itfelf j and 
fure 'tis not the worfe for being thus independent ; it has ?. 
Caufe and End, even to pleafe itfelf, and furely to have it in 
its own power to do fo is far from an Imperfeftion. 

Suppofe two Men, one has fufficient to ieed and cloath 
himfelf in his PofTefiion, the other is forced to go abroad and 
beg for both, and let any one judge which of them is in the 
moll perfeft or happy Condition. 

3dlv, 'Tis faid it docs not appear how pure indifFcrencc 
tan contribute to Happincfs ; on the contrary the more a Fa- 
culty is indifferent the more muft the Perfon poflcfs'd of it be 
infenfible of the Good he enjoys. But fure thofe that r.'.ife 
fuch Objeftions have either never read or little mindad the 
Book. If the Author had taught that the Faculty continued 
indifferent after the Choice, there had been ground for fuch an 
Objettion ; but on the contrary he holds that after the Elec- 
tion is made the Will is ns much attached to the thing cholen 


Sea. I. Sub. ^. Of Moral EviL 337. 

a foolill^ Choice. We have beheld not a few difre- 
garding the Intreaty of their Friends, the Advice 



whilft the Eleflion continues, as the natural Appetites are tcJ 
their Objetts ; and it enjoys it with as much, nay greater 
pleafure, and to fach a degree that fometime it prefers the En- 
joyment of it to Life. Bat the Happinefs lies in this, that it 
is not obliged to choofc, and when it has chofen, if it can't 
enjoy the Object of its choice, it may rejedl it again. 
: 4thly, 'Tis urg'd that fuch a Faculty as this would rendef 
Science ufclefs, reduce all adlions to mere Chance, and leave 
us no Meafures or Rules for them. 

I can't but wonder what fliould induce any to bring fuch 
Arguments. The Cafe is this : Man is placed by God ;in a 
World where he is concerned with, and has relation to many 
Objefts ; he has many Appetites which he may gratify by the 
right Enjoyment of thefe ObjeiSts ; he may meet with many 
difagreeable things in the courfe of Affairs, and may employ 
himfelf in many things that in the end will prove impoinble 
to compafs, that may hurt his fellow Creatures, or incroach on 
things forbid him by his Creator : To comprehend thefe he 
has an undcrftanding given him, as well as a power to choofe 
or refrain from any of them ; but becaufe his UnderRanding 
ic not infinite, and therefore he may often miftakc, and it may 
fo happen that the bars and limits aflign'd by God and Nature 
may hinder him from enjoying what his natural Appetites re- 
quire, and his Judgment fees wou'd be moil agreeable to him, 
therefore God has given him a power of Choice, whereby he 
may make thofe things agreeable that would be otherwife, 
were he only to gratify his natural Appetites. So that this 
Power is fuperior to them all, and in a great meafure com- 
mands them and their Adlions, infomiich that he finds a plea- 
fure and Satisfadion often in curbing and reftraining them. 
Nay this Faculty is of fuch. force that it always carries its Sa- 
Jtisfaclion with ii ; and tho' it cannot abfolately change tha 
natur« of the Appetites, or make us not feel the natural Evils 
that furround us, fuch as pain, torment, difappointmcnt ; yet 
by its exercite it raifes us fo much Satisfaftion as to make the<'c 
tolerable, if not pleafing to us- 

Now mull not every one fee that fuch a Faculty as this ads 
on the greateft reaion and for the bell end, even to make all 
the adions of a Man's Life, as far as poffible, pleafmg to him ? 
And doth it not appf:ar that fuch a Will nfcds plain and cer- 

Z ' uia 

33^ Of Moral Evil. Chap. V^. 

of their Relations, the Didares of their own Mind, 
Dangers, piftrefTes, Death, the wrath of God, and 
the pains of Hell ,• in fhort, defpifing all that is 
Good, or could appear to be fo, when fet in com- 
petition with fuch things as, exclufive of the Good- 
nefs which they receive from Eledion, are mere 
\ Trifles and worth nothing at all ; fuch as have no 
manner of Good or pretence of Good in them. 
There have been Perfons who knowingly, without 
any kind of hope, any kind of belief, have dcftroy'd 
thcmfelves and their Relations, and yet were in their 
right Mind and confiftent with themfelves, if a right 
IVlind may be judg'dof by fober Words and a le- 
rious tenor of Adion. Did thefe Men follow Rea- 
fon, or any other Good befide the fruition of their 
Choice ? We have fliewn already that this Power 
may produce thefe and greater Abfurdities; for fmce 
it is luppos'd to be of fuch a Nature as can pleafe 
itfelf in its A(5t, where ever it can exert that Ad, it 
can alfo pleafe itfelf, even in oppofition to the natu- 
ral Appetitesj the Senfes and Reafon. If then fuch 

a Prin- 


lj.\n Aleafures and the greateft prudence and judgment to z&. 
by: othcrvvife it may fall into impoffible, ahrur'd or wicked' 
Choices, It has been flievvn in the Book what limits arc af- 
iign'd our Wills by God and Nature, and how ncceffary it is' 
we fhculd keep within them. In fliort the Argument is as if 
one fliould alledge, a Prince is abfolute Govcrnour of his King- 
dom, and mull: not be controlcd by his Subjedls, therefore he 
needs no Counfellors, bccaiife he is not obliged to be deter- 
min'd by them. But hire the more abfolute he is, the more 
need he has to prefcribc good Rules to himfelf, and advife with 
the bell Counfellors he can find, becaufe he has it in his pow- 
er to rule well, and none is to blame but himfelf if he do nor. 
Whereas if he were to be determined by his Counfellors, he 
wou'd be under no fuch concern, fmce they, not he, wou'd 
m all reafon be anfwerabic for hi? Millakes. 

Sea. I. Sub. 5. Of Moral Evil. 339 

^ Principle be granted to be In us, it wilt not feem 
Grange that we iliould be able to do thing> that 
are repugnant to thefe,' if this be not allow'd, ic 
cannot be made appear how fo many Abfurdities, 
fo many things difagree.-'ble to Reafon, to Senfe ; fo 
many things contrary to the di(::iate of the Mind, 
fhould every Day be committed by Mankind. 
- XII. Nay, which may Teem more ftrangc, the ^Jj^^^^^*^^ 
Will appears to have fo great a Power over the Un- ftan/jng 
derftanding that the latter is lb far fuhdu'd by its admits not 
Choice, as to take Evil rhings for Good, and forc'd only evil 
to admit Falfities for Truths. Neither will this ^'^'^f''^\ 
appear impolhble to cne who recolkds thnt the |°°fit:es^ 
Senfes are as much narural Faculties, and hiVe by for Truths 
Nature as quick a Reiifn of thdr proper Objeds, wz. being 
and can as well diftinguifh thofe that are agreeable ""^5'' ^'^^^■' 
from them that are di'?greeable, as the Underdand- J^^'^-jj*^ 
ing. If therefore we fometimes pleafe ourfelves in 
choofing what is repugnant to the Senles, 'tis alfo 
poffible for us to take pieaCure in embracing what is 
difTonant to Reafon, The Senfes are forced to ad- 
mit and tolerate fuch things as are difguftful to 
them, which rhings they take for agreeable by u'e> 
having as complete Enjoyment of them as of thofe 
that are adapted to tlicm by Nature ■*. The lame 
may happen fometimes to the Under (landing, viz,. 
to be compeird by the Will to Falfities for 
Truths, to believe them thro' cuftom, and at laft 
make ufe of them fcrioufly as Truths. Hence comes 
that common Saying, that wc eagerly belicvs v^hat ipe 
eagerly dejire , and fome take a pleafure in fubduing 
not only Senfe, but Reafon too. I confcfs, he 
that does this, ads foolinily and is much toDhme, 
but from this very thing, that wc aft fooHihlvs, 

Z z th'at 

* Nay generalh fnore fo : ^Tis <s common Obfervation, that 
fuch things as nuere at fir ft the mo ft dijagreeahle of all to the Pa- 
late, become hy ufe the mofl delightful : v\%. Wines, Tobaa^t 
Olives, &c. 

340 Of Moral Evil. Chap. V. 

that we are to blame, 'tis evident that we not only 
can, but adually do pleafe ourfelves in Eledions 
which are made contrary to Reafon ; and that the 
Judgment of our Undcrftanding depends upon the 
Will, rather than that the Will is determin'd by 
it. From hence it is evident that all the Sign? and 
Properties of a Power of pleafing itfelf by Elec- 
tion agree to us, and therefore we certainly partake 
of it. 
*Tis pro- XIII. The fame will appear thirdly, from con- 
wehave ^^c^ng the Reafons which move us to the choice 
this Power of ihele Abfurdities according to the Opinion of 
from a thofe Men who think that the Will is paffive in E- 
confidera- le^lions. For if, while they are labouring to af- 
thoVrea- ^S" Reafons for thefe and the like Determinations 
fens which itiey produce nothing for Reafons but the very E- 
arefup- ledions themfelves, or their Effeds, it will be ap- 
poftd to parent that they are in a Mif^ake, and offer EfFeds 
^h^^W'H^ for Caufes; which will appear more fully from an 
Enumeration of thofe Reafons which are fuppofed 
to move the Will in fuch Cafes. 
Thofe are XIV. The Principal of thefe Reafons are Errors 
eniime- ^jr ^^^ Vnderjlandingt ObjTmacy of the Mind^ the force 
Tared. ^y pafjicns^ and M^dnefs; on thefe are charg'd all 
the unreafonable, abfur'd, and impious Adions of 
Men , thefe are efleemed the Caufes of all fuch E- 
lecfHons as cannot be allow'd to proceed from the 
intrinlic Coodnefs of the Objeds which are chofe ; 
but this is all groundlefs. 
^"^^'r^k ^^' ^°^ ^^ ^^^^ ^^^ place,' as to Errors of the 
Under-' ^ '^^jderjiandingy 'tis certain that we fometimes choofc 
Handing: hurtful Objeds by miftake, which we often la- 
thefe are ment, but never impure to ourfelves, except we be 
Ihewn to confcious that the Error was voluntary, ;. e. in 
uporde- ^°"^^ refpeft ow*d its Origin to Ele(5^ion. Elcdion 
prav'd E- then is prior to all culpable Error, for that depends 
UCdon ra- upon it, 'Tis not therefore always by miftake that 
ther than ^g choofe Abfurdities, but by chooling Abfurdu 
tVC3Ul<?it. - jjgj 

Scd. r Sub. 5. Of Moral Evil. 341 

ties we miftake the Truth. But 10 confefs the 
Truth, we are hurried on in an abfurd Elcftion, 
tho' we fee and know all that we are about to do : 
if then there be any Error, 'tis only this that we 
judge it better to enjoy a free Eledion, than to be 
exempt from natural Evils. Hence it is evident 
that there arifes fo much Pleafure from Ele<9:ion as is 
able to imppfe upon the Underftanding, and induce 
it to prefer that to all kinds of natural Good, nay 
to Life itfeif. But whether this be done errone- 
ouflv or wifely, 'tis the ftrongeft Argument that we 
have fuch an Eledive Self-pleafing Principle as this 
within us. 

XVI. Secondly, as for Objiinacy, by which they Secondiv 
fuppofethat we are moved to choofe abfurd things; obftinacy: 
'tis plain that this is nothing elfe but the perfeve- which is 
ranee of a bad Election : neither can Obftinacy and ^ewn to 
Perverfenefs be explain'd otherwife than by Eleftions. ^j^^-"^^ ^'"^ 
If it be granted that things pleafe us becaufe they pcrfeve- 
are chofen, we fee clearly enough what Obftinacy ring in a 
is, vi3j, an unnecefTary adherence to an Eledion, f^epravU 
and a Self-complacency in it contrary to the didate ^^^'^^^'^' 
of Reafon, and with the lofs of natural Good. (57.) 
But if the Will be determin'd from without, there 
will be no fuch thing as Obftinacy. By an obfti- 
Z 3 nate 


(57.) Leibnitz (in his Remarks frequently cited above) ar- 
gues * " That Obftinacy is not barely the continuance of a 
" bad Eleflion, but a difpofition to perfevcrc in it, proceed- 
" ing from fome Good that a Man forms to himfelf, or from 
" fome Evil which one fuppofes to attend the change. The 
** firft Eleftion, fays he, was made perhaps thro' mere Le'vitj^ 
♦' but the refolution of adhering to it comes from fome ftron- 
" gcr Reafonsor ImprefTions". But if this be all that is meant 
by Obftinacy, how come the World to fix fo bad a Notion to 
fhat Word ? If it be a difp^lition always proceeding from a 


» Page ^8 2 J 

342 Of Moral Evil. Qhap. Y . 

nate Perfon we fliall only mean one that has continu- 
ed a long time in a pernicious Error, without any 
Motive to change his Judgment. Now he that does 
this is miferable indeed, but cannot be call'd in the 
leaft deg'ee ohRinate, according to the common No-? 
tion of Mankind. 
Thirdljs XVIL Thirdly fince neither Errors nor Obfli- 
The vio- j^g^y gj-g fuHicient to explain the Nature of thele 

cviz. Be- 'i^iz,. the of Fame or Glory ; Anger, Ha- 
fire of trcd, CTf. Thcfe are the Caufes, fay thcy^ why we 

Fame and choofc 

Glorv', CJc 

all which ,- ^ <t t- n 

are proved JN O 7 E S. 

to derive 

their in- profpect of Good, or dread of Evil, and founded on fccond 
ordinate thoughts and ftronger Reafons : how can it ever be deemed a 
force from Crime ? Again, if ihcjirji Elcflioa can be made without any 
Election, external Motive, (which he fccms to allow by affigning Leni- 
ty aS the fole Caufe of it) why may not the perfeverance in it 
be fo too ? may not the fame Caufp be fuppos'd to produce the 
fubfequent Elc£licns, as well as the firfl ? In fliort, Leihnttx, 
after all his feeming oppofition to our Author on the head of 
Liberty, iTicfl: evidently grants the Queftion both here, and 
p. 480. where he afnrms, that in eircdt we are able to chang^ 
the Natures of things, and make thefe transformations above- 
mentioned. " Eut this (fays he) is not as ainong the Fairies^ 
" by a fimple A£l of that Magic Power ; but becaufe a Man 
" darkens or fupprcffes in his Mind, the reprcfentations ot 
*' the good or ill Qiialities naturally join'd to certain Objeflsj 
^' and becaufe we only regard tliofe which are agreeable to 
*' our Tafte, or PrepoITeffions 3 or even becaufe we join by 
-' force of thought, certain Qiialities, which are only found 
*' united by accident, or by our cuilomary way ofconfidering 
"' them". New what is it to darken or fupprefs the reprcfen- 
tations of good or ill Qualities, — to re^^ird fome only and neg- 
kc\ others, — and to join Qurdities to Objeds by the force of 
thought, — but to exert this very Power in debate ? Which 
ofien choofcs the fruition, or even the confidcration of fomc 
one out of- many equal and indilTercnt Objeds, and by that 
iimple A61 makes it agreeable to our Tafte, and joins fuch 
Si^ulities to it as could .ndcher proceed from Chance nor Cuf- ' 
tgin, no.r" any Afibciatiqn of Ideas whalfoever. S:;c ihe Con- 
cl'olron ai' this Subjcdl in the following Norr . 

Sed. I. Sub. 5. Of Moral EviL 343 

choofe abfurdly, and by them the Choice is derer- 
min'd. But Fame or Glory have no manner of 
Good in them, efpecially to thofe who beheve that 
they iliall not exift after Death : why then are thefe 
Men content to purchafe Glory with Life ? Certain- 
ly from no other Caufe befide Eledion; 'tis by 
Eledion that we have form'd thefe Idols to ou felves, 
and from thence they derive whatever Good is in 
them. To be talk'd of after Death, to mount upon 
the Wings of Fame, to extend our Name to diflanc 
Regions; thefe things pleafe us on no other account 
but becaufe we will them. Obfcurity, Oblivion, 
Retirement will be as pleafing to the Man that choo- 
fes them, and have been fo. Thofe Perfons then who 
imagine that thele determine Eledions, take EfFefts 
for Caules. For thefe, which are nothing in them- 
felves, fhew us that they acquire fo much Good- 
nefs from Eleftion as makes them over-ballance all 
kind of natural Good. 

XVIII. The fame muft be faid of Anger, Hatred, The fame 
Love and Defpair, by which many are believed to isfhewnof 
be driven upon Abfurdities. But in reality ail that Hatred;^ 
is abfurd and pernicious in thefe Paffions proceeds '^' ' 
from Eledion. Nature has given us Paffions which 
are generally innocens while folicitcd only by their 
proper Obje(5ls and natural Opportunity, as we fee 
in Brutes ; but they are compell'd to change the na- 
tural Objeds by the Power of Eledion : thus An- 
ger and Hatred are excited by the Will, and apply'd 
not to fuch things as are naturally hurtful, nor Love 
and Delire to fuch as are naturally defirable, but to 
others of a quite different kind, v/ith which they 
have no natural Congruity, fuch as Fame and Glo- 
ry after Death. Of this kind alfo are moil of the In- 
ftruments of Luxury, which are commonly fiid to 
pleafe, purely by the (Irength of Fancy, that is in re- 
ality, by Eledion. Hence it is that Men purfue 
with fp great eagernefsj and emotion fuch ^ings 35 

Z 4 " " are 

344 Of Moral Evil. Chap. V. 

arc in thcmftlu# triflng, pernicious, ai)d abfui'd. 
Nay they barter away Life itfclf lor irifles, and 
v/hen they cannot enjoy thcni, caft off that in dif- 
pair. 'Tis the EleCrjon itielf which fubftitnrts 
rhefe things as fit to be proCeciucd by thefj PaOTi- 
ons inftead of their natural Objeds, and while they 
are hurry 'd on, not accoiding to the exigaue of 
Nature^ but the command of the Will, they con- 
found every thing, tranfgrefs the bounds of reafon 
and utility, and difrcgarding ihefe rage without li- 
mits or reltramt, 
pfEnvy XIX. As for Envy anJ Revenge, they are not 
and Re- owing to Nature but the Will, and fetting afide 
vcnge. Election are mere nothing. For whatever is pre- 
tended to the contrary, there can be no other account 
given why any one Ihould undergo Labours, Dan- 
gers, Griefs and Difficulties ; why he fliould lofe 
his Reputation, Family, Country, nay his Life, 
for the Satisfadion of his Envy or Revenge, but 
that he refolv'd within himfelf, but that he chofe to 
fatisfy them. 'Tis evident that the moft unexperi- 
enc'dperfon is fufficiently convinc'd of this. But 
thefe, when once embrac'd by Eledion, becopie 
jrore agreeable than thofe things which Nature has 
inade neceH'ary. Tho'e abluid Eledions then are 
not made by the force of thdc Palfions, but the 
abfurd and irregular force of tfiefe flows from Elec- 
Fourthly, XX. They who perceive that thefe Caufes are 
Madnejs: infufficient, have recovirfe to Maci»cf$ and Phrefr^y^ 
'usprov'd j,-, order to accovint for abfurd Elections : but this 
*^" ^. r ^^ pl^)'""? upon Words, and raking Madnefs in a 
that theie different Senfc from that wherein it is commonly un- 
Mcnare dcrflood. He is look'd upon as mad that is lo far 
in their jjiforder'd in h^s Mind as not to be able to deduce one 
Senfcs jjg^ ^j.^jjj andther, nor make Obfcrvations upon 
choofc ab- ^^^t he fees: but thefe Men who do fo many abfurd 
f^rdly- fhings enjoy the abovciFiei^tion'd Powcr.s and hav? 
" • " ' ■ their 

Sed. I. Sub. 5. Of Moral Evil. 345 

their Underftanding and Senles ftrong enough by 
Nature : what is it therefore which drives them in- 
to Abfurdities \ The power and prevalence of the fu- 
perior Faculty, viz,, the WilU which has a Good 
peculiar to itielf, which it ptoduces by Eledion. 
This it purines regardlefs of all that Reafon, the 
Body, Circumftances, Appetites and natural Facul- 
ties require. For while it (an provide for and pleafe 
kfelf, it is not at all folicitous about any thing which 
may prejudice thefe, but has a certain Complacency 
in its own Exercife, and endeavours to augment its 
Irlappii^efs by the purfuit of fuch things as are re- 
pugnant to them. The more Difficulties and Ab- 
furdities it encounters, the more it applauds itfelf in 
% conlcioufnefs of its own Abilities i which feems to 
be the very thing that we call Vanity and Pride, 
Hereupon it compels the Senfes, Keafon, and natur 
ral Appetites, to be fubfervient to its Elecfiions: noi: 
can he becall'da Madman who ads againft Reafon, 
thro' the force of a fuperior Faculty, any more than 
i>e t|iat falls from a Precipece by the violence of a 
greater impulfe. Fpr it is not every one who ads 
againft reafon, that muft immediately be look'd up- 
on as Mad, but only he that ads abfurdly from fome 
injury done to tlie underihnding Faculty itfelf, or 
an Impediment to the \3{t of Reafon : he that could 
have followed the didate of Re,ifon and yet know- 
ingly violated it, muft not be reckon'd mad, but 
wicked, unlefs we will impofe upon ourfelves by 
changing the cuftomary Names of things. All thde 

XXI. If it be granted that we have this fuperior things 
Faculty, 'tis plain enough that all thefe things may g^""^ng^ 
come to pafs. For he that is endow'd with it, will otherwife 
be able to pleafe himfelf in the Profecution of his than by 
Eleftions, even to the detriment of both Body and admitting 
Mind ; to tJie prejudice of Senfes, Appetites and ^f "^""^^^ 
Reafon; which we often fee done to our Amaze- kjnd, 
liientj- but unlefs we have this Faculty imparted to 
" - USa 

34^ Of Moral Evil. Chap. V. 

us, it does not feem poffible for us to create Good 
to ourfelves by Election, and to prefer what is thus 
Asmnch created to every nariiral Good, 
goodarifes XXII. Thel'c things, I confefs, ought not to be 
Primriple *^°"^ ' ^^^ if nothing could be done which ought 
fo it is at- ^°^> there would be no fuch thing as a Fault. As 
tended therefore much Good ariles from this Principle, fo 
with this there is this Evil alfo, that by it Crimes and Follies 
Evil, wz. jj.g committed : And it has this Inconvenience, that 

a Power • j i • i 

of finnin^. ^^ "" "*^ '^^^^ ^^ ought not. 

XXIII. From the(e and other Arguments which 
'^\^^ T'^' ^^g^^^ b^ brought, I think it is evident that God has 
Se^Wiir S*^^^ ^'^ ^ Principle of this kind, and that our Will 
follows *s only determin'd by itfelf. They are miftaken 
the Judg- therefore who affirm that either the Appetites, Paffi- 
ment of ons, or Underftanding, determine Eledions. What 
i? di^ ^'^' P^°^^^'y ?^^^ occalion to the Mi (lake was, that other 
arofefro'm things pleafe or difpleafe us, belide what we choofe, 
Iience,'77/2;. viz, fuch as are agreeable to the Appetites or Senfes, 
that it is Now it being oblerv'd that we have regard to thefe 
impruaent jj^ Eledirns and do not choofe any thing repugnant 
aft' with- ^^ J^hem, but upon neceility, and that all Men are of 
out con- Opinion, that the Judgment of the Underftanding 
faking the Ought to be made uieofin choofing, and being ac- 
^'nder- cuftom'd to this kind of Choice, we become at lad 
J*^ 'I'-g- perfuaded that it is abfolutely neceffary, and that our 
Wills are always determin'd by fome Judgment of 
the Underftanding : at Icaft, that it i^ a Condition 
requifire in the O^jjcft, that the Mind judge the 
thing chofen to be good and agreeable to the Appe- 
tites. Whereas the contrary to all this is generally 
true viz., that the Mind judges things to be good 
becaufe we have willed them, becaufe we have form- 
ed an Appetite in ourfclvcs by fome antecedent Elefti- 
on, and thofe things which we embrace by this fr.c- 
'ditions u4ppetitey as we may call it, give us equal 
Pleafure with that which we defu-e by the Neccltuy 
of Nature. 

XXIV, Nay 

Sea. I. Sub. 5. Of Moral Evil. 54;^ 

XXIV. Nay we choofe Obje(5J:s vhich are con- We can 
traiy to all the Appetires, contrary to Reafon, and ^'^mor- 
deftitute of all Appearance of Good, perhaps for this fj^^J^^^Q^y 
only Reafon, that we may affert our Liberty of Elec- Liberty, 
tion> 'Tis certain that every one can do this, and which is 
he that does iu, proves by an Experiment that he is prov'd to 
ir^^t and has a Power of pleafing himfelf in Eleftion. f^^j^J^g 
>Ior can he be faid to be determin'd by the Judg- ^^i^g 
ment of the UnderQanding ; for this reafon is made without 
by the Mind itfelf, and may ferve equally for every any reafoi? 
Eledion, iince it is drawn from the Indifference of '^^ ^"* 
the Will itfelf: and he who does any thing upon a 
reafon which is made by himfelf, and is indifferent 
to either Side, muft be efteem'd to a6t in the fame 
manner as if he had done it without any reafon at all. 
"Tis evident therefore that we have this Power, and 
make ufe of the Appetites and Senfes only as Spies 
and Informers; of Reafon as a Counfellor; but that 
the Will is Mafter of itfelf, and creates pleafure for 
itfelf in Objects by Eledion. ("580 



(58 ) Upon the whole it appears that the true dcfcription of 
Free-will mull incUide thus much. A Power of choormg or 
not choofing, or of choofmg either Side in any given Cafe ; 
naturally independent of any mediate or immediate, external 
or internal force, compulfion, influence or neccfhty ; phyli- 
cally indetermln'd by either bodily Senfations, Appetites, is'c. 
or mental Perceptions, Reafon, Judgment. 'Tis an Ability 
of determining either among equal and indifferent Objeits, or 
of preferring the purfuit of fome before others that are entirely 
different from or contrary to them : or laflly, of preferring the 
very confideration of fome unknown Objedls to all the reft ; 
of deliberating upon, or attending to fome particular Ideas, 
jnd refolving to overlook others, tho' equally prefentcd to the 
Mind, and fuppos'd to be of equal Importance. 

All this is contain'd in the very Notion of a Se!f-movi7?g 
Ponver J (tho' none perhaps have given fo full and diflincl an 
Explication of it as our Author) for that which in ftriclnefs 
jnovcs itfelf, is properly and phyfi.cally independent of, an4 



Of Moral Evil. Chap. V. 

SECT. 11. 

Where it h Jhewn that Happinefi conjijis in 

The more 
free any 
Being is, 
the lefs he 
is exposM 
80 Motions 
fiom with- 
cut, and 
meets with 
lefs incon- 

I. T7 ROM what has been faid above, it appears 

Jl that a Being endow'd with a Power of 

choofing is more excellent and perfeft than one 



indifferent to all external Movers, as long as it continues to 
do fo; what is determin'd in certain circumftances by or ac- 
cording to particular Senfations, Motives, i^c. and cannot 
pofTibly be determin'd either without or againft them, is fo far, 
and in fuch circumftances, only moved, afted upon, and pure- 
ly palTive. If then there be any fuch thing, properly fpeaking, 
as an adlive Principle, it muft be endow'd with fuch an abfo- 
lutc Indifference as our Author fuppofes : and when we fpsak 
ox t\\& Jirongeji Motinjes , we don't mean fuch as have the grea- 
tcft phyfical Influence or Weight in turning the ballance of the 
Will (fince we fuppofe none of them to have any at all) but only 
fuch as the Mind moft commonly determines itfelf upon in 
fadt; and to argue from fuch determinations that thefe Motives 
muft have fuch an Influence both abfolutely and comparatively, 
/. e. whether taken by themfclves, or in oppofition to each 
other ; is manifeftly to beg the Queftion, and ftill to fuppofe 
that it cannot move or direft itfelf, notwithftanding our moft 
evident perception and experience of the contrary. And that 
we have fuch experience, a little reflection on ourfelves will 
convince us. " I think (fays Mr. CoUiber,) I may appeal 
«' to any confidering Man, whether he be not in all ordinary 
" Cafes fenfible of an ability of darting his thoughts upon an^^ 
" particular Objeft, even antecedently to any deliberation, 
*' and then, whether after deliberation about particular Objfds 
*' he cannot refumc his deliberAtiOK, and fometimes vary his 

•' Judgment J 

Sea. 2. Of Moral Evil. 349 

that is without it : For that which neither ads 
nor is aded upon, is the farthcft from Perfedion, 


*' Judgment; and whether, after the cleared Judgment, and 
*' moft deliberate Choice of particular things or actions, he be 
*« not ftill confcious of a power of fufpending his praftice, of 
" refuming the corifideration of the Objeds whenever he plear 
" fes, or of immediately choofmg or praftifrng the contrary, 
" without being determin'd by impreflions from without, or 
" impediments from within. But we have no clearer proof 
" of our own Exiftence than Confcioufnefs : and I conceive we 
" need not expeft greater Evidence of any thing than we have 
*' of our Exiftence *". 

If then our Mind ha? fuch a power of felefting fome parti- 
cular Ideas out of many perceived by theUnderilanding, and 
attending to them alone without any previous apprehenfion_ of 
their nature and tendency, wit'hout any fpecial Reafon, Motive 
or inducement wharfoever to fuch particular Choice; if the 
Mind, I fay, does in fonve Cafes exert fuch a power as this, 
then It is in thefe Cafes abfolutely free. It cannot here be di- 
refted by the Judgment, fmcc it is fuppos'd to acl: independent- 
ly of it : nay it may be properly faid fometimes to influence 
and direa, or rather to obftrufl and' fubvert the Judgment it- 
felf, for as much as it confines that to forae particular Objefts 
only, and of confequence renders it partial, and precipitates it 
in the Choice of thefe, and withdraw* others from it, which 
were abfolutely necelTary to a compleat View of the Subjeft, 
and an exadl determination about it. Hence the fpring of all 
Errors, at leaft all criminal ones, hence vitious, abfurd Elec- 
tions, and a Labyrinth of Woe. From the fame Power alf» 
duly apply"d proceeds the happy confcioufnefs of Defert, and 
in it is entirely founded all the reafon of Reward. It's ufeful- 
xiefs then, and neceflity, appear both for the eftablifhment of 
Ivloralityj the ground of all rational Happinefs ; and alfo, that 
we might always have wherein to pleafe ourfelves, which (as 
our Author has fhewn in the latter end of SubfeA. 4.) other- 
wife wc very often could not. Hence it appears I think fuf5- 
riently, that thi^ Power is one of our greateft Perfeftions, tho\ 
(like all othtr Pcrfeaions that come ihort of Innnityj it be 


* Impartial Enquiry, Sec. p. 42, 43- See alfo .an Efaj 9^ 
Confdoujnefs, p. 205., t^c. 

S5^ Of Moral Evil. Chap. V. 

fince it is of no more ufe in Nature than if it were 
nothing at all ,• that which is purely paflive in its 



liable to the greateft abufc, and fo capable of being turn'dinto 
the worft of Imperfedlions. 

It remains to be enquired with our Author, ■whether all the 
Happinefs arifing from it counterballanccs the Mifcry, and 
confequcntly, whether we and all oth«r rational Creatures 
fnight not have been as well or better without it. But for this 
fee § 2. and 5. 

We fhall here only add a Word or two in vindication of this 
Principle againil; the three principal Oppofers of Liberty above- 
inentioned. In the firft: place then, we don't afl'ert that by this 
Povver the Mind can choofe Evil as E-vil or refufe Good as 
Qood, \. e. that the former, as fuch, is or can be a Moti've for 
Choice, or the latter for refufal : But we fay that it can choofe 
the one and refufe the other njoithout any particular Mottle at 
all ; (i. e. any drawn from the particular nature of the Obje£t 
chofen,) nay, in oppofition to the rtrongelt Motive {^ciz. that 
Motive which prcfents the greatcil Happinefs, and which it 
ulually does, and always ought to follow) purely by the force 
of its free, a£l:ive or fclf moving Power. * 

You'll fay it docs this to prove it's own Po\yer, and the 
pleafure attending fuch proof is the ftrongelx Motive in thefe 
Cafes, I anfwer, that granting this to be fo (which yet is not 
very probable, as appears from what was obferv'd from the 
Bjj'ay on Confcioufnsjs in Note 45.) yet this, as our Author ob- 
fervcs, muft be a Motive of its own creating, which, with re- 
fpccl to Volition, is the fame as none at all. Nay this is x\\z 
very thing we arc endeavouring to prove, ws;. that the Soul 
has a Power of determining to think or ad, and of pleafing it- 
felf in fuch determination, without any other iVIotive or Rea- 
ion but what is produced by itlelf, and follo\vs that very de- 
termination ; without any external Caufe whatfoevcr : in which 
Power all its Liberty confifts, and the greateftPart of its Hap- 
pinefs, as will appear in the next Sedtion. 

Nor fecondly, will fuch a Power as this only make us liable 
to miilatc the true Good which is in things (as the Author of 
the Philofoph. Enquiry and argue) but on the contra- 
rr, it often make: x.n\t Good or Happinefs in thole things vvhic'^ 


* ^ee JackfonV Vindication of human Liberty, p. 49, CtV. or 
the leginnivg o/"£,, ScruttV Defence of Dr. Cbrkc'j A'afion, Skx-. 

Sea. 2. Of Moral Evil. 3 5 ^ 

Operations is one degree more perfed, but that 
which has the Principle of its Adions within itfeU, 



of themfelves had none at all ; and improves thofe things which 
have, and alleviates thofe which have the contrary Qualities ; 
and of confequence is not an Itr.perfeaiov, but a veiy valuable 
and neceffary Perfcdion. Our Author does not fuppofe us 
left to an abfolute, blind indifference in all Objeas (as Lf_^i- 
nitz often urges) without any Guide or Direftion m the Choice 
of them ; which would indeed be an imperfc-aion : biit af- 
firms that the Mind or Man is fcnfiblv and neceffarily afleaeu. 
by fome, and informed by his Undcrftanding of the Nature 
and Effecls of others, and fo is fufficiently dirccled to the Choice 
ofthcfe which arc in themfelves good ana agreeable to his 
Conftitution, and ^jhe n^erfa; yet Hill with the referve of a 
full Power of following or not following that Guide, ot neg- 
kaing or refufmg that Direftion : Which Vonvcr therefore, 
even in thefe Cafes, remains Hill unaffecled. In other Ob- 
iefts, he (hews that the Man is totally indifierent, which yet, 
by an arbitrary Choice, he can make to be no lefs conftituenr 
Parts of his Happinefs. , r u u 

Whence, in the third place, a reply may be form d to the 
common QueCtion, What Benefit is there in a Power of choof^ 
ing freely among things that are really indifferent, and exaftly 
alike ? We anlwer the Benefit of enjoying a^iy one of xh?m\, 
which Enjoyment a Man could not poffibly have without iuch 
a Liberty, but muft neceffuily hang in perpetual Siifpenfc, 
without any Choice at all ? this Leibnitz owns to be an una- 
voidable confequence of his Opinion * and to avoid this Ab- 
furdity, is driven to a greater, viz. to deny that there are any 
fuch indifferent and equal things in Nature f the contrary to 
which has been abundantly evinc'd already with refpecl: to 
■both God and Man. 

I,aftly, to the Arffuraent againft the Pofibility Oi fuch a 
Liberty, fo frequently repeated by the two Authors above 
mentionM, 'viz. that Anions done without any Motive, v/ould 
be EJeJIs without a Cau/e ; We reply, in fhort, that it is a plam 
Petitio Principij, in fuppofmg Motives to be the real phyfical 
efficient Caufes (and thefe are the only Caufes which can con- 
cern" the prefent Queilion) of Volition or Aftion, which we 

deny 5 

* Ejjais de Iheodice, p. 161, ^c. 
t ^ce his a^tb Letter to Dr. Clarke, 

352 Of Moral Evil. Chap. V. 

fince it approaches, as it were, nearer to God, an3 
is more independent, is alfo more of it [elf ^ i. e. it 
feemsto be made for its own fake, and chiefly ta 
refpecl its future Benefit, and on that account to 
be more noble and perfed:. Nor does it feem 
poflible for a greater Perfe6lion to be communi- 
cated than the fruition of fuch a Principle. The 
more free any one is, and the lefs liable to exter- 
nal Motions, the more perfed he \^ : God has there- 
fore multiply'd this kind of Creatures as far as the 
Sy demand Order of his Work allow 'd, and decreed 
that fuch as are paffive in their Operations fliould 
be fubfervient to thele. 
ilappinefs II. Since therefore Happinefs,' according to the 
arifcsfrom common Notion of it, is granted to arile from a 
the proper ^j^g ^^^ ^f jj^^^g Faculties and Powers which every 
ufc of the . J , 1 • r. r J ■ ^ 

Paculties, <^"^ en)oys ; and lince this Power ot determining 

^c. If ourfelves to Aftions and plealing ourfelves in 

therefore them, is the moft perfed of all, whereby we arcf 

*f r^^ the moft confcious of our Exiftence and our Ap- 

Ing be° proach towards God; our chief Happinefs will 

the moil confift in the proper ufe of it, nor can any thing 

noble of be abiblutely agreeable to us but what is chofen. 

all, the fj-s Yi is to be confefs'd that many external Ob- 

grcateft ^ • ^ 

Happinefs ^^^^' 

willconfill • ^^-_- _ ^ 

in the Ex- NOTES. 

ercife of 

it, /. /. in deny; and ydt are fir from filppbfing thefe A6>s to be abfolute- 

Eleftions. Jy without a Caufc; nay vvc alfign them another, and affirm 

that their only true and proper Ciiufe is this felf-moving Power, 

and the only Cauic of this is the Creator who communicated 


On this Subjcft may be fccn Dr Clarke's Demonjirat. p. 
I 36, i5c. 2d Edit, or his Remarks^ Sec. p. 28, &'c. or Chubb'i 
farther Reflexions on Natural Liberty. ColleQion of Trails, 
p. 388, i^c. 

{T.) Againft this it is objc(^ed, ift,' That the Author here 
delcribes Free-will to be a Power of choofing this or that with- 
out any dependence either on the other Faculties or Attributes 
•f the free Agent, or on the Qualities of external Objcds. 


Sea. 2. Of Moral Evil. 353 

'jCcfls, many that are offer 'd by the Senfes, pleafe 
lis ; bus if we look into the thing more nanov/ly, 



Anfwer. TIic Author never faid or imagin'd that Liberty 
Tvas a power to choofc //' all difts without any dependence 
on the other Faculties, ur the Qualities of Obje6>s, but the di- 
re£t contrary ; 'viz. that ali other Faculties of the Agent were 
to be confider'd, his Appetites confulted, and the fitnefs of Ob- 
je£ts obferv'd. Ke exprefly teaches that if a free Agent choofe 
any thing contrary to the natural Appetites without any Caufe, 
he gives himfelf unneceffary trouble, if any thing above his 
power to coiupafs, or impoflible in the Nature of things, he 
hiakes himfelf fo far unhappy. That which the Author main- 
tains is only this, that Goodnefs is the Agreement of a thing 
to foine Appetite, and that agreemeent may either arife from 
the natural fitncfs of the Gbjeft to the Appetite, or the Appe- 
tite's accommodating itfclf to the Obje£i: ; that God has given 
us a power in many Cafes, and indeed in the mod common 
Affairs of Life, to accommodate our will to things; that this 
is done by our choofing them and \v'liatfoever we (o choofe, if 
we can enjoy it, as long as the Choice continues, will pleafe 
us ; and lallly, that this power is of mighty advantage to us ; 
for we can't expecl that things fliould always anfwer our natu- 
ral Appetites, and therefore fince it is unreafonable all the 
World fliould be made to accommodate us, 'tis a great Bene- 
fit that God has given us a power to accommodate ourfelves to 
the things as we find them; if we make a right ufe of this 
power we may be alwayi happy, for we may ahva}'s choofe 
fuch things as we can enjoy, and reject thofe that can't be had, 
and if we do fo we may be always pleafcd. 

Thus things may become Good or Evil to us by our Choice 
and our Happinefs or Mifery will depend upon it. Now he 
that v/ould in earneft confute thii Notion has but one of thcfe 
two things to do, either firft, to ftiew that tliere is no fuch 
Power or Faculty pofiible, or 2dly, That there is no advan- 
tage in it. 

I will put the rambling Obje^licns that I have met with in 
as good a method as I can, tho' they are generally fo little to 
ihe purpofc, that it is harder to bring them in than anfwer 

2dly, Therefore it is urg'd that we know by experience that 
to make a Man pleafe himfelf in his Choice, it is notneccflary 
that he fhould believe that he is not infenfiblv a;id imDercepti--' 

A a '- bly 

354 ^/ ^0^^^ ^vil. Chap. V. 

this will appear to arife from hence only, that 
thcfe are as Motives which induce us to exert an 



bly direfted to it by fome external Caufe ; and the inference 
from this, if intended agiinft the Author, muft be, that there- 
fore a Man's choofing a thing doth not make it pleafing to 
him: but nothing like this follows; all thst can be juftly in- 
ferr'd is that whether a choice be free or necefiltated it is luffi- 
cicnt to make the thing chofen agreeable. 

It were in vain to produce all the Inllances impertinently 
brought to prove that a necelTitated choi<:e may pleafe us. Yet 
to fhew how Urangely fomc Authors can wander from the 
point I will examine one or two of them. Firll, it is faid, if 
a Man fhould upon mature Deliberation refolvc on a thing, 
and whilll about to execute it, on a fudden a ftrong impetu- 
ous thought comes into his Mind to do fomething elfe, and he 
follows that and fuccecds, he would conceive an extraordinary 
Joy ; for he muft imagine that God, a good Angel, or his good 
Fortune had prompted him to do it, and therefore it is not his 
Choice that pleafcs him. 

I anfwer, Firlt, it is plain fuch a Man alters his Choice, 
and makes a new one, and that new one pleafes him ; it his 
former Choice continued, he coa'd not have made the nev/ 
one, nor would the doing the thing he is about otherwife 
fatisfy him. 

But zdly. We muft diftinguifti between the Choice and the 
means of obtaining it. When once the Choice is made, the 
mofi; eafy and effectual ways of obtaining the thing chofen 
pleafe us beft. A Man is to fight a Battle, his choice is to con- 
quer ; he thinks of means to execute it. Several ways occur 
and he pilches upon one, which pleafes and is chofen, not for 
itfelf, but as fublcrvient to his deftre of Vi£tory. An Angel 
appears and direfts him to another : none can doubt but this 
will caufe extraordinary joy in him, bccaufc it brings him to 
obtain his Choice by the moft certain and infallible means. 
Now this is fo far from proving that Choice is not the thing 
that gives goodnefs to ObjefVs, that it direftly proves the con- 
trary. For here the only thirg that makes him rejed his 
reafon propofed to him as the beft n.eans to obtain his Choice, 
is becaufe he ha=! difcover'd a better. On the other Hand, it 
a General out c* treachery fhould defign to lofc a Battle, and 
it happened in ciie hurry that he fliou'd be forced to do fomc- 
thint^ that gain'ti it, he wovild not pleafe himlclf in the A6lion. 


Sea. 2; Of Moral Evil 355 

Aft of Eledioft, whereby we embrace them as if 

they were agreeable to the natural Appetites : for 

A a 2 tho*^ 


Here's a Viftory that is good to one and ill to another, and 
the difference lies plainly in the one's choofmg and the other's 
rejefting it. 

But zdly, 'tis obje£led, that a Ja:ifcrJJl or Caknniji who 
gives an Alms, nnd is perfuaded that God infpircs him to do 
jfo, is better plci'led with himielf than a Stoick, who attributes 
to himfelf all the Glory of a charitable A£lion. Well, v/hat 
then ? Therefore things do not pleafe us becaufe we choofe 
them. No fuch Matter. A true Chriflian, call him Janfeitijlt 
or what you will, choofes to prefer the Glory of God to his 
own, and therefore he is better pleafcd to think the Glory of 
what he does belongs to God, than to himfelf, as this is more 
agreeable to his Choice. 

[n fhort, all the Initances I have feen are of the fame Na^ 
ture, and if there were a thoufand of them they all receive the 
Came anfwer, they are nothing to the purpofc, and prove no 
more than that Men arc beft pleafed with the moll ciFectual 
means to obtain their Ele£):ions. 

But 3dly, It is alledged that if the Happinefs of Man con- 
fills in his Choice, God ought to have left him fairly to that 
Choice, fo that neither the other Faculties of his Soui nor 
QLialities of Objefls fhould have any power over him to re- 
llrain the ufe of his Freedom. 

If I underflrnd this rigiit, the meaning of it is that God 
fhould not have given Man any particular Appetites detcrmin'd 
to their Objeds, or made any thing impoihble for him to at- 
tain that he pleafed to choofe. This I confefs had been a free- 
dom with a witnefs, for it had put it hi the power of ever)' 
Man to turn the World as he pleafed. But if one Man had 
this power no other could have had it. For things can be but 
one Wc^y at once, and if one Man had put them into a certain 
method, all the rcil mull cither have been content with that or 
have been miferable ; but God has put them in the way that 
is bell, and fince they m^ifl not be changed, he has given every 
Man a Power to conform himfelf to them, and pleafe himfelf 
in the Choice : And to fccure th-? preferration of Men the bet- 
ter, he has given them naSural Appetites to fuch things as are 
neceflary for their fapport, and thereby guarded their Choice 
from hurting rhera as mucii as the nature of things, and the 
circumltances in which thev arc placed wil oermit i which is 

35^ Of Moral Evil. Chap. V. 

tho* the Will cannot be determin'd to Eledion by 
any thing but itfelf, yet it may be fcrJHiided to de-* 

t ermine 


{d far frolh beifig an injary, that it is a great inlhncc of Divire 
Goodiieis by fctting bounds to our Choice where it might 
hurt us, and leaving us in all other matters to pleafc ourfelvcy 
by a free Eleftion. Thus he has obliged us to take care of our 
lives by a ftrong Appetite to continue our Being. He has fe- 
curcd our feeding our Bodies by the Appetite of Hunger, (o 
that we are unealy under it; and yet that uneafincf:^ is not lo 
great, but our choice, tho' with fortie difficulty, will make it 
ipleafing to us : and fo in all other Appetites by which we are 
prompted to fupply our natural necclTities. And thus they 
always millake the Matter that prefume to teach God what he 
ihould do. 

But 4thly, It is urged, that we dcfire Happincfs nccelTarify, 
and cannot choofe Evil as Evil, and therefore our Choice does 
not make things agreeable, that is, good. But I fee no manner 
of confequence in the Argument, it rather proves the contrary. 
Forwemufttake notice that Good and Evil are refpeftivc 
things, and have relation to fome Appetite. Now we have 
feveral Appetites determined to their Objedls, and the things' 
agreeable or difagreeable to them arc good or bad antecedently 
to choice. But there arc other things, that have no agreeable- 
nefs or inconveniency to any Appetite before Eledion, and 
then are good or bad as they agree with that Choice. Now 
'tis plain that there is nothing good or bad in rcfpe'fl: of our 
natural Appetites, but \tc can choofe it, even Death itfelf: and 
thereforeit is not meant of them, or of this fort of Evil, when 
Vv'e fay v/e can't choofe Evil. But it is abfolutely impofiible 
that we fhou'd choole what is contrary to choice, and fo Evil 
in that fcnfc; for then we fhou'd choofe it and not choofe it at 
the fame time. This gives us the reafon why we cannot choofe 
Evil as jnch ; becaufc it is made good by our Choice. And if 
a ManV choice of things, and enjoying them, be that whicii 
makes him happy, it is impofhble he Ihou'd not choofe Happi- 
ncfs, bccnufe whilft he choofes and enjoys a thing, he cannot 
at the fame time choofe to rcjedl and want it, that is be 

But fthly, 'Tis further objefted that ihofc who believe thn.r 
they are only free from conftraint, thofe that think their Will 
is determin'd by the Underftanding, and thofe who are of opi- 
nioa that they poiTcfj indiifcrenccof Will; are all equally con- 

Sed. 2; Of Moral EvH. 337 

t ermine itfelf, in order to avoid what is abfurd and 
difguftful to the Natural Appetites. 

A a 5 III. For 


tent with themfelves, fo they choofe conveniently ; that is, fa 
they enjoy their choice, or attain fomc great good whether they 
torefaw it or no. 

I anfwer, this may be true, but nothing to the purpofe ; 
fines it is manifeft all of them make n Choice, aJ^d provided 
ihey obtain what they have chofcn, they are fo far fatisfy'd; 
which only proves that whether we believe our Choice to be 
neceflitited or voluntary, it is of fo grer.t force as to make the 
thing chofen agreeable, i. e. Good, as long as the Choice 

The true point in Qneftion here is whicj> of thefe Hypothe- 
fes will beft fecurc the Happinefs of Men. As to the Firfl of 
thefe Opinions, that fuppofes us free only from conftraint, and 
that our Choice is necelfarily determin'd to the good or ill we 
conceive in Objecls, the Author has proved that on this lup- 
pofuion Happinefs is impoffible, in his 5 th Chap. Sefl. i. Sub- 
fe£l. I. par. 18. As to the 2d, which fuppofes the Will to be 
determin'd by the laft aft of the Underltanding, this is (hewn 
to be equivalent to necefiity, becaufe the Underftanding is ne- 
ceffary and obliged to judge as things appear to it. And as to 
the 3d, that places an indifference in the Will, the Author has 
Jhcwn, Cap. 5.*Se6t. i. Subfeft. 2. par. 8. that mere indiffe- 
rence of Choice is of no ufe, but rather an impediment to Hap- 
pinefs, except the Will have ?.t the fame time a power to make 
the thing chofen agreeable. If fuch a Power be in the Will, 
the Author fhews, Subfeft. 3. of the fame Seft. Par. 22. that 
the Agent poflefs'd of it may be happy tho' he have a very im- 
perfeft Underftanding and commit many Miftakcs. 

It ought likcwifc to be confider'd th:it if we really have this 
Power, it is not material whether we know or believe that we 
have it or no, for whatever our opiiiion of it be, it will do its 
own Work, li a Man believe himfelf free, as generally Men 
do, when he really is neceflitated by a force he doth not per- 
ceive, he is never the freer on that account. And if he believe 
liimfelf ncccffitated contrary to what he feels in his own Alind, 
as fome are p':rfu?.dcd to do by the fophiftical Arguments of 
vain Philofophcrs, he is never the lefs free tor that. And 
hence it is that whatever opinion Men have concerning the 
I'reedom or necelBty of choice, they are equally pleas'd or dif- 
pleas'd ■witi:^ it, When once if Is ma^c ; becaufe the plcafurc 


35? Of Moral Evil. Chap. V 

Eleflion m. For 'tis certain that we make ufe of the 
*^ ^J}^ , Aflifrance of the Underftanding in Eleftions, and 
thhiss ^°^^ ^^ ^^ ^ Light before us to diftinguifh Good 
pleafeus. from Evil; but we ufe it as a Judge and a Coun- 
fellor, not as a Sovereign and Dictator : and to 
fpeak the truth, in order to avoid fooUili and hurt- 


(lotli not aiife from their opinion concerning the Faculty, but 
from the ule of it. 

But laftly, 'tis (xA that good Angels and S.iints in Heaven 
have no luch Liberty as this ; that the good Angels arc per- 
fcftly determined to love God, and the Souls of Men as foon 
as they enter Heaven, ceafe to be indifferent to Good and Evif, 
and can't make any other than a good Choice. 

I'i this is intended againfl the Author's Poficion, the Inference 
muft be either that the Angels and Saints do not choofe to be 
in Heaven, or that IJea^'en doth not pleafe becaufe they choofe 
■>o be there, neither of which Confequenc:s do at all follow. 
But then is it not ftrange that a Liberty of indifference which 
remains no longer than our miferable fojourning on Earth, and 
is at an end as foon as a Man begins to be perfeftly happy, 
fhculd be necefDry to our Happineff, and the Fountain of it 
here ? To which I ani\',er, that the whole Argument is foun- 
ded on a great Miflake. 

The Author believes that the Angels and Biefled in Heaven 
are happy only by this means, that they freely choofe every aft 
that they perform, and are always able to execute what they 
choofe. I own that tliev never choofe amifs, nor evei'' will: 
biU the rcafon of that is not want of Power, but becaufe either 
ifl-, their Circumflaiicrs are luch that they have no opportunity 
to make fuch Choices: Or adly, becaufe they are fo weil 
plL-a.';'d with the choice ihcy have maie that they will never 
alter it; or 3dly, becaule their Experience has fliewed them 
^vhat mifery an ill choice has brought on them or others. 
Time was when fume Angels made an ill choice and werq 
thrown into Hell '"or it; can we wonder if thofe that remain 
are grown wifer, and have learnt by the mifery of their Fel- 
Jows to choofe better .'' The fame may be faid of the Saints. 
They may remember the Mifcrics they fuffcr'd iiere on Earth, 
and that may teach them how to avoid the like: But to argue 
thai becaufe they will not choofe aniif<;, therefore they cannot, 
is a falfe Conclufjon. The truth is, herein confifts their Vir- 

Sea. 2.' Of Moral Evil. 359 

ful things, rather than to acquire what is good and 
agreeable. For whatever we choofe will (as .was 
ihewn before) be ip/b fa^o good and agreeable, ex- 
cept it lead us into Ibmething contrary to the Ap- 
petites, or othcrwife abfurd. The Undeiftanding 
therefore points out and admoniflies us (as we faid 
before) to avoid thefe external Evils, or to embrace 
the Good : but till we have exerted an Ad of Elec- 
tion about them, neither is the one abfolutely plea- 
A a 4. ling 


tue, their Goodnefs and Merit, that having the power to 
^choofe amifs they will not, and being pofTefled of a Faculty 
which they may either ufe well or abufe, they imploy it to 
the belt. Thus we may underftand how the Saints and An- 
gels are confirm'd in Goodnefs, not mechannically, or by a 
phvfical reftraint on their Wills, but by the lirninefs of their 
refolution and lleadinefs of choice. If the cale were other- 
wiie, their Virtue were no Virtue, nor any way praife worthy; 
they would be good Creatures, as the Sun is gQod, but no 
more thanks to them than to him. 

Let us confider farther, that tho' the Angels and Blefled in 
Heaven fhould havp loll their Freedom fo far as not to be able 
to choofe Evil, yet this doth not take away tiieir Choice in 
other aflions. We mull: not think that thefc blefled Creatures 
are altogether idle, and have no buflnefs or exercife of their 
Faculties; they furcly employ themfelves in what is good, 
and as there may be great variety of aftlons in which they may 
employ themfelves with pleafure, there is Hill choice enough 
left them, and the reafon why one fort of exercife pleafes thcni 
more than another arifts from their Choice. For having no 
neceffities to fupply by labour as v/e have here, no particular 
exercife is neccflary to them, and therefore nothing can be 
fuppofcd to make one exercife more pleafing than another, but 
their Choice. And in truth we coi'nt ourfelves the moft hap- 
py here when we have no particular bufinefs to oblige us to 
labour, but are left to employ our time as we pleafe. 

But lailly, wc don't know how 'tis with the Saints and 
Angels in Heaven; we know they, are h.ippy, but how or by 
what means we are entirely ignorant, and muftbe, till we get 
there, and therefore no argument ought or can be drawn from 
the ftate of their Happinefs to ours, 

360 Of Moral Evil. Chap. V. 

fing, nor the ether dtfpleafing. We have prov'd 

before that this is the Cafe, and it will be evident 

from Experience to any one that confiders it. If 

then nothing pleafe iis but what is in fonie refj^ed 

chofen, 'tis manifcfl: that our llappinefs muft be 

fought for in Eledion. 

He thcie- IV. We have fnewn above, that an intelligent 

fore that Creature, which is merely pafTive in its Operations, 

has a ree ^^p^Q^ ^^ made entirely happy : for as it is liable to 

power ot 1 M • • f)^' ,-r -1 • » 

chcofing, e"Sternal Motions it mult necellarily meet witn 

can always hurtful as v/ell as ufeful Objefls; nor is it poffible 

pleafe that all things ihould be agreeable. It remains there- 

himfeJf. Iq^^^ jI^^j ^ Creature which is to be exempt from 

all kind of Grief fiiouid have the Principle of his 

ov/n Happine's within him, and be able to deliglit 

Jjimfelf, in what manner foever external things be 

difpos'd ; ;. f. that he have the Government of his 

own Actions, and may pleafe himfelf by willmgo 

ther this or fonieihipg elfe : Such an Agent as this 

is, will be fatisficd with any Object that occurs i 

ilnce ObjCffls are not chofen by hun becaufc they 

pleafe him, but on the contrary, pleafe him becaufe 

they arc chofen. Wiioever therefore has free Choice 

may niake himfelf ^happy^ viz,, by choofing every 

thing which befalls him, and adapting his Choice 

to things. 

We can V. And this feems to be the only way that Crea» 

change our lures can be made completely happy : for fince things 

Elea;ons thtmfelves are neceffarily fix'd by certain Laws, and 

^f !^'" !,v, cannot be chan^'d, it remains that the l],le(Si:ions be 
them con- , , , . j '^ ^ i r 11 i • 

formrvble alf^r d, m order to ma^e them conrormapL' to thing'^j 

to things, i. e. to the Will of God : for thus free Agents will 

and fo can \i2^vQ a Power in themfelves cf attaining Happinefs. 

attain_^ Hence it is that we are fo frec|ucnrly admonifh'd in 

Ti^k. Holy Scripture to be conform' d to Cod*-; on this 

Point our Salvation and Happinefs turn : And with 


♦ Rom. 12. 2. Co/.J/l 3. 1, 2, ^c. 

Scv^. 2. Of Moral Evil. 36; 

p-ood reafon ; for what is Happinefs, if not to be in 
every thing as we will or choofe \ But he who choo- 
fes to conform himlelf in all things to the Divine 
Will, muft certainly be always what |ie would be, 
and will never be difappointed in his Choice : how- 
ever external things fall out, a Perfon thus difpos'd 
may enjoy Happinefs, nor does any one feem to 
have been capable of it on other terms. 

VI. But perfed Happinefs, may fome fay, is not Care of 
to be expected; for thofe Beings which are united the Body 
to terreftrial Matter muft neceifarily be affeded ^^^J^ 
with the Motions of it, as was lliewn before, and Appetites 
cannot bear the dilfolution of the Body, or the diflurb 
impairing of irs Organs (which are yet unavoidable) Hlcdlions 
without fome Pain and uneafy Senfation. I confefs, ^" ^J^'^ 
abfolute Felicity is by no Means to be hoped for in J^^^^" ^^^ 
the prefent State : But yet the more our Eledlions hinder our 
are conformable to things, the more happy we are ; Happinefs 
if then our Eledions were perfedly free, we fhould frombeing 
alfo be at Liberty to eaioy perfed Happinefs : but P*^"^"* ■ 
iince the care of our Bodies, and the natural Appe- 
tites diflurb our Eledions, and fomef imes byafs them 
to one Side, we cannot pleafe ourfelves va Eledions 
abfolutely, and without a Mixture of Uneafinefs, 
For the' they afford Delight, and even greater than 
the natural Appetites, yet they do not remove al! 
manner of Uneafinefs, nor extinguifh the Senfe 
of Pain. While therefore we are in this State, we 
muft acquiefce in a mix'd and imperfed Happinefs, 
fuch as the prefent State of things affords; and it is 
plain that this, fuch as it i*, arifes only from Elec- 
tions. For tho* we cannot by mere Eledion always 
extinguifli the Pain and Uneafinefs which arifes from 
pur being forc'd to bear fuch things as are difguftftil 
to the natural Appetites, yet we can choofe to bear 
thefe things and pleafe ourfelves in that Choic©,* 
the Confcioufnefs of our Powers in bearing thefe 
furpafling the Uneafinefs of Pain, nay perhaps aug- 

362 Gf Moral Evil. Chap. V. 

inenting the Fleafme fo fir as that the Excefs of it 
fhall overccme the Pain arifing from the fruftrated 
Appetites by fo many Degrees as could have been 
ohtain'd, if there had been no contrariety between 
them and the Eledion. For inftance, '\£ one feel 
two Degrees of Pain from a Diftemper, and receive 
fix Degrees of Pleafure from an Eledion to bear it 
with Patience and Decorum \ fubftrading two De- 
grees of Pain from thefe fix of Pleafure, he has four 
of folid Pleafure remaining : He v/ill be as happy 
therefore as one tliat has four Degrees pure and 
free from all Pain. If this be granted to be pof- 
lible, we may be as happy with the natural Appe- 
tites, as if nature had given us none, nor will there 
be any caufe to complain of them. {V.) 

VII. And 


{U.) The true advantage of fuch a Faculty appe.-^rs in many 
inliances, as is obferv'd in the Book. Firft, when by the 
courfe of Nature and the Order of the World we are obliged 
to undergo many things contraiy to cur natural Appetites, 
many things painful and difagreeable. 2dly, when by the 
weaknefs of our Underttanding we are obliged to make choices 
the ccnfequence of which we cannot forcfee, as it muft often 
Iiappen to a finite Ur.dcrlbnding. 3dly, when the general 
good of the World requires us to facrifice our particular Inte- 
reft or Apcetite. I.alliy, where there is little or no diffe- 
rence in matter cf choice as it happens in moll things of Life. 
Jn all thefe and mar./ other Cafes the right ule of this Facul- 
ty gives us eafe and Satisfadlion, and without it we muft be in 
continual torment. 

If it be faid that Reafon tells us we ought to be content and 
fubmit in fuch cafes, and therefore if the Will be determined 
by the hit aft of the Underibnding, there will need no fuch 
Faculty as the Author pleads for, that can make a thing good 
ty choofing. I reply, on the contrary this very cafe ihews 
the neceiTity of fuch a Faculty. For fuppofe I am fick and feel 
great rain, my Underftanding tells me this is unavoidable^ 
ihat it is the Will of God and the courfe of nature, and there- 
fore I ought to bear it with patience. If I have a power of 
chooiing thus to bear it, and by th.-it choice of making it plea- 


Sed:, 2.^ Of Mural Evil. 363 

VII. And here, by the Way, we may admire We have 
the Divine Goodnefs and Wifdom, which (fince '■^J^^""" *<* 

/-XL- n. admire 
Objeds the Divine 
N O T E SI, whicli cre- 

ated an 
fiT)g to me, it is to very good purpofe ihat my Underftanding that has 
makes this reprefentation, for by means thereof I obtain a de- where- 
gree of H.ippinefs in the midft of all the natural Evils that with to 
opprefs mc. But if I have no fuch ppv/cr to choofe, or if I pleafe it- 
choofe and that choice does not make the thing I fafFer better, felf in its 
it is in vain that my Underftanding makes fuch a reprefentati- own Na- 
on ; it only tells me thac I am miferable, but yields me no ture, how- 
help. Counfellors arc of great ufe to a Perfon that has a Power foever 
to execute what they advife ; otherwife their advices are in external 
vain, and only ferve to augment thcPerfon's Mifery by (hewing things be 
his impotence to help himfelf. 'Tis thus between the Under- difpofed. 
Handing and the Will, if wc fuppofe no power in the Will 
by chooling to make Objeds agreeable or difagreeable, it is in 
vain for the Underftanding to advile us to chooie them. To 
what purpofe Ihould we choofe them, when our Choice can 
make no alteration in them as to their Goqd or Evil Quali- 
ties ? 

But here it will be faid that antecedent to the Choice there 
is a goodnefs in bearing ficknefs patiently, and the Under- 
ilandingby reprefenting that Goodnefs to the Will determines 
it to choofe it, and from that fenfe of Good arifes the plcafure 
and eafe we find in Patience. But this I thmk is a plain 
miftake : for we oftgn find one Man of better ienfe than ano- 
ther uneafy und^r pain, whilft the weaker makes it eafy ta 

If you difcourfe thcfe two, you'll find that the Man of bet- 
ter Underftanding has a much clearer reprefentation of all Mo- 
tives that may induce patience than the other ; knows exadly 
all the benefits of Contentment, and how rquch it is his in- 
tcreft to comply with his circumftances i and yet he does i,^ 
not. How theji comes this difi'erence ? Whence can it arifc 
but from this, that the one choofes to comply and tiae othc^ 
does not? If it be merely the reafons and motives being more 
advantageoufly reprefented to one Man than the other, that 
makes the one patient and the other impatient under pain ; 
either that reprefentation arifes from fome free aft of the Will 
or from fome natural or accidental difpofition, inclination, 
pr ^ircumlhnce of the A^ent. If from a fre? adl of the 
• ■ • Will; 

364 Of Moral EvU. Chap. V. 

Objcifls ar£ generally fix'd and ccnfin'd under cer- 
tain Laws^ could create an Appetite that ihould 


jsror E s. 

Will; then it rccnrrs to what was pleaded fpr at the firfl, 
I'iz. that wc are pleafed becaufe we choo(e. But if the re- 
prefcntation that determines our Choice arifc from any natural 
or accidental difpofitinn, ^c. thefe being all external to the 
Will, and out of its power, 'tis plain the determination can't 
be free. He is a happy Man to whom fuch a difpofition, iff(. 
happens, but he can't be look'd c;i as more virtuous or com- 
mendable than he that choofes ill becaufe he wants them. lie 
may be commended, as oold or Je-vels are, becaufe he has 
ibme things that agree to our defires, but not as an Agent that 
merits thanks or praife for Virtue. 

And here I muft obferve that the generality of Men imagine 
that every thing anteccden\]y to choxe is either Good or Evil, 
and we fo far concerned in it, that except we could poife th& 
whole World exactly, and ballr.ncc all fjwre coniequence? 
with refpetl: to our convenience or inconvenience, we could 
never perform any a£l but what xnoCt either contribute to our 
Happinefs or hinder it. But this is a moft falfe Suppofition 
and contrary to reafon as v/ell as experience. For it liappens 
in a thoufand Inftances that the things we choofe areoffo 
little moment as to be pcrfcftly indifferent to us, and that only 
pieafes beil which we choofe. A Man is walking in a bowl- 
ing-green, the exercife of his Limbs is all -that he defigns, and 
%vhich way focvcr he walks he is equally pleafed. But if any 
hinder him after he has chofe his way, or force him to a diffe- 
rent one, it will provoke his Anger, and perhaps put him on 
a Quarrel that may colt him his Life. 

There's no neceffity therefore that to make an cqaillbrium 
for the Will, the World fhould be fc divided that all imprcffi- 
ons from one part, and ihe other, fhould be aftually equal, 
for as a Man may turn the beam of a bnllance v/ith his hand^ 
tho' as many weights lie in the other Scale as it can hold; 
fo the Will may determine indi, rho' all the confidcraticns 
the World aftbrds lay in op'iofitior) to the thi.ig v.'c choofe j bui: 
it ofren happens that the World affords none at all either way, 
and then the Will turns the balhnce as it pieafes. And in 
truth, if our Happinefs were conccrn'd in every circumilance 
of Life, it were unreafonable to oblige u: to choofe before '.v^ 

Sea 2. Of Moral Evil. 36^ 

have wherewith to fatisfy it within itfelf ; and might 
render any State agroeablCi barely by willing it. 



we knew them all, which is impoltiMe, and To God would 
have made a right Choice to depend on an impoilible Condi- 
tion. Whereas if tve have a power by the pleafiiie of our 
Choice to ballance the inconvcniencics that happen from out- 
xvard things^ it rafficlenily juilifies the Divine Good.ids, tho" 
he has put us in fuch Circumftances that it is impofTible always 
to regulate our Choice as we would have done, had we fore- 
feea all the Cenfequences that attend it. 

But here 'tis urged, that tho'' a Man doth not always per- 
ceive the rcafon which determines him to choofe one of the 
two things that fcem pf rfccily equal, yet there is always fome 
fecret imprefTion that does determine him. But this is to lup- 
pofe the very th'ng in Quellion ; juit as if i Man fhou'd go 
about to folve an Objeftion, to which he cou'd iind no oth(?r 
anfwer,- by telling the Objedlor that it cou'd net bo true, bc- 
caufe if it were, the pofition againlt which he produced it mufl 
be faife, 

In fhc.-t, we prove the Freedom and liidifterence of the 
Will by producing many Injftances where there is no motive to 
determine it one way more than the other ; Nay, when alT 
vif?ble Motives are againft if. To which the Enemies of Free- 
will reply, 'tis true, they can't produce or find any reafon ; 
but there is one, tho' imperceptible to the Man that choofcs* 
as well as to the rell of the World. Which as it is faid with- 
out rdafon needs none toconfiite it, 

Sut they ought to remember that to choofe any thing for a 
reafon not known or obferv'd; is to choofe without reafon? 
a reafon unknown is no reafon at all, except they'll fay that 
the vVill is determm'd as mechanically as matter is by impulfe. 

But we Carry the Matter yet much farther, and fliew that 
where there are 'many and ftrong Motives, great conveniency 
and agreeabltnefs to our natural Appitites on one fide, and no- 
thing but the exercife of our Liberty on the otiier, we often 
prefei- that to all thefe Motives, and are well pleafsd with 
ourfelves, when we have done lb. 

The Men that might live an eafy and quiet Life engage in 
hufinefs, toil and labour, and every one is fc well pleafed with 
his Choice, that xi i? hard tQ fay amongrt h many Hates, and 


366 Of Moral EvW. Chap.V. 

Now Free-Will has this EfFed by accommodating 
itfelf to Objeds, when the Objects themfelves can- 
not be chang'd. For the Man will be no lefs hap- 
py who choofes what he knows will come to pafs, 
than he who brings that to pafs which he choofes ; 
the one may be always done, the other is often im- 
poilible : this therefore, or none, is the W^y to 
arrive at Happincfs. 'Tis hard to comprehend how 
he can fail of Happinefs who has it in his Power 
to pleafe himfelf. This feems to have been the Opi- 


fuch variety of Conditions, which are moft happy: and tho' 
they fometimes complain ivhen preffcd with inconveniencies, 
yet as Horace obferVes, hardly one would change if an Option 
were given him. If the things themfelves pleafe abftraftedly 
from Choice, moft Men being of one Make, and having the 
fame Pafiions, Wants and Appetites, thofe only that had all 
things fuitable to thofe Appetites cou'd be pleafed, and all the 
World wou'd be confined to one v.'ay of living. 

But as Happinefs arifcs from the Choice, it fo happens that 
in the great variety of Circiimftances wherein Men arc placed, 
they generally are pretty equally happy, becaufe they enjoy 
their Choice. A Mariner's is a life that feems intolerable to 
me, and deftitute of all thofe things that are agreeable to my 
natural Appetites ; fuppofe then I am forced to that kind of 
Lite, muft I needs be miferable ? No, I will andean m.ike it 
my choice ; not from any Motive v/hich my Undeftanding 
affords me, for it reprcfents it as difagrceable in every rcfpeft: 
But I will choofe it and refolve to follow it, that it may pleafe 
me, and by the force of that Choice it will at length become 

If it be faid that the necefTity which is on me to lead that 
fort of Life determines my Choice ; 1 anfwer, that qu'te con- 
trary ; notliing is more oppofite to choice than lorce, and we 
find nothing is apter to make us rejeil and be difplcafed with a 
thing than to fee it forced on us. My being ibrced theretbre 
on Ship-board would lather raifcan averfion than pleafurc in 
me ; but as foon as bv the power of my Frcc-\> ill I refolve 
to live that Life, and be pleafed with it, I find the plcaiure 


Se6t. 2. Of Moral Evil. 367 

nion of the ancienc Stoizi-, who had the fame 
thoughts of Liberty with thofe laid down above, 
but did not explain them difrindly, nor compre- 
hend the whole Series of the Matter, 

However, 'tis very plain that they placed Hap- 
pinefs in the Ufe and Election of fuch things as arc 
in our own Power ,- which yet would be impofiible, 
if we were not able to pleafe ouiLlves in Elec- 
tion. (5 p.; 



begin and grow upon me. If there be any Wifdom in the 
World, undoubtedly this is the Mailer- piece, to make alJ 
things eafy to us by choofing theftatc and condition of Life in 
which neccifity has placed us. 

But my Underftanding reprefentaig the evil and hardfhip of 
a thing with the neceflity of bearing it, v/ill no way contri- 
bute to my eafe, except at the fame time it aiTure me that I 
can take away or diminiOi the natural Evil that accompanies it, 
if I choofe to endure it with Contentment, Without this the 
Confideration of the neceifu y that is upon me would rather 
cncreafe the difficulty and nneafmcfs I feel, than allay it; as 
knowing the danger of a Jiftemper encreafes a Man's fear of 
Death, if at ihe llinie time no remedy be ofter'd. 

In fhort, the Exercii'e ot this Faculty of making thing'; 
agreeable by Cho'ice is all the remedy Nature aHbrds us under 
unavoidable fuflerings ; if we have it not, we have none ; and 
if we have, it takes oiF the complaint vve make againft God 
for putting us in fuch Circamftances where we neceiiarily 
mull undergo fuch Evils, 

(59.) Our Author's the 5/ci/a here, m'ght pro- 
bably give Leibnitz, his reafon to fjfpedl him of maintaining 
all the abfurd Confcqucr.ces which that SeCl are faid to have 
dr.ivvn from the above mentioned Principle. Th-y indeed (if 
they be not greatlv tnifrcprefontcd) urg'd it io far as to aflert, 
that nothing external could hurt or incommode us except we 
pleas'd : That all Good and Evil was entirely in our Power 
and of our making; and confequently that all outward things 
were indifferent and alike to us, antecedent tc our ovv'n Choice. 
Which Notions, being contrary to every Day'* Experience in 



Of Moml Evil. Chap. V. 


Pleafure and Pain, led them on to deny that tlic latter was; 
properly an Evi?, or rather that there was any difference at all 
between them. This Dodirine is indeed liable to Leibvitx^i 
Objedlions of confounding all the diftinftions of things,^ 

of contradicting the natural Appetites, making Pvcafon and 

Underftanding ufelefs, and iiibverting all the other Facul- 
ties of the Mind. Thefe and the like Refleftions, I fay, are 
jultly made upon the Dodlrine of the Stoics, as they have ge- 
nerally exprefs'd themfelves ; and overthrow a total, abfolute 
Indifference of the Mind to will in all Cafes ; but are nothing 
at all to our Author, who never contended for it ; but on the 
contrary, infills upon a nccefTary, fix'd, and unalterable diffe- 
rence in the Natures of things, according to the prefent Sy- 
ftem ; and has allow'd their tull force to both Reafon and the 
natural Appetites, ail over the laft Seftion, as well as in the 
foregoing Chapters of this Book. 

But this has been explain'd in the Notes above. For an 
application of this Sedion See §.5. SubfcCt. 2. and ^he 
Notes to §. 5. Subfed. 3. 

Scd 3. Of Mora/ Evil. 369 


Concerniiig undue EleBmis^ 

I. T7II.OM hence it is fufficiciitly evident what '^o^'^'^ 
X kind of Eleifl ions are to be called undue ones : ?'^'' °^ 
Por it appears that Gcd ha*: given us this Faculty choofe is 
of chooling, that we may plcafe oiirfelves in the ule Mifery ; 
of it, and be happy in ihe fruition of thofe Ob- we_ choofe 
jeds which we choofe. For it is a Happinefs to ^,^^ 

• • \ '• i> jT\iT r r therefore 

o5tain tiie tnings cho r-n, and Muery to Le Iruf- ^^,|^g„ ^, ,, 
trated and fall Ihort of them. Whcnfcever there- choofe 
fore we knowingly make fuch a Choice^ as not to be '^^'hat csn- 
able to enjoy the things chofen, 'tis pfcin that we ?°^,^"^^ ^"' 
choofe foolillily and unduely : for \ve br ng upon ^Li 
ourfelves unnecciTary iVJiicry, fince we could have done ift. 
chofen otherwise with equal Pleafurc. Whoever when fuch 
then choofes knowingly what he cannot obtain, or ^'"rigs are 
wh'dt may produce unneceffa'-y trouble to himfcif *^^° .^" ^^ 
or other?, he mult be elteem o to cnoofe undnely. rjje. 
And this may be done, Mrlf, If any one choofe /»?- " 
foffib'ilities, it may feem ftrange rhit any Perfon 
fnould choofe a thing which is imoolTible, knowing 
it to be fo ; but 'tis very probable that this has hap- 
pen'd fometimes, as was /aid b fore. ^ 

n. Secondly, If he choofe fuch things as are /;> SecondJyj 
conftflent with each other : he that does iliis contra- Wheu 
dicls himfelf, and evidently cuts off all hopes of ^^^'■'^ 
Enjoyment. When we will any thmf?, v/e muft ^^''^S^ ^-^^ 
take all its neceilary confequences together wiih it. v/hich are 

B b But inconfijlent 

wirh esch 

* Sscl. I. Subfcwl. ^. r,nr, lo, ii. iz. ether. 

270 Of Moral Evil. Chap. V. 

But all tilings here are of a mix'd kind, and nothing 
is pure from all degrees of BitrerncTs : we often 
therefore will that part in a certain thing which is 
agreeable to the Appetites, and refufe tlie reft: but 
this is in vain, fince the agreeable Parts cannot be 
feparated from the difagrecable ones : we muft there- 
fore either choofe or rejcd: the whole. He than 
does otherwife cannot polllbly (ati':fy himfelf, fince 
he muft benr with what he wouid not ; He is there- 
fore voluntarily unhappy by an undue Eledlon. 
Thirdly, III. Thirdly, he mufl: be efteem'd to choofe un- 
If the duely, who aims at fuch things as he knows are 
*]'"r^^ ,^ not in his Power. For it is a hazard whether he 
not in the cnjc/ys thofe things that are not in his Powers and 
power of it is fcolifh to commit cur Happinefs to Chance ; 
the Elec- v.hile therefore it is in our Power to choofe only 
'^^' fuch things as we are certain of obtaining, we risk 

our Happmefs, or throw it away when we purfue 
Uncertainties : Nov/ we owe as much Happinefs to 
ourfelves as is in our Power, and oughi to ufe our ut- 
mofl: Endeavours to attain it ; but we lofe this by 
undue Ele<5lion when v.e delire thofe things which 
we know to be out of our Power. 
?ourthly, IV. Fourthly, Thst alfo is an undue Eledion, 
If any which obliges US to feize thofe things that are law- 
f^o^^ fully occupy'd by the Eledions of other Men. To 
th^twhich j^g aifappoinred of an Ekdion is Mifery, aswefaid 

3S pre-oc- , r • • tt • r i- i 

cupy'd by before,- to enjoy it, Happjnei?. Everyone there- 
the lawful fore that is endovs^'d with a Power of choofing, has 
Choice of g right to the enjoyment of the thing chofen, fo far 
others. 35 [^ ncceffary to the Exercife of his own Faculties, 
and is no impediment to the Good of others. But 
he muft he ctteem'd an impediment to the Good of 
others, who will appropriate to himfelf what is com- 
mon, or affume more and greater Advantages from 
the common Stock than fall to his Share. Thofe 
things then which are preoccupy'd by the Choice of 
other Men belons: to the Choofers? and cannot juft'- 

Seel. 3. Of Moral Evil. 371 

ly be taken from them : therefore he that covets 
them v/ould have what is not his due : i. c. endea- 
vours by an undue Eledion to rob others of their 
Right. This is to be referr'd in an efpecial Man- 
ner to fujh things as are pre-occupy'd by rhe Choice 
of the D.Mtv , for thefe are to be efteem'd bv all as 
facred and prohibited : nor can any one meet v/ith 
Succefs that oppoi'es himfelf to God, and choofes 
what God difapproves. For what God v/ills muf|: 
necelTarily come to pafs, but God wills the Happi- 
nefs of all ivlen as far as it is poifible ,• therefore he 
that offends unneccffarily againft the Happinefs of 
?.ny one, is fiippos'd to offend again/l God, and to 
choofe what is not his due. 

V. Fifthly, On this account it is unlawful for Fifthl)--, 
us to delire thofe thin.f^s which are hurtful to ourfelves Wher. 
or others. By hurtful things I underiland thofe that^'"^?'^ 
lead to natural Evils, viz. luch as are prejudicial to J,yj? 
the Body or Mind. It appears from what has been tind to 
faid, that thmgs pleafe us becaufe they are chofen, Natural 
but Reafon perfuades us to abftain from fuch Elec- Evils, are 
tions as may prove pernicious to our own Mind"?, ^^"I^"^ 
or thofe of others \ or fuch as defraud the Appetites j\^c-ilkv 
unneceiTarily : for we owe a G:atincation to thcfe 
Appetites, when it can be procured without greater 
Detriment. Therefore an Eleftion oppofed to thefe 
gratis., and without any reafon, mufu be jud.^'d an 
undue one, becaufe it deprives us of the due Enjoy ■=■ 
ment of our Appetites. {W.) 

B b z SECT. 


\W.) It has been objefled, that 'tis a ContradidJon for God 
to create fuch a Facully as is above defcrib'd, and yet that it 
fhou'd cl'iOofe amifs: for what can be amifs to a Faculty that 
can make every thing good by choofing it ? But the anfwer is 
plain, the Faculty is not ib indifferent but it has Limitations, 
■AvA he that has limits certainly docs amifs by rranfgrefiing 


372 Of Moral Evil. Chap. V. 


them. Tho' there is a natural Power in the Will f'o choofe a 
thing in oppofition to all its natural Appetites and the didtates 
of the Underftanding, and hereby to give itfelf feme degree ox 
pleafure for the time, and we fee that it forrictimcs doth fo ; 
yet the Evils that proceed from fuch an exorbitant exercife 
of this noble Faculty plainly fliew that it ought not have done 
fo; and the Author never faid or imagin'd any one would 
think he meant that Wifdom and Prudence were ufelefs to fuch 
an Agent, or that he ought not to regulate the exercife of this 
Faculty fo as to prevent its choofing impoffible, abfur'd or in- 
confiftent things, or the clalhing of his Choice with his na- 
tural Appetites and their Satisfaftion. A King muft have a 
Power to punifh his wicked Subjcfls with Death, and to re- 
ward thofe that deferve it with Honours and Riches; if he 
had not this Power, he could not govern. But fliall he there- 
fore kill the innocent and fquander away his Favours on the 
undeferving ? So Man has Free-will by which he may choofe 
Objefts, and gratify himfelf in the Choice; doth it therefore 
follow that he may choofe things impoflible, things beyond 
his power, or contrary to his natural Appetites ? Yet if he 
had not this natural Power to choofe, he could no more be 
happy, than a Prince could govern that had not the Power cf 
Rewards and Punifhments. 


Sed, 4. Of Moral Evil. 37^ 


How it is poffihle for us to fall into 
undue Ele&ions. 

I. « np I S difficult to compreliend, as was faid be- This is 

A fore, how one can fall iliorc of Happi- done (wt 
nefs who has it in his Power to pleaf'e himfelf; yet ^^'^^^^ 
if he choolc in the foregoing Manner, or the like, 
he muft neceflarily fail of his Choice, and his Ap- 
petite be fi-uftrated, /. e, he mufl be unhappy. Buc 
how is it polTible, you'll fay, that any one fliould 
make fuch a Choice ' 1 1 aniVer, This may pro- 
ceed firHr, from Error or Ignorance. Secondly, fiom 
Inadvertency or Negligence. Thirdly, from Levity, 
fourthly, from a confrafled Habit. FiftWy, from 
other Appetites implanted in us by Nature. Not that 
the Will can be determin'd by thefe, or any thing 
die which is external ; but that from hence it takes 
an handle and occalTon of determining itfelf, which 
it would not have had otherwife. 

II. Firft, As to the firfl: of thefe, we have pro- Firft, B7 
ved before that we are liable to Errors and Igno- Error or 
lance ; and that this is to be reckon'd among natu- ig^Qrance. 
ral Evils. When therefore we arc forc'd to choofe 
among things not fufficiently knov/n, our Errors 
are not to be charg'd upon us, nor is it credible 
that God will fuffer them ro prove fatal to us. Buc 
when we are under no manner of Neceility, an E- 
ledion ofcen prefents itfelf to us in Matters fuffi- 
ciently underftood, and then we hurry on without a 
B b 5 ftrift 

t See Locke'i Chapter of Power §, 5 7. ^c. 

374 QA -^^^^'^^ Evil Chap. V 

fliift and careful Enquiry, and choofe Impoffibili- 
tie, O'c. and rhcietore are not cmrely free from 
Fault, fince wc ought to dv-libira.e and examine things 
before Blciflion. 

c ,, III. Secondly, Thefe undue El^vTlions therefore 

Secondly, , i •'^ , t- i r i i ^ 

By Neoli- ^^y happen rbro Inadf ertenry, for by due Care we 

gence. " might pcrccivc the Good and Evil which is in Ob- 
jctfrs,- but being neghgent and fupine, we are fre- 
quently inipofed upon, and fuffer for cur Ncgh- 
gcncc, by i ailing into the foremeniion'd Inccnveni- 
Thirdlv ^^^^' ^^ ^^ the Third, Since the Fleafureof a free 
By giving Agent confifts in Elediorj, 'tis no wonder that he 
too great gives hiitifelf as large a Scope as he can in the Ex' 
Jndul- ercife of ir. Neirher will it be any thing furprifing, 
ifhe Excr- ^^ ^" ^^^^ ^^^^^ Exercife of Eleflions, he fornetimes 
cife of trcnTgrefs the Bounds prefcri/J him by God and 
Election. Narurei and light upon fome things which are at- 
tended with no very profpcrous I flue, (viz,, Abfur* 
ditiesand ImpoflTibiliLies) In'icc he will atiempt every 
thing. For he plca'es himfclfin the Trial, tho' he 
be unfortunate in the Event ,- but this is no Excufei 
for every one is obliged to take care of himfelf, lef^ 
he be too fond of indulging new Elcdions, and 
from Levity become unducly troublefome to hini- 
fclf or others. 
Fourthly, , V. Fourthly, We fee that frequent Choice creates 
By Otjli- an Habit ; this feems to proceed from hence, that as 
^acy,vx a we delight in an Election often repeated, we are ea- 
^'' fily induc'd to hope that the fame Pleafure will 
always follow the iame Ad, v/hcreupon we grow 
fupine and negligent, and difrcgard the Alterations 
of things j and he that does this may ealily fall 
into fuch Eledicns as will not be attended with 
Succefs. Befide, 'tis difficult for us to change tho^e 
Eledions, the Delight of which is fix'd and, as it 
were, riveted in the Mind by frequent Experi- 
ence: Yet we are not excufable for rufliing upon 


Sea 4: Of Moral Evil 375 

abfurd and impoflible tilings, in order to avoid the 
Uneafinefs attending the Change of Eleftion. And 
if we fearch into the Cafe more narrowly, we fhail 
find that rroft undue Eledions arife from this un- 
feafonabie Perfeverance, all v/hich defervedly come 
under the Charader of culpable Obdinacy. 

VI. Fifthly, It ha^ been often hinted, that we Fifthly. 
confift of a Soul and Body, that thefe arc mutual- j,^ g^rm- 
1y affeded by each other, and that from hence va- nityofthe 
nous Appetites arife in us, fuch as ihe Prefervation natural 
of the Body, Defire of Oifspring, and the likej ^m'^tcs. 
and whatever is an impediment to thele, we reckon 
hurtful. If therefore we be not upon our Guard, 

we are hurried on by the Importunity of them to 
AbJurdities, or when we give a loo!e to our Elec- 
tions, we grafp at fuch things as olfer an unnecefTary 
Violence to them : hence arife an immenfe train of 
Unealinefles to ourfelves and others ; hence comes 
Violence and Injury to our Nature and the Natu- 
ral Appetite?, to which we owe at leaft a moderate 
Indulgence : hereupoii we raihly and unlawfully feize 
thofe things that are pre -occupied by the Eledions 
or Appetites of other Men ; nay, are not fo cautious 
as to refrain from what is determia'd by the Will 
of God himfelf : from thefe and the like Occafjons 
it happens that we abufe our Liberty, and by un- 
due Eleftions bring natural Evils upon ourfelves or 
others. For as we are endov/d with Liberty in thefe 
and the like Cafes, we may either ufe it according 
ro the diftate of Reafon, or abufe it : this Power 
feems to be included in the very Notion of created 

VII. It appears from hence how cauriouHy Elec- f. ^"^'^" 
tions ought to be made; for tho notning pleafes us ou-^ht not 
but what is chofen, yet we do not only take delight in to be cho- 
ihoojing^ but much more in enjojivig the things chofen, ^en, and 
oiherwife it would be the fame thing whatever we ^I'-^y E^Igc- 
chofe ; we muft take care .then that our Eledions ^ot eafily 

B b ^ be cluDg'd. 

376 Of Moral Evil. Chap. V^ 

be made of fiuh things as we may always enjoy. 
Foi if they be of pcnihabk O'-jeclSj or inch as are 
not in the lead anfwerablc to the end of tlie Elector, 
he that chocfes thsm rrufl: ncccflariiy g^ie^ e at the 
Pifappointrnent. He niay avoid this, will feme fay, 
by changing his Ekdion, when the tiling cholen 
perilhes or fails ; but it is to be obferv'd that L'eifti- 
ons are not chang'd without a Senfe of Grief and 
Remorfe. For we never think of altering them till 
we are convinc'd thit we have chofcn amils. When 
therefore we are difappointed of the Enjoyment of 
what we have chofen, we deipair, become mi ferable, 
penitent, and confcious of an Evil Choice, and then 
at la ft begin ro alter our Choice; which cannot be 
done without an anicious and uneafy Senfe ofDifao- 
poinrmcnt, and the more and longer we have been 
?ntent upon any Elcdion, fo much the greater Pain 
it will cofl: us to be forced ro change it. Hence 
proceeds the Difficulty which we feel in altering 
EleiSions ,- hence many had rather perfift in abfuid 
Eledions than under;7o the trouble of altering them : 
For things pleafe us becaufe we will them , but to 
rcjeft what we have once willed is contradiding our- 
felvcs, and cannot be done without a very difagree- 
able flruggle and convuHlon of the JVlind : a-, any 
one may learn from Experience, (^o.) 



(60.) Any one th;U attentively confidcn the Workings of 
his own Mind, will foon be fatisfy'd oftlie Truth of ?11 that 
our Author here r.dvances ; he will obferve \^ hat difnculty 
and reluctance i^e feels in receding from wliat he has once 
firmly refolv'd upon, tho' perhaps he can perceive no manner 
of Good in it except whit arifes purely from that Refolution. 
To make a Vifit at a certain I'ime; to v^'allc to any particular 
place ; to recreate oarfclves with this or that kind of Diverfioh; 
may be Actions in themfelves perlcftly indifferent and trivial: 
but when once propofcd, even upon mere whim and caprice, 
and refolv'd on with as little rcafon, they become often as much 


Sea. 4. 

Of Moral Evil. 


the Obje£ls of our Hope and Defire, the thoughts of profecu- 
ting them give us as great pleafine and fatisiadion, and we arc 
as unwillingly withdrawn from them, and as much difap- 
pointed when we fall fhort of the fancied enjcyment of them, 
as we fhoi:ld be in Matters of the laft Importance. Every Man 
that has taken the leall notice of what pafles within himfelf, is 
able to give numberlefs Inftances of the truth of the foregoing 
Obfervation : :.vhich may ferve to convince us how great the 
force and power o'i Volition is, and what excellent ufe it may 
be of in Life. How it fiipplics us with courage and conljancy 
in the moll arduous Undertakings, and enables us to furmount 
the grea tell Difficulties: how it qualifies and alleviates our 
Pain, and augments the Sum of our Happincfs ; and makes us 
run contentedly the Round of low and otherwife tedious pur- 
fuits, and bear with pleafure the otherwife infupportable load 
of human Woes. This fliews the great ufefulnefs and necelli- 
ty of fuch a Principle, and will lead us to confider with our 
Author, in what a cautious manner ir ought to be exerted, left 
it fall upon wrong and improper Objefts, and thereby, inllead 
of leilening, inci-eafe our Mifery, and become itfelfthc greatefl 
part of it. That this Principle of Liberty, tho' frequently- 
attended with thefe confequences, is yet a Gift worthy of the 
moft beneficent Donor, inuil appear from a general cbmputa.- 
tion of its Good and Evil Effeds, with regard to the whole Sy- 
ilera, which will be the Subjed of the following Sedions. 


57^ of Moral Evil. Chap. V. 


How Evil EleBions are co?tJtJle?tt 
with the Power and Good7iefs of 

S U B S E C T. I. 

Trofofes the Difficulty^ with a Preparative 

to the Solution of it. 

The Evils J. TT 7"E have ilifwri that moral Evils arife from 
of Free- YV undue Eledion ; that Eledions are free; 

A8;ents are , , • . w rr r « 

riOt necef- ^"^^ ^"^t It IS not at all necellary for any one know- 

fary, and iPgly and willingly to purfue the worfe. Moral 
Therefore Evils cannot therefore be excufed by neceflity, as 
leein to be the natural ones, and thofe of Imperfedion are. 'Tis 
by God P^^^*^ ^^^^ created Nature implies Imperfedion in the 
volurtari- Very terms of its being created (lincewhat is abfo- 
3y. lurely perfett is very God) either therefore nothing 

ar all muft be created, or Tomething imperfcft. We 
have ihewn that by the fame NeccfTuy Natural 
Evils are annex'd to things naturally imperfect, and 
that God, agreeably to what infinite Power and 
Goodncfs required, permitted no manner of Evil in 
Nature, the abfence whereof would not have intro- 
duced more or greater Evil. Since therefore Incon- 
veniencies attend either the prefence or abfence of it, 
God m^de that which was accended with the leaft. 


Sed- 5. Sab. i. Of Moral Evil. 379 

There ate no Evils then which could pofTibly be 
avoided, and therefore they muft be look'd upon 
as neceflfaiy, fince the Imperfedion of a Creature did 
;iot admit of pure and abfolute Good. But this 
Necellity does not appear in free Agents : For the 
Evils incident to them ktm to proceed, not from 
imperfeftion of Nature, huifree Choice, and are there- 
fore permitted by God voluntarily, fmce neither the 
Nature of Things, nor the Good of the Univerfe 
require the permillion of them : that is, the World 
would be as well without as with them. 

ir. ' Tis to be obferv'd, that God permitted the Moral E^ 
former kind of Evils bscaufe they were infeparable vilshave 
from things s either therefore the things muft not ^yconnec- 
havebeen created, or their iiiherent Evils tolerated, tionwitha 
But Evil. EledioRS have no neceffary connexion freeNa- 
with the free Ads of the Will : neither does the '^ire, nor 
Nature of Man require that he fhould choofe amifs : ^^^^f^^^^ 
nox does any benefit accrue to him from thefe Elec- ^^^ ^^" ^^*^ 
tions which could not be obtained without them, 
as it dcss in Hunger, Thirft, Fear, and the reft of 
the Paffions ,• for without thefe Affedions, as was 
fjiewn, the Animal would Toon perifh j but no Evil 
would befal us (nay what Good would not I) if we 
always attended to Reafon, and never chofe amifs. 
Since therefore Man might bring the greateft plea- 
fure to himfelf, and exercife his faculties by choo- 
fing always well> how comes it to pafs that God 
fufl^crs him to hurt himf.1fand others unneceiTarily 
by Evil Eledions? If it be faid that a Power of 
chooling either Side is coatain'd in the very Notion 
of Liberty; this muft be allow'd, but yet there 
feems to be room enough for the Exercife of Liber- 
ty, tho' the Will were confin d to the choice of 
what is lawful and convenient ; what need is there 
then of fuch a Power as may extend to the choice 
pi Evil ? 

IIL Thi§ 


lies the 
ftrcfs of 

culfy, -viz. 
why did 
God per- 
mit choie 
which are 

"We don't 
jknow fo 
much of 
the Nature 
of think- 
ing Beings 
ii cf ma- 
ferial ones 
and thcic- 
foi'e are 
leTs pre- 
pared for 
»n An- 
I'wer to 
this Difil- 

0/ Moral Evil Chap. V. 

HI. This feenjs to be the hardeH: point, the main 
fti'e(s of the DiiTicultyj viz,. Whence come Moral 
Evils,- i, €. thofe that are not neceffary? If chey be 
faid to be necLffary, how are they ficcf If they be 
not nece/lary, why does God permit them ^ The 
latter feerns repugnant to the Goodnefs of God, the 
former to the Nature of a (y^q Agent. 

iV. It muft be confcfs'd, that we are lefs prepar- 
ed for a Solution of this Difficulty than the former; 
for the Nature and Syftcms of the Intellevftual World 
are lefs known to us than thofe of the purely 
Material one : Material Objefts furronnd us, and oc- 
cupy all the Inlets to Knowledge, and are the only 
things that immediately nfrc(5t our Scnfcs. They in- 
trude upon us wirh an infinite Variety, and produce 
many and various Seafatinns in us. But of intellec- 
tual Beings, of their Operations, or of "-he mutual 
connexion between them, \\2 have but very fevv^, 
and tliofe very obfcure Notions, viz,, fuch as arife 
only from the reHecftion ofour Underllandiiig upon 
itfelf, or are colleded by the ufc of F^eafon deduc- 
ing one thing from nnorher : For, of all intcl!e(5i:ual 
Ik-ings, GUI own Mind alone is immediately per- 
ctiv'd by us; nor can v/e (as in Bodies) compare the 
Notions arifing from ir, with thofe that proceed 
from other Sources: all our Knowledge therefore of 
Spirit:, or thinking ikings is derived from this alone. 
'Tis no v/cnder then if we be very much in the da:k 
in our Kca'cnings about thcfe and their Opperitions : 
and do not fo clea ly perceive the neceffity of allow- 
ing Fiee-Wil) to them, as contrariety in tlie Moti- 
tions of Matter; nor fo eali'y apprehend what In- 
convenience would follow from reih'aininj^ rhe exer- 
ciie of Liberty, as we lee the confequence of raking 
away the motion of Marrer. We know that withc.uc 
Morion rhe whole Mafs of Matter would prove en- 
tirely uiclsis, and rhac there would be no room lor io 
many ^loimals as now v;e find receive their Origir^ 


Sta, 5. Sub. I. Of Moral Evil. 3,81 

and Subfiftence from ir; which is juftly efteem'd 
a greater Evil, and more intolerable than all the na- 
tural Evils arifing from Matter and JMotion: and 
we fliould nnd the Time thing in the prevention of 
the ufeof Free-Will, if we underftood the Syftem 
of the Intclledual as well as that of the Material 
World. But if we can iliew that more Evils necef- 
f^rily arife from withdrawing or reftraining the ufe of 
Free- Will, than from permitting the abiiie of it, it 
muft be evident thae God is oblig'd to fuifer cither 
thefe or greater Evils. And fince the lealt of thefe 
neceffary Evils is chofen, even infinite Goodnefs 
could not poffibly do beiter. 

V. Let us try then wh rher the abufe of Free-Will The abufe 
could be prohibited with lefs detiimei^it to the whole ^m[°^" 
Syftem, than what arifes from the permifiion of it. be'coiv 
There are three Ways v>^hereby God may be con- cciv'd to 
ceiv'd able to have prevented bad Eledions,- firft, have been 
If he had created no Free Being at all. Secondly, P/'^^'^nted 
If his Omnipotence interoofe, and occaflonaily re- „,u?!u^!{f 

n • } ^TiT-u I • T • ' It r r ^ which arc 

Irram the Wih, which is naturally liee, from any confidcr'd' 
wrong Eleftion. Thirdly, If he lliould change the in the fbl- 
prefent ftace of things, and tranflate Man into ano- lowing 
ther, where the occafions of Error and incitements ^^^^ '' 
to Evil being cut off, he fliould meet with nothing 
thac could tempt him to choofe amifs. 


3^2 Of Moral Evil. Chap. V^ 

S U B S E C T. II. 

Why God has created Free Agents. 

God I. A S to the firfl-, 'Tis certain that God warJ 

tnight Jl\. not compeU'd by any neceiliry to create 

vent-d*^^' ^"y ^^^'"? ^^ ^^^' ^^^ might (herelbre have prevented 
moral E- all Pvloral Evils, if he had not endow'd any Being 
^ils, if he with Free Choice : for fo there would have been 
iadiefuf- nothing that couM ini. But fuch a monftrous De- 
edtocre- f-^^c^ ^^^^ Hidtm \jo\x\d have been left in Nature by 
ireeBein-^. this means, vtZ. ny taking away all hree Agents, as 
would have put the World into a worfe Condition 
than that which it is in at prelent, v/ith all the Mo- 
ral Evils that dillrefs it, tho' they were multiply'd 
to a much greater Number. 
Silt with- II. For in the firft place, if we fet afideFree A- 
outtheie pents, /. f. thofe which have the Principle of A(fli- 
^^orid ^^ xvithin themfelves, there is properly nothing at 
Iiave been ^^ Self-aftive, for all other Beings are merely pallive : 
a mere there is indeed lome kind of A^lion in Matter, viz.. 
Machine Motion; but we know that it is pallive even with 
and every j-fg^j^l ^.o that ; 'tis therefore the Adron of God up- 
,''"Spai- Qn Matter, rather than of Matter itfelf; which does 
not move itfelf, but is moved. Without Free A- 
genrs then the whole World would be a mere A/.t- 
'chine, capable of being turn'd any Way by the Fin- 
ger or Will of God, but able ro effeft nothing of 
itfelf. Hay the whole Work of God could not 
of iiifelf exert one fingle Ad or Thought, but 
would be totally brute and llupid, as much as a 
Wheel or a Stone: it would continue fluggifa and 
incapable of Adion, unlefs aduared by external 



Sea. 5- Sab, 2. Of Moral Evil 38^ 

force. Second Caufes could therefore effed no- 
thing which might be imputed to them, but all 
would be done entirely by the firfl-. We need not 
fay, how much a World thus conftirured would 
be inferior to the prefenr, nor how incommodious 
and unworthy cf its Divine Author- 

III. Man, you'll fay, neceffarily affents to this objeftiou 
Propofition, twice two make four, but tho' his from thofe 
Mind is ncceffarily driven to this AfiTcnr, and con- ^^° '^«- 
fequently is not free, ye^. he is a^ive : ior it can ^u^'^tt 

r 1 i • 1 I T» >i • /-r • • • , . the Un- 

icarce be laid that a Man is palhve in giving his acrltand- 
Aflent '^. The fame may be affirm'd of God, who ing is ad- 
tho' we fuppofe him to be abfbluteiy free in his pri- Jve, tho" 
mary Eledions, yet when rhefe are once fix'd, he "^^^^^ry^ 
mult necefTarily execute what he had decreed: ne-Qg^^^- 
verthelefs he is properly Self-adive in all Cafes, con-felf. 
fequently there may be lomething adive in Nature, 
tho' there were nothing free. 

IV. As to the former Part of the Objedion, 'tis^nfwer ta 
not very clear what may be the efficient Caufe of in- the former 
telleduaj Afient; if the Objed, then the Mind is P^^t of the • 
merely paffive in the Ad of Underftanding : nor ^^i^*^^°°' 
is A {Tent imputable to it any more than Deicent to 

a Stone; but if the Object; be efteem'd only a Con- 
dition upon which the Underftanding ads, we fhall 
want a Caufe to determine the Underftanding ; 
which cannot be fuppofed to determine itfdf, any 
more than the Fire determines itfelf to burn com- 
buftible Matter. For no body judges the combuf- 
tible Matter to be adive v/hen it is fet on Fire, or 
that the Fire burns of itfelf without being kindled 
by fomeihing elfe. The World then wi.hout Li- 
berty will be a piece of Mechanifm, where nothing 
moves itfelf, but every thing is mov'd by an ex- 
ternal Caufe, and that by another, and fo on till 


* See Note 42.. 

3^4 Of Moral Evil. Chap. V 

we come at the fir/}, namely God ; who will be 
the only Sclf-adivc Being, and muft be cftcem'd 
the real Caufe of all things : neither can any thing, 
whether well or ill done, be afcribed to others. 
Anfwer to V. As to the latter part of the Objection, That 
t e latter, g^j^g ^^^ l^^ denominated Free, who is held by 
no other tie than his own Eledion : But God is no 
otherwife oblig'd to execute his Decrees, therefore 
he is free, if he did but make his Decrees freely; 
and is purely adive in every Operation wherein he 
executes them. For he fufFers nothing by necclTity, 
nor from any other befide himftif, and is detei'min- 
ed to aft by his own Liberty. 

VI. Secondly, We believe that God created the 
World in order to exercife the Powers he is poiTcl- 
fed of for the Good of the Univerfe; the Divine 
Goodnefs therefore delights and applauds itfelf in its 
thing were Works, and the more any thing refembles God, 
free, that ^.nd the more *ti^ Self-fufficient, it is to be elkem'd 
fo much the more agreeable to its Author. Bui 
any one may underftand how much a Work which 
moves itfelf, pleafes itfelf, and is capable of recei- 
vii;g and returning a Favour, is preferable to one 
that does nothing, feels nothing, make? no. return, 
unlefs by the force of fome external Irnpulfe : any 
Per/on, I fay, may apprehend this, who^ remem- 
bers what a Difference there is between a Child 
carefling his Father, and a Machine turn'd about by 
the hand of the Artificer. There is a kind of 
Commerce betv/een God, and fuch of his Works 
ar are endov/'d wi:h Freedom ; there's room for 
Covenant and mutual Love. For there is fome 
fort of A^ffion on both Side*^, whereby the CnM- 
rure may in lome meafure return the benefits of the 
Creator, at Icaft make an acknowledgement for thera ; 
and if any thing in the Divine Works can b: cun- 
ceiv'd to be agreeable to God, this mull certa'.'^ly 
' ■ " b<? 

God has 2 
cency in 
his Works, 
and if no- 

would be 
in them 
which is 
mofl a- 
to the 

Sea. 5. Sub. 2. Of Moral Evil. 385 

be fo '^. One fuch Adion as this is preferable tO 
all the Sportings of Matter, or the LaSyrinths of 
Motion : if there had been no free Creatures, God 
iTiuft have ■ been deprived of this : Compiacencys 
which is almoft the only one worthy of him that 
he could receive from the Creation. 'Tis there- 
fore as much agreeable to God that he fhould have 
made fuch Beings, as it is to the World that they 
lliould be made: for if nothing of this kind had 
been created, the very btft thing among the Crea-» 
tures, and that which is moft agreeable to the Dei- 
ty, would have been wanting. . 'Tis better there- 
fore to permit the abufe of Liberty in fome than 
to have omitted fo. much Good. For the Defed:. 
and Abfencc of fuch Agents is to. be efteemed i. 
greater Evil than all the Crimes confequent upon 
the abufe of Liberty. 

Vn. Thirdly, From what has been faid? weNeceiTary 
learn that fome Evils which neceffarily adhere jq ^'^^ *^^ ^ 
things, viz,. Natural ones, and thofe of Imperfedi- j^j^^^^^^'^^ 
on, did not hinder the Divine Goodneis from crea° Creation • 
ring the Good with which they were conneded, ofthings, 
fince the cxccfs of Good compenfared for the fewer ^^'"^^ ^<^f^ 
and lefs Evils which were unavoidable : Thus God f 
chofe fuch Animals as were Mortal, afflifted vach JJiil^'^py^^ 
Hunger, Thirfl, and other Padions, rather than fible. 
none at all. If then thofe Evils vvhicli w^i'tnkef" 
fary and forefeen did not hinder God from creating 
the Good that was annexe to them, how much lels 
fhould the pojjihle Evils ariling from the abufe of 
Free-Will hinder his (joodncis from creating Free- 
Agents ? To enjoy fi'ee Choice is a greater Good 
than fimple Life, but we willingly accept this lat- 
ter with all the train of Natural Evils, how much 
more gratefully inould we embrace the Gift of Li- 
C c bertyg 

* See Fiu-adiie loll; B, 3. I. -ico, ^c. 

386 Of Moral E'-cil Chap. V. 

berty, attended only with fome Danger of Evils, 

but not with the Evils themfelves, as in the former 

Cafes, {61.) 

Natural VIII. Fourthly, It muft be obferv*d that Elecfti'* 

Evilj'are ^ns are therefore eOcem'd Evil, becaufe they lead 

fhan^Mo- ^^ ^^^^ Natural Evils. For if an Eledion contain 

ral ones, nothing abfurd or prejudicial, 'tis not a wrong one. 

and Free-- Hatred of God, Rebellion againft his Commands, 

Will a Murther, Theft, Lying, are Sins, becaufe rhey 

G^^dthan ^'^^ hurtful to ourfelves or others, becaufe they de- 

theNatu- pfive US of natural Good, and lead to Evil. Eledi- 

ral Appe- ons therefore are wrong and undue on account of 

tites. the natural Evils which fometimes attend them ; 

Natural Evils then are greater than Moral "^ : For 

that which makes any thing bad muft neceffarily be 

worfe itfelf : But Free-Will is better than a natural 

Appetite, and a Gift more worthy of the Deity, 

it is not therefore to be deny'd to the Creatures on 

account of the concomitant Evils, any more than 

the natural Appetites and Propenfities: both of 

them indeed fometimes lead us into the fame Evils, 

but with this DiiFerence, that the one, w^. the 


N OT E », 

(61.) In relation to «j, indeed, a Gift which is intended on- 
ly with tbe pollibility of fome inconvcnicncics, appears to be 
of more dignity and value than one that brings fome degree 
of unavoidable Mifery along with it, and as fuch it ought to be 
lecciv'd with proportionable gratitude by us. But with refpefl 
to a Being who forefecs all the Abufcs of Free-Will, all the 
contingent Evils confequent thereupon arc as certain as the na- 
jnral and necelTar)' ones, and therefore ought to be equally 
provided againft. This Argument therefore about the Contin- 
_ff»f>' of Moral Evil, fo far as it relates to the Deity, need not. 
be infifted on, fince our Author allows the Divine Preiciencc, 
and confiftently with that, oilers reafons Sufficient for the Vir- 
dication of th"^ other Attributes of God in the prefcnt Cafe. 

- * B(t Chap. 4. §. 4. par. 8. and R, i. 

Sta, 5. Sub, 2. Of Moral Evil. 387 

natural Appetite, loads us with Evils by neceffity, 
but the other, viz,. Free- Will, not of neceffity, but 
only if we pleafc. Thefe might have been avoided 
fince they are contingent, but thofe could nor, fince 
they force themfelves upon us againfl: our Wills : 
If therefore it was not unworthy of God to create 
an Appetite which was attended with necefTary Evils; 
?iow much more agreeable v/as it to his Goodnefs to 
have endow'd us with Free-Will, by which thefe 
Evils may be avoided or at leafl: alleviated ? If the 
natural Appetite be a greater Good than what thefe 
Evils which flow from" it can overballance, and there- 
fore worthy to be implanted in Animals by the De- 
ity j how much more excellent a Good will Free- 
Election be, by which alone we become capable of 
Happinefs, tho' join'd with the danger of falling 
into Evils by abule ? 

IX. Fifthly, If the State of Man would be worfe The State 
without Free- Will than with it; 'tis plain that Li- of Man 
berty diminifhes inftead of increafing the Sum of ^°"''^.^^ 
Evils, and is beftaw'd upon us for that end. But Prce-Will- 
hov/ much more miferable the State of Man would were ta- 
be without Liberty than it is with it, will appear ken away. 
to any one who confiders v;hat fort of Creatures we 
fhould be without Eledion. For if Man v/ere not 
free, he would bs driven by the violence of Mat- 
ter and Motion, and fooner or later be quite over- 
v^helm'd v/ith thoCe natural Evils which neceffarily 
arife from the Nature and Laws of Motion. But 
It is better to ftruggle with fome of thefe with Li- 
berty, than all of them with neceffity ; the former 
is the Condition of Men, the latter of Brutes ^. If 
by being deprived of Eledrion we fhould be freed 
from all kind of Evil, we might complain of God 
for giving it i but feeing that whether we be free or 

C c 2 bound 

* OKiy in fome pegree. ^ee the Ohfervathn from Bayle »> 
Note 24J,, 

Of Moral Evil. Chap. V^ 

bound by the chain of Fate (while we have Bodies)- 
we muft necelfarily endure thofe Evils which are 
confequent upon the affefitions of Bodies ; (nay 
thofe very Evils which v/e were afraid of falling in- 
to by a wrong Choice) 'ris in vain to dtfire the ab- 
Jence of Liberty, by relying upon which, and ufing' 
it aright, we may avoid the moft bitter part even of 
thefe neceffary Evils. ' 

Free A- X. For in the Sixth place, it is moft manifefe that 
gents only tHe greateft Good, and that whereby Men excel 
arecapable Qji^gf Animals, is owing to Liberty. By the affif- 
Happ^ineis, ^^^nce of this we rife above Fate, and when attack'd 
therefore ^\oxw without by adverfe Fortune, we find our 
it is better Happinefs within ourselves. Other Animals have 
to enjoy nothing to oppofe to a Diftempcr, Death, or 
'^' Pain; nothing to delight themfelves in, except 
Sleep, Food, and the Appetite of propagating 
their Species. But a free -Agent, in the midft of 
Pains and Torments, of Hunger and Thirft, nay 
Death itfelf, has wherewithal to pleafe itfelf, and 
to blunt the Edge of all thefe Evils. We com- 
plain of our Bodies, that by being tied to them, we 
are oblig'd to undergo very many and great Hard- 
fhips J how much more full of Complaints fliould 
we be if we were entirely fubjefted to them, and 
hurried into Evils without any Remedy or Relief? 
Is it not better for us to have our Happinefs in our 
own Power, than to be oblig'd to feek it elfewhere, 
nay rather to defpair of it? Which Happinefs is 
only to be found in a Free Choice, as was fliewn 
before. From hence it appears, I hope, fufficiently 
why God created Free Agents notwithftanding the 
abufe which they were liable to. For he chofe a 
Creature which would fcmetimes do amifs, rather 
than that every thing fhould be dragged by Fate,. 


S&a. S- Sub. 2: Of Moral Evil. j^p 

and a Chain, of NeceiTity, into inevitable Evilso 


C c 5 XI. But 

N T E S. ^ 

(62.) Our AutKor having fhewn in Se£l. 2. that thegreateft 
part of our Happinefs confifts in this Principle of Eledion, 
nere points out fome of the many Inconveniencics that would 
attend the lofs of it. Firft, If there was no fuch thing as a 
•free Agent, all would be mere Mechanifm and neceflary Ef- 
feifts of the firft Caufe, ;. e. the bed and nobleft part of Nature 
would be cut off, that which of all others is mpft worthy of 
and agreeable to the Deity. There would be no Cjeatures 
capable of making any kind of return, of paying any reafonable 
Obedience and Duty to God ; no poflibility for him to difplay 
his Wifdom, Goodnefs and Mercy in the Government of them, 
nor any means of bringing them to the fublimeft Degree of In- 
telleftiial Happinefs, vi%. that which arifes from Morality. Se- 
condly, Thofe paffive Beings themfelves would be in a much 
V/orfe Condition than they now are. They would be deprived 
of all the Happinefs which they now enjoy from the choice of 
indifferent Objefts ; they would be neceflarily expofed to all 
the natural Evils arifing from the general Laws of Matter and 
Motion, 'c'/s. Diflempei-s of the Body, Inclemency of the Sea- 
fons. Hunger and Thirft, ^c. which Liberty enables them 
frequently to guard againft and avoid, and frequently to bear 
with pleafure, and even to convert to their fuperior Good : 
nay, they mull inevitably undergo the greateft part of thofe 
very Evils which at prefeut, by this Power, they have at mofl 
oflly a /^/^^//zVv of incurring. Thirdly, Without Liberty, the 
other moft exalted Powers of the Mind would be entirely ufe- 
lefs, and often aggravations of our Mifery. " A Faculty of 
" Underibnding (fays Dr. Jenkhi \a 1) without a Will to de- 
^' termine it, if left to itfelf, muft always think of the fame 
*' Objed, or proceed in a continued feries and conneftion of 
" thoughts without any Aim or End ; which would be a per- 
" petual Labour in vain, and tedious Thoughtfulnefs to no 
?' purpofe : but if it fhould be fometimes determined by fome- 
** thing external to new Objefls, yet what u!e of Reafon could 
<' there be in Contemplations, which were merely obtruded 
" and forcM upon the Mind?" And to forefee a train of 
Evils, without any power of acting againft and oppoHug them, 


[«.] R eafonahlenefi of the Chrijlian Religion, ?,d Vol» C. 12, 
^. 238. 5 thEdit, 

39C> Of Moral Evil. Chap. V, 

The bene- XL But you'll fay, that you defiie the Pleafure 
p^°w-ii ^"^^ Advantages ariling from free Eledions but 
"^^Idnot '^^'^^'^ ^^^ have the Power to Sin,- i.e. you would 
be had ^ave a Liberty refhain'd by Nature within certain 
withouta bounds, fo as never to extend to Evil. But it may 
Power of be juftly doubted v/hether this was poffible in the 
Sinning, pref^nt ftarg of things : For ^ree-Will is naturally 
an adivc Power, and determines itfelf to Aftion, 
and requires nothing more in Objeds, than that 
they fliould give occafion for the Exercife of Elec- 
tions ; 'tis therefore adive in its own Nature. Now 
whatfoever is limited by another admits of bounds, 
and is therefore paffive with refped to iht Limiteri 
it Teems equally abfurd then for a Free Agent to be 
thus limited, as for Matter, which is in itfelf and of 
its own Nature paffive, to determine itfelf to AcTti- 
OHj ansi is perharps no lefs impoffible. C<^50 

Xlik Secondly. 


xnuft be only anticipating Mifery, and adding the future to the 
prefentj, and a fenfe of our Inability of ever helping ourfelves to 
both. Thefe Confiderations arc fufficient to prove, that the 
want of Liberty in general would be an irreparable Damage to 
any confcious Syllcm. 

For a fuller Explication of them fee Mr. Jackfons, Defence 
of human Liberty, p. 79, l^c, and Scott's Chrijlian Life, Part z. 
C. 4. Sect. 3. p. 3 I 8, crV. "^-vo. or Sherlock on Pro'vidence, C. 7. 
p. 240. 2d Edit, or D'Oyh's Firji Difftrtation, C. lO. or Dr. 
Jenkin in the Chapter above cited. 

The next Enquiry mult be, what Confcquences would at- 
tend either theLiniit.ition of this free Power to iovat particular 
Obje^s, or the Infringement and Sufpenfion of it on particular 

(63.) If Matter were made <7-7/'j,'£', it would be no longer 
Natter : in like manner if a felf moving or active Being were 
3-ender'd paffive, it would be no longer what it now is, nor 
Iiuve the fame properties which it now has. Hence appears the 
abfurdity of fuppofing a Liberty, properly fo call'd, to be de- 
teraiin'd to feme particular ways of ading, 'tis the fame as the 
• ■ Liberty 

Sea. ^. Sub. 2. Of Moral Evil. 391 

XII. Secondly, If the Will were naturally re- The will 
flrain'd to choofe Good only, it muft have this re- ^°"''^ "°^ 
ftraint either from the Objeli or the Vnderfla.nAing : min'Vto 
But neither could be done. Iffome things were in Good by 
themfelves always Good, and others Evil, it might Objefts, 
be poffible indeed that the Will (hould no more ad- finccthe 
mit of Evil than the Sight does of Savours: But ^°°^^^^' 
Moral Good and Evil are very frequently not ab- generally 
folute things, but merely relative : for there is al- proceeds 
mofl: no Adion which proceeds from Choice, but from Eke- 
what may be good or Evil upon a change of Cir- ^'0"v 
cumftances *. Even Natural Evils theipfelves are 
fometimes good and eligible. Free- Will then muft 
C c 4 needs 


Liberty of a Stone to fome particular Ways of moving, i. e. no 
Liberty at all. The very EiTence of Liberty includes an ablo- 
lute Phyfical Indifference to either Side in any given Cafe, 
Such a Liberty as this has been fhewn to belong to Man in le- 
fpedl of Willing. He can will or choofe any thing in Nature, 
he can alfo either choofe or refufe any thing in Nature, he can 
alio either choofe or refufe any thing, and therefore to deter- 
mine his Will to fome Objefts, or incline it to one Side in any 
given Circumftances, would be fo far to deilroy it. The Que- 
ilion then is not, whether a Man might be neceffarily inclin'd 
to fome particular thing or aft, and yet continue to have Frec- 
Will ; for that, I think, is a contradidion. But whether he 
ihould have his power of willing deftroy'd on fome particular 
Occafions, or whether he fhould be fometimes alter'd and 
made what at prefent he is not. Whether this Change of Man's 
Nature would in the main prove worthy of the Deity, or be- 
neficial to the World, will be more fully examined in the fol^ 
lowing Subfeclion : our Author proceeds to enquire how this 
determination could poifibly be effefted in the prefent State of 
things, and if upon Enquiry into all the imaginable Methods 
of effcfling it, they appear to be either infufficient for the En4 
propofed, or attended with worfe Confequences than the pre- 
Ertablifhment, this mult be an invincible Argument againft 

* See Turner'/ Difcourfe of the Lanvs of Nature, and the rea- 
Jon of their Obligation, Sedl. 23, 24., ox Pufendorf of the Laivi 
f Nature, B. J. C. 2. Seft. 6, 

3g2 Of Moral /Ev'il Chap. V. 

needs be indifferent lo all external Objids, arid 

thoTe things which sre now agreeable, become (horr- 

ly difagrecablc, according to the infinite variety "<)f 

eircumftances and the Exigence of Affairs. 'The 

Will therefore cannot 1 e deteimii/d to Good by Ob- 

jeds. Nny, to confcfs the Truth, we pencratly do 

hot choofe Obje(5i:s becaufe rhcy are Good, hut they 

become Good becaufe we choo';e them. .The Good- 

nefs of them therefore is for the mofl: part dcter- 

min'd by the Ek^flion, and not that by the Good- 

Rcfs. For we have fliewn before *, that this is tfie 

Nature of an Elcdive ractilry, and fuch it ought to 

be, otherwife we could not have the leafl: pofTibility 

1 ft"V of s^^^inirig Happinefs in (o great a variety and un- 

ten finds t^^rtainty of outward things f' 

nothing XIII. Thirdly, The Will was no more capable 

good in of being derermin'd perpetually to Good by the 

things, ex- ^nderfiayiding^ than by OijJclIs. For the Under- 

thev heb ^^nding ads ncceffarily, and reprefenis nothing as 

towards Goodbut what proceeds from Objtdsi if therC" 

the attain- fore the Will were determin'd t-y it, it would nei- 

mentofr.n {\y^Y be free nor always able to pleafe itfelf. For 

Elcclior, jj^g Undcrllandins; ofteq repvefcnrs al! external thinj^s 

the Will ■ /• J > > ^ J ^A i ^ 

therek'ie ^^ '^" ^'^'^ unprofperous, and could never make us 

could not take natural Evils, fuch as Death, Labours, Tor- 
be deter- ments, for real Good, tho' it might indu.e us to bear 
rnin'dto t\^^iY\ in profpedc of a farther End. But tp endure 
theUnd^- ^ ^^^*"§ ^"^ ^'^^"^ '^^ ^ farther End, is to undergo, 
^andin"-. prefect Mifery in hopes of future Happincfs^ i. e. 
to weigh 3 prefenc Evil againfl: a future Good, and 
of two Evils to choofe the lefs; which Reafon in- 
deed perfu'sdes us to do, fince it is neccffary that it 
iliould be done : but this helps nothing towards a 
Vindication of the Divine Goodnefs, which has im^ 
pofcd this Neceffity upon us : nor can he be happy 

» Sea. x.Subfea. 3. 

■\ §e£ par. i6 and ij of i his Se3, 

Sed. 5- Sub. 2. Of Moral Ew\]: 39I 

by the Judgment of his own Underftanding, v/ho 
muft undergo thefe things. But if it be granted 
that things pleafe us, not bccaufe the Und^rftand- 
ing judges thtm to be ehgible, but becaufe we re-^ 
folve to exercife our Free-will in performing them, 
even thefe will become agreeable by Eledion, and 
the Underrtanding will perceive them to be made 
fo, and not make them to be fo. *Tis not there- 
fore the Office of the Underftanding to govern the 
Will, but to difcover means for the attainment of 
that which is chofen, and to give warning when it 
choofes fuch things as are abfurd or impofiible: 
For the Under Handing, as we faid before, judges 
that to be good which is agreeable to our Choice, 
except this lead us into Abfurditics. In order there- 
fore to avoid Abfurdities, we make qfe of the Un^ 
derftanding as a Monitor, not a Mafter. 

And from hence, I think it appears how incon- 
venient ic would be for the Choice to depend in 
all cafes upon the Underftanding. For fince the 
Judgment of the Underftanding depends upon the 
Objeds themfelves, and the natural congruity which 
they bear to the Appetites ; if the Choice were to 
be determined by its Judgment, 'tis evident that 
we muft neceffarily want a great many things 
V'hich the Underftanding judges to be good, and 
^ould never hope for folid Happinefs, (<^40 fince 


JV T E S. 

(64.) That is, if every thing which the Underftanding re- 
prefcnted as good in itfelf, made a necejfary Part of my Hap- 
pinefs, I fhould be always unhappy, fince I could never attain 
to all the Good I faw. Whereas by this Power of willing, I 
cut o(T' fcveral of thefe apparent Goods, and only make fuch 
be conitituent parts of my Happinefs as I choofe, and if I 
chofc only fuch as I could obtain, I might be always Happy. 



and Wif- 
dom of 
God be- 
ing equal 
to his 
iiim from 

0/ Moral Evil, Chap. V, 

Objecfis are fix'd, as we faid before *, and cap never 
anfwer to our natural Appetites in every Particular. 
In order therefore to the attainment of continual 
Happinefs, it was neceffary that we fhould he able 
to plenfe ourfelves in feme refped, independently of 
the Undefflanding, and by Election to conftitute 
thofe things good and agreeaole to us, which the Un- 
der (landing, if there had been no fuch Eledion^ 
would have pronounced ofFenfive, difagreeable and 
painful : From hence it appears how fie is that this 
Power fhould be freed from the Government of the 
Underftanding ; but if it is freed, it could not be 
determin'd by it. 

XIV. Fourthly, It is to be obferv'd that the 
Divine Pov/er is Infinite, and that there are innu- 
merable things pofliole to it which are repugnant to 
one another, and deftrudive of each other, and 
cannot by any means be confident. If therefore 
Cod Ihould a»5l according to the Infinity of his 
Power, without any regard to his other Attributes 
he would efFe(fl nothing at all, or elfe immediately 
deflroy what he had effeded. His infinite Wifdom 
and Goodnefs therefore gave bounds and reftraint 
to his Power, which would otherwife confound 


I^7^ O T E S, 

This Propofition, ^viz. that all Good does 7iot 7nahe att Effential 
Part of our Happinefs, becaiife ave do not ^u-ill it, is aflertcd by 
Mr. Locke [h'] and well urg'd asa Reafon why the greater Good 
does not abiolutely determine the Mind : and the fame, I 
think, might as juftly be aflirm'd of P^/w, viz. That the re- 
moval of all Pain does not make a neceffary part of our prefent 
Happinefs, fince we do not ahvays abfolutely ivill or dejire to 
remove it ; but on the contrary choofc to bear it, and by that 
Choice, often produce a Pleafure, which does more than cpuii 
terballance it. See C. 5. Sed. z. and Note 45. 

* Secfl. I. Subfea. 3. par. 2. 
\h^ Chapter oi Pox'jtr, §. 43. 

Sea 5. Sub. 2. Of Moral Evil. 395 

every thing ,• and thefe muft of neceflity be equally 
Infinite with his Power, otherwife infinite Evils 
muft certainly arife from infinite Power. But a 
Creature, as his Eledive Power neceffarily extends 
farther than his Wifdom and Goodnefs, is made na- 
turally liable to fall fometimes into Evils. 'Tis well 
known that Mathematicians fometimes fuppofea Line 
to be infinite in which they may take a Point where- 
ever they pleafe. Now fince our Eledion may be 
made as we pleafe, the Wifdom and Coodnefs where- 
by it is to be govern'd, ought to be infinite : for if 
the Line be finite, a Point may be pitch'd upon be- 
yond it : and in like manner, if the Goodnefs and 
Wifdom be finite, the Choice may be made with- 
out and beyond them, that is, amifs. But fince 
all created Wifdom and Goodnefs muft neceffarily 
be finite, it follows that there wants a fufficient re- 
ftraint upon Eledions, and that every free Creature 
is neceffarily defeBible. As then all created Beings 
are neceffarily imperfed in general, fo every one has 
its own peculiar Defed. And this kind of Imper- 
fedion, viz., the Po\yer of Sinning, is proper and 
peculiar to fuch as enjoy Free- Will : nor can they 
be conceiv'd feparate from each others any more than 
Contrariety from Motion. (65.) 

XV. From 


(65.) As Motion witliout Contrariety would be of no ufc, 
fo Liberty without a Power of doing amifs, if fuch a thing were 
poffible, would be of no value : it would not have the good 
EfFctIs and Ends for which Liberty was given : particularly it 
would not be attended with the happy confcioufnefs ol Defert, 
or the Idea of receiving a Benefit by way of reward, conferr'd 
upon us for having done what was right and good, and what 
we might as eafily have not done. From which Idea, as inclu- 
ding Self- Approbation, is'c. we frequently feel a far more ex~ 
quifite Plcafure, than from the intrinfic Value of the Benefit 


39^ Of Moral Evil. Chap. V, 

But Man XV. From hence it appears that a Faculty of plea- 
^^y fing itfelf by Eledion cannot be determin'd to Good 

mifs fince ^^ Obje^s, in the fame manner as the Sight is to 
his Good- Light, or Tafte to Savours, (fince Goodnefs is not 
ncfsand always an abfolute Quality in things, like Light 
Wifdom and the Objects of Sen(e) nor by the V^tderJIa^idm^y 
nat erare ^^^^^ many things muft be chofen in which the Un- 
jior canbe „ ,. / ^ . r^ j 

adequate ncrltanamg can perceive no manner ot CjOgq, except 

to his that they are capable of being chofen, and when 
Power. chofen pleafe, becaufe they exercife the Faculty. 
And tho' the Objeds of Eledion are not Infinite, 
yet in a finite number there are infinite refpeds in 
which Good or Evil may be produced: Theie's 
need then of infinite Wifdom and Goodnefs to di- 
^ red the Choice, lefi: it deviate into Evil. Since 

therefore a Creature endow'd with Wifdom is finite, 
it is impolTible but that it fhou'd have a natural 
Power of fometimes choofing wrong. 
'Tis better XVL Fifthly, If the Will was confined to the 
tobefome- Choice of thofe things only which the Underfland- 
times de- j^g (Jerlares to be good, or was refl:rain'd from 
vt^kh Plea- ^^^^oo^f^'g ^^11 ^^'^^ Goodnefs of the Objeds were 
{me, than apparent, we muft of necelTuy helitate in many 
to be al- things, and be anxious and folicitous in all. For fince 
ways foh- things are conneded together by a long chain of 
gitous. Confequences, it is impolTible for us to form a right 
Judgment of the abfolute Goodnefs of them, with- 
out a foreknowledge of rhefe Confequences, we 
jnuft therefore have been oblig'd to ufe all poffible 



itfelf: Nay, without this Idea, to be loaded with Favours 
would prove even an Uneafmcfs to a generous Mind. This 
Notion will be farther explained and vindicated in the follow- 
ing Subfeftion ; for the Trnth of it we mud appeal to the 
conflant Experience of the ingeniious part of Mankind. 

Sect. 5^. Sub. 2. Of Moral fivil, j'97 

Difquifition before every Eledion, and fufpendthe 
Choice where any Sufpicion of Error or Ground 
of Doubt fhou'd appear : but fuch a Difquilition 
and continual Solicitude would be a greater Bar to 
Happinefs than many Errors and natural Inconve- 
niencies. For if the Will can produce Good to it- 
felf by chooling, the Errors and Inconveniencies 
to which it is expos'd by a bad Choice, may be 
compen fated by the Pleafure which arifes from the 
Senfe of Liberty. But if we were obliged to all 
poffible Enquiry, more inconvenience would be 
felt from that Obligation, than from fonie Errors 
in Eleftions ; nor v/ould all of them be by this 
means avoided ; for after all poffible Examination, 
a finite Underuanding may be deceiv'd. Evil Elec- 
tions are to be avoided on account of the Uneafinefs 
conicquent upon thtm, if therefore fuch a Difqui- 
fition as is neceflary to difcover the Good, and a 
Sufpenfion of the Eledive Faculty till that Good 
be diTcover'd, would bring greater Unealinefs than 
fom? wrong Eledions, a Man will be more happy 
with a Power of doing amifs, than if he were 
6blig'd to wait for the determination of the Under- 
ftanding in every Cafe. For it is better that fome 
Perfons fhould lometimes do amifs, and fufFer Un- 
ealinefs from the Confciencc of having done fo, 
than that all iVJen fhould in every Cafe be always 
afraid, uncertain, and folicitous, nay generally ceafe 
from 3il minner of Aftion. 

XV I r. Su h is the nature of our Will that it 'Tis bet- 
can plvafe itfelf in Election, and by its own Power ferto be 
make \\vi things chofen agreeable, tho* in them- i" danger 
felves di ''agreeable to the Apperires. And tho' this ^^^^„ \^^.^^ 
cannot be dc-ne at all times, and in every Objed, to ceafe 
yet it is better to run the hazard, than to be de- fromElec- 
prived of fo ufeful a Faculty, or to be reftrain'd ^^°"- 
from Election till an imperfed Underftanding, fuch 


9^ Of Moral Evil. Chap, V. 

as that of Man neceflarily is, were clearly con-' 
vinccd of that Impoiribility. It is therefore con^ 
venient for us to derive our peculiar and chief Hap- 
pinefs from the Willitfelf; for if it depended on 
the Underftanding it would come with ,difficulty. 
Pains and Anxiety, and we could feldom enjoy it 
pure and unmix'd. 'Tis better therefore iot us to 
be able to pleafe ouifelves without a long Specu- 
lation of Antecedents and Confequences, tho' with 
a danger of Sinning, than to ceafe from Elecflioti, 
and be reftrain'd from the Exercife of our Facul- 
ties, till a whole train of thefe were perfedly ap- 
parent, which if it could be at all, yet would not 
be without Pain and Anxiety, as any one will find 
that tries. {66.) 



(66. ) All that Ba)'le oh]t£ks to this [r,] is taken from the Na- 
ture of Good Angels, and Glorified Souls, who, according to 
him, are no Icfs happy in themfelves, nor perform a lefs ac- 
ceptable Service to the Deity for the want of it; and wla^ 
therefore might not we? — To what was obferv-d about the 
Inconclufivencfs of all fuch Arguments as arc drawn from Be- 
ings of a different Order in Note H we fliall here add, firlh 
that it is more than we are obliged to grant, that either Angels 
or Saints in Heaven arc abfolutely devoid of Liberty. They 
may have more clear Imprcllions of Good and' Evil on their 
Minds, more enlarged Underftandings, fewer and lefs Tem- 
tations, ^c, without being lefs free [^^.]; nay they muft be in,' 
one fenfe more free, the more they are fo qualified. [^.] This 
way of reafoning^ therefore proceeds upon a falfe, or at leail un- 
certain Hypothefis. 

gecondly, Tho' it fliould be granted that thefe glorious Be- 
ings, fuppofing them all neccflary, might have as ample Know- 

[<■.] See his Jnfwer to the ^ieries of a Provincial, and Crii. 
Dit^. Article Marchionitcs, Remark F. i^c. 

[rt'.] See A. Bp. Davves'j ^th Serm. p. 73, 74. and the latter 
end of Note T. 

[f J See the beginning of t^OiC J z. 

kCl. 5. Sub. 3. Of Moral Evil, S9? 

S U B S E C T. III. 

Why God does not interpofe his Omnipotence^ 
and occafionally reftrain the Will from de- 
praved Elections. 

t ''T^ I S evidf nt from what has been faid, that it ^J^^'^^J'^I^ 
X was agreeable to the Divine Gocdnefs to ^^j^would' 
have created Free Agents, for without thefe the arifefrom: 
Syftem of Nature would have been imperfeft: nor thence, 
could cheir Adions have been determined to Good than from; 
by any natural Propenfity or Limitation, in the J^j^pr^,^ 
fame manner as the Senfes are limited by Objefts : -y^in^ 
But yet It is certain that they depend upon God 
for their Adions and if he fhould fufpend his In- 
fluence, they v/ould not ad: at aU Since therefore 
he could fo eafily hinder the abufe of Liberty, why 
does he fuffer it ? Why does he not reftrain Elec- 


ledge, as ardent Love of the Divine Perfe£rions, and confe- 
fjuently be as happy in the Enjoyment of God and themfelvcs, 
)5 if they were all free ; tho' they might have no ocrafion to. 
iee or experience Vice, in order to their being fully acquainted 
with the Excellence of Virtue, and made fenfible of the infi- 
nite Wifdom, Pov/er and Goodners of the Deity, fhewn in the 
Government and Suppreffion of the former, and in the Pro- 
duftion and Improvement of the latter: The', I fay, thefe ex- 
alted Beings could be luppofed to have a thorough Intuition of 
all the Attributes of God without any fuch manifeftation of 
them in his Works ; (againft which Notion fee D'Oyly? Firji 
DiJJ'ertatioTt, C. 8. and Conchfon, p. 123.) yet it does not 
feem poffible for fuch imperfccl Creatures as <we are, to attain 
imto this excellent Knowledge, and enjoy the happy Effeds 
of ic on any other Terms than the prefent. We could not furr 


ibo Of Moral Evil. Chaf). V. 

tions when they tend to Vice and Abfurdity ? We 

grant that this Objeftion cannot be fatisfaftorily an-^ 

Iwer'd otherwi(e than by I'hewing that more and 

greater Evils would bcfal the Univerle from fuch an 

Interpofition, than from the abufe of Free- Will. In 

order to which it is to be confider'd. 

It would ij. In the firfl: place, That this cannot be effed- 

Viden^e^^ cd without Violence done to Nature, 'Tis allow'd 

to prevent '^^^'^ Eledions ought to be free, and that thinking 

theAftion Beings cannot orherwife be happy: God himfelf in 

of Free- creating them has determin'd, as it were by a Laiw,' 

^^M^' ^^^^ ^^^y ihould be free. For by giving them a 

on of the Nature endow'd with Choice, he allov/'d them 

Siin, to make ufe of it. They cannot therefore be hin- 

der'd without Violence done to the Laws of the 

Creation. I grant that God can difpenfe with the 

Laws of Nature; but who will require or allow 

this to be done frequently ? The bounds of this 

World, and the number of thinking Beings are 

unknown to us, but we believe that the Syftem of 

Nature will endure for ever. Nov/ as all things 

depend upon the Will of God, we cannot have any. 



have had fo lively an Idea of the Mercy of God, if there had 
never been any proper Objeds of it. Wc could. not have been 
io thoroughly conlcious of our Dependency or Danger; nor 
had fo grateful a fenfe of our conilant Support, our frequent 
Deliverances, nor conftquently have arrived to fo great a degree 
cither of Virtue or Happincfs in this Life or the next, by any 
other Method; as will be further fticwn in Notes 79 and 82. 
Either then thefe Happy Beings are Hill perfcdlly free, which 
Freedom conllitutes the greateil part of their Ilappinefs; and 
let any Man try to prove the contrary ; or at Icalt they once 
were fo, in order to their greater Perte£lion, and are now on- 
ly alter'd by being tranflated into another State, and put out of 
larther Trial ; and confcqucntly they belong to our Author's 
third Expedient, which will be cxamin'd in Subfe<^. 5. 

Sea. S' Sub. 3. Of Moral EviL 401 

other Security of our Happinefs, and of the Dura- 
tion of the World, than the Divine Cottftancy and 
immurahility : the Univerfal Laws of Nature are 
the AfTurances of this Conftancy, and upon them 
does the Security and Happinefs of the whole Work 
depend. It is not therefore to be expeded that 
God fliould lighly difpenfe with thefe Laws, much 
lefs alter them by his Omnipoteni^e every Moment. 
Since then it is provided by an Univerfal Law, that 
Free Agents lliould procure to themfelves Happi- 
nefs by the ufe of Ele6}:ion, and it is impofiible but 
that thefe, being lef: to themfelves, fhould fome- 
times fall into deprived Eledions, would it not be 
an Infringement and a Violation of this Law, if 
God fliould interpofe and hinder the ufe of that Fa- 
culty which by the Law of Nature he had eftabli- 
fhed ? We don't exped that the Situation of the 
Earth, or Courfe of the Sun, fhould bealter'd on 
our account, becaufe thefe feem to be things of 
great Importance, and we apprehend it to be un- 
reafonable, I that for our private Advantage the 
Order and Harmony of things fliould be changed, 
to the detriment of fo many Beings. But to alter 
the Will, to (lop Eledion, is no lefs a Violation of 
the Laws of Nature, than to interrupt the Courfe 
of the Sun. For a Free Agent is a more noble 
Being than the Sun, the Laws of jts Nature ace to 
be efleem'd more facred, and not to be changed 
without a greater Miracle. There would then be 
a kind of Shock and Violence done to Nature, if 
God fhould interfere and hinder the Actions of Free- 
Will ; and perhaps it would prove no lefs pernici- 
ous to the Intelledual Syftem, thin the Sun's ftand- 
in ftill would be to the Natural. His Goodnefs 
therefore does not fufFer him to interpofe, except 
when he forefees that the Evils ariiing from our de- 
praved Elections are greater than thofe which would 
D d ^ cnfue 

402 Of Moral Evil. Chap. V. 

en rue upon an Interruption of the Courfe of Na- 
ture, which he only can know who knows all 

ter o^ ^^^' Secondly, Such an Interruption as this would 

fingin the "°t ^^^7 ^^ Violence to Nature, but quite invert 
Eleftions the Method of treating Free Agents. This Me- 
of his thod is to hinder or excite Eleftions by Rewards 
Creatures, ^^^ Puniflimcnts : To divert them from unreafon- 
quite in- ^^^ ^^ abfurd things, and draw them to better by 
vert the the perfuafion of Reafon. But it is doubtful whe- 
Method of ther the Nature of the thing will permit an Eleftion 
treating jq ^g determined by Impulfe, or as it were by im- 

J^^, ' mediate Contafl. For it feems equally abfur'd to 
cents. , r- r-i o- 1 ^ "^1 

attempt a change or Election by any other means 

than thofe above menrion'd, as to dclire to ftop the 

Motion of Matter by Intreaty or offering Rewards. 

May we not with the fame reafon exped that Mat- 




(67.) By this lall Concefiion our Author evidently allows 
that God may fometimes have fufficient reafon to interpofe in 
matters relating to our Eleftions ; (tho' perhaps he ncv'cr afts 
upon the Will by P/'v/n«/ /w/>a//2', or irrefifliblv, which will 
be coniider'd in the next Siibfeftion.) his Defign therefore is 
only to fhew that this ought not to be done fjequently, or as 
often as Men choofe amifs. Now this may be illuilated in the 
fame manner as we treated of the Laws of Motion. That" 
there are general Mechanic Laws in the Natural World, the 
Eftablifhment and Prcfervation whereof tends more to the 
Happinefs of the Creation, and is every way more worthy of 
the Deity, than to aft always by purtitular Wills, was fhewn 
in Note 25 Jf thefe Laws were frequently alter'd and unfix'd, 
they would ceafe to be Laws, and all Aftion, and Contrivance 
which depends upon the Stability, and computes the future 
F. 'lefts of them, muft ceafe, or at Icaft prove infignificant. In 
like manner Liberty has been proved to be an Univcrfal Law 
of Intelleftual Beings, and the great Ufe and Excellence of it 
cvinc'd, and therefore we have equal reafon to fuppofe that ic 
could not be, at leafl not frequently, fufpcadcd, without as 
g.reat Inconvenience as would attend the Violation of thefe' 

Sea. S' Sub. 3. Of Moral EviL 403 

ur fhould be moved by Rewards and Punifliments, 
as the Will influenc'd by Phjjicd Impnlfe, ss chey 
call it \ For it i-. by tlufe Means that they would 
have God to (lop or alter the Choice. So prepo